United States v. AlliedSignal, Inc.

206 F. Supp. 2d 320, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24581, 2001 WL 1873768
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. New York
DecidedAugust 10, 2001
Docket3:97-cv-00436
StatusPublished

This text of 206 F. Supp. 2d 320 (United States v. AlliedSignal, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 2d 320, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24581, 2001 WL 1873768 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).

Opinion

DECISION & ORDER

MCAVOY, Distrist Judge.

I. Procedural Background

The United States of America commenced the instant litigation against defendants Alliedsignal, Inc. and Amphenol Corp., as successors in interest of the Bendix Corp. (collectively “Alliedsignal” or “Defendants”), 1 pursuant to section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (“CERCLA”), seeking recovery of costs incurred by the United States with respect to the release or threatened release of hazardous substances at or from the Sidney Landfill Superfund Site (the “SLF” or the “Site”) located in the Towns of Mason-ville and Sidney, New York. Defendants, in turn, commenced a third-party action against the Town of Sidney, the Village of Sidney, the Town of Masonville, and the Town of Tompkins (collectively the “Municipal Defendants”) seeking: (1) recovery for past and future response costs at the Site pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607; (2) contribution for all past and future response costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1401, and common law; (3) indemnification; and (4) a declaratory judgment defining the future obligations of the parties.

By Memorandum - Decision & Order dated August 18, 1999, United States v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 62 F.Supp.2d 713 (N.D.N.Y.1999), recon. denied, 72 F.Supp.2d. 29 (N.D.N.Y.1999), familiarity with which is assumed, the Court denied the United States’ motion for approval of a consent decree with the Municipal Defendants. In .that decision, the Court also dismissed Alliedsignal’s cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9607 against the Municipal Defendants .and otherwise denied the Municipal Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

By Memorandum - Decision & Order dated March 30, 2001 United States v. Alliedsignal, Inc., 97-CV-436, Dkt. No. 143, 2 familiarity with which is assumed, the Court found Alliedsignal liable for response costs at the SLF. 3 The Court further found that, during the relevant time period, Bendix disposed of waste oil at the SLF, however, the Court found that a triable issue of fact existed regarding the quantity of waste oil Bendix disposed of, Notwithstanding the finding that Bendix disposed of waste oil at the SLF, the Court found that there was a triable issue of fact regarding whether Alliedsignal was jointly and severally liable for the harm at SLF and, if not, whether it had proven a reasonable basis for apportionment of the harm. In this regard, the Court noted that the mere fact Bendix waste oil has been deposited at the SLF does not mean that the harm is indivisible. United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 722 (2d Cir.1993). Instead, the Court found that the focus must be on whether Alliedsignal has demonstrated a reasonable basis for dividing up the harm and whether Alliedsignal’s contributions to the site over and above their splid waste (i.e., *322 the waste oils), either individually or when mixed with the other substances at the site, - affected the response costs. United States v. Monsanto, Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 (4th Cir.1988). The Court found that Alliedsignal had submitted evidence suggesting that the amounts of oil it may have deposited at the SLF did not increase the toxicity, migratory potential, degree of migration, or synergistic capacities of the hazardous substances at the site by way of its expert testimony that the conditions at the site are consistent with what is found at a typical municipal solid waste (“MSW”) landfill. The Court concluded that summary judgment was not appropriate because, if, at trial, Alliedsignal upheld its substantial burden and proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the environmental harms at the SLF were consistent with. those found at a MSW only landfill and were not increased by Bendix’s waste oñ and, thus, that apportioning liability based upon the potentially responsible parties’ (the “PRPs”) relative volumetric contributions would be reasonable, then it would establish divisibility.

In the March 20, 2001 Memorandum-Decision and Order, the Court granted the Third Party Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part and dismissed Al-liedsignal’s state-law based contribution and indemnity claims. 4 The Court denied the Third Party Defendants’ summary judgment motion in all other respects. Prior to trial, the third party suit settled.

The bench trial in this action commenced on June 18, 2001 in Watertown, New York and concluded on June 25, 2001. At the close of Defendants’ proof, 5 the Government moved for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Cxv.P. 52. The Court reserved decision on that motion. .

II. Evidentiary and Jurisdictional Issues

A. CERCLA § 106(B)(2)

At the commencement of trial, the Government argued, for the first time, that CERCLA § 106(B)(2) (“Section 106(B)(2)”) deprived this Court of jurisdiction to determine whether Defendants have already incurred more than their proportionate share of response costs. 6 *323 Essentially, the Government argues that because Defendants claim they have already paid more than their fair share of response costs, this Court cannot determine whether either the harm at SLF is divisible or Defendants proved a reasonable basis for apportionment, but rather, Defendants must utilize Section 106(B)(2) and apply to the Superfund for reimbursement.

The plain terms of Section 106(B)(2) illustrate that it is applicable where a PRP can establish: (1) it is not liable for response costs, or (2) the response action ordered was arbitrary and capricious or otherwise unlawful. In this case, the Court has already determined that Alliedsignal is responsible for response costs pursuant to CERCLA § 9607 and that the Government’s response action was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, this ease is outside the ambit of Section 106(B)(2).

Section 106(B)(2) is also inapplicable because Defendants do not seek reimbursement for response costs they have paid, but rather, seek to avoid liability for further response costs based on the well-settled rules of divisibility and apportionment, which would appear to be rendered meaningless in numerous cases should the Court adopt the Government’s reading of Section 106(B)(2).

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Related

Goodrich v. Betkoski
99 F.3d 505 (First Circuit, 1996)
United States v. Alliedsignal, Inc.
62 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. New York, 1999)
United States v. Monsanto Co.
858 F.2d 160 (Fourth Circuit, 1988)
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.
990 F.2d 711 (Second Circuit, 1993)

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Bluebook (online)
206 F. Supp. 2d 320, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24581, 2001 WL 1873768, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-alliedsignal-inc-nynd-2001.