United States v. Aguilar

59 F. App'x 326
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 26, 2003
Docket01-4237
StatusUnpublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 59 F. App'x 326 (United States v. Aguilar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Aguilar, 59 F. App'x 326 (10th Cir. 2003).

Opinion

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

Defendant Eva Daisy Aguilar (“Aguilar”) was indicted on one count of possession of ammunition by a restricted person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and one count of aiding and abetting an individual to knowingly enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. A jury found Aguilar guilty of aiding and abetting marriage fraud and not guilty of possession of ammunition by a restricted person. Aguilar appeals, arguing that the district court improperly admitted evidence of prior fraudulent marriage arrangements in violation of Rules 403 and 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I. BACKGROUND

Aguilar made arrangements for Kimberly Reeves (“Reeves”) to marry Jesus Amaya (“Amaya”) in exchange for $5000, rent and utilities, and payment for a divorce which would occur eighteen months after the marriage. Reeves was aware Amaya was in the United States illegally and needed to get married before April 30th for immigration purposes. 1 Prior to the wedding, Reeves and Amaya completed INS paperwork, with Aguilar’s assistance, and Reeves tried on wedding dresses at Aguilar’s house. Aguilar told Reeves that she and Amaya would have to live together for thirty days and, afterwards, Amaya would need to keep some belongings at the apartment and stay the night on occasion. Two days after meeting, Reeves and Amaya were married in Las Vegas, Nevada. Shortly after the wedding, Reeves wanted to “back out” of the marriage. After an argument with her parents, the police were contacted. Reeves falsely reported to the police that she had been kidnapped. During the kidnapping investigation, police discovered that Aguilar had arranged for the marriage of Reeves and Amaya.

Aguilar and four others were indicted for aiding and abetting an individual to knowingly enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws. One week before trial, the government filed a notice of intent to rely upon Rule 404(b) evidence. An amended and supplemented notice of intent was submitted on the Friday before trial. In the notices, the government announced its intention to introduce evidence through the testimony of at least five witnesses that Aguilar advised the witnesses about false marriage arrangements, attempted to arrange at least five fraudulent marriages in order to evade immigration laws, and solicited one witness to provide potential brides for false marriages. In addition, the government intended to introduce evidence that Aguilar *328 previously aided and abetted illegal aliens to enter the United States and that Aguilar had illegally possessed other firearms and ammunition not charged in the indictment.

At trial, defense counsel objected to the notices on the grounds that they were untimely, unspecific, and that the evidence sought to be presented was more prejudicial than probative. The government argued that the evidence of the prior fraudulent marriage arrangements was offered to show a common scheme or plan. The district court overruled Aguilar’s objection in part: it admitted the evidence of Aguilar’s prior fraudulent marriage arrangements but excluded evidence concerning the aiding and abetting and the firearm and ammunition possession as more prejudicial than probative.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 404(b) Notice

Aguilar contends the district court should have excluded the evidence of prior fraudulent marriage arrangements because the notice of intent was untimely and, therefore, prejudicial. Rule 404(b)’s notice provision states that “upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.” Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Thus, according to Rule 404(b), pretrial notice is required only when the defense requests such advance notice. United States v. Tuesta-Toro, 29 F.3d 771, 775 (1st Cir.1994) (stating defense must present a timely request to “alert the prosecution that the defense is invoking its specific right to pretrial notification” under 404(b)); United States v. Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1148 (6th Cir. 1995) (concluding that Rule 404(b) places an initial duty on the defense to request the provision of prior bad acts evidence from the prosecutor); United States v. Vega, 188 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.1999) (noting that the notice requirement is not triggered until a request is made by the defendant).

In this case, Aguilar did not request reasonable pretrial notice of the government’s intention to rely on prior bad acts evidence during trial. Thus, the government acted appropriately under Rule 404(b) when it submitted its notice of intent one week before trial because it was not obligated to provide pretrial notice. Because there was no violation of Rule 404(b) and Aguilar’s counsel declined to seek a continuance to deal with the evidence, there was no error that resulted in prejudice.

Aguilar further objected that the pretrial notice filed by the government was not specific as to the witnesses and evidence to be admitted. Rule 404(b) requires the prosecution to disclose “the general nature” of evidence intended to be introduced. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). Here, the government apprised Aguilar of the names of the witnesses and the content of their testimony. The supplemental notice specified in further detail the testimony of certain witnesses. The notices were more than sufficient to provide the “general nature” of evidence sought to be admitted by the government under Rule 404(b).

B. Admission under Rule 404(b)

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Bluebook (online)
59 F. App'x 326, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-aguilar-ca10-2003.