United States v. Aaron Davis

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedJanuary 17, 2023
Docket22-1002
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Aaron Davis (United States v. Aaron Davis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Aaron Davis, (3d Cir. 2023).

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________

No. 22-1002 _____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

AARON DAVIS, Appellant

_____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Delaware (District Court No. 1-19-cr-00101-001) District Judge: Hon. Leonard P. Stark _____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) November 8, 2022

(Filed: January 17, 2023)

Before: JORDAN, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. _________ O P I N I O N* _________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Aaron Davis challenges his conviction for taking part in a

large fraud scheme that targeted financial institutions, a healthcare company, and the

Government. He lodges two objections. The first is to the District Court’s admission of

victim impact testimony from a representative of the targeted healthcare company that

lost money due to the scheme. The other is to the Government’s urging the jury to use

common sense during the portion of the Government’s closing argument about willful

blindness, which Davis construes as a “Golden Rule” instruction. For the reasons set

forth below, we reject Davis’s arguments and will affirm.

I. 1

In the summer of 2017, Davis and a few accomplices hatched an ambitious fraud

scheme. The group targeted two banks, a nonprofit healthcare company called Sutter

Health, and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”). The plan unfolded in three parts

over a three-month period: they used a check kiting 2 scheme to steal money from the

1 Ordinarily, we write not precedential opinions with the benefit of a written opinion from the District Court. But Davis’s claimed errors arose from the District Court’s oral rulings on his objections, none of which were reduced to writing. We do not fault the District Court for that decision under the circumstances. Still, the absence of a written opinion obliges us to explore the facts, procedural background, and legal analysis more fully than usual for a non-precedential opinion, and we do so here. 2 Check kiting takes advantage of the lag time in the process banks use to reconcile the balances of accounts involved in a transaction between them: Check kiting is a systematic pattern of depositing nonsufficient funds (NSF) checks between two or more banks, resulting in the books and records of those banks showing inflated balances that permit these NSF checks to be honored rather than returned unpaid. In addition, other checks and

2 banks; a business email compromise 3 scheme to steal money from Sutter Health; and a

wire fraud scheme to steal SSA funds by applying for benefits in the name of a retiree

without his knowledge or consent. 4 But the banks involved quickly grew wise: they froze

Davis’s accounts and, by doing so, limited the group’s theft to just over $225,000 of the

$1.3 million they managed to deposit in the accounts through fraud. A federal grand jury

later indicted Davis for two counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2);

withdrawals may be honored against these inflated balances, resulting in actual negative balances, to the extent that banks allow withdrawal of uncollected funds. Johnny S. Turner et al., Check Kiting: Detection, Prosecution, and Prevention, 62 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 12, 13 (Nov. 1993), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/145802NCJRS.pdf. 3 The FBI explained the nature of business email compromise scams in a recent report commissioned by Congress: BEC scams rely on deception and social engineering to convince victims— including companies, charities, schools, real estate purchasers, and the elderly—to send money, usually via wire transfer, to bank accounts controlled by criminal actors. While there are many variations, BEC schemes often involve the spoofing of a legitimate, known email address or the use of a nearly identical address to appear as someone known to or trusted by the victim. BEC scams are initiated when a victim receives false wire instructions from a criminal attempting to redirect legitimate payments to a bank account controlled by fraudsters; such scams are constantly evolving as criminals become more sophisticated. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Business Email Compromise and Real Estate Wire Fraud, 4 (2022). 4 Davis’s scheme targeted Jay Abraham, who testified at trial that he had previously applied for Social Security benefits but never took disbursement of the money because, as a successful marketing consultant, he did not need to do so. Abraham learned of Davis’s fraudulent application purely by chance when Medicare denied his claims for treatment of a catastrophic medical condition because the disbursement of his Social Security benefits triggered irregularities in Medicare’s claims process.

3 two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and one count of money

laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.

Davis’s trial lasted five days, and the Government put on a dozen witnesses and

introduced more than 100 exhibits to explain the nature and breadth of Davis’s scheme.

The Government’s case included evidence showing the banks told Davis that they

suspected fraud, though Davis and his cohort continued their efforts undeterred. The jury

also heard that Davis alleged in a police report that the suspicious money appeared in his

account because of fraud against him, and he supported those allegations with documents

that law enforcement officials later found to be false.

During the trial, Davis challenged the Government’s efforts to elicit so-called

“victim impact testimony” from Sutter Health’s Chief Financial Officer, Mark Wheeler.

Wheeler testified that Davis redirected $1.1 million in company funds to his account and

over $220,000 of that money remained outstanding. Having established the company’s

loss, the Government asked Wheeler to “tell the jury about the impact of [the] loss on

Sutter Health.” App. 613 (emphasis added). Davis quickly raised a relevance objection,

arguing the impact on Sutter Health bore no relation to the charged offenses. The

Government argued the testimony was “clearly relevant” because “the company was

defrauded out of the lost money.” App. 613. After weighing the objection and response,

the District Court allowed Wheeler’s testimony but did not explain its ruling.

Wheeler then told the jury that the losses hurt the company’s ability to fulfill its

mission:

4 So I mean the impact for us—we’re not for profit, you know, healthcare. We provide a lot of services in our communities. So missing money or losing money to fraud means less patients we can serve, less community impact we can have. We do a lot of charitable, charitable contribution to our individual communities so, yes, it had a financial impact. We’ve had negative years over the last two years operating losses. COVID has taken a toll. Fraud just continued to impact us, you know, or undermine what we can do in the community. So it is very impactful to Sutter Health.

App. 613–14. Davis challenged the testimony a second time after Wheeler finished and

the jury left the room.

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