AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:
Amalia Olivares was convicted, after a trial to the district court, on six counts of knowingly transporting aliens know
ing them to be in the United States illegally, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324.
We find that the search forming the basis of her conviction was conducted without probable cause; and we reverse.
In the district court the parties stipulated, in effect, that, if the six aliens named in the indictment were called as witnesses, they would testify to events constituting the substantive elements-of the offenses charged against defendant.
The stipulation was, however, subject to defendant’s motion to suppress all evidence, and the fruits thereof, obtained as a result of the search of the vehicle in which defendant was transporting the aliens. After hearing the testimony relevant to the motion to suppress, the district court denied the motion, and the stipulation was admitted. The facts pertinent to this appeal are not in dispute.
I.
At 4:15 a. m. on October 13, 1973, Constable Jesus R. Cano, who was employed by the County of El Paso to work with law enforcement officers in the area of Fabens, Texas, noticed a heavily loaded Ford Eeonoline Van moving slowly up a slight incline in front of the Texaco service station about a mile from Fabens. The van was spotted by Constable Cano on the access road leading to Interstate 10, as the van was coming north from Fabens and heading toward El Paso. At this point, the van was approximately four or five miles from the border with Mexico. Constable Cano knew from his experience with narcotics and alien smuggling in the Fabens area that vehicles similar to this van were used for such smuggling. The fact that this van was on the road at 4:15 a. m. also aroused his suspicions.
About ten minutes after the van passed, Constable Cano happened to meet Deputy Sheriff Bobby C. Deffers of the El Paso County Sheriff’s Department and informed him that a van with an exceptionally heavy load had entered the highway going west. Constable Cano suggested that Deputy Deffers stop the van and check it out.
In his twenty-one months with the El Paso Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Deffers had experience in detecting the smuggling of marijuana and illegal aliens. In addition, he was aware that there had been problems in the area with smuggling and burglaries and that van-type vehicles had been used for these purposes. So he proceeded on to Interstate 10. When he located defendant’s vehicle, he noticed that the van was riding a “little low in the rear,” as though it were carrying a load, that the rear windows of the van were blocked, and that the van had out-of-state license plates. Deputy Deffers turned on his emergency lights, and, after defendant pulled over to the side of the road, Deffers notified his dispatcher that he was making a routine traffic check.
Deputy Deffers walked up to the van and asked defendant for identification, whereupon she produced a valid Illinois driver’s license. At this point, he noticed a passenger sitting in the front seat — “what appeared, to be a Mexican male.” Deputy Deffers asked the passenger for identification. Though the reply was in Spanish and Deputy Deffers did not understand Spanish, the passenger apparently indicated that he had no identification. Deputy Deffers next inquired as to the passenger’s home, and to this the passenger replied, “Mexico.” From his position, Deputy Deffers could not see to the rear of the inside of the van because a blanket, which hung behind the two front seats, blocked his
view. Deputy Deffers asked defendant what was in the back of the van, to which she replied that there were two mattresses. He then asked defendant to open the van, which she did, and eighteen to twenty males and females were found inside. When these individuals were asked to produce proper identification permitting them to be in this country and were unable to do so, they were detained, and the Border Patrol was notified. After transporting the individuals to the Texaco service station, Deputy Deffers and the Border Patrol searched them for weapons and narcotics and found none.
II.
It is settled, of course, that a moving vehicle may be stopped and searched without a warrant where there is probable cause for the search. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2537-2538, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Carlton v. Estelle, 5 Cir., 1973, 480 F.2d 759, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1043, 94 S.Ct. 546, 38 L.Ed.2d
334.
The Government contends that probable cause for the warrantless search of defendant’s van is furnished by viewing, as we must, these circumstances as a whole:
the van was riding low because it was carrying a heavy load; the van was moving in a direction away from the border; the van was spotted at 4:15 a. m.; the van bore out-of-state license plates; the rear windows of the van were blocked; and the officers were aware of a high incidence of marijuana and alien smuggling in the Fabens area.
See, e. g.,
United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 5 Cir., 1974, 492 F.2d 109; United States v. Doyle, 5 Cir., 1972, 456 F.2d 1246. We realize that we must deal not with technicalities but with probabilities associated with the everyday practical considerations of reasonable men.
See
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). We cannot say, however, that the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge in this case would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed,” Brinegar v. United States,
supra
at 175, 69 S.Ct. at 1310-1311;
see
Carroll v. United States,
supra
at 162, 45 S.Ct. at
288; Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645, 24 L.Ed. 1035, 1036 (1878). Tested by objective standards,
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AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:
Amalia Olivares was convicted, after a trial to the district court, on six counts of knowingly transporting aliens know
ing them to be in the United States illegally, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324.
We find that the search forming the basis of her conviction was conducted without probable cause; and we reverse.
In the district court the parties stipulated, in effect, that, if the six aliens named in the indictment were called as witnesses, they would testify to events constituting the substantive elements-of the offenses charged against defendant.
The stipulation was, however, subject to defendant’s motion to suppress all evidence, and the fruits thereof, obtained as a result of the search of the vehicle in which defendant was transporting the aliens. After hearing the testimony relevant to the motion to suppress, the district court denied the motion, and the stipulation was admitted. The facts pertinent to this appeal are not in dispute.
I.
At 4:15 a. m. on October 13, 1973, Constable Jesus R. Cano, who was employed by the County of El Paso to work with law enforcement officers in the area of Fabens, Texas, noticed a heavily loaded Ford Eeonoline Van moving slowly up a slight incline in front of the Texaco service station about a mile from Fabens. The van was spotted by Constable Cano on the access road leading to Interstate 10, as the van was coming north from Fabens and heading toward El Paso. At this point, the van was approximately four or five miles from the border with Mexico. Constable Cano knew from his experience with narcotics and alien smuggling in the Fabens area that vehicles similar to this van were used for such smuggling. The fact that this van was on the road at 4:15 a. m. also aroused his suspicions.
About ten minutes after the van passed, Constable Cano happened to meet Deputy Sheriff Bobby C. Deffers of the El Paso County Sheriff’s Department and informed him that a van with an exceptionally heavy load had entered the highway going west. Constable Cano suggested that Deputy Deffers stop the van and check it out.
In his twenty-one months with the El Paso Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Deffers had experience in detecting the smuggling of marijuana and illegal aliens. In addition, he was aware that there had been problems in the area with smuggling and burglaries and that van-type vehicles had been used for these purposes. So he proceeded on to Interstate 10. When he located defendant’s vehicle, he noticed that the van was riding a “little low in the rear,” as though it were carrying a load, that the rear windows of the van were blocked, and that the van had out-of-state license plates. Deputy Deffers turned on his emergency lights, and, after defendant pulled over to the side of the road, Deffers notified his dispatcher that he was making a routine traffic check.
Deputy Deffers walked up to the van and asked defendant for identification, whereupon she produced a valid Illinois driver’s license. At this point, he noticed a passenger sitting in the front seat — “what appeared, to be a Mexican male.” Deputy Deffers asked the passenger for identification. Though the reply was in Spanish and Deputy Deffers did not understand Spanish, the passenger apparently indicated that he had no identification. Deputy Deffers next inquired as to the passenger’s home, and to this the passenger replied, “Mexico.” From his position, Deputy Deffers could not see to the rear of the inside of the van because a blanket, which hung behind the two front seats, blocked his
view. Deputy Deffers asked defendant what was in the back of the van, to which she replied that there were two mattresses. He then asked defendant to open the van, which she did, and eighteen to twenty males and females were found inside. When these individuals were asked to produce proper identification permitting them to be in this country and were unable to do so, they were detained, and the Border Patrol was notified. After transporting the individuals to the Texaco service station, Deputy Deffers and the Border Patrol searched them for weapons and narcotics and found none.
II.
It is settled, of course, that a moving vehicle may be stopped and searched without a warrant where there is probable cause for the search. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2537-2538, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Carlton v. Estelle, 5 Cir., 1973, 480 F.2d 759, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1043, 94 S.Ct. 546, 38 L.Ed.2d
334.
The Government contends that probable cause for the warrantless search of defendant’s van is furnished by viewing, as we must, these circumstances as a whole:
the van was riding low because it was carrying a heavy load; the van was moving in a direction away from the border; the van was spotted at 4:15 a. m.; the van bore out-of-state license plates; the rear windows of the van were blocked; and the officers were aware of a high incidence of marijuana and alien smuggling in the Fabens area.
See, e. g.,
United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 5 Cir., 1974, 492 F.2d 109; United States v. Doyle, 5 Cir., 1972, 456 F.2d 1246. We realize that we must deal not with technicalities but with probabilities associated with the everyday practical considerations of reasonable men.
See
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). We cannot say, however, that the facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge in this case would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed,” Brinegar v. United States,
supra
at 175, 69 S.Ct. at 1310-1311;
see
Carroll v. United States,
supra
at 162, 45 S.Ct. at
288; Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645, 24 L.Ed. 1035, 1036 (1878). Tested by objective standards,
see, e. g.,
Dodd v. Beto, 5 Cir., 1970, 435 F.2d 868, 870, the movements of this van did not give rise to a reasonable belief that criminal activity was afoot. Driving a loaded van with out-of-state plates in the early morning hours, heading west from Fabens toward El Paso, does not create a reasonable inference of criminal activity. The situation is not, moreover, turned into a basis for probable cause merely because there was a high incidence of smuggling in the area.
Cf.
Sibron v. State of New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1902, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968).
Most of the circumstances offered by the Government in support of probable cause came into play before Deputy Deffers stopped defendant’s van. If subsequent events are also considered, however, no adequate basis for the search is apparent. Although Deputy Deffers reported to his dispatcher that he was making a routine traffic check, he testified that no traffic violation was involved in his stopping the vehicle. When asked for identification, defendant produced a valid Illinois driver’s license; and she explained that the van was riding low because there were two mattresses in the rear. That defendant’s passenger in the front seat was from Mexico, coupled with other facts set forth above, is still insufficient to establish that probable cause existed.
See
United States v. Mallides, 9 Gir., 1973, 473 F.2d 859, 860.
There being no probable cause for the search of defendant’s van, the search violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free of “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Accordingly, since the evidence obtained as a result of the search should have been excluded by the district court, defendant’s conviction is
Reversed.