United States v. Airco, Inc.

386 F. Supp. 915, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11377
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 30, 1974
Docket72 Civ. 265
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 386 F. Supp. 915 (United States v. Airco, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Airco, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 915, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11377 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

Opinion

OPINION

BONSAL, District Judge.

The United States commenced this action against defendant Aireo, Inc. (“Aireo”) on January 20, 1972 to prevent and restrain alleged continuing violations by Aireo of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 1px solid var(--green-border)">2. Jurisdiction is predicated on section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4.

Aireo, formerly known as the Air Reduction Company, Inc. is a diversified manufacturing company incorporated under the laws of New York. In 1972, the products which Aireo produced and sold were within two major groups: (i) metallurgical and (ii) gases and related equipment. Products of the metallurgical group include ferroalloys, carbon, graphite, electrodes, and metal. The major products of the gases and related equipment group are industrial gases, cryogenic equipment, welding and cutting equipment, and medical gases and equipment. Of Airco’s sales of approximately $518 million in 1972, products of the metallurgical group accounted for 42.6% and products of the gases and related equipment group accounted for 57.4%. In 1972 Aireo ranked 255th in *917 sales on Fortune’s Directory of the 500 largest United States industrial corporations and had assets of some $607 million.

The complaint charges that since at least as early as 1959, and continuing to the date on which the complaint was filed, Aireo violated section 1 of the Sherman Act “by entering into combinations involving reciprocal purchasing arrangements with respect to a substantial amount of interstate commerce whereby the defendant purchased products and services sold by various suppliers upon the understanding that those suppliers would purchase the products and services of the defendant, in unreasonable restraint of the aforesaid trade and commerce.” In addition, the complaint charges that during this same period of time Aireo, “through the use of its purchasing power,” violated section 2 of the Sherman Act “by attempting to monopolize that part of the aforementioned interstate trade and commerce consisting of the requirements of actual and potential suppliers of the defendant for ferroalloys, industrial gases and other products sold by the defendant.” The action was tried by the Court without a jury on July 11 and 12, 1974. After completion of the government’s case, Aireo moved pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 41(b) for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the government has shown no right to relief. Under F.R.Civ.P. 41(b) this Court has the power to decide the case on the merits and, unlike in a jury case, need not consider the government’s evidence in a light most favorable to the government. 5 J. Moore, Federal Practice If 41.13 [3], at 1155 (2d ed. 1974). See also Huber v. American President Lines, 240 F.2d 778, 779 (2d Cir. 1957). However, in reaching the decision hereinafter set forth, the Court has interpreted the evidence in a light most favorable to the government.

Section 1 of the Sherman Act

The government contends that Aireo violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by entering into combinations with its suppliers involving reciprocal buying. Simply defined, reciprocal buying is the practice of if you buy from me, I will buy from you, or conversely, if you don’t buy from me, I won’t buy from you. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F.Supp. 36, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Whether accomplished by coercion or by more subtle arrangements, reciprocal buying has been recognized by the Supreme Court as “one of the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust laws are aimed. The practice results in ‘an irrelevant and alien factor,’ . . . intruding into the choice among competing products, creating at the least ‘a priority on the business at equal prices.’” Federal Trade Commission v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594, 85 S.Ct. 1220, 1221, 14 L.Ed.2d 95 (1965). Among the consequences of reciprocal buying is the foreclosure of markets to competitors through use of purchasing power.

Courts have most frequently confronted reciprocal buying as an anti-competitive practice in the context of conglomerate mergers challenged under section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18. See Federal Trade Commission v. Consolidated Foods Corp., supra; Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009, 90 S.Ct. 567, 24 L.Ed.2d 501 (1970); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963), affirming 218 F.Supp. 530 (W.D.Pa. 1963). The leading case on reciprocal buying as a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act is United States v. General Dynamics Corp., supra.

The General Dynamics case arose out of a merger between General Dynamics Corporation and Liquid Carbonic Corporation, which resulted in Liquid Carbonic’s becoming a division of General Dynamics. Finding that the merger created a potential for reciprocal buying which had been actively exploited to benefit the sales of the Liquid Car *918 bonic division and that at the time of the merger both General Dynamics and Liquid Carbonic had the intent to employ reciprocity to generate sales, the Court held that the merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act. However, although the Court found the presence of contracts for the sale of Liquid Carbonic’s products to suppliers of General Dynamics, which were predicated on reciprocal buying, it held that a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act by reason of the actual practice of reciprocal buying had not been established because the government had failed to prove that a not insubstantial amount of commerce was affected.

In analyzing reciprocal buying as a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Court in General Dynamics drew an analogy with tying arrangements and focused on “specific contracts or combinations between the defendant’s Liquid Carbonic Division and vendors of General Dynamics which were consummated as a result of” reciprocity. 258 F.Supp. at 51. The government had argued that if reciprocity was systematically interjected into the sales of the Liquid Carbonic division, and statistics and statements of the defendant indicated that the program was effective, then the Court could infer the existence of contracts in restraint of trade. The Court’s answer is quoted at length:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
386 F. Supp. 915, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11377, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-airco-inc-nysd-1974.