United States v. Aaron Morales

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: July 12, 2024
• Docket: 23-2295
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________

No. 23-2295 ____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

AARON MORALES a/k/a ACE, Appellant ____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 1:18-cr-00023-001) District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner ____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on May 24, 2024

Before: RESTREPO, FREEMAN, and McKEE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 12, 2024)

_______________

OPINION * _______________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.

Aaron Morales pleaded guilty to a cocaine distribution offense and was sentenced

to 156 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he challenges the procedural reasonableness of

his sentence. We will affirm.

I

In March 2023, Morales pleaded guilty to one count of distributing and possessing

with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846

and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii).

At sentencing, the District Court calculated a Guidelines range of 110 to 137

months’ imprisonment. 1 It acknowledged mitigating factors, including strong familial

support, but determined that the aggravating factors warranted an upward variance.

Based on Morales’ extensive criminal history—including an “accumulation of criminal

history points” that the judge believed was “the most [he had] ever seen in . . . 20 plus

years on the federal bench,” App. 205–06—his role in the offense, and his risk of

reoffending, the Court varied upward and sentenced Morales to 156 months’

incarceration. Morales timely appealed.

1 The Court adopted the Guidelines range as calculated in the parties’ plea agreement, which included a three-level “aggravating role enhancement,” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), and a two-level reduction for “affirmative acceptance of responsibility,” App. 108.

2 II

The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

Morales did not object at his sentencing hearing after the District Court announced

the sentence. Accordingly, we review for plain error. United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759

F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). Under this demanding standard, we will remand

only when the error is “clear or obvious, affects substantial rights, and affects the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 259 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

III

Morales argues that the District Court erred by varying upward based on factors

already accounted for in the Guidelines range. He also argues that the District Court

failed to meaningfully consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and explain its upward

variance. With respect to both arguments, we discern no error (plain or otherwise).

A

Morales first argues that the District Court erred by varying upward based on his

role in the offense and his criminal history, which are already accounted for in the

Guidelines range. This argument is foreclosed by § 3553(a) and our precedent.

Section 3553(a)(1) requires courts to consider “the nature and circumstances of the

offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” at sentencing. The statute

3 does not constrain these considerations to Guidelines calculations, and we will not infer

such a limitation.

In addition, we have “emphasize[d] that a sentencing court is not prohibited from

considering the factual basis underlying a defendant’s sentenc[ing] enhancements, and

indeed, should consider those facts in order to tailor the sentence to the defendant’s

individual circumstances.” United States v. Greenidge, 495 F.3d 85, 103 (3d Cir. 2007);

see also United States v. Pawlowski, 27 F.4th 897, 912 n.8 (3d Cir. 2022) (finding no

authority “precluding a sentencing court from considering a fact at the § 3553(a) stage

merely because that fact is also relevant to the Guidelines calculation”). The District

Court did not err by varying from the Guidelines range based on Morales’ role in the

offense and criminal history.

B

Morales next argues that the District Court erred by failing to adequately consider

the § 3553(a) factors and explain its reasoning. We disagree.

While there is no “uniform threshold for sufficiency” courts must meet in

discussing the § 3553(a) factors, we require them to provide “more than a rote recitation

of the . . . factors” to uphold a sentence on appeal. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558,

567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). A sentencing court must adequately explain its reasoning,

but “need not discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors so long as the

record makes clear that the court has taken them into account.” United States v. Clark,

726 F.3d 496, 502 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

4 The District Court’s analysis satisfied this standard. The Court addressed the

mitigating factors in Morales’ case, including his supportive family members and their

testimony about his character, before turning to the aggravating factors. The Court

reasoned that an upward variance was necessary based on the significant quantities of

drugs involved, Morales’ role in the trafficking scheme, his criminal history, and his

potential for recidivism. Because the District Court meaningfully considered the

§ 3553(a) factors and explained its reasoning, it committed no procedural error.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 2

2 Because Morales is represented by counsel, we decline to consider the arguments in his pro se letter dated June 22, 2024. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.8, 31.3 (2011); United States v. Turner, 677 F.3d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 2012).