14‐2706‐cr United States v. Aldeen
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2014
(Submitted: June 22, 2015 Decided: July 6, 2015)
Docket No. 14‐2706‐cr
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
AHMED ALDEEN,
Defendant‐Appellant.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Before: CABRANES, POOLER, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from a July 28, 2014 judgment of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York (Townes, J.), sentencing defendant‐
appellant Ahmed Aldeen to eighteen monthsʹ imprisonment and three yearsʹ supervised release for a violation of the conditions of his supervised release. On
appeal, Aldeen argues that his above‐Guidelines sentence was procedurally and
substantively unreasonable. Because we find that the district court did not
comply with its procedural obligations to provide an adequate explanation of
Aldeenʹs sentence, we vacate and remand for resentencing and, to the extent
necessary, further fact‐finding and explanation of the sentence imposed.
REMANDED.
____________________________
Karen L. Koniuszy and Susan Corkery, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Kelly T. Currie, Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
Yuanchung Lee, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., New York, NY, for Defendant‐Appellant. ____________________________
CHIN, Circuit Judge:
Defendant‐appellant Ahmed Aldeen appeals from a July 28, 2014
judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Townes, J.), convicting him, following a guilty plea, of violating for the second
time the conditions of his supervised release by associating with a convicted
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felon. As he admitted at his plea allocution, Aldeen spoke to a member of his sex
offender treatment group in the subway, after one of their sessions. The district
court revoked Aldeenʹs supervision and sentenced him to eighteen monthsʹ
imprisonment to be followed by an additional three years of supervised release.
Aldeen now challenges his above‐Guidelines sentence on both
procedural and substantive grounds. For the reasons set forth below, we remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
In August 2008, Aldeen was convicted, following a guilty plea, of
one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(5) and (b)(2). In his plea allocution, Aldeen admitted that in the
course of downloading adult pornography, he came into possession of two
videos of child pornography, which he kept and viewed even after discovering
they contained child pornography. The district court sentenced him to fifty‐one
monthsʹ imprisonment and three yearsʹ supervised release. The judgment
contained the standard conditions of supervision, see U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c), as well
as five special conditions, see id. § 5D1.3(d), including a ban on using a computer
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or similar electronic device to access pornography ʺof any kind,ʺ and notifying
the Probation Department of any computer to which he had access.
After being released from prison, Aldeen began serving his initial
term of supervised release in February 2010. On September 28, 2011, the
Probation Department charged him with violating several of his conditions of
supervised release, including by failing to notify the Probation Department that
he had certain access to the internet. He eventually pled guilty to failing to
report to his Probation Officer. On August 22, 2012, the district court sentenced
him to ten monthsʹ imprisonment, the top of the Guidelines range, as well as
three additional yearsʹ supervised release. The judgment, however, was not
entered until January 28, 2013.
For this second term of supervised release, the district court
imposed the standard conditions of supervision and three special conditions.
Relevant to this appeal are the following:
[Standard Condition] 9) [T]he defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in criminal activity, and shall not associate with any person convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation officer . . . .
[Special Condition] 1) The defendant shall participate in a mental health treatment program, which may include
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participation in a treatment program for sexual disorders . . . .
[Special Condition] 2) The defendant is not to use a computer, Internet capable device, or similar electronic device to access pornography of any kind. . . . The defendant shall also cooperate with the United States Probation Departmentʹs Computer and Internet Monitoring program. Cooperation shall include . . . identifying computer systems, Internet capable devices, and/or similar electronic devices the defendant has access to . . . . The defendant may be limited to possessing only one personal Internet capable device, to facilitate our departmentʹs ability to effectively monitor his Internet related activities.1
App. at 47‐48.
In 2014, one year into this second term of supervised release, Aldeen
was again charged with violating the conditions of supervision. According to
the Probation Department, Aldeen allegedly spoke with another member of his
treatment group, also a convicted felon, on the subway following a group
treatment session, in violation of Standard Condition 9. Probation stated that it
had ʺreceived informationʺ that Aldeen had asked his fellow group member for
1 Aldeen appealed the district courtʹs judgment with respect to the prohibition against viewing pornography of any kind and argued that he should be permitted to view adult pornography. On motion of the government, this Court vacated the judgment and remanded for the district court to reformulate this special condition. On remand, the district court determined that it was appropriate to continue to bar Aldeen from viewing all pornography.
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ʺassistance with leaving the country undetected.ʺ Id. at 60. The Probation
Department also charged Aldeen with violating Special Condition 2, which
barred certain possession and uses of computers and other internet capable
devices, by, among other things, possessing an unreported cellphone that
contained pornographic images. The Probation Department additionally
charged Aldeen with committing a state crime by failing to disclose all internet
accounts and identifiers, including social networking accounts, in violation of his
level 1 registered sex offender obligations under the New York State Electronic
Security and Targeting of On‐line Predators Act.
Pursuant to an agreement with the government, Aldeen pled guilty
on April 17, 2014 to the first charge: associating with a person convicted of a
felony. He allocuted that he ʺspoke to one of [his] group at the subway,ʺ
knowing the person had been convicted of a felony, and knowing that he was not
supposed to have contact with other group members outside the treatment
program. Id. at 73.
The first charge was a grade ʺCʺ violation, as defined by U.S.S.G.
§ 7B1.1(a)(3). Because Aldeen was in Criminal History Category II when he was
originally sentenced, the Guidelines range for the violation was four to ten
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monthsʹ imprisonment per U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a). Because his original offense of
possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A was a Class C
felony, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(b)(2), 3559(a)(3), the maximum statutory sentence
that could be imposed on revocation was twenty‐four months, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3).
On April 23, 2014, the district court sentenced Aldeen to eighteen
monthsʹ imprisonment and an additional term of supervised release of three
years.2 The district court explained its sentence as follows:
Mr. Aldeen, you havenʹt even tried. You lie to everybody. I looked back through my notes. When I accepted your guilty plea, I did so and I said even though I know heʹs lied about parts of this, and you continue to do that. You used this unauthorized electronic device, this cell phone. You lied to your probation officer, and it was just totally unbelievable to
2Because Aldeen is scheduled to be released from prison on July 7, 2015, it is unlikely that his term of imprisonment will be shortened by the resentencing proceedings. See Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Locator, http://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (find by name: Ahmed Aldeen). Though resentencing will likely occur after his release, a criminal case ʺdoes not necessarily become moot when the convict finishes serving the sentenceʺ when there exists ʺʹsome concrete and continuing injury.ʹʺ United States v. Mercurris, 192 F.3d 290, 293 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). Aldeenʹs appeal is not moot ʺbecause a favorable appellate decision might prompt the district court to reduce [his] three‐year term of supervised release.ʺ United States v. Kleiner, 765 F.3d 155, 156 n.1 (2d Cir. 2014); see also Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding ʺeffectual reliefʺ possible where ʺthe district court might, because of our ruling, modify the length of [defendantʹs] supervised releaseʺ).
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me that you came to probation with that telephone, and you gave it to the officers downstairs and then picked it up as you were going out the door.
I mean, you just ignored the conditions that have been set for you. You admitted contact with a felon outside of the treatment facility. You lied in treatment. . . . [Y]ou took a polygraph examination,3 which indicated that you lied in your denial of contact with minors. I just ‐‐ and this is your second violation of supervised release. I just find that in order to deter you and hopefully cause you to really think about this and stop committing these offenses, you are ‐‐ the guidelines for the violation in charge one is ‐‐ those guidelines are four to ten months. That is far too short a term to afford deterrence in this case.
I do find that my sentence, which will hopefully get to you, must be above the advisory guideline range, just to try to [a]ffect you, in causing you to obey the conditions of supervised release.
App. at 80‐81. The district court concluded that Aldeenʹs ʺabidance of the
conditions of supervised release, . . . ha[s] been almost nil in this case.ʺ Id. at
86. Judgment was entered on July 28, 2014.
This appeal followed.
3After defense counsel objected to the district courtʹs reliance on the polygraph examination, the district court agreed that the polygraph examination, which the government had administered on February 6, 2014, would not be used as a basis for the district courtʹs sentence. ‐ 8 ‐
DISCUSSION
We review a sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness
under a ʺdeferential abuse‐of‐discretion standard.ʺ Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007); see United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 278 (2d Cir. 2012) (ʺ[O]ur
standard is ʹreasonableness,ʹ ʹa particularly deferential form of abuse‐of‐
discretion review.ʹʺ) (quoting United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 188 & n.5 (2d
Cir. 2008) (en banc)); see also United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 258 (2d Cir.
2014). Aldeen challenges both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of
his sentence.
A. Procedural Reasonableness
1. Applicable Law
A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court ʺfails to
calculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the
Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors,
selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain
the chosen sentence.ʺ United States v. Chu, 714 F.3d 742, 746 (2d Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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The court must ʺstate in open court the reasons for its imposition of
[a] particular sentence,ʺ 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), and where the sentence is outside an
advisory Guidelines range, the court must also state ʺthe specific reasonʺ for the
sentence imposed, in open court as well as in writing ‐‐ ʺwith specificity in a
statement of reasons formʺ that is part of the judgment, id. § 3553(c)(2). See
generally United States v. Sindima, 488 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2007). The sentencing
courtʹs ʺstatement of reasons must at least explain ‐‐ in enough detail to allow a
reviewing court, the defendant, his or her counsel, and members of the public to
understand ‐‐ why the considerations used as justifications for the sentence are
ʹsufficiently compelling [] or present to the degree necessary to support the
sentence imposed.ʹʺ Id. at 86 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
United States v. Rattoballi, 452 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)).
When a district judge deviates from an advisory Guidelines range, it
must consider the ʺextent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is
sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.ʺ Cavera, 550 F.3d at
189 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50)). Where there is a variance, on appellate review,
ʺwe may take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a
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deviation from the Guidelines. . . . [A] major departure should be supported by a
more significant justification than a minor one.ʺ United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d
93, 135 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
These concepts apply as well to sentences for violations of
supervised release. See United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005)
(ʺThe standard of review on the appeal of a sentence for violation of supervised
release is now the same standard as for sentencing generally: whether the
sentence imposed is reasonable.ʺ). Nonetheless, there are some differences
between sentencing for the underlying crime and sentencing for a violation of
supervised release. Supervised release was established by the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., and was designed ʺto
ease the defendantʹs transition into the community after the service of a long
prison term for a particularly serious offense, or to provide rehabilitation to a
defendant who has spent a fairly short period in prison for punishment or other
purposes but still needs supervision and training programs after release.ʺ S. Rep.
No. 98‐225, at 124 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3307; see also United
States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000) (ʺCongress intended supervised release to
assist individuals in their transition to community life. Supervised release fulfills
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rehabilitative ends, distinct from those served by incarceration.ʺ). Supervised
release is not, fundamentally, part of the punishment; rather, its focus is
rehabilitation.4
Though the imposition of an above‐Guidelines sentence triggers a
ʺhigher descriptive obligation,ʺ United States v. Cassesse, 685 F.3d 186, 193 (2d Cir.
2012), we simultaneously require less rigorous specificity where, as here, a court
sentences a defendant for violation of supervised release. See United States v.
Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 132‐33 (2d Cir. 2008) (ʺ[A] courtʹs statement of its
reasons for going beyond non‐binding policy statements in imposing a sentence
after revoking a defendantʹs probationary term need not be as specific as has
been required when courts departed from guidelines that were, before Booker,
considered to be mandatory.ʺ (quoting United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 245
(2d Cir. 2005))); see also United States v. Hargrove, 497 F.3d 256, 260‐61 (2d Cir.
The Sentencing Commission, in a 2010 report, drew a parallel 4
between the ʺprimary purpose of supervised release ‐‐ to facilitate the reintegration of federal prisoners back into the community,ʺ and ʺthe purpose of the Second Chance Act of 2007, . . . which was intended to ʹreduce recidivism, increase public safety, and help state and local governments better address the growing population of ex‐offenders returning to their communities.ʹʺ U.S. Sentencing Commʹn, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release 2 n.11 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research‐and‐publications/research‐ publications/2010/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf (last visited July 6, 2015); see also United States v. Wessels, 539 F.3d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 2008) (Bright, J., concurring) (ʺCongress has directed a shift from policing those on parole to rehabilitating them.ʺ). ‐ 12 ‐
2007) (ʺWe have drawn a sharp divide between initial sentencing and the
revocation of supervised release with respect to the protections and safeguards
available to the individual.ʺ).
2. Application
Aldeen argues that the district court erred by failing to state in open
court, and in writing as part of its judgment, the reasons for imposing an above‐
Guidelines sentence with the specificity required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). ʺSection
3553(c) requires no specific formulas or incantations; rather, the length and detail
required of a district courtʹs explanation varies according to the circumstances.ʺ
Cassesse, 685 F.3d at 192. As a general matter, the requirements of § 3553(c) have
ʺlikely been satisfied when a courtʹs statements meet the goals ʹof (1) informing
the defendant of the reasons for his sentence, (2) permitting meaningful appellate
review, (3) enabling the public to learn why the defendant received a particular
sentence, and (4) guiding probation officers and prison officials in developing a
program to meet the defendantʹs needs.ʹʺ Id. at 192‐93 (quoting United States v.
Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2007)). Because Aldeen did not object at
sentencing to the district courtʹs failure to explain its reasoning, we review his
procedural challenge for plain error. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d at 208.
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We conclude that the district court committed plain error by failing
to adequately explain the reasoning for its sentence.
On the present record, we are not persuaded that the district court
provided a sufficiently compelling justification to support the degree of the
variance. See Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189. The district court imposed a custodial
sentence of eighteen months, when the Guidelines only called for four to ten
months, as well as an additional three years of supervised release. Moreover,
Aldeen pled guilty only to associating with a convicted felon, and he admitted
only that he ʺspoke to one of [his] group at the subwayʺ following one of their
group treatment sessions. App. at 73. Without more, this conduct ‐‐ speaking to
a member of the treatment group in the subway after one of the sessions ‐‐ would
not seem to warrant such a substantially above‐Guidelines sentence. Indeed, it
would seem that the district courtʹs decision to impose an 18‐month sentence and
another three years of supervised release was driven by other considerations.
At the sentencing, the government argued that an above‐Guidelines
sentence was appropriate because Aldeen had ʺmultiple unreported devices.ʺ Id.
at 78. The Probation Officer argued that an above‐Guidelines sentence was
appropriate because Aldeen ʺnever once reported any sexual urges in any of
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those [treatment] sessions, or any struggles with pornography,ʺ and that he
ʺseems to not be able to control himself, with not having unauthorized devices
and using them for sexual purposes.ʺ Id. at 79. The district court seemed to
accept the arguments, as it made clear that it was troubled by Aldeenʹs purported
use of an ʺunauthorized electronic device, [a] cell phone.ʺ Id. at 80.
Aldeen pled guilty, however, only to associating with a convicted
felon. He did not admit to possession of multiple unauthorized devices or using
any such devices for pornographic purposes, as the Probation Department
alleged, and, in fact, that charge (the second specification) was dismissed. The
judgment declared that ʺ[t]he defendant has not violated condition(s) 2‐3 and is
discharged as to such violation(s) [of his] condition[s].ʺ Id. at 87.
Ordinarily, conduct supporting acquitted or dismissed charges may
be taken into account in sentencing if the government establishes that conduct by
a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 155‐56
(2007); United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 684 (2d Cir. 1990) (permitting the use of
dismissed charges to support an above‐Guidelines sentence). Such conduct,
however, must still ʺrelate in some way to the offense of conviction,ʺ even if that
relation is not ʺtechnically coveredʺ by the Guidelinesʹ definition of relevant
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conduct. Kim, 896 F.2d at 684; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1) (defining relevant
conduct as ʺall acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant . . . that
occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for
that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for
that offenseʺ). As we clarified in United States v. Wernick, more is required than
ʺthe bare fact of temporal overlap.ʺ 691 F.3d 108, 115 (2d Cir. 2012); see also
United States v. Ahders, 622 F.3d 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2010) (requiring more than
ʺmere temporal proximityʺ). For instance, ʺif a bank executive is engaged in
embezzling money from her company from February to September, and she
assaults a coworker at an office party in July,ʺ the assault could not be deemed
ʺrelevantʺ for the purposes of sentencing. Wernick, 691 F.3d at 115.
Here, it appears that the district court relied on the allegations
regarding the use of multiple unauthorized devices, even though that charge was
dismissed. But there was no hearing, and, even assuming that Aldeen made use
of multiple unauthorized devices, the district court made no specific finding that
the use of multiple unauthorized devices was relevant to the conduct of
conviction: associating with a convicted felon by communicating with him in the
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subway following a group treatment session. In the absence of further
explanation and specific findings, it is difficult for us to evaluate whether there
was a meaningful, and not merely temporal, connection.
Similarly, with respect to the subway conversation, the government
argued that Aldeen had ʺpreviously abscondedʺ and ʺhere he is approaching
somebody, asking for information about how to flee the country.ʺ App. at 78.
But in his plea allocution, Aldeen admitted only to speaking with a member of
the group in the subway after a session. He did not admit that he asked the
group member for assistance in fleeing the country, as the government alleged.
The Probation Department report asserted only that the Probation Officer had
ʺreceived informationʺ to this effect, without even identifying the source of the
information. Id. at 60. The district court did not make any findings on this issue,
and it is unclear, on this record, whether the communication between Aldeen
and the group member was innocuous or whether Aldeen was genuinely up to
no good.
Because there was a major deviation from the Guidelines range in
this case, the district court was obliged to provide a more substantial justification
for its sentence. On the current record, in the absence of specific findings and a
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more detailed explanation, we are unable to conclude that there were
ʺsufficiently compellingʺ reasons to support the deviation. Cavera, 550 F.3d at
189 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). Moreover, we cannot discern from this record
whether the district courtʹs principal purpose in imposing eighteen monthsʹ
imprisonment and three additional years of supervised release was to punish
Aldeen or to further his rehabilitation.
The written statement of reasons fares no better. Section 3553(c)(2)
requires that the district court state ʺwith specificityʺ the ʺspecific reason for the
impositionʺ of an above‐Guidelines sentence on the written statement of reasons
form. The district court failed to do so. Instead, in its ʺStatement of Reasonsʺ in
the non‐public portion of the judgment, the district court checked off the box for
a sentence ʺabove the advisory policy statement range,ʺ but left blank Part IV(C),
which asked for an explanation of ʺthe facts justifying a sentence outside the
advisory policy statement.ʺ We have recognized that ʺʹthe better courseʹ in such
circumstances [is] ʹto remand so that noncompliance with subsection 3553(c)(2)
may be remedied.ʹʺ Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d at 133 (quoting United States v. Jones,
460 F.3d 191, 197 (2d Cir. 2006)). At a minimum, the district court should have
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completed Part IV(C) of the statement of reasons form to comport with its
statutory obligations.
We acknowledge that sentencings in revocation proceedings are
often conducted in a more informal manner than sentencings in the underlying
criminal cases. We do not suggest that the sentencing for violations of
supervised release must be accompanied by ʺ[t]he full panoply of procedural
safeguardsʺ that attends a sentencing on initial criminal charges. United States v.
Carlton, 442 F.3d 802, 809 (2d Cir. 2006). Nonetheless, even in the revocation
context, a district court must sufficiently explain its reasoning so that the parties,
the public, and a reviewing court can understand the justification for the
sentence, particularly when there is a material deviation.
Accordingly, we remand to the district court for further findings and
explanation. To the extent the district court relies on conduct that was the
subject of the dismissed charges or on misbehavior beyond the conduct of
conviction, the district court must make findings with respect to the factual bases
for its sentencing decision, including, inter alia, whether there was a meaningful
connection between the conduct of conviction and conduct falling beyond the
scope of the defendantʹs plea. On remand, if the district court adheres to its
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decision to deviate above the Guidelines range, it shall also provide a written
explanation in the judgment to memorialize in writing the stated reasons for the
sentence.
B. Substantive Reasonableness
We turn now to the question of substantive reasonableness: whether
the sentence of eighteen monthsʹ imprisonment and three additional yearsʹ
supervised release ʺshock[s] the conscience,ʺ constitutes a ʺmanifest injustice,ʺ or
is otherwise substantively unreasonable. United States v. Rigas, 583 F.3d 108, 123
(2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see generally Chu, 714 F.3d at
746, 748‐49. Our review for substantive unreasonableness is ʺparticularly
deferential.ʺ Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d at 289 (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). We will set
aside sentences as substantively unreasonable ʺonly in exceptional cases where
the trial courtʹs decision ʹcannot be located within the range of permissible
decisions,ʹʺ Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208,
238 (2d Cir. 2007)), that is, when sentences ʺare so ʹshockingly high, shockingly
low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of lawʹ that allowing them to stand
would ʹdamage the administration of justice.ʹʺ Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d at 289
(quoting Rigas, 583 F.3d at 123).
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As this Court has observed, ʺthe measure of what is conscience‐
shocking is no calibrated yard stick.ʺ OʹConnor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 203 (2d
Cir. 2005) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998)). In the
instant case, on this record, even if Aldeenʹs sentence does not shock the
conscience, it at the very least stirs the conscience. As suggested above, a
sentence of eighteen monthsʹ imprisonment and three additional yearsʹ
supervised release for speaking to a fellow member of the treatment group in the
subway following a treatment session, without more, seems exceedingly harsh.
There may have been additional circumstances justifying such a material
deviation, but for the reasons discussed above, on this record we are unable to
discern them. Accordingly, remand for a fuller record will facilitate appellate
review of the question of substantive reasonableness as well. See United States v.
Ahuja, 936 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1991) (ʺ[I]n cases where the impact of our
invalidation of a departure ground is unclear or the sentence imposed by the
district court strains the bounds of reasonableness, remand for resentencing may
well be warranted.ʺ).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REMAND to the district court with
instructions that it vacate the sentence and resentence Aldeen in accordance with
the above. Because Aldeen has already served the majority of his above‐
Guidelines sentence, the mandate shall issue forthwith.
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