United States v. Amador Mendoza
This text of United States v. Amador Mendoza (United States v. Amador Mendoza) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 4 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-35364
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:11-cr-00181-WFN-14 v.
AMADOR SANCHEZ MENDOZA, AKA MEMORANDUM* Amador Sanchez,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington Wm. Fremming Nielsen, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 14, 2023 Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN and DESAI, Circuit Judges, and SILVER,** District Judge.
Amador Sanchez Mendoza appeals the district court’s denial of his motion
to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing
that under United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972), the sentencing judge
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Roslyn O. Silver, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, sitting by designation. improperly considered prior convictions for violations of a state drug possession
statute that was later ruled unconstitutional by State v. Blake, 481 P.3d 521 (Wash.
2021). The district court denied the motion but granted a certificate of
appealability. Mendoza appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1291, 2253(a), and 2255(d). We review the denial of a § 2255 motion de novo
and affirm.
To succeed on his due process claim, Mendoza must, in part, establish the
invalidated convictions were “demonstrably made the basis for the sentence.”
United States v. Hill, 915 F.3d 669, 674 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v.
Vanderwerfhorst, 576 F.3d 929, 935–36 (9th Cir. 2009)). To meet this test, the
sentencing court must have “made it abundantly clear that [the challenged
information] was the basis for its sentence.” Id. (quoting Farrow v. United States,
580 F.2d 1339, 1359 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc)). Merely referencing or mentioning
the challenged information is not enough. Id. at 675.
In denying Mendoza’s § 2255 motion, the district court judge, who was also
the sentencing judge, specifically stated he “did not enhance Mr. Mendoza’s
sentence based on the simple possession convictions, nor did the Court rely on
those convictions to determine the proper sentence within the parties’ agreed
range.” “Once the § 2255 judge makes a finding of no enhancement based on his
own recollection, this may not normally be overridden . . . [and] the judge’s own
2 estimation of the deleterious impact of the prior convictions on his determination
of sentence will not be reversed absent clearly contradictory evidence in the
record.” Farrow, 580 F.2d at 1355 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The evidence does not clearly contradict the district court’s conclusion that
the simple possession convictions did not enhance Mendoza’s sentence. Mendoza
qualified as a career offender, and thus fell into Criminal History Category VI
under the guidelines, even without the three invalidated convictions. Cf. Tucker,
404 U.S. at 448 (the “real question” is “whether the sentence . . . might have been
different if the sentencing judge had known that at least two of the respondent’s
previous convictions had been unconstitutionally obtained”). The sentencing judge
mentioned those invalidated convictions only within the context of explaining why
a particular sentencing enhancement would not be applied. Moreover, the
sentencing judge made clear the sentence was based on Mendoza’s “danger to this
society,” his lengthy criminal history, and the likelihood of recidivism. The fact
that the sentencing judge mentioned two of the three invalidated convictions in the
colloquy is not enough. Hill, 915 F.3d at 675.
The evidence does not clearly contradict the district court’s conclusion that
Mendoza’s invalidated convictions were not “demonstrably made the basis” of his
sentence. Id. at 674.
AFFIRMED.
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