United States v. Abbott Laboratories

Opinion

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. ex rel. Case No.: 20cv286-W (MSB) Everest Principals, LLC, 12 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF-RELATOR’S Plaintiffs, 13 MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER v. REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ 14 SUPPLEMENTAL 30(b)(6) NOTICE ABBOTT LABORATORIES, et al., 15 Defendants. [ECF NO. 170] 16

17 18 This is a qui tam case, wherein Plaintiff-Relator, Everest Principals, LLC (“Relator”) 19 maintains causes of action against Defendants Abbott Laboratories, Abbott Laboratories 20 Inc., Abbott Cardiovascular Systems Inc., and Abbott Vascular Inc. (collectively referred 21 to as “Defendants” or “Abbott”) on behalf of the United States of America and several 22 states for violations of the federal False Claims Act (“FCA”) and analogous state laws. 23 (ECF No. 85 at 6.) 24 The instant discovery dispute concerns Relator’s Motion for a Protective Order 25 (“Motion”), seeking protection from Defendants’ May 21, 2025, Supplemental Notice of 26 30(b)(6) Deposition (“Supplemental Notice”). (See generally ECF No. 170.) The 27 Supplemental Notice provides that Defendants will take the continued 30(b)(6) 2 for a protective order, arguing, among other things, that the Supplemental Notice seeks 3 duplicative testimony and unduly burdens Relator. (ECF No. 170). After reviewing 4 informal letter briefs lodged by the parties, the Court held an informal Discovery 5 Conference on June 5, 2025. (ECF No. 167.) The Court indicated it would require the 6 deposition to go forward; however, the witness could choose to split the deposition 7 between two days. Following the conference, Relator requested an opportunity for 8 formal briefing, and the instant Motion and Defendants’ Opposition to Relator’s Motion 9 for Protective Order (“Opposition”) followed. (ECF Nos. 170 & 173.) For the reasons 10 explained below, the Court DENIES Relator’s Motion. 11 I. BACKGROUND 12 A. Factual Background 13 Relator is a limited liability company whose sole member was employed by 14 Defendants as a Therapy Development Specialist in its Structural Heart Division from 15 August 2015 to April 2017. (ECF No. 85 at 7.) Defendants are involved in the 16 manufacturing and sale of medical devices, instruments, medications, and other health 17 care products. (Id. at 8.) In the operative Third Amended Complaint (“Operative 18 Complaint”), Relator summarizes its allegations as follows: “Defendants engaged in an 19 unlawful, systematic, and nationwide scheme of paying kickbacks to physicians and 20 hospitals in the form of, inter alia, patient referrals, patient practice building, free 21 patient marketing service, honoraria for sham speaker programs, rewards in the form of 22 clinical trial opportunities, marketing events and consulting services, free lavish meals, 23 and cocktail parties, to induce physicians and hospitals to use Abbott’s [cardiac medical 24 device] for medical procedures performed on cardiac patients covered by [federal and 25 state] healthcare programs, in violation of the FCA, [Anti-Kickback Statute (“AKS”)], and 26 analogous state laws and statutes.” (Id. at 6–7.)

27 / / 2 Relator filed the original Complaint on February 14, 2020. (ECF No. 1.) After the 3 United States reported that all named government entities declined to intervene in the 4 litigation [ECF No. 8], Defendants filed their first Motion to Dismiss on July 29, 2021. 5 (ECF No. 30.) Relator filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on August 19, 2021, 6 alleging causes of action on behalf of the United States and twenty-seven states, plus 7 the District of Columbia. (ECF No. 35 at 6.) Defendants again moved to dismiss, arguing 8 Relator failed to adequately allege presentment of a false claim, inducement of a false 9 claim, causation with particularity, illegal kickbacks, and scienter related to the federal 10 claims, and that the state law claims should be dismissed. (ECF No. 45 at 13–32.) The 11 District Court found Relator’s allegations sufficient for its federal claims, but dismissed 12 the state law claims for failure to allege “with particularity how any false claims were 13 submitted to each state identified in the FAC.” (ECF No. 56 at 16.) 14 Relator filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) on September 22, 2022, 15 maintaining the federal claims and state law claims on behalf of twenty-five states and 16 the District of Columbia. (ECF No. 57 at 6.) Defendants moved to dismiss the state law 17 claims in the SAC, arguing Relator failed to state claims on which relief could be granted 18 due to a lack of particularity. (ECF No. 59 at 12–21.) The District Court dismissed all 19 state law FCA claims except for those pertaining to four states: California, Florida, 20 Georgia, and New York. (ECF No. 62 at 4–9.) The District Court found Relator had 21 sufficiently pleaded FCA claims in violation of these four states’ laws. (Id.) Finally, 22 Plaintiffs filed the operative Third Amended Complaint on May 23, 2023. (ECF No. 85.) 23 Since issuing the original Scheduling Order in April 2023, the Court has granted four 24 extensions on (1) November 17, 2023; (2) April 23, 2024; (3) October 4, 2024; and (4) 25 January 22, 2025. (ECF Nos. 77, 120, 132, 137, 147.) In total, the fact discovery deadline 26 was continued 500 days, from January 2, 2024, to May 16, 2025, and the expert

27 discovery deadline has been continued 528 days, from May 14, 2024, to October 24, 2 A. April 24, 2025, Discovery Order 3 In April 2025, this Court addressed a dispute related to Defendants’ Interrogatory 4 No. 3, which asked Relator to: “[i]dentify each alleged false claim (as that term is used in 5 the Complaint) that You allege Abbott presented or caused to be presented to either a 6 federal or state government.” (ECF No. 154-5 at 3.) Defendants sought a complete, 7 unqualified response to Interrogatory No. 3 during fact discovery. (ECF No. 154-1.) 8 Relator opposed this, arguing it should not be required to identify all allegedly false 9 claims without the benefit of expert analysis. (ECF No. 155.) Following an informal 10 Discovery Conference and formal briefing, on April 24, 2025, the Court issued a written 11 Order requiring Relator to supplement its response to Interrogatory No. 3 by producing 12 a complete list of allegedly false claims no later than May 16, 2025—the cutoff of fact 13 discovery. (ECF No. 159.) The Court also permitted Defendants to “conduct fact 14 discovery on any newly identified false claims by June 16, 2025.” (Id. at 11.) 15 In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that the information requested in 16 Interrogatory No. 3 was relevant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). (Id. at 17 7–8.) Additionally, the Court found that the list of allegedly false claims was “factual 18 information that should be produced during fact discovery.” (Id. at 8.) Regarding 19 Relator’s argument that expertise was needed to identify this information, the Court 20 found Relator did not adequately explain why its experts had not made sufficient 21 progress on this work, “considering it began receiving claims data in August 2024” and 22 received numerous extensions to the discovery schedule. (Id. at 8–11.) Thus, the Court 23 concluded Relator had not met its burden to resist the requested discovery, and it 24 ordered Relator to produce a complete list of allegedly false claims by May 16, 2025. 25 (Id. at 11.) 26 B. Relator’s Newly Identified Claims and Defendants’ Supplemental Notice

27 Pursuant to the April Discovery Order, on May 16, 2025, Relator served a 2 2025, Defendants served a Supplemental Notice of 30(b)(6) Deposition, stating: 3 “[Abbott] will take the continued deposition upon oral examination of [Relator] as to 4 Topic Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, and 21, to the extent such topics relate to the 5 alleged false claims newly identified in Relator’s May 16, 2025 Fifth Supplemental 6 Objections and Responses to Defendants’ Interrogatories.” (ECF No. 170-3 at 3.) During 7 meet-and-confer discussions, Relator indicated it would not put up a witness for 8 another 30(b)(6) deposition. (ECF No. 173 at 7.) The parties attended a Discovery 9 Conference with the Court on June 6, 2025, and this Motion and Opposition followed. 10 (See ECF Nos. 167, 170, 173.) 11 C. Relator’s Motion 12 Relator asks the Court to “strike the Supplemental Notice and permit any further 13 discovery related to the identification of the Newly Identified Claims to be provided 14 through written interrogatory responses or expert testimony.” (ECF No. 170-1 at 6.) 15 First, Relator emphasizes it is a “single member LLC consisting solely of former Abbott 16 employee, Lisa Knott.” (Id. at 5.) Defendants deposed Ms. Knott in her individual 17 capacity on April 29, 2025, and in her representative capacity via a 30(b)(6) deposition 18 on May 15, 2025. (Id.) Because Ms. Knott has already been deposed for fourteen hours, 19 Relator argues a “third deposition will result in ‘unreasonably cumulative and 20 duplicative’ testimony and place an undue burden on Relator.” (Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 26(b)–(c)).) 22 Specifically, Relator argues the Supplemental Notice seeks duplicative testimony 23 because it only adds one new topic: Topic 21. (Id. at 8–9.) Ms. Knott has already been 24 deposed twice on Topics 1–8, 12, and 13 of the Supplemental Notice. (Id. at 8.) To the 25 extent Ms. Knott has knowledge related to the factual basis of the Newly Identified 26 Claims, Relator contends it is the same as the factual basis she previously testified to

27 during depositions or set forth in written discovery responses. (Id. at 8–9.) Moreover, 2 10–11.) Relator contends it is impossible to prepare someone to testify regarding 3 specific information “on more than 100,000 claims, including (but not limited to) the 4 specific MitraClip kickback events, specific referrals generated, and every Healthcare 5 Provider and Hospital Administrator involved.” (Id. at 10.) Relator claims Defendants 6 seek to harass Relator under the guise of Rule 30(b)(6). (Id. at 11.) 7 Finally, Relator states it does not contest that Defendants should be permitted to 8 conduct discovery related to the Newly Identified Claims; it merely contests the use of 9 another 30(b)(6) deposition as the proper method for this discovery. (Id. at 12–13.) 10 Relator argues the information Defendants seeks is more properly provided through 11 expert discovery or supplementing its interrogatory responses. (Id. at 12.) 12 Furthermore, Relator says it provided Defendants with the methodology employed by 13 Relator’s experts in preparing the list of Newly Identified Claims. (Id. at 13.) In closing, 14 Relator argues Ms. Knott “should not be subject to another seven hour deposition when 15 Defendants can obtain the information through much less burdensome and more 16 effective means.” (Id. at 14.) 17 D. Defendants’ Opposition 18 Defendants respond by noting that on May 15, 2025, Abbott deposed “Relator’s 19 designee pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) concerning, among other things, the factual bases 20 for Relator’s contention that the 3,773 claims Relator had challenged to that point were 21 false.” (ECF No. 173 at 7.) The next day, Relator served a supplemental response adding 22 more than 100,000 Newly Identified Claims. (Id.) Put simply, Defendants contend they 23 will be unfairly prejudiced if they are deprived 30(b)(6) testimony on the 100,000-plus 24 Newly Identified Claims simply because Relator delayed the disclosure. (Id. at 5.) 25 First, Defendants argue Relator cannot establish undue burden or harassment. 26 (Id. at 8–10.) Relator identified the Newly Identified Claims as false, Ms. Knott verified

27 the claims under penalty of perjury, and Relator’s lawyers signed off on the 2 “requisite diligence” when identifying the claims in the first place. (Id. at 9.) Or, if 3 Relator cannot explain the factual basis for alleging the claims as “false,” it should 4 withdraw the supplemental response. (Id. at 9.) Further, Defendants argue Relator 5 erroneously suggests 30(b)(6) depositions are limited to the deponent’s personal 6 knowledge, when in fact a 30(b)(6) deponent must testify as to all matters “reasonably 7 available via its agents and otherwise, including its factual contentions.” (Id. at 9–10.) 8 Regarding Relator’s contention that another deposition would harass Ms. Knott, 9 Defendants respond that Relator can designate anyone who “consent[s] to testify on its 10 behalf,” even a hired actor. (Id. at 10 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)).) Moreover, if 11 Relator had added the new claims on May 14 rather than May 16, Defendants maintain 12 they would have inquired about the Newly Identified Claims at the 30(b)(6) deposition 13 on May 15. (Id.)1 14 Next, Defendants argue that the Supplemental Notice does not seek duplicative 15 testimony because Defendants did not know the Newly Identified Claims during the 16 prior 30(b)(1) or 30(b)(6) depositions, and therefore Defendants could not test claims 17 that had not been identified. (Id. at 11.) Further, Defendants argue Topics 1–8, 12 and 18 13 are not identical, because the Supplemental Notice calls for testimony only “to the 19 extent such topics relate to the alleged false claims newly identified in Relator’s May 20 16, 2025 [response].” (Id. (citing ECF No. 170-3 at 3) (alteration in original).) 21 Defendants reiterate that their intended questioning goes beyond Ms. Knott’s personal 22 knowledge, and instead asks whether Relator has the “requisite factual basis” for the 23 more than 100,000 Newly Added Claims. (Id. at 11–12.) 24

25 26 1 Defendants also explain Relator was on notice about Abbott’s intent to depose Relator on the Newly Identified Claims. (ECF No. 173 at 10 n.4.) In a May 14 brief filed with the Court, Defendants wrote 27 that “Abbott intends to conduct additional questioning about the list of 3,773 claims at this week’s 2 the Newly Identified Claims. (Id. at 12–14.) Written interrogatories on 100,000-plus 3 Newly Identified Claims would likely result in objections and motion practice, restricting 4 Defendants’ ability to ask follow-up questions and drawing out discovery. (Id. at 12.) 5 Similarly, expert depositions are insufficient because experts cannot testify as to 6 Relator’s factual contentions. (Id. at 13.) Because the Newly Identified Claims implicate 7 procedures by more than 500 new physicians, Defendants argue it would be impossible 8 to efficiently depose or serve discovery on 500-plus people. (Id. at 14.) Thus, under 9 these circumstances, Defendants stress a 30(b)(6) deposition makes sense. (Id.) 10 III. APPLICABLE LAW 11 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 authorize parties to obtain discovery 12 regarding any unprivileged matter that is relevant to any claim or defense and 13 proportional to the needs of the case, “considering the importance of the issues at stake 14 in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant 15 information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the 16 issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 17 likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). District courts have broad discretion to 18 determine relevancy for discovery purposes. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 19 (9th Cir. 2002). Similarly, district courts have broad discretion to limit discovery where 20 the discovery sought is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained 21 from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive”; 22 the requesting party “has had ample opportunity” to obtain discovery; or the discovery 23 sought is beyond the scope of Rule 26(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 24 Rule 30(b)(6) permits a party to provide notice of a deposition to a “public or 25 private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other 26

27 2 more officers, directors, or managing agents . . . to testify on its behalf . . . about 3 information known or reasonably available to the organization.” Id. Courts in this 4 Circuit have emphasized that Rule 30(b)(6) imposes an affirmative duty of meaningful 5 preparation on the corporate representative. See, e.g., Risinger v. SOC, LLC, 306 F.R.D. 6 655, 663 (D. Nev. 2015) (holding the 30(b)(6) designee’s duty to prepare “goes beyond 7 matters personally known to the witness or to matters in which the designated witness 8 was personally involved”); Bd. of Tr. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., 9 253 F.R.D. 524, 526 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (finding a designee must “review all matters known 10 or reasonably available to it in preparation for the 30(b)(6) deposition”). At the same 11 time, courts acknowledge a 30(b)(6) witness is not expected to know the intimate 12 details of every aspect of a business or dispute. See, e.g., United States v. HVI Cat 13 Canyon, Inc., No. CV 11-5097 FMO (SSX), 2016 WL 11683593, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 14 2016) (holding a 30(b)(6) notice calling for at sixty-one topics “would make witness 15 preparation a nearly impossible task”); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., No. C 11-1846 16 LHK PSG, 2012 WL 1511901, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012) (noting a 30(b)(6) deposition 17 “ becomes less realistic and increasingly impossible as the number and breadth of 18 noticed subject areas expand”). 19 Rule 26 permits a party to move the court for a protective order “to protect a 20 party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 21 expense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The party seeking the protective order must make a 22 strong showing of “good cause” before a party is denied the right to take a deposition. 23 Id. See also Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975). 24 “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of showing 25 specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips ex rel. 26 Est. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

27 Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The burden is upon the party 2 unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning” will not satisfy the Rule 3 26(c) good cause standard. Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 4 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). 5 IV. DISCUSSION 6 Applying the legal standards set forth above, the Court finds Relator has not met 7 its heavy burden for the issuance of a protective order because it has failed to 8 demonstrate specific harm or prejudice that will result from a supplemental 30(b)(6) 9 deposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1); Phillips, 307 F.3d at 1210–11. To the contrary, 10 Relator’s assertions resemble the sort of “[b]road allegations of harm, unsubstantiated 11 by specific examples or articulated reasoning” that courts generally reject. Foltz, 331 12 F.3d at 1130. 13 Relator’s primary argument against the deposition is that it seeks duplicative 14 testimony, as Defendants have already deposed Relator twice on Topics 1–8, 12 and 13. 15 (ECF No. 170-1 at 8–11.) Further, Relator argues its sole member, Ms. Knott, does not 16 have any additional personal knowledge related to the Newly Identified Claims that she 17 has not already orally testified to or set forth in written discovery responses. (Id.) The 18 Court disagrees with Relator’s assertion that the existing discovery is sufficient for 19 several reasons. First, when Defendants took Ms. Knott’s depositions on April 29 and 20 May 15, 2025, Relator had not yet produced the more than 100,000 Newly Identified 21 Claims. Without this list, Defendants could not adequately question Ms. Knott about 22 the doctors who submitted the Newly Identified Claims, their purported connection to 23 the alleged kickbacks, or Relator’s factual basis for identifying the claims as false. As 24 Defendants point out in their Opposition, “[i]f Relator had served its supplemental list 25 on May 14 rather than May 16,” Defendants could have inquired about the new claims 26 at the 30(b)(6) deposition on May 15. (ECF No. 173 at 5.) Defendants’ position is

27 further supported by their May 14 filing, which warned Relator of their intent “to 2 Defendants merely because Relator did not produce the Newly Identified Claims until 3 the day after the initial 30(b)(6) deposition. 4 Second, courts have rejected the argument that a 30(b)(6) deposition is 5 unnecessary or cumulative simply because an individual has already testified about the 6 same topics. See, e.g., Corker v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. C19-0290RSL, 2022 WL 7 92979, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 10, 2022) (allowing a single witness to be deposed as an 8 individual and as an organizational representative under Rule 30(b)(6)); La. Pac. Corp. v. 9 Money Mkt. 1 Institutional Inv. Dealer, 285 F.R.D. 481, 487 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (explaining 10 the distinction between testimony of an individual and testimony of a corporate entity). 11 In the context of a 30(b)(6) deposition, the deponent must be prepared to testify as to 12 “information known or reasonably available to the organization.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 30(b)(6). However, the organization has flexibility to designate an officer, director, 14 managing agent, or “other persons who consent to testify on its behalf.” Id. Thus, 15 Relator need not designate Ms. Knott as its 30(b)(6) witness, so long as the selected 16 deponent can “become educated and gain the requested knowledge to the extent 17 reasonably available.” Kelly v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., No. 04CV807-AJB BGS, 2011 18 WL 2448276, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 20, 2011). Relator did not object to the initial 30(b)(6) 19 deposition on May 15, 2025—even though Ms. Knott had already been deposed in her 20 individual capacity on April 29, 2025—which further cuts against Relator’s objection to 21 the supplemental 30(b)(6) deposition now. 22 Third, notwithstanding Relator’s argument that Defendants have already obtained 23 testimony on Topics 1–8, 12 and 13, the Court finds the language of the Supplemental 24 Notice is sufficiently distinct. The Supplemental Notice expressly states it will take the 25 continued deposition as to these topics “to the extent such topics relate to the alleged 26 false claims newly identified” on May 16, 2025. (ECF No. 170-3 at 3.) It also adds Topic

27 21, which calls for “[t]he factual basis for Your identification of the Newly Identified 2 Cnty. of San Francisco, No. C 08-04022 SI, 2010 WL 455290, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2010) 3 (“Even if the general topics to be addressed at the 30(b)(6) deposition will overlap to 4 some extent, the questions asked and the answers given might not”) (internal citations 5 omitted). Moreover, while Relator might prefer the Newly Identified Claims be explored 6 through other devices such as written interrogatories or expert discovery, Defendants 7 may choose the method by which they conduct their own discovery. See Memory 8 Integrity, LLC v. Intel Corp., 308 F.R.D. 656, 661 (D. Or. 2015) (“The Federal Rules of Civil 9 Procedure generally allow a party to select the method or methods of discovery and the 10 order of discovery methods used”). Many courts have held that live testimony from a 11 witness subject to cross-examination is preferable to other discovery methods, which 12 also weighs in Defendants favor. See Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Wolf, No. 317CV02366-BAS- 13 KSC, 2020 WL 4336064, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2020) (collecting cases). 14 More fundamentally, Relator has not made a particularized showing of harm or 15 prejudice to support a finding of good cause. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1063. Relator 16 generally argues that Defendants seek to harass Relator under the guise of Rule 17 30(b)(6), and it is impossible for a witness to “testify as to the factual specifics of 18 100,000 claims.” (ECF No. 170-1 at 11.) As discussed above, Relator could have avoided 19 a supplemental 30(b)(6) deposition by supplying the 100,000-plus Newly Identified 20 Claims earlier. And if Relator has concerns about Ms. Knott sitting for another 21 deposition, it has the option to designate a different 30(b)(6) witness. However, “[j]ust 22 because complying with a discovery request will involve expense or may be time 23 consuming, does not make it unduly burdensome.” Cancino Castellar v. McAleenan, No. 24 3:17-CV-491-BAS-AHG, 2020 WL 1332485, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2020) (internal 25 citations omitted). See also Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 253 F.R.D. at 526 26 (“[E]ven if the documents are voluminous and the review of those documents would be

27 burdensome, the deponents are still required to review them in order to be deposed”) 2 obligations under Rule 30(b)(6). Moreover, if Relator exercised diligence in compiling 3 the list of Newly Identified Claims, then it should not be so onerous to prepare a witness 4 to testify as to the factual basis of these claims. Relator can protect its 30(b)(6) witness 5 by raising appropriate objections at the deposition. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2). 6 Lastly, the Court notes that some of the cases relied upon by Relator are easily 7 distinguishable from the instant case due to the egregious numbers of deposition topics 8 they involved. See, e.g., Reno v. W. Cab Co., No. 218CV00840-APG-NJK, 2020 WL 9 5902318, at *2 (D. Nev. Aug. 31, 2020) (finding eighteen pages of broad deposition 10 topics was excessive); Apple Inc., 2012 WL 1511901, at *2 (holding a 229-topic 11 deposition notice was facially excessive). Here, the Court does not believe that eleven 12 topics is so overly broad to warrant a protective order, particularly where Relator added 13 100,000 new claims and has otherwise failed to articulate specific harm or prejudice. 14 See, e.g., Al Otro Lado, 2020 WL 4336064, at *3 (denying protective order where moving 15 party failed to demonstrate the “time, expense, burden, or specific, non-speculative 16 harm” that would result from a 30(b)(6) deposition); Kelly, 2011 WL 2448276, at *6 17 (denying protective order because the movant failed to meet its “burden of establishing 18 that the areas of examination are so burdensome, cumulative, or duplicative so as to 19 justify” precluding a 30(b)(6) deposition). 20 V. CONCLUSION 21 The Court finds Relator has not met its burden of establishing good cause for a 22 protective order because it has not shown specific harm or prejudice that would result 23 from a supplemental 30(b)(6) deposition. Blankenship, 519 F.2d at 429; Rivera, 364 F.3d 24 at 1063; Cadent Ltd. v. 3M Unitek Corp., 232 F.R.D. 625, 629 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (denying 25 protective order where plaintiff “presented absolutely no evidence showing a specific 26 and particular need” for protection). The Court will not deprive Defendants of the

27 opportunity to challenge the Newly Identified Claims, nor will it interfere with 1 || practical limitations of deposing a witness about more than 100,000 claims and strongly 2 ||suggests Defendants focus their questioning on whether Relator has the requisite 3 || factual basis for the Newly Identified Claims. 4 Therefore, the Court DENIES Relator’s Motion. (ECF No. 170.) Relator must 5 || produce a 30(b)(6) designee for deposition on a date? mutually convenient for 6 || Defendants’ counsel, but in any event no later than July 25, 2025. Defendants may 7 depose Relator’s 30(b)(6) designee only as to the Newly Identified Claims. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 Dated: June 27, 2025 _ = _ 2 FF u Honorable Michael S. Berg United States Magistrate Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 3 The 30(b)(6) designee may choose to split the deposition between two days, not to exceed seven 28 total hours.