UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DisTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, and LUCIA HURTADO, NOEMI ROMAN, and ARGENTINA ROQUE, Intervenor-Plaintiffs, V. Case No: 6:18-cv-1836-Orl-28GJK ADVOCATE LAW GROUPS OF FLORIDA, P.A., JON B. LINDEMAN, JR., and EPHIGENIA K. LINDEMAN, Defendants.
ORDER In this action under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Court previously granted th Defendants’ motions to dismiss but also granted leave to amend to the United States □ America and the three Intervenor-Plaintiffs. (Order, Doc. 60). Plaintiffs have file Amended Complaints, (Docs. 65 & 66), and Defendants again move to dismiss unde Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief ca be granted, (Docs. 69 & 70). Upon consideration of the parties’ filings and pertinent law Defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied. I. Legal Standards “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain... a short and plain statemen of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[D]etailec factual allegations” are not required, but “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal
956 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) “To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factu: matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quotin Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In considering a motion to dismiss brought under Rul 12(b)(6), a court limits its “consideration to the well-pleaded factual allegations, document central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed.” La Grasta v. Firs Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004). Il. Background The background facts were recounted at length in the prior Order (Doc. 60) and wi only briefly be stated here. Defendant Advocate Law Groups of Florida, P.A. is a law □□□□ and Defendant John Lindeman, Jr. is its general managing partner. (Doc. 65 □□□ 8-9). M Lindeman’s wife, Defendant Ephigenia Lindeman, is the firm’s chief financial officer. (Ie 1] 9-10). Intervenor-Plaintiffs are Hispanic, native Spanish-speakers who have limite proficiency in the English language. (Id. ]{] 5-7). They allegedly responded to Defendants advertisements for “loan modification and foreclosure rescue services,” retaine Defendants to get assistance in reducing their mortgage payments, and paid Defendant thousands of dollars in fees. (Id. {J 8, 12). According to Plaintiffs, Defendants “deliberately targeted” the Intervenor-Plaintiff: and other Hispanic homeowners “for a scheme involving unfair and predatory □□□ modifications and foreclosure rescue services,” (id. 11), and did not deliver on thei promises. Intervenor-Plaintiff Lucia Hurtado ended up selling her house in a short sale (id. ] 62); Intervenor-Plaintiff Noemi Roman’s house was sold at a foreclosure sale, (id Nf 79-82); and Intervenor-Plaintiff Argentina Roque eventually obtained loan modificatior with the help of a nonprofit organization, (id. J 102).
In their initial Complaints (Docs. 1 & 30), Plaintiffs brought claims under sever provisions of the FHA—42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3604(b), 3605, 3617, and 3614. This Cou granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismissed the claims brought unde §§ 3604(a), 3604(b), and 3605 with prejudice. In their § 3604(a) claim, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants had “made unavailable or den[ied] a dwelling” to Plaintiffs “becaus of .. . national origin’ as prohibited by that provision. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). But this Cou rejected Plaintiffs’ attempts to bring Defendants’ alleged conduct within this provision. An § 3604(b) makes it “unlawful... [t]o discriminate against any person in the term: conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services c facilities in connection therewith, because of . . . national origin.” Id. § 3604(b). This Cou found Plaintiffs’ allegations against Defendants to also be outside the terms of thi provision. □ Section 3605 makes it “unlawful for any person or other entity whose busines includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against an person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such | transaction, because of . . . national origin.” Id. § 3605(a). In the prior Order, this Cour dismissed the § 3605 claim because Plaintiffs did “not allege facts plausibly □□□□□□□□□□ conclusion that Defendants’ ‘business includes engaging in residential real estate-relate transactions” as defined in that section. (Doc. 60 at 14). All of the Plaintiffs also brought claims under § 3617, prohibiting coercion intimidation, threats, and interference with housing rights provided by other sections of the FHA, and the United States brought a claim under § 3614, addressing “pattern or practice cases. The Court dismissed those claims without prejudice and with leave to amend sx that Plaintiffs could clarify their § 3617 theory, on which a § 3614 claim could then □□□□□□□□
be based. Plaintiffs have now repleaded the § 3617 and § 3614 claims, and Defendant again move to dismiss. A. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 Section 3617 provides that it is “unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfer with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised c enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercis or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 « this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 3617. Although the Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims fc violations of §§ 3604 and 3605, an underlying violation of one of the sections □□□□□□□□□ □□ § 3617 is not required for an actionable § 3617 claim. See Sofarelli v. Pinellas Cnty., 93 F.2d 718, 721-22 (11th Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 781. 82 (7th Cir. 2009) (To hold otherwise would make § 3617 entirely duplicative of the othe FHA provisions . . .. Coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference with or on account of □ person's exercise of his or her §§ 3603-3606 rights can be distinct from outright violation: of §§ 3603-3606.”). The facts alleged in the Amended Complaints are different from those of mos § 3617 cases, which typically involve disputes such as those between neighbors o between a homeowner and a homeowners’ association.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DisTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, and LUCIA HURTADO, NOEMI ROMAN, and ARGENTINA ROQUE, Intervenor-Plaintiffs, V. Case No: 6:18-cv-1836-Orl-28GJK ADVOCATE LAW GROUPS OF FLORIDA, P.A., JON B. LINDEMAN, JR., and EPHIGENIA K. LINDEMAN, Defendants.
ORDER In this action under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Court previously granted th Defendants’ motions to dismiss but also granted leave to amend to the United States □ America and the three Intervenor-Plaintiffs. (Order, Doc. 60). Plaintiffs have file Amended Complaints, (Docs. 65 & 66), and Defendants again move to dismiss unde Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief ca be granted, (Docs. 69 & 70). Upon consideration of the parties’ filings and pertinent law Defendants’ motions to dismiss are denied. I. Legal Standards “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain... a short and plain statemen of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[D]etailec factual allegations” are not required, but “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal
956 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) “To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factu: matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (quotin Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). In considering a motion to dismiss brought under Rul 12(b)(6), a court limits its “consideration to the well-pleaded factual allegations, document central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed.” La Grasta v. Firs Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004). Il. Background The background facts were recounted at length in the prior Order (Doc. 60) and wi only briefly be stated here. Defendant Advocate Law Groups of Florida, P.A. is a law □□□□ and Defendant John Lindeman, Jr. is its general managing partner. (Doc. 65 □□□ 8-9). M Lindeman’s wife, Defendant Ephigenia Lindeman, is the firm’s chief financial officer. (Ie 1] 9-10). Intervenor-Plaintiffs are Hispanic, native Spanish-speakers who have limite proficiency in the English language. (Id. ]{] 5-7). They allegedly responded to Defendants advertisements for “loan modification and foreclosure rescue services,” retaine Defendants to get assistance in reducing their mortgage payments, and paid Defendant thousands of dollars in fees. (Id. {J 8, 12). According to Plaintiffs, Defendants “deliberately targeted” the Intervenor-Plaintiff: and other Hispanic homeowners “for a scheme involving unfair and predatory □□□ modifications and foreclosure rescue services,” (id. 11), and did not deliver on thei promises. Intervenor-Plaintiff Lucia Hurtado ended up selling her house in a short sale (id. ] 62); Intervenor-Plaintiff Noemi Roman’s house was sold at a foreclosure sale, (id Nf 79-82); and Intervenor-Plaintiff Argentina Roque eventually obtained loan modificatior with the help of a nonprofit organization, (id. J 102).
In their initial Complaints (Docs. 1 & 30), Plaintiffs brought claims under sever provisions of the FHA—42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3604(b), 3605, 3617, and 3614. This Cou granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismissed the claims brought unde §§ 3604(a), 3604(b), and 3605 with prejudice. In their § 3604(a) claim, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants had “made unavailable or den[ied] a dwelling” to Plaintiffs “becaus of .. . national origin’ as prohibited by that provision. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). But this Cou rejected Plaintiffs’ attempts to bring Defendants’ alleged conduct within this provision. An § 3604(b) makes it “unlawful... [t]o discriminate against any person in the term: conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services c facilities in connection therewith, because of . . . national origin.” Id. § 3604(b). This Cou found Plaintiffs’ allegations against Defendants to also be outside the terms of thi provision. □ Section 3605 makes it “unlawful for any person or other entity whose busines includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate against an person in making available such a transaction, or in the terms or conditions of such | transaction, because of . . . national origin.” Id. § 3605(a). In the prior Order, this Cour dismissed the § 3605 claim because Plaintiffs did “not allege facts plausibly □□□□□□□□□□ conclusion that Defendants’ ‘business includes engaging in residential real estate-relate transactions” as defined in that section. (Doc. 60 at 14). All of the Plaintiffs also brought claims under § 3617, prohibiting coercion intimidation, threats, and interference with housing rights provided by other sections of the FHA, and the United States brought a claim under § 3614, addressing “pattern or practice cases. The Court dismissed those claims without prejudice and with leave to amend sx that Plaintiffs could clarify their § 3617 theory, on which a § 3614 claim could then □□□□□□□□
be based. Plaintiffs have now repleaded the § 3617 and § 3614 claims, and Defendant again move to dismiss. A. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 Section 3617 provides that it is “unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfer with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised c enjoyed, or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercis or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 « this title.” 42 U.S.C. § 3617. Although the Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims fc violations of §§ 3604 and 3605, an underlying violation of one of the sections □□□□□□□□□ □□ § 3617 is not required for an actionable § 3617 claim. See Sofarelli v. Pinellas Cnty., 93 F.2d 718, 721-22 (11th Cir. 1991); see also, e.g., Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771, 781. 82 (7th Cir. 2009) (To hold otherwise would make § 3617 entirely duplicative of the othe FHA provisions . . .. Coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference with or on account of □ person's exercise of his or her §§ 3603-3606 rights can be distinct from outright violation: of §§ 3603-3606.”). The facts alleged in the Amended Complaints are different from those of mos § 3617 cases, which typically involve disputes such as those between neighbors o between a homeowner and a homeowners’ association. But “the language of the FHA i: broad and inclusive,’ ‘prohibits a wide range of conduct,’ ‘has a broad remedial purpose, and ‘is written in decidedly far-reaching terms.”” Ga. State Conf. of the NAACP v. City o LaGrange, 940 F.3d 627, 631-32 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting City of Miami-v. Wells Fargo é Co., 923 F.3d 1260, 1278 (11th Cir. 2019)). Having extensively considered the parties arguments and reviewed the case law, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to state a claim under § 3617. It is plausible that Defendants’ alleged actions
amounted to coercion, intimidation, threats, or interference with their clients’ exercise | enjoyment of housing rights. Thus, the United States’ Count | and the lone claim of th Intervenor-Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint survive the motions to dismiss. B. 42 U.S.C. § 3614 Section 3614(a), which is titled “Pattern or practice cases,” provides: Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter, or that any group of persons is being denied any of the rights granted by this subchapter and such denial raises an issue of general public importance, the Attorney General may commence a civil action in any appropriate United States district court. 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a). In Count Il of its Amended Complaint, the United States brings § 3614(a) claim, alleging both that Defendants’ conduct constitutes “a pattern or practic of resistance to the full enjoyment of rights” and that a “group of persons is being denied rights granted by the FHA. The United States alleges throughout its Amended Complair that Defendants violated § 3617 with regard to not only the Intervenor Plaintiffs but also t other Hispanic homeowners who enlisted Defendants’ services. In light of the Court’: determination that the § 3617 claims survive the motion to dismiss, the United States § 3614 claim survives as well. Ul. Conclusion As set forth above, it is ORDERED that Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 6! & 70) are DENIED. oo DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida-6én Novamber 2.4 , 2020. ) 7 we
— Co □□□ JOHN ANTOON II United States District Judge Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record