NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 24-3024 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AARON JOSEPH, Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Criminal No. 1:24-cr-00294-001) Chief District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb ____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on December 5, 2025
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, FREEMAN and BOVE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 21, 2026)
_______________
OPINION* _______________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.
Aaron Joseph pleaded guilty to one charge of conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine and was sentenced to a 114-month term of imprisonment. He now
appeals that judgment. Because there is no non-frivolous basis for challenging his guilty
plea or sentence, we will grant his counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and affirm the judgment.
I
Between October 2020 and July 2022, Joseph conspired with others to distribute
methamphetamine in New Jersey. In furtherance of that conspiracy, he knowingly
shipped a package containing 5,100 methamphetamine pills from California to New
Jersey on February 14, 2022. A co-conspirator in New Jersey paid him for those drugs,
which Joseph knew the co-conspirator would distribute.
During the investigation into the conspiracy, the government identified 20
additional packages shipped from California to New Jersey with characteristics similar to
the package Joseph shipped on February 14, 2022. The similar characteristics included
shared points of origin and destination and common or overlapping sender and addressee
information.
In 2023, Joseph was arrested and charged in a one-count Information with
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine contrary
to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He later entered a
written plea agreement with the government. He agreed to plead guilty to the
Information, and, in exchange, the government agreed not to bring any additional charges
2 against him for his involvement in the conspiracy. He also stipulated that he knowingly
shipped the package containing 5,100 methamphetamine pills (weighing approximately
1,889 grams and containing approximately 33 grams of methamphetamine), and he
waived his right to appeal or otherwise challenge those stipulated facts. In all other
respects relevant here, he reserved the right to pursue an appeal.1
During an April 2024 hearing, the District Court conducted a colloquy regarding
Joseph’s stated intent to plead guilty. Joseph was sworn and acknowledged that he was
not under the influence of any medication or substance, that he understood the nature of
the proceeding, and that he had thoroughly discussed the terms of the plea with his
attorney. He also acknowledged the charges and potential penalties he could face and the
rights he was entitled to. He confirmed that he wished to waive his rights and enter a
guilty plea. The Court established the factual basis for the plea and then accepted the
guilty plea.
Prior to sentencing, the Probation office prepared a Presentence Investigation
Report (“PSR”) that calculated an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 140 to 175
months’ imprisonment. Joseph submitted a sentencing memorandum and a mitigation
report. The mitigation report detailed Joseph’s childhood, which was wrought with
trauma.
1 Joseph also waived the right to challenge his guilty plea or sentence on the basis of the immigration consequences.
3 At a sentencing hearing, neither party objected to the Sentencing Guidelines
calculations or sought a departure. Instead, Joseph sought a downward variance based on
the low concentration of methamphetamine in the pills he shipped. The District Court
declined to vary downward on that basis, explaining that the pills had harmed society.
However, upon considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the District Court granted a
downward variance to 114 months’ imprisonment based on Joseph’s tragic childhood. It
explained that it could not impose a greater variance because of the severity of the crime
and Joseph’s criminal history. It also imposed a sentence of six years’ supervised
release—varying upward from the Guidelines’ recommendation of three years, and
explaining that it did so to provide Joseph with additional resources and guidance from
the Probation Office.
Joseph timely appealed. His counsel then moved to withdraw under Anders, and
Joseph filed a pro se brief on the merits of his appeal.
II2
In support of her Anders motion, Joseph’s counsel filed a brief stating that, upon
review of the record, this appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 109.2(a). Thus, we must determine “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled [our
local] rule’s requirements” for Anders briefs; and “(2) whether an independent review of
the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
4 (3d Cir. 2001). An issue is frivolous if it “lacks any basis in law or fact.” McCoy v. Ct.
of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988).
When we conclude at Step 1 that counsel has satisfied her duties, we may limit our
Step 2 review of the record to the issues counsel raised. United States v. Langley, 52
F.4th 564, 569 (3d Cir. 2022). At both steps, our review is plenary. United States v.
Brookins, 132 F.4th 659, 666 (3d Cir. 2025).
A
Joseph’s counsel has satisfied her obligations under Anders. Counsel correctly
identified the only three possible areas of review: the District Court’s jurisdiction, the
voluntariness of Joseph’s guilty plea, and the legality of his sentence. Counsel
recognized that the District Court’s jurisdiction was sound. She also detailed how the
District Court conducted a comprehensive plea colloquy, established all the requirements
for a valid guilty plea, and complied with all mandatory procedures in imposing Joseph’s
sentence.
Counsel’s Anders brief does not address the issues Joseph raised in his pro se
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 24-3024 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AARON JOSEPH, Appellant ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Criminal No. 1:24-cr-00294-001) Chief District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb ____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on December 5, 2025
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, FREEMAN and BOVE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 21, 2026)
_______________
OPINION* _______________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. FREEMAN, Circuit Judge.
Aaron Joseph pleaded guilty to one charge of conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine and was sentenced to a 114-month term of imprisonment. He now
appeals that judgment. Because there is no non-frivolous basis for challenging his guilty
plea or sentence, we will grant his counsel’s motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and affirm the judgment.
I
Between October 2020 and July 2022, Joseph conspired with others to distribute
methamphetamine in New Jersey. In furtherance of that conspiracy, he knowingly
shipped a package containing 5,100 methamphetamine pills from California to New
Jersey on February 14, 2022. A co-conspirator in New Jersey paid him for those drugs,
which Joseph knew the co-conspirator would distribute.
During the investigation into the conspiracy, the government identified 20
additional packages shipped from California to New Jersey with characteristics similar to
the package Joseph shipped on February 14, 2022. The similar characteristics included
shared points of origin and destination and common or overlapping sender and addressee
information.
In 2023, Joseph was arrested and charged in a one-count Information with
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine contrary
to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He later entered a
written plea agreement with the government. He agreed to plead guilty to the
Information, and, in exchange, the government agreed not to bring any additional charges
2 against him for his involvement in the conspiracy. He also stipulated that he knowingly
shipped the package containing 5,100 methamphetamine pills (weighing approximately
1,889 grams and containing approximately 33 grams of methamphetamine), and he
waived his right to appeal or otherwise challenge those stipulated facts. In all other
respects relevant here, he reserved the right to pursue an appeal.1
During an April 2024 hearing, the District Court conducted a colloquy regarding
Joseph’s stated intent to plead guilty. Joseph was sworn and acknowledged that he was
not under the influence of any medication or substance, that he understood the nature of
the proceeding, and that he had thoroughly discussed the terms of the plea with his
attorney. He also acknowledged the charges and potential penalties he could face and the
rights he was entitled to. He confirmed that he wished to waive his rights and enter a
guilty plea. The Court established the factual basis for the plea and then accepted the
guilty plea.
Prior to sentencing, the Probation office prepared a Presentence Investigation
Report (“PSR”) that calculated an advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 140 to 175
months’ imprisonment. Joseph submitted a sentencing memorandum and a mitigation
report. The mitigation report detailed Joseph’s childhood, which was wrought with
trauma.
1 Joseph also waived the right to challenge his guilty plea or sentence on the basis of the immigration consequences.
3 At a sentencing hearing, neither party objected to the Sentencing Guidelines
calculations or sought a departure. Instead, Joseph sought a downward variance based on
the low concentration of methamphetamine in the pills he shipped. The District Court
declined to vary downward on that basis, explaining that the pills had harmed society.
However, upon considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the District Court granted a
downward variance to 114 months’ imprisonment based on Joseph’s tragic childhood. It
explained that it could not impose a greater variance because of the severity of the crime
and Joseph’s criminal history. It also imposed a sentence of six years’ supervised
release—varying upward from the Guidelines’ recommendation of three years, and
explaining that it did so to provide Joseph with additional resources and guidance from
the Probation Office.
Joseph timely appealed. His counsel then moved to withdraw under Anders, and
Joseph filed a pro se brief on the merits of his appeal.
II2
In support of her Anders motion, Joseph’s counsel filed a brief stating that, upon
review of the record, this appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 109.2(a). Thus, we must determine “(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled [our
local] rule’s requirements” for Anders briefs; and “(2) whether an independent review of
the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300
2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
4 (3d Cir. 2001). An issue is frivolous if it “lacks any basis in law or fact.” McCoy v. Ct.
of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 438 n.10 (1988).
When we conclude at Step 1 that counsel has satisfied her duties, we may limit our
Step 2 review of the record to the issues counsel raised. United States v. Langley, 52
F.4th 564, 569 (3d Cir. 2022). At both steps, our review is plenary. United States v.
Brookins, 132 F.4th 659, 666 (3d Cir. 2025).
A
Joseph’s counsel has satisfied her obligations under Anders. Counsel correctly
identified the only three possible areas of review: the District Court’s jurisdiction, the
voluntariness of Joseph’s guilty plea, and the legality of his sentence. Counsel
recognized that the District Court’s jurisdiction was sound. She also detailed how the
District Court conducted a comprehensive plea colloquy, established all the requirements
for a valid guilty plea, and complied with all mandatory procedures in imposing Joseph’s
sentence.
Counsel’s Anders brief does not address the issues Joseph raised in his pro se
brief, but that does not render the Anders brief inadequate per se. Langley, 52 F.4th at
573. Indeed, counsel’s brief demonstrates that she conducted a conscientious
examination of the record in search of appealable issues. Id. at 569. She also has
explained why any issues are frivolous. Accordingly, we confine our review to the issues
counsel identified in her Anders brief.
B
Our independent review of the record confirms counsel’s view of this appeal.
5 First, the District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 because Joseph
was charged with a federal criminal offense.
Second, Joseph’s guilty plea was valid. The District Court conducted a thorough
colloquy to ensure that Joseph was competent, understood the nature of the proceedings
and the options available to him, and made a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
constitutional rights associated with a trial. The Court reviewed the charges, the potential
penalties, and the collateral consequences of the plea. It also established a factual basis
for the plea. The colloquy satisfied all the requirements of the Constitution and Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
Finally, before imposing Joseph’s sentence, the District Court followed the
mandatory procedure of (1) calculating the appropriate Sentencing Guidelines range; (2)
ruling on any departure motions; and (3) exercising discretion by considering the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 (3d Cir.
2014) (en banc). It did not err in adopting the Guidelines range set forth in the PSR (to
which neither party objected). There were no departure motions, so it proceeded to a
review of the § 3553(a) factors. It heard and addressed arguments from counsel, heard
Joseph’s allocution, and clearly explained the reasons for imposing the sentence. There
is no non-frivolous basis to challenge the procedural reasonableness of the sentence.
Moreover, Joseph’s sentence is below the statutory maximum, and his term of
imprisonment is 26 months below the low end of the advisory Guidelines range. In the
circumstances of this case, there is no non-frivolous challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. See United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir.
6 2009) (en banc) (stating that a sentence is substantively reasonable “unless no reasonable
sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for
the reasons the district court provided”).
* * *
For the reasons set forth above, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and
affirm the judgment.