United States of America v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedApril 3, 2019
Docket1:14-cv-09412
StatusUnknown

This text of United States of America v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc. (United States of America v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States of America v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America, Inc., (N.D. Ill. 2019).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES, ex rel. RONALD J. STRECK,

Plaintiff, Case No. 14 C 9412 v. Judge Harry D. Leinenweber TAKEDA PHARMACEUTICALS AMERICA, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. BACKGROUND The relator, Ronald J. Streck (“Relator”), a former executive of a network of drug regional wholesalers, brings this qui tam action against Defendants, Astellas Pharma US, Inc. (“Astellas”) and Eli Lilly and Company (“Lilly”). The action is being brought on behalf of the United States and 26 states. Neither the United States nor any of the states has sought to intervene. The underlying facts of the case are not in dispute. The case involves the allegation that Astellas and Lilly defrauded Medicaid in violation of the False Claims Act and corresponding state statutes, when they calculated certain rebates owed under the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program (“MDRP”). This program is designed to offset the cost of prescription drugs dispensed to Medicaid patients. Participating manufacturers must pay the government a rebate of a portion of the proceeds of their drug sales that are covered by a state’s Medicaid plan. The base for computation of the rebate is the Average Manufacturer’s Price

(“AMP”), which is the average price wholesalers pay participating manufacturers for drugs. The lower the AMP, the lower the rebate that the manufacturer must pay to the government. This case involves two separate methods that the defendants employed to lower their AMPs, which in turn lowered the rebates that they paid under the MDRP. The Relator contends that these methods, or “schemes,” constitute fraud on the government and violate the False Claims Act. According to the Complaint, Astellas, from April 1, 2005 through March 31, 2010, entered into agreements with drug wholesalers under which the wholesalers would provide “core services” to Astellas of real value to it, and in return, Astellas

agreed to pay the wholesaler a payment of a percentage of gross purchases. These services included, among others, contract administration; inventory and sales reports; returns processing; and inventory management. The wholesale agreement allowed Astellas to account for these payments as discounts from its sales price which reduced its AMP, which in turn resulted in a reduced rebate under the MDRP. The Complaint classifies Astellas as a “Discount Defendant.” With respect to Lilly, the Complaint alleges what the Complaint describes as the “service fee scheme.” According to the Complaint, Lilly adopted a method to reduce its AMP by deducting

“price-appreciation credits” (“PACs”) from the service fees it agrees to pay its wholesalers for performing services such as previously described as services performed by Astellas’ wholesale customers. PACs were created to inhibit drug wholesalers from speculative buying to build up stocks of drugs in the hope that the manufacturers would increase their prices in the future. Such increases would enable a wholesaler to sell its extra inventory at a profit. To deter this practice manufacturers, such as Lilly, began to insert so-called “clawback” provisions in their agreements with their wholesalers, which obligated the wholesalers to return their profits to the manufacturer. The clawback provisions, instead of providing for cash payments for these excess

inventory profits, were structured so that the manufacturer received credits for these profits, known as “price appreciation credits” (“PAC”), which were used to offset the service fees the manufacturer paid to the wholesaler. By statute and regulation, however, the service fees incurred by a manufacturer, provided they are bona fide, are not deductible from its sale price when calculating its AMP. So, the service fee “scheme,” as alleged in the Complaint, charges that Lilly, knowing that service fees were not deductible from its sales price, lowered its service fees by deducting the PACs, thereby increasing its profits without raising its AMP. II. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY HISTORY

Since the adoption of the MDR Program in the 1990s, Congress and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services of the Department of HHS (“CMS”) have adopted comprehensive statutes and regulations that govern the calculation of the AMP. In 1991 Congress defined AMP as “the average price paid to the manufacturer for the drug in the United States by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396-8(k)(1). In 2006, Congress directed CMS to promulgate a regulation to clarify the requirements for determining the AMP. CMS responded with a regulation that, among other things, prohibited the inclusion of

“bona fide service fees” (“BFSF”) in the calculation of the AMP. BFSF were defined as: fees paid by manufacturer to an entity; that represent fair market value for a bona fide, itemized service actually performed on behalf of the manufacturer that the manufacturer would otherwise perform (or contract for) in the absence of the service arrangement; and that are not passed on in whole or in part to a client or customer of an entity, whether or not the entity takes title to the drug. Id. at § 447.502 (2007).

The regulation also required the manufacturer to adjust the AMP for a specific rebate period if cumulative discounts, rebates, or other arrangements subsequently adjusted the prices that the manufacturer actually realized from the wholesaler. In 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, a/k/a “Obama Care” (the “ACA”). As a result, CMS withdrew its 2007 regulation to account for the changes brought

about by the ACA. Manufacturers were directed to comply with the ACA’s statutory requirements, which included a prohibition of deducting fees paid for distribution service and inventory management fees from the AMP calculation. In 2012, CMS proposed a regulation that largely tracked the 2007 regulation in defining service fees. CMS specifically mentioned PACs in the preamble to that proposed regulation. It said, “retroactive price adjustments, sometimes known as price appreciation credits, do not meet the definition of a bona fide service fee as they do not reflect any service or offset of a bona fide service performed on behalf of the manufacturer.” 77 Fed. Reg. 5318,5332 (Feb. 2, 2012). However, the regulation adopted in

2016, did not mention PACs. III. PREVIOUS LITIGATION A. Streck I The relator commenced his litigation in 2008 when he filed a qui tam action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (“Streck I”). Both Astellas and Lilly, together with a number of other drug manufacturers, were named as Defendants. The government declined to intervene in the case against Astellas and Lilly and a number of other manufacturers. Streck then voluntarily dismissed Astellas and Lilly and some of the other defendants, from Streck I. However, the remaining Defendants, including both discount defendants and service fee defendants, moved to dismiss the

Complaint, contending that the statutory and regulatory requirements governing the AMP were ambiguous, that their interpretations were reasonable, and therefore that the complaint should be dismissed for failing plausibly to plead scienter. The District Court denied the motion with respect to the discount defendants but granted the motion with respect to the service fee defendants. The discount defendants then settled with the relator and the relator appealed the dismissal of the service fee defendants to the Third Circuit. That court affirmed the dismissal in a non-precedential opinion. U.S. v. Allergan, Inc., 746 Fed. Appx. 101 (3rd Cir. 2018). B. Streck II

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