United States v. A.C.P.

379 F. Supp. 2d 225, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11633, 2005 WL 1389258
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedJune 7, 2005
DocketCR 04-159PG
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 379 F. Supp. 2d 225 (United States v. A.C.P.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. A.C.P., 379 F. Supp. 2d 225, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11633, 2005 WL 1389258 (prd 2005).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

PEREZ-GIMENEZ, District Judge.

Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Gustavo A. Gelpi’s Sealed Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) (Docket No. 103) regarding the government’s motion to transfer juvenile A.C.P. to adult status. (Docket No. 12.) Upon reviewing the R & R, the objections, the applicable case law, the record, as well as the particular circumstances surrounding this juvenile’s case, the Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge’s assessment of the same and accordingly adopt his recommendation.

BACKGROUND

On April 7, 2004, A.C.P was arrested by federal agents. The following day the government filed the charging information and five days later moved to transfer A.C.P. to adult status pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Gelpi on April 16, 2004.

Since April 2004, A.C.P. has been detained in a juvenile institution and has provided substantial cooperation to federal authorities, resulting in several convictions. As the Magistrate Judge adequately illustrated, the Speedy Trial Act clock was tolled by A.C.P.’s repeated requests for continuances and waiver of Speedy Trial Act rights in order to obtain the best possible outcome of his plea agreement in light of his uninterrupted and effective cooperation with the government. (See Docket No. 103 at 2-4.)

Following several procedural events, A.C.P. finally requested that his transfer hearing be reopened. The hearing resumed on April 11, 2005. On April 28, the Magistrate Judge issued the R & R and gave the parties five days to file any objections. The government timely objected, (Docket No. 108), and defendant responded. (Docket No. 110.)

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Local Rule 72, and Local Criminal Rule 157.1; a District Court may refer disposi-tive motions to a U.S. Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. The adversely affected party may contest the Magistrate Judge’s findings by timely filing objections. See Local Rule 72(d). If *227 objections are filed, the District Judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report to which [an] objection is made. Id. Failure to timely file specific objections waives the right to review by the District Court, and waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See U.S. v. Valencicir-Copete, 792 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1986); see also U.S. v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424(1980).

II. TRANSFER OF JUVENILE TO ADULT STATUS

Upon the government’s motion, a district court may transfer a juvenile if it finds, after a hearing, that such transfer “would be in the interest of justice,” in light of six specific factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 5032. U.S. v. Female Juvenile, A.F.S., 377 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir.2004). In assessing whether transfer is warranted the district court must consider evidence, and make findings in the record, of the following factors:

the age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile’s prior delinquency record; the juvenile’s present intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response to such efforts; [and] the availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile’s behavioral problems.

18 U.S.C.A. § 5032. The court “need not find that each factor weighs in favor of transfer in order to grant the Government’s motion.” U.S. v. Male Juvenile E.L.C., 396 F.3d 458, 461 (1st Cir.2005). In fact, the court “need not even find that a majority of factors weigh in favor of the prevailing party, inasmuch as it is not required to give equal weight to each factor.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Instead, the Court may balance the factors as it deems appropriate. See id. (collecting cases). “The analytical balancing of the transfer factors cannot be expressed mathematically.” Id. at 462. The District Court’s findings regarding the transfer factors are reviewed for abuse of discretion, but the “findings of fact underlying the transfer decision are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.” U.S. v. Smith, 178 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir.1999).

There is a statutory presumption in favor of juvenile proceedings. Female Juvenile, A.F.S., 377 F.3d at 32. Indeed, the underlying purpose of the federal juvenile delinquency process is to “remove juveniles from the ordinary criminal process in order to avoid the stigma of a prior criminal conviction and to encourage treatment and rehabilitation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 220 (10th Cir.1990)) (citations omitted). District courts “must balance these important interests against ‘the need to protect the public from violent and dangerous individuals.’ ” Male Juvenile E.L.C., 396 F.3d at 461 (quoting United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 47 F.3d 68, 71 (2d Cir.1995)). The decision on whether to transfer “a young individual to adult status ... is in most instances a difficult one as it can have severe consequences for a juvenile’s rehabilitation.” Male Juvenile E.L.C., 396 F.3d at 461.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSFER FACTORS

Following an in-depth analysis of the six factors and with the benefit of a comprehensive hearing, the Magistrate Judge concluded that A.C.P. should not be transferred. Although the nature of the offense itself weighed heavily in favor of transfer, the Magistrate Judge determined that the combination of his lack of prior juvenile record and cooperation with the government weighed heavily in favor of *228 maintaining his juvenile status. Ultimately, he concluded that the coupling of factors tilted the balance in favor of keeping A.C.P.’s juvenile status. The Magistrate Judge felt compelled to depart from the jurisprudential consensus in cases involving armed robbery in light of the uniqueness of A.C.P.’s case and the extraordinary rehabilitative efforts he has demonstrated throughout the year following his arrest. Cf. Smith,

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Bluebook (online)
379 F. Supp. 2d 225, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11633, 2005 WL 1389258, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-acp-prd-2005.