MEMORANDUM
DALZELL, District Judge.
As a result of David G. Weisenthal’s brief visit to Cuba in March of 1997, he returned to Philadelphia with gifts of Cuban products having a value in Cuba of less than one hundred dollars. Believing that these tobacco and other trinkets violated the American embargo against importing Cuban products, the United States Customs Service on April 18,1997 seized all of these goods.
Because Weisenthal wants his cigars and other Cuban
tsatskes
back, he on May 20, 1998 brought an action against the United States,
Weisenthal v. United States,
Civil Action No. 98-MC-83. The Government three months later brought the instant
in rem
action for forfeiture of these same items, and on October 28, 1998 we consolidated it with Weisenthal’s earlier action.
After a nonjury trial yesterday, this will constitute our Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) findings of fact and conclusions of law in this matter.
The Government and Weisenthal have stipulated to certain basic facts. They agree that on April 18, 1997, Weisenthal arrived at Philadelphia International Airport aboard an Air Jamaica flight from Montego Bay, Jamaica. Before landing, Weisenthal filled out and signed a Customs Declaration (Customs Form 6059B). Weisenthal and the Government agree that Weisenthal did not have a license to import his Cuban goods from the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (hereinafter “OFAC”), the agency responsible for administering the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, Part 515, 31 C.F.R.
The Government has put forth two theories under which it claims that the defendant items are subject to forfeiture. First, it argues that Weisenthal failed to declare the goods to Customs officials upon his arrival at the Philadelphia International Airport, and therefore they are subject to forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (and also should be treated as smuggled pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 148.18 and forfeited under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(l)(A)). Second, it contends that Weisenthal violated the Cuban embargo when he imported Cuban merchandise into the United States without first obtaining a license from OFAC, and therefore that the items should be forfeited under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(2)(B). We will consider each of these arguments in turn.
A.
Burdens of Proof
In a civil forfeiture proceeding, the Government must first establish probable cause to forfeit the defendant property.
See
19 U.S.C. § 1615;
United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass’n,
918 F.2d 1289, 1292 (7th Cir.1990). “Probable cause” is defined as “reasonable ground for the belief of guilt supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.”
United States v. Three Hundred Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Dollars,
661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.1981), citing
United States v. One 1978 Chevrolet Impala,
614 F.2d 983, 984 (5th Cir.1980) (per curiam).
As we stated in open court yesterday, we find that the Government has shown probable cause with respect to both of its theories for forfeiture. One Customs official stated that Weisenthal failed to declare the Cuban items, so there is probable cause for the Government’s first theory. And it is undisputed that Weisenthal did not have a license from OFAC to import Cuban merchandise, so there is probable cause for the Government’s second theory.
Once probable cause is established, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture.
See United States v. Edwards,
885 F.2d 377, 390 (7th Cir.1989). Weisenthal therefore bears the burden of disproving both of the Government’s theories.
B.
Weisenthal’s Alleged Failure to Declare Cuban Merchandise
The Government alleges that Weisen-thal did not declare the defendant items to Customs officials upon his arrival at the Philadelphia International Airport, and therefore that they are subject to forfeiture.
Customs
Inspector Paul Nardella testified that Weis-enthal, when he arrived at the Inspector’s secondary examination station, told him that he had nothing to declare. Inspector Nar-della testified that he then searched Weisen-thal’s luggage and discovered the offending goods.
Weisenthal disputes the Government’s allegation. He testified that upon his arrival at the Philadelphia International Airport, an unidentified Customs officer took his declaration card
and asked if he had anything to declare. Weisenthal testified that he told the Customs official that he had “alcohol and tobacco products” to declare, and, based on that statement, the official referred Weisen-thal to Inspector Nardella’s secondary examination station. A mark, “T-l”, on the upper right corner of the declaration card confirms (as the Government concedes) that Weisen-thal indeed saw a “roving inspector” before he saw Inspector Nardella. Because this “roving inspector” has not been identified (despite the parties’ efforts to find him), Weisenthal’s testimony on this point is unre-butted, and we in any event accept it.
Weisenthal testified that he also told Inspector Nardella that he had tobacco within the duty-free limit to declare. We give more weight to Weisenthal’s recollection on this point than we do to Inspector Nardella’s, because the events that day were far more extraordinary to Weisenthal than they were to this seasoned Inspector. Inspector Nar-della testified that as a Customs Inspector, he interacts with as many as forty passengers per day. It is therefore not surprising that the Inspector’s memory of the particulars of the incident was not as consistent or exact as Weisenthal’s.
We therefore hold that Weisenthal properly declared all of the seized items to Customs officials.
C.
Weisenthal’s Violation of the Cuban Embargo
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MEMORANDUM
DALZELL, District Judge.
As a result of David G. Weisenthal’s brief visit to Cuba in March of 1997, he returned to Philadelphia with gifts of Cuban products having a value in Cuba of less than one hundred dollars. Believing that these tobacco and other trinkets violated the American embargo against importing Cuban products, the United States Customs Service on April 18,1997 seized all of these goods.
Because Weisenthal wants his cigars and other Cuban
tsatskes
back, he on May 20, 1998 brought an action against the United States,
Weisenthal v. United States,
Civil Action No. 98-MC-83. The Government three months later brought the instant
in rem
action for forfeiture of these same items, and on October 28, 1998 we consolidated it with Weisenthal’s earlier action.
After a nonjury trial yesterday, this will constitute our Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) findings of fact and conclusions of law in this matter.
The Government and Weisenthal have stipulated to certain basic facts. They agree that on April 18, 1997, Weisenthal arrived at Philadelphia International Airport aboard an Air Jamaica flight from Montego Bay, Jamaica. Before landing, Weisenthal filled out and signed a Customs Declaration (Customs Form 6059B). Weisenthal and the Government agree that Weisenthal did not have a license to import his Cuban goods from the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (hereinafter “OFAC”), the agency responsible for administering the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, Part 515, 31 C.F.R.
The Government has put forth two theories under which it claims that the defendant items are subject to forfeiture. First, it argues that Weisenthal failed to declare the goods to Customs officials upon his arrival at the Philadelphia International Airport, and therefore they are subject to forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1497 (and also should be treated as smuggled pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 148.18 and forfeited under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(l)(A)). Second, it contends that Weisenthal violated the Cuban embargo when he imported Cuban merchandise into the United States without first obtaining a license from OFAC, and therefore that the items should be forfeited under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(2)(B). We will consider each of these arguments in turn.
A.
Burdens of Proof
In a civil forfeiture proceeding, the Government must first establish probable cause to forfeit the defendant property.
See
19 U.S.C. § 1615;
United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchants Ass’n,
918 F.2d 1289, 1292 (7th Cir.1990). “Probable cause” is defined as “reasonable ground for the belief of guilt supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.”
United States v. Three Hundred Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty Dollars,
661 F.2d 319, 323 (5th Cir.1981), citing
United States v. One 1978 Chevrolet Impala,
614 F.2d 983, 984 (5th Cir.1980) (per curiam).
As we stated in open court yesterday, we find that the Government has shown probable cause with respect to both of its theories for forfeiture. One Customs official stated that Weisenthal failed to declare the Cuban items, so there is probable cause for the Government’s first theory. And it is undisputed that Weisenthal did not have a license from OFAC to import Cuban merchandise, so there is probable cause for the Government’s second theory.
Once probable cause is established, the burden of proof shifts to the claimant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture.
See United States v. Edwards,
885 F.2d 377, 390 (7th Cir.1989). Weisenthal therefore bears the burden of disproving both of the Government’s theories.
B.
Weisenthal’s Alleged Failure to Declare Cuban Merchandise
The Government alleges that Weisen-thal did not declare the defendant items to Customs officials upon his arrival at the Philadelphia International Airport, and therefore that they are subject to forfeiture.
Customs
Inspector Paul Nardella testified that Weis-enthal, when he arrived at the Inspector’s secondary examination station, told him that he had nothing to declare. Inspector Nar-della testified that he then searched Weisen-thal’s luggage and discovered the offending goods.
Weisenthal disputes the Government’s allegation. He testified that upon his arrival at the Philadelphia International Airport, an unidentified Customs officer took his declaration card
and asked if he had anything to declare. Weisenthal testified that he told the Customs official that he had “alcohol and tobacco products” to declare, and, based on that statement, the official referred Weisen-thal to Inspector Nardella’s secondary examination station. A mark, “T-l”, on the upper right corner of the declaration card confirms (as the Government concedes) that Weisen-thal indeed saw a “roving inspector” before he saw Inspector Nardella. Because this “roving inspector” has not been identified (despite the parties’ efforts to find him), Weisenthal’s testimony on this point is unre-butted, and we in any event accept it.
Weisenthal testified that he also told Inspector Nardella that he had tobacco within the duty-free limit to declare. We give more weight to Weisenthal’s recollection on this point than we do to Inspector Nardella’s, because the events that day were far more extraordinary to Weisenthal than they were to this seasoned Inspector. Inspector Nar-della testified that as a Customs Inspector, he interacts with as many as forty passengers per day. It is therefore not surprising that the Inspector’s memory of the particulars of the incident was not as consistent or exact as Weisenthal’s.
We therefore hold that Weisenthal properly declared all of the seized items to Customs officials.
C.
Weisenthal’s Violation of the Cuban Embargo
The Government’s second argument is that the property is subject to forfeiture because Weisenthal violated the Cuban embargo. Specifically, the Government alleges that Weisenthal violated 31 C.F .R. § 515.204, which is part of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. That regulation provides:
[ejxcept as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury ... by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise, no person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States may purchase, transport, import, or otherwise deal in or engage in any transaction with respect to any merchandise outside the United States if such merchandise:
(1) is of Cuban origin----
31 C.F.R. § 515.410, an interpretive regulation which the Treasury Department added in 1974, states that “Section 515.204 prohibits, unless licensed, the importation of commodities of Cuban origin.”
As far as the parties and we can tell, there are no reported decisions construing either of these regulations, or of those cited and discussed later in this Memorandum.
It is undisputed that Weisenthal did not have a license from OFAC. The items, there
fore, are subject to forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(2)(B), which provides:
(c) Merchandise which is introduced ... into the United States contrary to law shall be treated as follows:
(2) Merchandise may be seized and forfeited if—
(B) its importation or entry requires a license, permit or other authorization of an agency of the United States Government and the merchandise is not accompanied by such license, permit, or authorization.
While Weisenthal admits that he did not have a license to import the Cuban items, he argues that he did not violate the regulations because he relied on the April 1994 edition of a Customs Service brochure entitled “Know Before You Go,” which a Customs official gave him on a previous trip.
This brochure, at page six, discusses a traveler’s duty-free exemptions, and states that
[n]ot more than 100 cigars and 200 cigarettes (one carton) may be included in your exemption. Products of Cuban tobacco may be included if purchased in Cuba,
see
page 20.
Weisenthal’s argument is that the plain language of page six of “Know Before You Go” should be regarded as “instructions” within the meaning of Regulation 515.204, thereby authorizing United States citizens to import a limited amount of tobacco products from Cuba. The term “instructions” is not defined anywhere within Part 515. Counsel for the Government stated that as far as he knew, OFAC has never issued an “instruction” and that there are no agency rulings discussing what an “instruction” is, despite the fact that “instructions” are mentioned in the regulations.
Thus, Weisenthal gave
OFAC more credit than the agency was due when he assumed that the mention of “instructions” in the regulations meant that OFAC actually would issue an “instruction” from time to time, or that OFAC (or Customs) even knew what an “instruction” was.
In the end, however, Weisenthal’s contention must fail because it is merely supported by common sense. Because it was the Customs Service, and not OFAC, who published “Know Before You Go,” the brochure could not be an
OFAC
“instruction” within the meaning of OFAC’s Regulation 515.204. Also, 31 C.F.R. § 515.502(b) provides that “[n]o ... instruction ... authorizes a transaction prohibited under this part unless the ... instruction ... specifically refers to this part.” As page six of “Know Before You Go” does not mention the regulations, § 515.502(b) tells us that we may not construe it as authorizing the importation of Cuban articles without a license. Finally, as the Government pointed out at trial, the brochure directs travelers to contact the Customs Service if they have any questions, which Weisenthal admits that he did not do, although that may be because he reasonably did not think that there was any ambiguity in the sentence on page six. We therefore are constrained to hold that “Know Before You Go” was not an “instruction” allowing the importation of Cuban tobacco.
Weisenthal’s argument — that he relied on an official Government publication, and therefore did not violate any laws — is nevertheless quite attractive. He is a reasonable and experienced American traveler who in good faith attempted to comply with Customs regulations. His passport directed him to consult “Know Before You Go” for further information, and he did just that. Page six of the brochure contained a simple English sentence to which he gave ordinary meaning, though if he incorporated “page 20” to that simple sentence he would have had, to be sure, confusion and gibberish to decipher. He reasonably believed that he was authorized to import the “Cuban tobacco” as accompanied baggage.
Unfortunately, the issue is not whether Weisenthal’s reading of the brochure was reasonable — which it most assuredly was— but whether Weisenthal had a license to import Cuban merchandise. 31 C.F.R. § 515.204 does not contain a
mens rea
requirement, and therefore even the most honest and reasonable intentions cannot save Weisenthal’s cigars.
Weisenthal also argues that he did not violate the Cuban embargo because his travel was “fully sponsored” by his friend, Andreas Doelling, a German citizen and resident alien of Jamaica, as a birthday present. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(g)(2) does state that “if [a] traveler can establish that all necessary transactions involved fully sponsored or fully hosted travel within Cuba, such transactions do not violate the prohibitions of this part.” Weisenthal argues that this provision authorizes him to import Cuban merchandise because (c)(3) of that section provides that someone who is authorized to travel to Cuba may purchase, and import as “accompanied baggage”, merchandise with a foreign market value not to exceed $100. However, (g)(1) of that section states that “the authorization contained [in (c)(3)] does not apply to fully sponsored or fully hosted travelers.” Thus, Weisenthal has misconstrued the “fully sponsored” exception, which gives him no safe haven.
Lastly, Weisenthal asks that we direct OFAC to issue a “specific license” pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 515.801(b) (July 1, 1997 ed.) because “an unusual problem is presented”.
It is true that § 515.544(b)(2) covers “goods which are imported by a person entering the U.S., which are claimed to have been acquired in Cuba as a bona fide gift,”
but the regulation subjects this general rule to the conditions that:
(i) The goods are of small value, and
(ii) There is no reason to believe that there is, or has been since July 8, 1963, any direct or indirect financial or commercial benefit to Cuba or nationals thereof from the importation.
31 C.F.R. § 515.544(2). While it is undisputed that the goods at issue were “of small value” at least in Cuba, we do not see how we could hold that their purchase did not have “any direct or indirect financial or commercial benefit to Cuba or nationals thereof’ since they were, in fact,
bought
in Havana. Although Weisenthal suggested to us that the purchase of these items “on the black market” meant that the Castro regime was not enriched by these transactions, the regulation also mentions Cuban “nationals” who, we may safely assume, were happy to receive the dollars or Deutschemarks from Herr Doelling.
We therefore must consign these cigars to the Government’s pyre rather than Weisen-thal’s humidor.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF FORFEITURE
AND NOW, this 7th day of January, 1999, after a nonjury trial yesterday, and in accordance with the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the accompanying Memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. JUDGMENT IS ENTERED in favor of plaintiff United States of America and against defendant property;
2. All right, title, and interest of David G. Weisenthal and his heirs and assigns in the following property is hereby FORFEITED TO AND VESTED IN the United States of America: one hundred Cuban cigars; nine Cuban cigarettes; one Cuban wood jewelry box; five Cuban key chains; one Cuban coin; and fifteen Cuban mini cigars; and
3. The Clerk shall CLOSE this case statistically.