United States Securities and Exchange Commission v. Everett

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND No. 25-4211 EXCHANGE COMMISSION, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-08985-FWS-DFM Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. MEMORANDUM*

CHARLES EVERETT,

Defendant - Appellant,

PATRICK JEVON JOHNSON, FRANK EKEJIJA, GARY FEWELL, GEORGE MATTIA, CHASE STEWMON, DOES 1- 10,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Fred W. Slaughter, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 31, 2026**

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and WARDLAW and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Charles Everett appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for relief

from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse

of discretion. See Marroquin v. City of Los Angeles, 112 F.4th 1204, 1211 (9th

Cir. 2024). We affirm.

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Everett’s

Rule 60(b)(2) and (3) claims were untimely.1 Rule 60(c)(1) requires motions

brought under Rule 60(b)(2) or (3) to be filed “no more than a year after the entry

of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). That one-year deadline is not tolled

during the pendency of an appeal. Trendsettah USA, Inc. v. Swisher Int’l, Inc., 31

F.4th 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2022). Final judgment was entered on March 22, 2023,

but Everett did not move for Rule 60(b) relief until May 22, 2025, more than two

years later. The district court therefore properly concluded that Everett’s motion

based on Rule 60(b)(2) and (3) was time-barred.

2. The district court likewise did not abuse its discretion in denying relief

under Rule 60(b)(5). Everett argues that SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024),

1 Although Everett does not expressly invoke Rule 60(b)(3) on appeal, he asserts that “[t]he SEC . . . induced Everett to sign a motion vacating the jury trial” under a section of his opening brief entitled “Settlement Misconduct.” Accordingly, we construe this claim as alleging fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the SEC under Rule 60(b)(3). See Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1260 (9th Cir. 2004).

2 25-4211 entitled him to a jury trial. However, Jarkesy addressed the constitutionality of

adjudicating claims alleging securities fraud before SEC administrative law judges,

not civil enforcement actions litigated in federal district courts. See id. at 120.

Everett’s case proceeded in federal district court, where summary judgment was

entered after the court concluded that no genuine dispute of material fact existed.

Jarkesy does not disturb the settled rule that “a summary judgment proceeding

does not deprive the losing party of its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.”

Gordon v. Virtumundo, Inc., 575 F.3d 1040, 1066 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation

omitted); see Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 120. The district court therefore acted within its

discretion in rejecting Everett’s reliance on Jarkesy.

3. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in denying relief under Rule

60(b)(6). Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is available only in “extraordinary

circumstances.” Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th

Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). On appeal, Everett identifies no extraordinary

circumstance warranting relief from a judgment entered more than two years

earlier. Accordingly, we see no reason to disturb the district court’s ruling.

To the extent Everett challenges the correctness of the underlying summary

judgment, those arguments are not properly before us on appeal from the denial of

his Rule 60(b) motion. Rule 60(b) “[is] not intended to provide relief for error on

the part of the court or to afford a substitute for appeal.” Twentieth Century-Fox

3 25-4211 Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (9th Cir. 1981).

AFFIRMED.

4 25-4211