United States v. 100 Cuban Cigars

35 F. Supp. 2d 405, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70, 1999 WL 10274
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 7, 1999
DocketCivil Action 98-3728
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 35 F. Supp. 2d 405 (United States v. 100 Cuban Cigars) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. 100 Cuban Cigars, 35 F. Supp. 2d 405, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70, 1999 WL 10274 (E.D. Pa. 1999).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

DALZELL, District Judge.

As a result of David G. Weisenthal’s brief visit to Cuba in March of 1997, he returned to Philadelphia with gifts of Cuban products having a value in Cuba of less than one hundred dollars. Believing that these tobacco and other trinkets violated the American embargo against importing Cuban products, the United States Customs Service on April 18,1997 seized all of these goods. 1

Because Weisenthal wants his cigars and other Cuban tsatskes back, he on May 20, 1998 brought an action against the United States, Weisenthal v. United States, Civil Action No. 98-MC-83. The Government three months later brought the instant in rem action for forfeiture of these same items, and on October 28, 1998 we consolidated it with Weisenthal’s earlier action.

After a nonjury trial yesterday, this will constitute our Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) findings of fact and conclusions of law in this matter. 2

*407 The Government and Weisenthal have stipulated to certain basic facts. They agree that on April 18, 1997, Weisenthal arrived at Philadelphia International Airport aboard an Air Jamaica flight from Montego Bay, Jamaica. Before landing, Weisenthal filled out and signed a Customs Declaration (Customs Form 6059B). Weisenthal and the Government agree that Weisenthal did not have a license to import his Cuban goods from the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (hereinafter “OFAC”), the agency responsible for administering the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, Part 515, 31 C.F.R. 3

The Government has put forth two theories under which it claims that the defendant items are subject to forfeiture. First, it argues that Weisenthal failed to declare the goods to Customs officials upon his arrival at the Philadelphia International Airport, and therefore they are subject to forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (and also should be treated as smuggled pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 148.18 and forfeited under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(l)(A)). Second, it contends that Weisenthal violated the Cuban embargo when he imported Cuban merchandise into the United States without first obtaining a license from OFAC, and therefore that the items should be forfeited under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(2)(B). We will consider each of these arguments in turn.

A. Burdens of Proof

In a civil forfeiture proceeding, the Government must first establish probable cause to forfeit the defendant property. See 19 U.S.C. § 1615; United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass’n, 918 F.2d 1289, 1292 (7th Cir.1990). “Probable cause” is defined as “reasonable ground for the belief of guilt supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” United States v. Three Hundred Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Dollars, 661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.1981), citing United States v. One 1978 Chevrolet Impala, 614 F.2d 983, 984 (5th Cir.1980) (per curiam).

As we stated in open court yesterday, we find that the Government has shown probable cause with respect to both of its theories for forfeiture. One Customs official stated that Weisenthal failed to declare the Cuban items, so there is probable cause for the Government’s first theory. And it is undisputed that Weisenthal did not have a license from OFAC to import Cuban merchandise, so there is probable cause for the Government’s second theory.

Once probable cause is established, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture. See United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 390 (7th Cir.1989). Weisenthal therefore bears the burden of disproving both of the Government’s theories.

B. Weisenthal’s Alleged Failure to Declare Cuban Merchandise

The Government alleges that Weisen-thal did not declare the defendant items to Customs officials upon his arrival at the Philadelphia International Airport, and therefore that they are subject to forfeiture. 4 Customs *408 Inspector Paul Nardella testified that Weis-enthal, when he arrived at the Inspector’s secondary examination station, told him that he had nothing to declare. Inspector Nar-della testified that he then searched Weisen-thal’s luggage and discovered the offending goods.

Weisenthal disputes the Government’s allegation. He testified that upon his arrival at the Philadelphia International Airport, an unidentified Customs officer took his declaration card 5 and asked if he had anything to declare. Weisenthal testified that he told the Customs official that he had “alcohol and tobacco products” to declare, and, based on that statement, the official referred Weisen-thal to Inspector Nardella’s secondary examination station. A mark, “T-l”, on the upper right corner of the declaration card confirms (as the Government concedes) that Weisen-thal indeed saw a “roving inspector” before he saw Inspector Nardella. Because this “roving inspector” has not been identified (despite the parties’ efforts to find him), Weisenthal’s testimony on this point is unre-butted, and we in any event accept it.

Weisenthal testified that he also told Inspector Nardella that he had tobacco within the duty-free limit to declare. We give more weight to Weisenthal’s recollection on this point than we do to Inspector Nardella’s, because the events that day were far more extraordinary to Weisenthal than they were to this seasoned Inspector. Inspector Nar-della testified that as a Customs Inspector, he interacts with as many as forty passengers per day. It is therefore not surprising that the Inspector’s memory of the particulars of the incident was not as consistent or exact as Weisenthal’s.

We therefore hold that Weisenthal properly declared all of the seized items to Customs officials.

C. Weisenthal’s Violation of the Cuban Embargo

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Bluebook (online)
35 F. Supp. 2d 405, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70, 1999 WL 10274, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-100-cuban-cigars-paed-1999.