United States Rubber Co. v. American Oak Leather Co.

181 U.S. 434, 21 S. Ct. 670, 45 L. Ed. 938, 1901 U.S. LEXIS 1379

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: May 13, 1901
• Docket: 150
• Status: Published

Opinion

MR. Justice Shiras,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a case in which the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting in chancery, was called upon to administer and distribute the assets of an insolvent corporation. The jurisdiction of the court was invoked by a bill of complaint filed on behalf of unsecured creditors seeking to set aside as fraudulent certain preferences held by the defendants. Pending that controversy, a receiver was appointed, and ultimately a fund was realized for distribution amounting to about $111,000.

The contested questions raised by the bill, intervening petitions, and answers were referred to a master to take proofs and report the same “ together with his conclusions thereon as to the facts only.”

After stating his findings of facts, the master thus stated his conclusions thereon:

“ I And nothing in the testimony which has been taken before me upon this reference which so changes the record which was before the court upon the hearing of the application for the ap- . pointment of a receiver as to lead me to a conclusion different from that announced by the court at that time; indeed, the effect of the testimony,' in my judgment, is to explain and strengthen the conclusion then expressed by the court, that there was no fraud in fact or want of good faith shown in the conduct of any of the defendants in respect to the transactions complained of; and upon a careful examination of the whole record and testimony I so find and report.”

The Circuit Court overruled exceptions taken to the findings and conclusion of the master, and confirmed his report.

The conclusions of the Circuit Court were thus expressed in the opinion of Circuit Judge "Grosscup:

“ After as careful an examination of the evidence as I have been able to give to it, I have come to the following conclusions:

“ First. That the intervening creditors have not clearly proven that the rubber company and the Candee Company had anjr intention to commit a fraud upon the other creditors at the time of the arrangement of January, 1896 ; on the contrary, I think the weight of proof shows that both these companies believed that, with the help they were about to give Fargo & Company, that company would be able to weather the storm. I am, therefore, of the conclusion that there was no intentional fraud committed.

“ Second. The proof on the part of the intervenors has not clearly shown that the ten thousand dollars borrowed from the Metropolitan National Bank upon which the Fargos were personally liable as indorsers did not go into the business of and to the benefit .of the Fargo Company; on the contrary, the proof clearly shows that, so far as the Metropolitan National Bank knew, the money had gone to the company. Under these circumstances I see no reason why the Metropolitan National Bank had not a right to advance the ten thousand dollars additional money. . . .

“ Fourth. . . . Candee & Company, the rubber company and the bank would, undoubtedly, in January or in August, have had the rightful power to have obtained the judgment notes actually taken. Had they taken judgment thereon, there can be no doubt but that their preference would have been sustained. The vice in the conduct of the rubber company and the Candee Company consisted in their attempting to tie up the corporation against the power to give like preferences in favor of others. It was, in a certain sense, a new attempt; it was in the line of efforts of creditors to secure themselves; it was, on the whole, not ungenerous to Fargo & Company; and did not, considering their rights to have taken judgment notes, and the fact that none of the other creditors attempted to obtain such notes, or any other preference, before the general crash, do any actual injury to the other creditors.

“ On the whole, I think the interests of justice will be best subserved by placing them in the class with the other creditors, and compelling them to pay the general costs of this litigation.”

In the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals there does not appear to have been made any serious attempt to overrule or substantially modify the master’s findings of facts; but the conclusion of the Circuit Court permitting the defendants to participate in a pro rata distribution of the fund was not approved, and the decree in that particular was reversed by a majority of the court.

In his dissenting opinion Mr. Justice Brown thus expressed his views on the questions of fact:

“ I find no testimony to satisfy me that an actual fraud upon the general creditors was intended. . . . The evidence satisfies me that there was a Iona fide effort to assist the Fargo Company in continuing its business, with the hope of ultimately» pulling it through, and that if this attempt had been successful, it would have redounded greatly to the interest of the general creditors. It was natural, at least, that in making this attempt the rubber companies should have endeavored to secure themselves, not only for their immediate outlay of $50,000, but for their prior debts. In palliation of the secrecy which was held to make this constructively fraudulent, it may be said that publicity doubtless would have destroyed the entire scheme of raising money to carry on the. business.”

Nor has our own examination of the evidence led us to disapprove of the findings of facts by the master, confirmed and adopted by the Circuit Court.

What judgment, then, ought a court of equity to render upon such an ascertained state of facts ?

The view of the majority of the Court of Appeals was that the defendants in the court below should not be allowed to participate in the fund until all the other creditors had been paid in full. The result in the present case and in most similar cases would be that the defendants would get nothing, as the fund would not reach them. This would be a striking exercise of power by a court of equity. Thereby the advantages obtained by remedies on the law side of the court would be transferred to the complainants on its equity side; the preferred would become the unpreferred creditors, and the unpreferred become the preferred creditors.

The common law recognizes in every man the right to dispose of his property as he pleases. If he becomes insolvent, he may pay one creditor, and leave another unpaid. He may secure one and not another by a transfer of assets. Such a condition of things, when left uncontrolled, naturally resulted in great abuses. Under cover or pretence of paying or securing one set of creditors, property actually procured from another would be withdrawn from the reach of the latter. Yet the only remedy afforded by the common law was in the principles of the statute of 13 Elizabeth, c. 5, which have been substantially reenacted in the various states of the Union. Under those principles a collusive transfer, placing the property of a debtor out of the reach of his creditors, while securing to him its beneficial enjoyment, would be invalid. But an insolvent debtor may prefer a creditor, even though the latter has knowledge of such insolvency and the effect of the preference be to delay or disappoint his other creditors. Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585; Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U. S. 631.

The right of an insolvent debtor to prefer one creditor to another exists in the State of Illinois to its fullest extent, and the giving of judgment notes is recognized as a legitimate method of preference. Tomlinson v. Matthews, 98 Illinois, 178; Field v. Ridgely, 116 Illinois, 424.

The abuses which are possible in such a state of affairs were among the causes that led to the enactment of bankrupt laws forbidding preferences by insolvent debtors. Bat, in the absence of such laws, as in the present case, if a remedy is sought in a court of equity against fraudulent preferences, it must be on allegation and proof of a design to defraud and delay the complaining creditor. It does not suffice to show a mere case of a preference intended by an insolvent debtor in paying or securing a ion a fide creditor, even though the latter was well aware that the natural effect of the preference could work a detriment to other creditors. This was well known to the learned counsel who drew the bill of complaint in the present case, and accordingly we find therein charges that C. JEL Fargo & Company, the United States Rubber Company and L. Candee & Company entered into a fraudulent agreement, in and by which it was provided that said foreign corporations should be immediately placed in control of said 0. H. Fargo & Company, and have sole and exclusive power and authority to manage, control and direct the business and affairs of C. II. Fargo & Company; that said transfer of control should be effectuated secretly, and to be kept secret, so as to enable 0. H. Fargo & Company to continue apparently doing business for a limited time, and that said C. II. Fargo & Company should continue during said period to purchase merchandise on credit, and should turn the same or the proceeds thereof over to the said' foreign corporations, and should secure and prefer said foreign corporations out of the assets and property then owned by C. H. Fargo & Company, and out of the property and merchandise which should be thereafter purchased by C..H. Fargo & Company, to the exclusion of the other creditors, and to defraud, hinder and delay the other creditors; and that it was not intended that C. H. Fargo & Company should bona fide continue business, but, on the contrary, it was intended that they should continue in business for a limited time only, and only for the purpose of consummating, said fraudulent agreement. The bill further alleges that said agreement was carried out; that a large amount of merchandise was purchased on credit from other creditors, and that, finally, by means of judgment notes and transfers of accounts, the entire assets of C. II. Fargo & Company were levied on for the benefit of the secured cred itors; that the claims of the said rubber companies and of the Metropolitan National Bank were considerably less than the amount for which judgments were severally confessed in their favor, and that therefore said judgments so confessed were absolutely null and void, etc.

Without pursuing in further detail the allegations of the bill, it may be conceded that, if satisfactorily sustained by evidence, they would have justified the conclusion that the transactions between C. H. Fargo & Company and the defendants constituted, not an agreement for the purpose of securing tona fide creditors, but a conspiracy to hinder, delay and defraud the unsecured creditors of C. H. Fargo & Company. But, as already stated, and as found by the master and the Circuit Court, these incriminating allegations were not sustained, and the conclusion of the master, of the Circuit Court and of the dissenting justice of the Circuit Court of Appeals was that no fraud upon the general creditors was intended or actually carried into effect.

The theory of the Court of Appeals, as forcibly expressed in the opinion of Circuit Judge Woods, would seem to be an application to the facts of the case of the principles of the bankrupt law, with its feature of forbidding preferences. It overlooks, as we think, the legal right of creditors to secure themselves by legal remedies, even though they may result in hardship and loss to others. In stating, that the rubber companies were guilty of fraud in fact, we think the Circuit Court of Appeals was not borne out by the findings of the master and of the Circuit Court, nor by the facts as they appear to us; and in holding that, as against other creditors, they and the Metropolitan National Bank should not be allowed to share in the fund for distribution, there was error.

If, in the agreement between C. H. Fargo & Company and the preferred creditors, and the giving and taking of the preferences, there was no actual fraud upon the other creditors intended, it may not be easy to clearly state the grounds on which a court of equity may deprive the defendants in the bill of the legal advantages thus obtained.

Still, it has often been held that permitting personal property, like a stock of goods, to remain in the possession of an insolvent merchant as a basis for credit, however rightfully intended, is forbidden by the policy of the law. And we adopt the view of the Circuit Court, that “ while the policy of the law permits preferences and such preferences as are necessarily unknown to others than those concerned, it does not permit any device which prevents the debtor from giving a like advantage to his other creditors, if he so rvishes, unless such device is put in the form of a mortgage or other instrument perpetually open to public inspection upon the public record. .. . . The device resorted to accomplished for the Fargos and the favored creditors all that a secret chattel mortgage, with possession and power of sale remaining in the mortgagee, could have accomplished, and must therefore be treated in equity, upon all considerations of justice and reason, as such a mortgage would be treated. . . . The judgment notes themselves would not have been a fraud in law; the assignment of the accounts or of the plant at Dixon would not themselves have been a fraud in law; but connected, as they were, with the other advantages obtained — namely, deprivation of the Fargos of all further power and permission to retain possession of the goods and reap the profits of their trade, a scheme on the whole under which a dishonest trader could effectually shelter himself — they are, in my judgment, within the plain prohibitions of the law,” citing Robinson v. Elliott, 22 Wall. 513.

The decree-of the Circuit Court, while depriving the rubber companies and the Metropolitan National Bank of the prior liens created by the confessed judgments and assignments, placed them in the class with the other creditors, and entitled to share ratably in the distribution of the fund in court.

Mr. Justice Brown, in his dissenting opinion in the Circuit Court of Appeals, thus expressed the same view:

“ Upon the whole it does not seem to me that such a case of fraud is made out as authorizes the court to postpone the claims of the preferred creditors to those of the general creditors, and thereby practically to confiscate them; and there is no sound reason for departing from the general rule laid down in the Supreme Court in White v. Cotzhausen, 129 U. S. 329, and in Streeter v. Jefferson County Bank, 147 U. S. 36, wherein the preferred creditors were permitted, after their security had been set aside, to stand upon an equality with the general creditors.”

The case of White v. Cotzhausen arose under the voluntary assignment act of the State of Illinois, and it was held that creditors who had attempted to secure an illegal preference of their debts by means of a conveyance to them of the property of their debtor when insolvent, to the exclusion of other creditors, were not thereby debarred, under the operation of the statute, from participating in a distribution, under that act, of all the debtor’s property, including that illegally conveyed to them. The Circuit Court held that such illegally preferred creditors should be postponed in the distribution, but this court said,_y<sr Mr. Justice Harlan:

“We are not able to assent to this determination of the rights of the parties; for the mother, sisters and brother of Alexander White, Jr., were his creditors, and, so far as the record discloses, they only sought to obtain a preference over the other creditors. But their attempt to obtain such illegal preference ought not to have the effect of depriving them of their interest, under the statute in the proceeds of the property in question, or justify a decree giving a prior right to the appellee. -It was not intended by the statute to give priority of right to the creditors who are not preferred. All that the appellee can claim is to participate in such proceeds upon tenns of equality with other creditors.”

A similar view prevailed in Streeter v. Jefferson County Bank, and it was held that where a creditor of a bankrupt caused execution to be levied, before the bankruptcy, on goods of the bankrupt to satisfy the debt, and the levy was afterwards set aside as an illegal preference within the purview of the bankrupt act, in consequence of knowledge of the debtor’s condition by the plaintiff’s attorney, that the creditor was not thereby precluded from proving his debt against the bankrupt.

There is a wide difference between the case of a fraud ab in-itio, such, for instance, as a scheme to enforce a false or pretended indebtedness, so as to remove the assets of an alleged debtor from tbe reach of his Iona fide creditors, and the case of an attempt by bona fide creditors to secure preferences for themselves, but using methods forbidden by statute or by the policy of law. In the former case, undoubtedly, a court of equity will refuse to permit the guilty parties to derive any profit or advantage from the fraudulent arrangement. In the latter cast ■■ court of equity will not declare a forfeiture of just debts, or, by postponing them till all other creditors are satisfied, practically confiscate them, but will, while defeating the attempt to obtain a forbidden preference, leave such creditors to use and enjoy the same rights and remedies possessed by other creditors.

"We think the present case is one in which the fundamental rule, that equality is equity, may properly be applied, and that will result in avoiding the attempted preferences and in permitting all the creditors to share ratably in the distribution of the fund in the hands of the receiver.

The decree of the''Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed vrith costs, and that of the Circuit Court is affirmed.

Me. Justioe BeowN did not take part in the decision of the case.