United States v. Almanza
This text of United States v. Almanza (United States v. Almanza) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 14 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-2176 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:21-cr-00212-FLA-1 v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK LINK ALMANZA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fernando L. Aenlle-Rocha, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 12, 2025** Pasadena, California
Before: OWENS, BENNETT, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Frank Link Almanza appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence seized from his car, which he argues was obtained in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. We review the district court’s denial of the suppression
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). motion de novo. United States v. Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 2007).
As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
Almanza was not seized under the Fourth Amendment at the outset of his
encounter with the officers.1 Two officers approached Almanza and his
companion on foot in a well-lit public parking garage. See United States v. Kim,
25 F.3d 1426, 1430 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n officer’s approach of a car parked in
a public place does not constitute . . . [a] Fourth Amendment seizure.”). They did
not “draw [Almanza’s] attention to their weapons,” United States v. Brown, 996
F.3d 998, 1006 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 1141,
1146 (9th Cir. 2007)), nor otherwise assert authority over his movements using
“sirens or lights,” Washington, 490 F.3d at 767. The two casino security cars
assisting on the scene parked well behind Almanza’s vehicle and left his forward
means of egress unobstructed. Id. at 770 (holding officer’s “initial encounter” with
suspect was not a seizure when officer “parked his squad car a full car length
behind [the suspect’s] car [and] did not block it”). Under these circumstances, a
1 During the course of the encounter, Sergeant Woodill developed probable cause to seize Almanza after he observed Almanza’s suspicious demeanor, smelled a strong odor associated with black tar heroin, and spotted a glass jar containing a baggie of what looked like black tar heroin in the car’s center console. Thus, Almanza’s appeal is limited to whether Almanza was seized without reasonable suspicion at the outset of the encounter.
2 23-2176 “reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter and leave.” Id.
Because we hold that Almanza was not seized by the officers’ approach, we
do not reach the issue of whether the officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity to warrant such a seizure.
AFFIRMED.
3 23-2176
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