United States v. Aluminum Company of America

214 F. Supp. 501, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9868, 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,653
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. New York
DecidedJanuary 28, 1963
DocketCiv. 8030
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 214 F. Supp. 501 (United States v. Aluminum Company of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 214 F. Supp. 501, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9868, 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,653 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).

Opinion

BRENNAN, Chief Judge.

This is a civil antitrust action brought by the United States against the Aluminum Company of America, hereinafter referred to as “Alcoa” and the Rome-Cable Corporation, hereinafter referred to as “Rome” to annul the acquisition by Alcoa of the stock and assets of Rome.

The complaint in this action was filed April 1, 1960 and charges that the acquisition, above referred to, is in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18. The complaint seeks the usual relief in this type of case — to wit: an order of divestiture and injunction against further acquisitions and such other and further relief as may be just and proper. Defendants’ answers, while ad-- *503 mitting certain allegations of the complaint, deny that the transaction involved is in violation of the statute. No question is raised as to the jurisdiction of this court.

On March 31, 1959, pursuant to a prior .agreement, Alcoa acquired all of the .assets of Rome by an exchange of stock ■of the two corporations. Title to the assets of Rome was taken in a newly formed corporation also known as the Rome Cable Corporation. The new company is a wholly owned subsidiary of Alcoa and, since the acquisition, has been ■operated as a division thereof. The crux ■of the litigation arises from plaintiff’s ■contention that the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen ■competition or tend to create a monopoly in certain lines of commerce consisting principally of wire and cable products— all in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

Brief reference is made at this point to the defendants and the general nature of their business activities in order to .afford an insight into the more detailed ■discussions to follow.

Alcoa is a fully integrated aluminum producer. In the manufacturing process, it refines aluminum bearing ore into primary aluminum and converts same into intermediate and various aluminum end products. It manufactures such products in several states and sells and ships same in various forms throughout the United States and in foreign countries.

Rome was incorporated in 1936. It was and is primarily engaged in the manufacture of wire and cable products in which copper was and is the predominant metal used in its operations. In 1952 Rome installed equipment for the manufacture of aluminum rod from aluminum ingot purchased from primary producers. It began producing such rod for its own use in 1953. Thereafter it began to manufacture and sell certain types of aluminum wire and cable in addition to its broad line of copper products.

THE LAW

Before proceeding to discuss Alcoa’s and Rome’s position in the markets in which they are active participants, it would seem logical to refer briefly to the legal principles involved. An understanding of the language and purpose of the statute is essential as an approach is made to the decision which must necessarily involve the recognition of the prohibitions imposed and the application of same to the facts disclosed.

The basis of this action rests upon the provisions of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, the relevant part of which is quoted below.

“No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”

The language of the above statute, taken alone, poses problems both in its construction and application. The courts have proceeded upon a case-to-case basis to construe and apply the statute to the facts of a particular litigation. It seems fair to state that the law involved is still in a state of development and that no formula, possessing rigidity, may be applied. This is necessarily so since the statute deals with reasonable probability in the constantly changing economy in which we live.

The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe Co. v. U. S., 370 U.S. 294, 82 S.Ct. 1502, 8 L.Ed.2d 510 is, as stated therein, the first case coming before that court wherein an analysis of the scope and purposes of the statute, as it now exists, was necessary to the issue raised. It would seem to follow *504 that reference to the holdings in that decision would be more profitable than to discuss how far the previous landmark decisions under the Sherman Act are applicable or to reconcile or distinguish decisions of circuit and district courts which had decided Section 7 cases prior to the Brown Shoe decision. The most often quoted decisions, referred to above, are either cited or are found in the notes in the Brown Shoe opinion and their application may be gathered from the text thereof.

The legislative history of the statute is discussed in, the above Brown Shoe Co. decision and does not require repetition here. Such discussion appears to confirm some previously stated purposes of the statute and sets at rest certain controversies relative to the meaning and application thereof. This court’s understanding thereof is summarized below and the quotations therein are, unless otherwise indicated, taken therefrom.

Congress considered that “ * * * a rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy” was an evil to be curbed. Effective competition and the protection of small businesses were results to be accomplished. The statute was intended to supply a deficiency in the existing statute and to apply to all types of mergers. Its purpose was to curb monopolistic acts at their beginnings or incipiency rather than await their fruition and the standards for judging their legality are broader than, but may include, those applied in Sherman Act violations. All mergers however are not to be condemned. Condemnation is limited to those having “demonstrable anticompetitive effects” although such demonstration is satisfied by a probability. Certainty is not required. Proof of probability is sufficient provided the menace to competition is clear-cut as distinguished from a temporary condition or an “ephemeral possibility”. No particular tests are provided in the statute to measure either the product or geographic market. Neither are qualitative or quantitative tests controlling in measuring the effect of a merger. Both measurements must be made in the light of all the relevant factors which may vary in accordance with the facts of the particular acquisition under consideration.

In addition to the above summary of the discussion of the legislative history as gathered from the opinion in the Brown Shoe case, the decision therein, in its holdings seems to otherwise clarify the vagueness of the language of the statute and afford something of a guide to the trial courts in their application to the facts of the litigation before

The lines of commerce or prod~ uct market may consist of both broad and submarket lines.

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Related

United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
377 U.S. 271 (Supreme Court, 1964)

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214 F. Supp. 501, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9868, 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,653, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-aluminum-company-of-america-nynd-1963.