United States v. Amoco Oil Co.

64 F. Supp. 2d 801, 49 ERC (BNA) 1949, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20281, 1999 WL 760523
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedJuly 21, 1999
Docket2:96-cr-00095
StatusPublished

This text of 64 F. Supp. 2d 801 (United States v. Amoco Oil Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Amoco Oil Co., 64 F. Supp. 2d 801, 49 ERC (BNA) 1949, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20281, 1999 WL 760523 (N.D. Ind. 1999).

Opinion

ORDER

LOZANO, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on (1) The United States’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Liability on Its Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Causes of Action, filed on October 7, 1998; (2) Motion of Defendant, Amoco Oil Company, for Summary Judgment on Counts Eight, Nine, and Eleven of the Complaint, filed on October 8, 1998; and (3) Request for Oral Argument on Amoco’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed by Defendant, Amoco Oil Company, on November 23, 1998. For the reasons set forth below, the United States’ summary judgment motion is GRANTED IN PART and TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT IN PART; Amoco Oil Company’s summary judgment motion is DENIED IN PART and TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT IN PART; and the request for oral argument is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

The United States of America, through the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), has filed a suit claiming that Amoco Oil Company (“Amoco”) has violated environmental laws. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on three of EPA’s claims, which involve the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq. and regulations promulgated thereunder.

Amoco operates a petroleum refinery in Whiting, Indiana. The summary judgment motions focus on sulphur recovery operations at the refinery, and Amoco’s briefs, fact statement, and exhibits portray those operations as follows: The refinery has a “sulphur recovery unit” which recovers sulphur from process gases, and is referred to by Amoco as “No. 2 SRU” (even though apparently there is only one sulphur recovery unit at the refinery). No. 2 SRU (hereinafter “the SRU” for brevity) consists of two amine strippers; two sour water strippers; three Claus trains, called “A-train,” “B-train,” and “C-train”; a tail gas unit; a standby tail gas incinerator (hereinafter “the incinerator” for brevity); and an emergency flare.

The Claus trains are of particular importance to the summary judgment motions. According to Amoco’s materials, each Claus train consists of a thermal reactor and three catalytic reactors. The Claus trains oxidize hydrogen sulfide to sulphur dioxide, which reacts with the hydrogen sulfide in the presence of a catalyst to form elemental sulphur and water. The elemental sulphur is collected and sold. All three Claus trains normally operate simultaneously, but two can operate while one is down for repairs. Regarding input, acid gas from the amine strippers is fed to all three Claus trains. Gas from the sour *803 water strippers is fed only to B-train and C-train. Regarding output, tail gas is fed from the Claus trains to the tail gas unit and the incinerator. The tail gas unit converts sulphur compounds in the gas exhausted from the Claus trains to elemental sulphur. Unlike the incinerator, the tail gas unit serves as a pollution control device and has a continuous emissions monitor.

As portrayed in Amoco’s materials, the operations of the SRU have changed over time. A-train and B-train were constructed in 1971, with C-train constructed later during 1979-81. At about the same time C-train was built, Amoco added the tail gas unit. Before the additions of C-train and the tail gas unit, tail gas from A and B-trains was routed into the atmosphere through only one outlet, the incinerator. Since the additions, Amoco has used the tail gas unit as the primary outlet for all three Claus trains. However, when the tail gas unit is temporarily inoperable, Amoco routes tail gas from A and B-trains to the incinerator, thus bypassing the pollution control feature and continuous emissions monitor on the tail gas unit. Amoco also sends what it considers negligible amounts of tail gas from C-train through the incinerator for brief periods when the tail gas unit cannot be used because of equipment startup, shutdown, or malfunction. See Amoco Summ.J.Br., pp. 4-5; Amoco Stmt, of Undisputed Material Fact; Amoco Summ.J.Ex. 5; Amoco Summ.J.Ex. 13 at Bates 933 (describing Claus trains as one of the “four basic processing sections” that make up the SRU); Amoco Summ. J.Ex. 11 at Bates 228.

EPA asserts that Amoco’s routing tail gas through the incinerator and other procedures it has followed or not followed since adding C-train have violated regulations that were promulgated after A and B-trains were constructed, but before C-train was constructed. Amoco denies this. DISCUSSION

Summary judgment motions often turn on the strength of evidence, but interpreting regulatory language is actually more central to resolving the summary judgment motions before the Court now. Some ground rules apply:

[A court should] give deference to the views of the agency charged with administering [a] statute, so long as the agency’s suggested interpretation is reasonable. Similarly, when the question at hand involves an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, and the meaning of the regulation is in doubt, the courts will defer to the agency’s interpretation if that interpretation is reasonable. In both circumstances, deference to an agency’s interpretation is appropriate only because the intent of the drafter or drafters — whether Congress or the agency itself — is in doubt. Intent is, of course, at the heart of the judicial inquiry because the courts endeavor to give effect to the designs of Congress and the agencies to which the legislature has delegated authority. In discerning intent, courts traditionally focus on the language of statutes and regulations because we presume that legislatures and agencies mean what they say; most of the time, the “plain language” of a statute or regulation will be the best indicator of the enacting body’s will, and thus, only when the text is silent or ambiguous will [a court] defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation.

Marlowe v. Bottarelli, 938 F.2d 807, 811-12 (7th Cir.1991) (citations omitted).

The issues here arise out of Amoco’s use of the incinerator since adding C-train. EPA concedes that before C-train and the tail gas unit were added in 1981, Amoco could legally route tail gas from A and B-trains to the atmosphere by way of the incinerator. However, EPA claims that under new regulations in effect by 1981, adding C-train meant that gas from all three trains had to pass into the atmosphere through a continuous emissions monitor, something the tail gas unit has but the incinerator lacks. According to EPA, the three trains form a single “Claus sulphur recovery plant” subject to the new regulations. Amoco concedes that C-train *804 falls under the regulations, but it argues that the individual trains are separate plants, so adding C-train did not put A and B-trains under the regulations. Thus, Amoco says, it may continue to freely direct tail gas from A and B-trains to the incinerator, bypassing the pollution control feature and continuous emissions monitor on the tail gas unit. Amoco also alleges that it may direct small amounts of tail gas from C-train through the incinerator when the tail gas unit cannot be used because of equipment start-up, shutdown, or malfunction.

With this background, we turn to the regulatory language.

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Bluebook (online)
64 F. Supp. 2d 801, 49 ERC (BNA) 1949, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20281, 1999 WL 760523, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-amoco-oil-co-innd-1999.