United States Trustee v. Wray (In Re Wray)

136 B.R. 122, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 78, 1992 WL 10914
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 8, 1992
Docket14-21573
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 136 B.R. 122 (United States Trustee v. Wray (In Re Wray)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States Trustee v. Wray (In Re Wray), 136 B.R. 122, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 78, 1992 WL 10914 (Pa. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERNARD MARKOYITZ, Bankruptcy Judge.

The United States Trustee has brought a motion pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) to dismiss debtors’ voluntary chapter 7 petition, averring that granting debtors relief under chapter 7 would constitute a substantial abuse of that chapter of the Bankruptcy Code. The U.S. Trustee asserts that the debts listed in the bankruptcy schedules are primarily consumer in nature and maintains that debtors are able to fund a chapter 13 plan.

Debtors oppose the motion. They concede that their debts are primarily consumer in nature, but deny that granting them relief would be a substantial abuse of chapter 7. Debtors specifically deny that they are able to fund a chapter 13 plan of reorganization.

The U.S. Trustee’s motion will be granted. Debtors’ chapter 7 petition will be dismissed. However, the court will consider vacating the order of dismissal if debtors file a motion to reconsider within ten (10) days of the entry of the Order and request conversion to chapter 13 at that time.

-I-

FACTS

Debtors filed a voluntary joint chapter 7 petition on September 10, 1991. Dennis Wray is a school teacher and earns approximately $40,500 per year. Janet Ann Wray is a part-time receptionist who earns approximately $4,000 per year. Debtors’ combined monthly gross income exceeds $3,700.

In the bankruptcy schedules appended to their petition, debtors listed assets valued at $18,405.00 and total liabilities of $76,-746.42. Secured debt pertaining to motor vehicles and certain household items amounted to $16,795.86. The remaining $60,011.06 in debt is unsecured. None of the debt incurred is attributable to illness or to unforseen catastrophic circumstances. Except for $2,573.25 owed to the father of Janet Ann Wray, all of the unsecured debt is credit card debt incurred in making consumer purchases.

Debtors claim that their combined monthly net income is $2,720.42. They also assert in Schedule J that their current monthly expenditures amount to $4,084.73, which exceeds their alleged monthly net income by $1,364.31. Included among their monthly expenditures are the following:

Rent and utilities $ 722.00
Food 453.00
Clothing 55.00
Medical and dental ex- 23.00 penses
Recreation, etc. 38.00
Charitable contributions 20.00
Credit card and personal 2,178.58 loan payments
Hair cuts, dining out, 166.00 gifts, and pets

Attached to the petition was a declaration signed by both debtors in which they declared, under penalty of perjury, that the information contained in the schedules was true and correct to the best of their knowledge, information, and belief.

A section 341 meeting of creditors was conducted by the interim chapter 7 trustee on October 16, 1991. A report of no distribution was filed on October 17, 1991, in which the chapter 7 trustee represented that no property was available for distribu *124 tion to creditors over and above what had been exempted by debtors.

On November 20, 1991, the U.S. Trustee filed the motion to dismiss which is before the court at this time. Notice of a hearing on the matter was sent to debtors and to their counsel. A hearing on the motion was conducted on December 17, 1991, at which time debtors’ counsel appeared and opposed the motion.

-II-

ANALYSIS

11 U.S.C. § 707(b) provides as follows:

After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United States trustee, but not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the granting of relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor.

Debtors concede that their debts are primarily consumer in nature — i.e., were incurred by them primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(7). The bankruptcy schedules submitted by debtors indicate that the debts incurred by them were entirely, not merely primarily, consumer in nature.

The issue that must be decided is whether granting debtors relief would constitute substantial abuse of the provisions of chapter 7 of the Code.

Congress regrettably did not define “substantial abuse”. The principal factor to be considered in determining whether substantial abuse will occur is whether the debtor has the ability to repay the debts for which a discharge is sought. See In re Kelly, 841 F.2d 908, 913-14 (9th Cir.1988). Substantial abuse will occur if a debtor who has the ability to repay all or a substantial portion of the scheduled debts under a chapter 13 plan is granted relief under chapter 7. See In re Hudson, 56 B.R. 415, 419 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1985).

Had debtors so chosen, they could have filed a joint petition under chapter 13 of the Code. They are individuals with regular income who owe less than $100,000 in non-contingent, liquidated debts and owe less than $350,000 in secured debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).

Granting debtors a discharge under chapter 7 would, in light of the circumstances presented in this case, constitute a substantial abuse of the provisions of chapter 7. Debtors are able to fund a chapter 13 plan which would repay at least a substantial portion of the debt owed to their creditors.

Debtors’ bankruptcy schedules would seem at first glance to indicate that they lack the ability to so fund a chapter 13 plan. According to debtors, their monthly expenditures ($4,084.73) exceed their combined monthly income ($2,720.42) by $1,364.31. Nothing remains after their monthly expenditures with which they could pay creditors.

Certain expenditures listed by debtors are, however, objectionable. For instance, debtors at present are spending a total of $2,178.58 (or approximately 53% of their monthly net income) to pay certain favored prepetition credit card debts and a prepetition loan from the father of one of the debtors. Debtors, by voluntarily paying these unsecured prepetition creditors while paying other creditors nothing and seeking to enjoy a discharge with respect to the latter debts, are attempting to circumvent and/or to subvert the distribution scheme set forth at 11 U.S.C. § 726. Certain preferred general unsecured creditors, who have been selected by debtors, in effect would be paid ahead of other similarly situated creditors.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
136 B.R. 122, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 78, 1992 WL 10914, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-trustee-v-wray-in-re-wray-pawb-1992.