United States v. Anderson

625 F.3d 1219, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 23532, 2010 WL 4608796

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 16, 2010
• Docket: 09-50559
• Status: Published

Opinion

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

The United States appeals the district court’s dismissal of Defendant-Appellee Dante Anderson’s indictment for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The court concluded that the defendant’s two predi cate felony convictions were insufficient to support a federal indictment because each resulted from a plea of nolo contendere in a California state court and, therefore, did not conclusively establish Anderson’s guilt.

Title 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) prohibits possession of a firearm by “any person ... who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” “What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20); accord United States v. Valerio, 441 F.3d 837, 839 (9th Cir.2006) (“Under the federal felon in possession statute, state law controls on whether a person has a ‘conviction,’.... ”).

The California Penal Code, section 1016(3), provides that “[t]he legal effect of [a nolo contendere] plea, to a crime punishable as a felony, shall be the same as that of a plea of guilty for all purposes.” A plea of nolo contendere “is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.” People v. Whitfield, 46 Cal.App.4th 947, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 377 (1996).

The district court’s holding was clearly erroneous. Section 922(g)(1) requires only that the defendant was “convicted” of a previous felony, as defined by the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. California law treats a plea of nolo contendere as equivalent to a guilty plea. Thus, Anderson’s nolo contendere pleas resulted in convictions, and either conviction was sufficient to qualify as a predicate felony.

The district court’s dismissal of the indictment under § 922(g)(1) is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.