United States Steel Corp. v. Board of Assessment & Revision of Taxes

223 A.2d 92, 422 Pa. 463, 1966 Pa. LEXIS 577
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 27, 1966
DocketAppeals, Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 15 to 25
StatusPublished
Cited by33 cases

This text of 223 A.2d 92 (United States Steel Corp. v. Board of Assessment & Revision of Taxes) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States Steel Corp. v. Board of Assessment & Revision of Taxes, 223 A.2d 92, 422 Pa. 463, 1966 Pa. LEXIS 577 (Pa. 1966).

Opinion

Opinion Per Curiam,

These are cross appeals from orders of the lower court affirming and modifying certain real estate tax assessments on the Fairless Works, a steel mill owned by United States Steel Corporation (Steel). The parties other than Steel are the Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes of Bucks County (Board), the School [466]*466District of Falls Township and the Board of Supervisors of Falls Township (Intervenors).

The assessments in question concern the years 1960 through 1963. The relevant taxing statute is §602 of The Fourth to Eighth Class County Assessment Law,1 Act of January 18, 1952, P. L. (1951) 2138, as amended, 72 P.S. §5453.602 (1965 p.p.), which provides in pertinent part: “(a) It shall be the duty of the chief assessor to assess, rate and value all subjects and objects of local taxation . . . according to the actual value thereof .... After there has been established and completed for the entire county the permanent system of records consisting of tax maps, property record cards and property owner’s index, as required by section three hundred six of the act herein amended, real property shall be assessed at a value based upon an established predetermined ratio, of which proper notice shall be given, not exceeding seventy-five per centum (75%) of its actual value or the price for which the same would separately bona fide sell.... In arriving at such value, the price at which any property may actually have been sold shall be considered, but shall not be controlling. Instead, such selling price estimated or actual shall be subject to revision by increase or decrease to accomplish equalization with other similar property within the county. After the completion of the permanent system of records for the county, when assessing real property, the chief assessor shall also take into consideration the value of such property as indicated by the use of the permanent system of records, cost charts and land values applied on the basis of zones [467]*467and districts as well as the general adherence to the established predetermined ratio.” We have held that, within the meaning of statutes of this nature, the term “actual value” refers to market value. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corporation Appeal, 412 Pa. 299, 194 A. 2d 434 (1963); Buhl Foundation v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, 407 Pa. 567, 180 A. 2d 900 (1962). As defined by this Court, market value is “ ‘ “ the price which a purchaser, willing but not obliged to buy, would pay an owner, willing but not obliged to sell, taking into consideration all uses to which the property is adapted and might in reason be applied.” ’ ” Buhl Foundation v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, supra at 570, 180 A. 2d at 902. The record reveals that the Board’s assessments were founded upon the statutory standard and were in such sufficient compliance therewith that they may not be overturned for lack of adherence to the statutory concept of actual value. Accordingly, the attempt on the part of Steel to apply depreciated reproduction cost as the value-fixing standard must fail. As we indicated in both Baldwin-Lima and Buhl Foundation, supra, and on numerous other occasions, reproduction cost has no probative value for any purpose in fixing the fair market value of improved real estate for tax purposes.

If that were the only basis upon which the Board’s assessment might be assailed, we would be required to uphold the Board’s valuation and disregard the lower court’s modification. Nonetheless, there is cause to modify the assessment. In Jones & Laughlin Tax Assessment Case, 405 Pa. 421, 175 A. 2d 856 (1961), we held that improvements, whether fast or loose, which (1) are used directly in manufacturing the products that the establishment is intended to produce; (2) are necessary and integral parts of the manufacturing process; and (3) are used solely for effectuating that pur[468]*468pose are excluded from real estate assessment and taxation. On the other hand, we indicated, improvements which benefit the land generally and may serve various users of the land are subject to taxation. Likewise, structures which are not necessary and integral parts of the manufacturing process are subject to taxation. In Jones & Laughlin, we had occasion to discuss the nature of the steel industry, and we observed that out of necessity most of the equipment used in the manufacture of steel is large, heavy and securely entrenched with solid foundations. Those observations are equally applicable to the instant matter. Applying the principles of Jones & Laughlin, the court below excluded from taxation the following items which the Board had assessed: the railroad track used exclusively in manufacturing; the craneways for overhead cranes; the ore yard; the blast furnace and stock bins; the slag pits; the sintering plant; the ore screening station; the coke screening station; the open hearth charging platforms; the soaking pit platforms; the catwalks and special stairways; and the blast furnace cast houses. We agree with the court below on certain items and disagree on others.

Without involving this opinion with a lengthy discussion of the process by which steel is made, we will simply note that the components of steel are iron ore, coke and limestone. After its arrival at the steel works, the iron ore is mixed and blended until the proper grade is produced. The coke is processed from coal, which is heated and quenched until it turns into coke; the coke is then refined until the particles reach the proper size for blending with the iron ore and limestone. These three basic materials are processed into molten steel, which is poured into various molds to form ingots of raw steel, which ingots are further fabricated into numerous shapes, sizes, types and grades of the finished steel product. A valuable by-product of [469]*469this operation, is slag, which itself is of important industrial use. Each of the structures and items of machinery and equipment excluded from assessment by the lower court plays its role in this remarkable process. Some satisfy the three-fold ruling of Jones & Laughlin; others do not. We shall examine each and determine which items should be assessed for taxation purposes.

That portion of the railroad track used exclusively in manufacturing serves as a massive conveyor belt for the Fairless Works whereby materials essential to the steel manufacture process are transferred from one processing station to the next. Its function is the same as that of a standard sized conveyor belt in a factory which turns raw material into a finished product. Clearly, this trackage is excluded from taxation under the Jones d Laughlin standard.

The craneways for overhead cranes provide support for the rails upon which massive overhead cranes move through the buildings carrying iron, steel and other in-process products. If the railroad track serves as a conveyor belt between processing stations, then the crane-ways serve the same function within a station. These craneways, although attached to the supporting columns of the buildings, provide no support as such therefor and are not subject to assessment.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
223 A.2d 92, 422 Pa. 463, 1966 Pa. LEXIS 577, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-steel-corp-v-board-of-assessment-revision-of-taxes-pa-1966.