United States v. Amadou Diallo, Also Known as Amadou Bailo Diallo

40 F.3d 32, 40 Fed. R. Serv. 1044, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32580
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedNovember 16, 1994
Docket74, Docket 93-1864
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 40 F.3d 32 (United States v. Amadou Diallo, Also Known as Amadou Bailo Diallo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Amadou Diallo, Also Known as Amadou Bailo Diallo, 40 F.3d 32, 40 Fed. R. Serv. 1044, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32580 (2d Cir. 1994).

Opinion

McLAUGHLIN, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Amadou Diallo appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York-(Nicholas Tsoucalas, Judge, sitting by designation) convicting him, after a jury trial, of importing heroin into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), and possessing heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Diallo arrived at J.F.K. International Airport in New York with fifty-eight heroin-filled condoms in his garment bag and forty more heroin-filled condoms in his digestive tract. His defense was that he thought he was smuggling gold dust, not heroin.

On appeal, Diallo argues that the district court committed reversible error by excluding expert testimony of a commodities analyst, who would have testified about the economic motivation for smuggling gold dust. He also contends that the prosecutor’s misconduct during summation deprived him of a fair trial. We hold that it was reversible error to exclude the expert testimony. Accordingly, we do not reach Diallo’s second claim of error, and. we reverse and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

Amadou Diallo arrived at Kennedy Airport on a flight from Benin, Africa. A customs official noticed that Diallo appeared nervous, and asked him to open his garment bag. Inside were fifty condoms filled with powder. They smelled of excrement and vomit, suggesting that Diallo had swallowed the condoms. The official then escorted Diallo to' a search room where he discovered another eight condoms in Diallo’s bag. After a field test showed that the condoms contained heroin, Diallo was arrested and x-rayed. The x-ray revealed foreign bodies in Diallo’s digestive track. Diallo eventually passed forty more condoms, for a total of ninety-eight condoms filled with heroin.

Diallo was indicted for importing heroin into the United States in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), and for possessing heroin with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At trial, the customs offi *34 cial recounted the events leading to Diallo’s arrest. In addition, a chemist for the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) testified that the condoms contained a total of 501.4 grams of 84% pure heroin. Another DEA expert testified that the wholesale value of - the heroin was $70,000-$85,000, and that possession of 501 grams of heroin was consistent with distribution, rather than personal use.

In his defense, Diallo testified that he believed he was smuggling gold dust, not heroin. According to Diallo, he 'had flown to Benin on business, where he met a trader in gold and African art. Diallo testified that the trader paid him $1,000 to smuggle gold dust out of Benin.

To buttress his story, Diallo sought to call Jeffrey Christian, a commodities consultant. Based upon his review of Benin’s gold export regulations, which he obtained in preparation for Diallo’s trial, Christian would have testified, as an expert, that smuggling gold from Benin was more profitable than exporting it legally by complying with Benin’s gold export regulations. By way of qualification, Diallo showed that Christian’s firm compiled statistics on the world trade in precious metals. Moreover, Christian had advised several African nations on their precious metals export policies.

Upon objection, the district court excluded the proffered testimony. The court challenged Christian’s qualifications, noting that Christian had no knowledge of Benin’s export regulations before being approached to testify and had never even been to Benin. The court also questioned the need for and relevance of the proffered testimony.

The jury found Diallo guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 70 months’ imprisonment. Diallo now appeals.

DISCUSSION

United States v. Onumonu, 967 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.1992), is squarely on point. There, the defendant, who was charged with smuggling heroin, claimed that he believed the condoms he had swallowed contained diamonds, not heroin. Id. at 784. He sought to introduce the expert testimony of a gemologist, who would have testified about the feasibility and economic motivation for smuggling diamonds by swallowing condoms containing them. The district court excluded the testimony, however, finding that it was neither relevant nor helpful to the jury.

This Court reversed. We held that the gemologist’s testimony was relevant and would have .helped the. jury to determine a fact in issue: the likelihood that the defendant really believed he had swallowed condoms containing diamonds, not heroin. Id. at 786-88 (citing Fed.R.Evid. 401, 702); see id. at 788 (“[T]he average New York juror knows little about ... smuggling diamonds” and “the feasibility and profitability of smuggling diamonds in the alimentary canal.”). We concluded that the failure to admit the expert testimony was an abuse of discretion, depriving the defendant “of a fair opportunity to present his ease to the jury.” Id. at 789.

Here, at oral argument, the government conceded that Christian’s proffered testimony was relevant under Onumonu and would have helped the jury to ascertain Diallo’s true state of mind. That leaves only the question of Christian’s qualifications, and the government contends that because he was not qualified as an expert, his proposed expert testimony was properly excluded. We disagree.

District courts are accorded considerable discretion to determine an expert’s qualifications. See Fed.R.Evid. 104(a); United States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 805 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1397, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991). ‘Whether a witness is qualified as an expert can only be determined by comparing the area in which the witness has superior knowledge, skill, experience, or education with the subject matter of the witness’s testimony.” United States v. Lewis, 954 F.2d 1386, 1390 (7th Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A district court’s conclusion that an expert is not qualified to testify will be affirmed unless manifestly erroneous. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d at 805.

*35 Although Christian had never been in Benin itself, he had advised neighboring African countries about their gold export policies.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Reginald Graham
123 F.4th 1197 (Eleventh Circuit, 2024)
SLSJ, LLC v. Kleban
277 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D. Connecticut, 2017)
Karavitis v. Makita U.S.A., Inc.
243 F. Supp. 3d 235 (D. Connecticut, 2017)
Duchimaza v. United States
211 F. Supp. 3d 421 (D. Connecticut, 2016)
United States v. Tin Yat Chin, AKA Tan C. Dau
371 F.3d 31 (Second Circuit, 2004)
Bank of China v. NBM LLC
359 F.3d 171 (Second Circuit, 2004)
Bank of China, New York Branch v. Nbm LLC
359 F.3d 171 (Second Circuit, 2004)
United States v. Boykoff
67 F. App'x 15 (Second Circuit, 2003)
United States v. Kelley
6 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D. Kansas, 1998)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
40 F.3d 32, 40 Fed. R. Serv. 1044, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 32580, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-amadou-diallo-also-known-as-amadou-bailo-diallo-ca2-1994.