United States v. American Optical Co.

95 F. Supp. 771, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 203, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2035
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedNovember 14, 1950
StatusPublished

This text of 95 F. Supp. 771 (United States v. American Optical Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. American Optical Co., 95 F. Supp. 771, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 203, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2035 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).

Opinion

BONDY, District Judge.

This is an application for the determination of a reasonable royalty for a nonexclusive, non-assignable license to make, use and vend semi-rimless spectacle mountings under United States Letters Patent Reissue No. 21,255 (hereinafter called the Gagnon patent). The application is made by American Optical Company (hereinafter called American), owner of the Gagnon patent, at the request of Shuron Optical Company, Inc. (hereinafter called Shuron), applicant for a license under that patent, pursuant to provisions of the final judgment entered September 17, 1948, on consent, in this civil anti-trust action. The judgment cancelled a number of patent licenses and agreements and ordered compulsory licensing of numerous patents, including the Gagnon patent, on a uniform and reasonable royalty basis.

Article VI(D) of the judgment provides: “Upon application for a license under the provisions of this Section, the defendant to whom application is made shall state the royalty which it deems reasonable for the patents to which the application pertains. If the parties are unable to agree upon a reasonable royalty, the defendant may apply to this Court for the determination of a reasonable royalty, giving notice thereof to the applicant and the Attorney General, and he shall make such application forthwith upon request of the applicant. In any such proceeding, the burden of proof shall be upon the defendant to whom application is made to establish by a fair preponderance of evidence, a reasonable royalty, and the Attorney General shall have the right to be heard thereon * *

Upon the application of Shuron for a license under the Gagnon patent, American proposed a royalty of 40 for each mounting covered thereby. This rate not being acceptable to Shuron, it called upon American to apply to the court for the determination of a reasonable royalty. American thereupon instituted this proceeding. The Attorney General, having been notified, stated that the government did not wish to take any position with respect to the royalty controversy between American and Shuron.

American contends that 40 per mounting has become the “established” royalty for a license under the Gagnon patent because it has been “paid by such a number of persons as to indicate a general acquiescence in its reasonableness by those who had occasion to use the invention.” Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152, 165, 9 S.Ct. 463, 468, 32 L.Ed. 888. Whether established or not, however, American further contends that 40, representing 1.4 per cent, of the selling price of the mounting to wholesale distributors ($2.85), is a reasonable royalty. Shuron denies that any royalty has been established for a license under the Gagnon patent and asserts that a reasonable royalty for such a license is zero.

Shuron has conceded for purposes of this proceeding that the Gagnon patent is valid and covers “Numont” mountings manufactured by it. Its claim that the patent is worthless is predicated on its contention that Gagnon’s invention did not make any contribution whatever to the practical spectacle art but was “of the most trifling [773]*773character * * * the shadow of a shade.” Columbia Machine & S. Corp. v. Adriance Machine Works, 2 Cir., 79 F.2d 16, 18. See also U. S. v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 349, 67 S.Ct. 1634, 91 L.Ed. 2077. It is agreed, however, that evidence as to the scope and nature of the Gagnon patent becomes a relevant consideration only in the event that there is not any established royalty for a license under the patent.

Shortly after the consent judgment can-celled all outstanding licenses under the Gagnon patent (other than a paid-up license issued some years before to the Bausch & Lomb Optical Company), nine of fifteen potential Gagnon licensees accepted the royalty rate of 4<j; proposed by American, and received licenses. When it became known that Shuron intended to cause the initiation of the present proceeding, the other prospective licensees suspended negotiations for licenses pending the result of the proceeding.

Owing to the reluctance of the members of the optical industry to divulge their sales figures, the court has not been informed as to the amount of sales of semi-rimless spectacle mountings by each optical manufacturer. Counsel, however, have stipulated that the nine companies which have executed Gagnon licenses since the consent judgment accounted for slightly less than 25 per cent, of the total volume of sales of semi-rimless mountings in 1947; that sales of such mountings by the companies, including Shuron, which have not executed licenses constituted slightly more than 25 per cent, of the total; and that sales by American and Bausch & Lomb together constituted approximately 50 per cent, of the total. It has further been stipulated that the largest sellers of semi-rimless mountings in 1947 were American, Shuron and Bausch & Lomb, in that order, and that the nine licensees ranked, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, llt’h, 12th, 15th and 16th in relative volume of semi-rimless sales in that year.

American urges that the nine licensees, comprising 60 per cent, of those who had occasion to consider taking a license under the patent, represent a fair cross section of the industry and are a sufficient number to show general acquiescence in the reasonableness of the royalty rate. See Rude v. Westcott, supra; 3 Walker on Patents (Deller’s Ed. 1937), § 823, p. 2158. Shuron maintains that the nine licenses were tainted by duress and hence are not probative of true market value.

Even if American actually represented to prospective licensees that it would sue them for infringement if they practiced the Gagnon invention without taking a license, such a representation is always implicit in negotiations for a patent license and does not constitute duress. And American’s promise to some of the optical manufacturers that they would receive the benefit of any subsequent court reduction of the royalty was merely declaratory of its obligation under the uniform royalty provision of the consent judgment.

While there is nothing in the record to substantiate Shuron’s charge of duress, the court is nevertheless of the opinion that under the circumstances the nine licenses do not establish a royalty for a license under the Gagnon patent. It is claimed that the nine licensees were in a stronger bargaining position than the ordinary applicant for a patent license by reason of the fact that under the consent judgment they could have compelled American to resort to the courts (as Shuron (lid) if they were dissatisfied with the terms offered them. However, those nine licensees did slightly less than 25 per cent, of the total volume of business in semi-rimless mountings. While it can not be assumed that each of the nine accounted for only 2.8 per cent, of such business, it may be inferred that a number of them had too small a financial stake in the matter to warrant the expense of litigating the reasonableness of the 4$ royalty, especially when they had the right to cancel their licenses on 30 days’ notice and were assured that any later reduction in the royalty rate would inure to their benefit. Moreover, the prospective licensees may have been at some disadvantage in conducting their negotiations with American because they were already using the patented invention in the manufacture and sale of semi-rimless mountings. The court, therefore, is not satisfied that those licenses, [774]

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Related

Rude v. Westcott
130 U.S. 152 (Supreme Court, 1889)
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.
305 U.S. 111 (Supreme Court, 1938)
United States v. National Lead Co.
332 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court, 1947)

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Bluebook (online)
95 F. Supp. 771, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 203, 1950 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2035, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-american-optical-co-nysd-1950.