United States v. Alejandro Daniel, Jr.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: August 16, 2023
• Docket: 22-3840
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 23a0381n.06

Case No. 22-3840

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Aug 16, 2023 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN ALEJANDRO DANIEL, JR., ) DISTRICT OF OHIO Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION

Before: COLE, CLAY, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.

COLE, Circuit Judge. Alejandro Daniel, Jr. appeals the denial of his motion to suppress

evidence, arguing that the relevant search warrant lacked probable cause and contained a material

omission. But because officers reasonably relied on the search warrant in good faith, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 22, 2020, agents with the Miami Valley Bulk Smuggling Task Force were

surveilling a hotel in an area allegedly frequented “by persons involved in drug trafficking and

money laundering for various drug trafficking organizations.” (Warrant Aff., R. 19-1, PageID 76.)

Agents noticed a silver Dodge Charger with a California license plate in the hotel parking lot and

decided to check the vehicle’s plate number for recent border crossings; the vehicle entered the

United States from Mexico on July 14, 2020, occupied by Jermaine Bounds and Daniel. Law

enforcement databases indicated that Daniel was previously caught crossing the border with a user-

amount of marijuana. Bounds had a prior drug-related offense on his record and an active arrest

warrant for a traffic violation. Neither Bounds nor Daniel were registered as guests at the hotel. Case No. 22-3840, United States v. Daniel

At some point during the surveillance, agents saw a woman, later identified as Alexis

Iniguez, remove pet supplies for her dog from the Dodge Charger’s trunk. Iniguez was on the

hotel guest list, and research revealed that she had crossed the Mexico-U.S. border several times

before, most recently in 2019. Agents later saw Iniguez, her dog, and two men—ultimately

confirmed to be Bounds and Daniel—approach the Dodge Charger. Iniguez and her dog got into

the Dodge Charger while Bounds and Daniel got into a nearby Kia Soul, and both cars departed.

The agents followed the two cars into Dayton, where they stopped at the intersection of

Fairview Avenue and Mayfair Road. Iniguez parked the Dodge Charger on Mayfair while Bounds

parked the Kia Soul on Fairview near the intersection so that someone sitting in the Kia Soul could

observe the parked Dodge Charger. Daniel exited the Kia Soul and approached the Dodge

Charger, motioning for Iniguez to get out. Daniel then took the car key from Iniguez and got into

the car, “reaching into” the front passenger area, then the driver’s area. Daniel then locked the car

with the key fob and began walking north on Mayfair with Iniguez and her dog in tow. Agent

Richard Miller followed.

Eventually, Daniel and Iniguez noticed Miller following them and split up. When

approached by agents, Bounds declined to answer any questions or provide identification, while

Daniel provided identification but denied having been in either the Dodge Charger or the Kia Soul

and said that he “would love to help but doesn’t know.” (Id. at PageID 77–78.)

Iniguez proved more talkative. She told Miller that Daniel had offered to pay her an

indeterminate sum to drive the Dodge Charger from California to Dayton, and she needed the

money to pay off her credit card debt. So on July 19, she picked the Dodge Charger up in

California from Bounds and Daniel, who also asked her to rent another car, the Kia Soul, so they

could follow her. The group then met at a hotel in Arizona on July 20. From there, Bounds and

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Daniel directed Iniguez to drive the Dodge Charger to Dayton. They arrived in Dayton in the early

hours of July 22, where Iniguez rented two hotel rooms for the group under her name.

Iniguez told Miller that “she thought this trip was illicit” but needed the money. (Id. at

PageID 78.) She also stated that she did not know who owned the Dodge Charger but believed

that Daniel drove it regularly. And she gave Miller permission to search both the Dodge Charger

and the hotel rooms. The search of the rooms turned up a “user amount of high-grade marijuana

and paraphernalia” in the room where Bounds and Daniel had stayed. (Id. at 78–79.) The search

of the Dodge Charger lasted “maybe less than ten minutes” and did not result in discovery of any

contraband. (Hr’g Tr., R. 22, PageID 116–17.) Despite discovering no evidence, agents decided

to tow the car.

Later that day, Agent Jason Leslie provided an affidavit to an Ohio state court judge

describing the individuals’ history of border-crossings and any prior offenses; agents’ observations

at the hotel; the group’s drive to Dayton; the agents’ observations at the Fairview-Mayfair

intersection; Iniguez’s statements to Miller, including her purported consent to search the car and

hotel rooms; and the marijuana found in the hotel room. The warrant did not state that a search of

the Dodge Charger had failed to turn up contraband.

Finding that the affidavit provided probable cause that evidence of money laundering or

drug trafficking could be found in the vehicle, a state court judge issued the warrant, authorizing

agents to search the Dodge Charger for illicit drugs as well as any related paraphernalia, supplies,

and records. The search led to the discovery of three kilograms of a drug mixture suspected to

contain fentanyl or heroin, which had been stored in a secret “aftermarket” compartment within

the dashboard of the car. (Plea Agreement, R. 37, PageID 222.)

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Daniel was indicted for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more

of a controlled substance containing heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)(A) and

(b)(1)(A), and 846. Daniel moved to suppress the evidence found in the Dodge Charger on the

grounds that the search and seizure of the car were not supported by probable cause and requested

an evidentiary hearing.

After an evidentiary hearing and supplemental briefing from the parties, the district court

denied the motion, concluding that the warrant was supported by probable cause. Daniel

subsequently entered a guilty plea pursuant to an agreement that allowed him to appeal the denial

of his suppression motion. This appeal follows.

II. ANALYSIS

In an appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the district court’s

factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Waide, 60 F.4th

327, 335 (6th Cir. 2023).

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures and requires that

search warrants be supported by “probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Probable cause

“requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of

such activity.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (quoting Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243–44, n.13 (1983)).

If police obtained evidence via a search that lacked probable cause, courts may suppress

that evidence under the exclusionary rule. Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236 (2011). But

the exclusionary rule does not apply where police relied in good faith on a warrant later found

deficient, so long as their reliance was objectively reasonable. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

897, 922–24 (1984). So where, as here, officers discovered the evidence after obtaining a warrant,

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even if the warrant lacked probable cause, the good-faith exception precludes suppression unless:

(1) the warrant affidavit includes statements that the affiant knew or should have known were

untrue; (2) “the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his or her judicial role;” (3) the warrant

affidavit is “bare bones” or lacks any indicia of probable cause; or (4) “the warrant is so facially

deficient” that it would be unreasonable for police to think it was valid. United States v.

Washington, 380 F.3d 236, 241 (6th Cir. 2004).

In his brief, Daniel argued that the good-faith exception should not apply to the warrant in

this case because the underlying affidavit contained two material omissions that amounted to

untruths and otherwise lacked sufficient indicia of probable cause. But at argument, Daniel’s

counsel conceded that the “crux of this case” is whether one particular purported omission was

significant enough to change the probable-cause and good-faith analyses, so we focus on that

specific omission.

Material omissions in a warrant affidavit can defeat application of the good-faith exception,

but “an affidavit which omits potentially exculpatory information is less likely to present a

question of impermissible official conduct than one which affirmatively includes false

information.” United States v. Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir. 1997); see also United States

v. Ardd, 911 F.3d 348, 351–53 (6th Cir. 2018) (analyzing statements alleged to constitute

falsehoods or material omissions in the good-faith exception context). To show that the good-faith

exception is inapplicable because of a material omission, the defendant must show that the

omission rises to the level of a “deliberate falsehood” or “reckless disregard for the truth.” Atkin,

107 F.3d at 1217 (quoting United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 568 n.26 (6th Cir. 1993)).

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To start, the affidavit contains the following information about the car search:

Iniguez stated she would give Agents consent to search the Charger and her hotel rooms . . . . Iniguez stated Daniel still had the keys but granted Agent [Miller] permission to use a vehicle access tool to conduct the consent search. Iniguez stated to Agent Miller that she does not know who the owner of the Dodge Charger was, but she knows Alejandro Daniel, Jr. to drive the vehicle on a regular basis. After the consent search, Iniguez agreed to grant consent to search her two hotel rooms . . . . Inside the hotel room[] where Daniel and Bounds were staying[,] Agent Miller located a[] user amount of high-grade marijuana and paraphernalia. Agents did not locate contraband in Iniguez’s room.

(Warrant Aff. R. 19-1, PageID 78–79.)

The affidavit notes that the hotel room search occurred “[a]fter the consent search.” (Id. at

PageID 78). Given the preceding statements, this reference to a consent search can only refer to

the search of the Dodge Charger. And reading further, the affidavit discloses the contraband found

in the hotel room, so a reader could understand the affidavit’s bare mention of a consent search to

suggest that nothing was found in the car. This also comports with Leslie’s testimony at the

evidentiary hearing, where he stated that he “thought that . . . [he] had mentioned that search had

taken place,” but that it was “very possible” he had failed to state that officers found no contraband.

(Hr’g Tr., R. 22, PageID 119.)

In context, it is not clear that the affidavit’s failure to clarify that nothing was found in the

car qualifies as an omission, let alone a material one: Failing to state that contraband was found

in the car search suggests—if obliquely—that nothing was found, particularly given that when

officers found contraband in the hotel room, it was stated in the affidavit. So including this

information would have only bolstered an accurate impression, rather than correcting a

misimpression; therefore, failing to clarify the search’s futility does not rise to the level of a

falsehood or a reckless disregard for the truth so as to avoid the good-faith exception. See United

States v. Asgari, 918 F.3d 509, 516 (6th Cir. 2019).

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Additionally, Daniel has not identified, nor are we aware of, a case where a similarly vague

statement in an affidavit qualified as a material omission that would defeat application of the good-

faith exception. On the contrary, in at least one case, we said that an unclear statement that could

be read in two ways (one favorable to the defendant, one unfavorable) did not constitute a

falsehood or material omission that would overcome the good-faith exception. Ardd, 911 F.3d at

352–53.

Nor does our case law support Daniel’s contention that the initial search’s fruitlessness

caused probable cause to wane such that officers could not reasonably rely on the search warrant.

True, officers’ awareness of an initial, fruitless search of the location is “relevant to a determination

of whether they relied on the warrant in good faith.” United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 932

(6th Cir. 1990). But it is not dispositive if, under the specific facts of the case, failure to mention

the initial search’s lack of results would not have led the judge issuing the warrant to a different

conclusion. See id. at 934.

Such is the case here. Aside from the fact that context clues indicate that nothing was

found in the car, the initial search here was akin to the search in Bowling—a fifteen-minute search

of a trailer—where we affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress. Id. Like in Bowling, the search

of the Dodge Charger was brief, lasting at most ten minutes, and the evidence was ultimately found

in a location not originally searched, a hidden “aftermarket” compartment. So, as in Bowling, the

“search here was not so broad as to . . . imply bad faith.” Id.; see also United States v. Green,

554 F. App’x 491, 495–97 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming the denial of a motion to suppress where the

omitted fact, if disclosed, would not have changed the outcome of the issuing judge’s probable-

cause analysis).

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By contrast, in cases where brief searches have caused probable cause or reasonable

suspicion to wane, officers received some kind of affirmative indication that there was no

contraband in the vehicle, such as with a drug-sniffing dog. See, e.g., United States v. Davis,

430 F.3d 345, 356 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that officers’ reasonable suspicion that the defendant’s

car held contraband was dispelled after the “highly trained” drug-sniffing dog at the scene failed

to alert); see also Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251, 260 (6th Cir. 2020) (“A reasonable jury could

conclude that the dog’s failure to alert inside the car dispelled the probable cause provided by its

initial alert to the exterior”). There was no affirmative indication here disproving the existence of

contraband in the car, putting this case closer to Bowling and Green, where we affirmed denials of

motions to suppress because omitted information would not have altered the probable-cause

calculus.

Daniel has not demonstrated that the omission of the initial car search’s fruitlessness from

the affidavit amounted to a deliberate falsehood or showed reckless disregard for the truth.

Therefore, even if the warrant lacked probable cause, the good-faith exception applies. And

although the district court affirmed on the basis of probable cause and did not apply the good-faith

exception, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Boler v. Early, 865 F.3d 391,

414 (6th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Gilbert, 952 F.3d 759, 762–63 (6th Cir. 2020)

(affirming based on the good-faith exception where the district court had resolved a motion to

suppress on probable-cause grounds).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

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