United States v. Aguirre

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: April 20, 2026
• Docket: 25-2052
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 25-2052 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:23-cr-00187-DCN-1 v. MEMORANDUM* HECTOR AGUIRRE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Idaho David C. Nye, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 16, 2026** Portland, Oregon

Before: OWENS, VANDYKE, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Hector Aguirre appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to

suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. We have jurisdiction under 28

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). U.S.C. § 1291. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them

here. We affirm.

1. The district court properly denied Aguirre’s motion to suppress because

Officer Seferino Tapia’s opening of Aguirre’s driver-side door was reasonable

under the circumstances of the traffic stop. The parties do not dispute that the

officers lawfully stopped Aguirre after observing traffic violations, including a

missing front license plate and suspended registration. When Officer Tapia

approached the vehicle, Aguirre’s driver-side window was only partially open and

tinted, which obstructed Officer Tapia’s view of the interior, and Aguirre stated

that the window was broken. Aguirre also indicated that the door could not be

opened from the inside. Under these circumstances, opening the door from the

outside was a minimal and reasonable step to facilitate communication with the

driver and ensure officer safety during the stop. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434

U.S. 106, 110 (1977); Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 356 (2015).

Additional circumstances reinforced the reasonableness of Officer Tapia’s

actions. Officer Tapia knew that Aguirre was a gang affiliate from prior contacts,

and observed a red bandana associated with a gang hanging from the vehicle’s

rearview mirror. Given the obstructed visibility into the vehicle, as well as these

safety considerations, Officer Tapia’s limited action in opening the door was

objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111.

2 25-2052 Because Officer Tapia’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances,

we need not reach the question of whether opening Aguirre’s driver-side door was

a search.

2. Even if Officer Tapia’s act of opening the door constituted a Fourth

Amendment violation, suppression would not be warranted because the challenged

evidence was discovered through an independent source. See United States v.

Gorman, 859 F.3d 706, 718 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232,

238 (2016)).

Here, a second officer, Talon Derrick, independently developed probable

cause to search Aguirre’s vehicle from a lawful vantage point at the passenger-side

window. From that position, Officer Derrick detected the odor of marijuana

emanating from the vehicle and observed behavior consistent with drug use,

including that Aguirre looked “moderately lethargic.” Aguirre also admitted to

Officer Derrick that marijuana was present in the vehicle. Because possession of

marijuana is unlawful in Idaho, these observations supplied probable cause to

believe that the vehicle contained contraband. Idaho Code §§ 37-2732(c)(3), 37-

2705(d)(19); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993) (noting

that the plain-view doctrine may be analogized to other senses); State v. Gonzalez,

789 P.2d 206, 207 (Id. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that, in Idaho, smelling marijuana

in a car supplies probable cause to search the vehicle). The automobile exception

3 25-2052 therefore authorized the subsequent search of the vehicle that produced the

challenged evidence.

AFFIRMED.

4 25-2052