Case: 14-10788 Date Filed: 09/09/2014 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 14-10788 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cr-00193-MEF-SRW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALVIN TOLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ________________________
(September 9, 2014)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Alvin Toles appeals his 24-month imprisonment sentence for revocation of
his supervised release. We affirm. Case: 14-10788 Date Filed: 09/09/2014 Page: 2 of 6
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2004, Toles was convicted of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 71
months of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. Toles began serving
his term of supervised release on January 15, 2010. On October 26, 2010, the
district judge revoked Toles’s term of supervised release, because he had been
arrested for possessing a firearm. The judge sentenced Toles to 24 months of
imprisonment, with no supervised release to follow.
On October 19, 2010, Toles was charged with being a felon in possession of
a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pled guilty to the charge, and
on April 1, 2011, the district judge sentenced Toles to 27 months of imprisonment
and 3 years of supervised release, to run concurrently with the 24-month
imprisonment sentence imposed on October 26, 2010. Toles began serving his
second term of supervised release on March 8, 2013.
On November 21, 2013, the district judge revoked Toles’s second term of
supervised release, because Toles failed to comply with numerous terms of his
supervision. The judge sentenced Toles to an imprisonment sentence of
time-served, plus a 24-month term of supervised release, which was to begin upon
Toles’s release to Herring House, a residential substance-abuse-rehabilitation
facility in Dothan, Alabama. A mandatory term of supervised release required
2 Case: 14-10788 Date Filed: 09/09/2014 Page: 3 of 6
Toles to attend and to comply with all obligations of Herring House for one year or
until he was discharged successfully from the program.
Toles began his third term of supervised release on December 10, 2013,
when he was released to Herring House. On January 6, 2014, Toles was
discharged from Herring House for disruptive behavior and noncompliance with
program rules and objectives. The same day, the government filed a petition to
revoke Toles’s third term of supervised release, based upon his discharge from
Herring House.
At the revocation hearing, Toles admitted to violating a mandatory term of
supervision; the district judge revoked Toles’s term of supervised release. Before
imposing Tole’s sentence, the judge recognized the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range was 7 to 13 months of imprisonment, and the statutory maximum
term was 24 months of imprisonment. Rather than imprisonment, Toles requested
that he be sent to a facility that could provide both substance-abuse and mental-
health treatment.
The judge denied the request, sentenced Toles to the statutory-maximum
sentence, and noted Toles had 22 prior convictions or adjudications, and this was
the third time the judge had revoked Toles’s supervision. The judge explained a
sentence above the Guidelines range was warranted, because Toles previously had
received the benefit of lesser sentences but had not changed his behavior.
3 Case: 14-10788 Date Filed: 09/09/2014 Page: 4 of 6
On appeal, Toles argues his 24-month imprisonment sentence is both plainly
erroneous and unreasonable, because it is greater than necessary to comply with
the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553. He also contends his sentence
creates an unwarranted sentencing disparity among supervised-release-revocation
cases, and he cites two unpublished decisions, United States v. DeArmas, 556 F.
App’x 854 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam), and United States v. Gray, 290 F. App’x
283 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), to support this assertion.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release
for reasonableness. United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 1 A district judge must impose a sentence that is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51,
128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). Toles argues only that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of a sentence “under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. at 41, 128 S. Ct. at 591. The party who
challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing the sentence is
unreasonable. United States v. Dean, 635 F.3d 1200, 1203-04, 1209 (11th Cir.
2011).
1 Toles did not object to the reasonableness of his sentence in district court and concedes in his initial brief that plain-error review may apply. We need not decide if plain-error review applies, because we conclude there was no error, plain or otherwise. 4 Case: 14-10788 Date Filed: 09/09/2014 Page: 5 of 6
A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it “fails to achieve the purposes
of sentencing stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 1209. When revoking a
defendant’s term of supervised release and sentencing the defendant, the judge
must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for deterrence; (3) the need to protect
the public; (4) the kinds of sentences and the Guidelines range; (5) any pertinent
policy statements; and (6) the need to provide restitution to any victims. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) & 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(C), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(7).
A sentencing judge also must consider “the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). “A well-founded claim of
disparity, however, assumes that apples are being compared to apples.” United
States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) (noting codefendants were not similarly situated, when
one defendant cooperated with the government and entered a plea agreement, and
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Case: 14-10788 Date Filed: 09/09/2014 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 14-10788 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cr-00193-MEF-SRW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALVIN TOLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama ________________________
(September 9, 2014)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Alvin Toles appeals his 24-month imprisonment sentence for revocation of
his supervised release. We affirm. Case: 14-10788 Date Filed: 09/09/2014 Page: 2 of 6
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2004, Toles was convicted of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 71
months of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release. Toles began serving
his term of supervised release on January 15, 2010. On October 26, 2010, the
district judge revoked Toles’s term of supervised release, because he had been
arrested for possessing a firearm. The judge sentenced Toles to 24 months of
imprisonment, with no supervised release to follow.
On October 19, 2010, Toles was charged with being a felon in possession of
a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pled guilty to the charge, and
on April 1, 2011, the district judge sentenced Toles to 27 months of imprisonment
and 3 years of supervised release, to run concurrently with the 24-month
imprisonment sentence imposed on October 26, 2010. Toles began serving his
second term of supervised release on March 8, 2013.
On November 21, 2013, the district judge revoked Toles’s second term of
supervised release, because Toles failed to comply with numerous terms of his
supervision. The judge sentenced Toles to an imprisonment sentence of
time-served, plus a 24-month term of supervised release, which was to begin upon
Toles’s release to Herring House, a residential substance-abuse-rehabilitation
facility in Dothan, Alabama. A mandatory term of supervised release required
2 Case: 14-10788 Date Filed: 09/09/2014 Page: 3 of 6
Toles to attend and to comply with all obligations of Herring House for one year or
until he was discharged successfully from the program.
Toles began his third term of supervised release on December 10, 2013,
when he was released to Herring House. On January 6, 2014, Toles was
discharged from Herring House for disruptive behavior and noncompliance with
program rules and objectives. The same day, the government filed a petition to
revoke Toles’s third term of supervised release, based upon his discharge from
Herring House.
At the revocation hearing, Toles admitted to violating a mandatory term of
supervision; the district judge revoked Toles’s term of supervised release. Before
imposing Tole’s sentence, the judge recognized the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range was 7 to 13 months of imprisonment, and the statutory maximum
term was 24 months of imprisonment. Rather than imprisonment, Toles requested
that he be sent to a facility that could provide both substance-abuse and mental-
health treatment.
The judge denied the request, sentenced Toles to the statutory-maximum
sentence, and noted Toles had 22 prior convictions or adjudications, and this was
the third time the judge had revoked Toles’s supervision. The judge explained a
sentence above the Guidelines range was warranted, because Toles previously had
received the benefit of lesser sentences but had not changed his behavior.
3 Case: 14-10788 Date Filed: 09/09/2014 Page: 4 of 6
On appeal, Toles argues his 24-month imprisonment sentence is both plainly
erroneous and unreasonable, because it is greater than necessary to comply with
the purposes of sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553. He also contends his sentence
creates an unwarranted sentencing disparity among supervised-release-revocation
cases, and he cites two unpublished decisions, United States v. DeArmas, 556 F.
App’x 854 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam), and United States v. Gray, 290 F. App’x
283 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam), to support this assertion.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the sentence imposed upon the revocation of supervised release
for reasonableness. United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252
(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 1 A district judge must impose a sentence that is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51,
128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). Toles argues only that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of a sentence “under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. at 41, 128 S. Ct. at 591. The party who
challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing the sentence is
unreasonable. United States v. Dean, 635 F.3d 1200, 1203-04, 1209 (11th Cir.
2011).
1 Toles did not object to the reasonableness of his sentence in district court and concedes in his initial brief that plain-error review may apply. We need not decide if plain-error review applies, because we conclude there was no error, plain or otherwise. 4 Case: 14-10788 Date Filed: 09/09/2014 Page: 5 of 6
A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it “fails to achieve the purposes
of sentencing stated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. at 1209. When revoking a
defendant’s term of supervised release and sentencing the defendant, the judge
must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for deterrence; (3) the need to protect
the public; (4) the kinds of sentences and the Guidelines range; (5) any pertinent
policy statements; and (6) the need to provide restitution to any victims. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) & 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(C), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(7).
A sentencing judge also must consider “the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). “A well-founded claim of
disparity, however, assumes that apples are being compared to apples.” United
States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1101 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) (noting codefendants were not similarly situated, when
one defendant cooperated with the government and entered a plea agreement, and
the other defendant provided no assistance to the government and proceeded to
trial).
In addition, a sentence is substantively unreasonable if the judge balances
the § 3553(a) factors unreasonably or places unreasonable weight on a single
factor. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1192-93 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
5 Case: 14-10788 Date Filed: 09/09/2014 Page: 6 of 6
Toles has failed to meet his burden of proving his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. Dean, 635 F.3d at 1203-04, 1209. In imposing the sentence, the
district judge considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e)
& 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(D), (a)(4)-(7). The judge noted Toles’s 22 prior
convictions or adjudications and Toles’s problems following rules. The judge also
stated he had given Toles more chances than any other defendant he had seen in
the last 12 years. This was the third time the judge had revoked Toles’s term of
supervised release. The judge explained he was imposing a sentence above the
Guidelines range because of Toles’s repeated failure to benefit from lesser
sentences and treatment programs. Although Toles compares his 24-month
sentence to the sentences imposed in Gray and DeArmas, he has not demonstrated
that he is similarly situated to the defendants in those cases. In fact, he admits
those defendants had committed different types of violations and had not “been
found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Accordingly, the district
judge’s decision to impose the statutory maximum of 24 months of imprisonment
was substantively reasonable.
AFFIRMED.