United States of America v. Patricio Paladin

2024 DNH 100

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: November 21, 2024
• Docket: 09-cr-186-PB-1
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Case No. 09-cr-186-PB-1 Opinion No. 2024 DNH 100 Patricio Paladin

ORDER

Patricio Paladin was convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to

distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, three counts of

distribution of cocaine, and one count of possession with intent to distribute

cocaine. Doc. 81 at 2. Because Paladin had two qualifying felony drug

convictions, he was initially sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Doc. 87 at 16.

Congress amended § 841(b)(1)(A) in 2018 as a part of the First Step Act

to reduce the mandatory minimum sentence for defendants with two

qualifying convictions from life to twenty-five years. See Pub. L. No. 115-391,

§ 401(a)(2), 132 St. 5194, 5220 (2018). At the same time, it changed the

trigger for the twenty-five-year mandatory minimum sentence from two

“felony drug convictions” to two “serious drug felony” convictions. See United

States v. Fields, 53 F.4th 1027, 1031 (6th Cir. 2022) (describing changes).

1 Paladin filed a compassionate release motion based on this change in the

law, Doc. 113, which I granted. As a result, I reduced Paladin’s sentence

from life to twenty-five years, which is the sentence he is currently serving.

Doc. 124.

Paladin recently filed a second motion for compassionate release citing

another change in the law as a basis for a further sentence reduction. See

Doc. 139. For the reasons explained below, I deny Paladin’s motion.

I. ANALYSIS

A court may grant a request for a sentence reduction brought by a

defendant who has exhausted administrative remedies if:

(1) there are extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant a sentence reduction; (2) such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; and (3) after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, the court finds, in its discretion, that the particular circumstances of the case justify reducing the defendant’s sentence.

United States v. D’Angelo, 110 F.4th 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2024) (cleaned up);

United States v. Ayala-Vázquez, 96 F.4th 1, 12-13 (1st Cir. 2024); United

States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14, 18-19 (1st Cir. 2022). I determine whether

these requirements have been met by bearing in mind “the holistic context”

of the defendant’s case. D’Angelo, 110 F.4th at 48.

2 A change in the law can be considered in determining whether

extraordinary and compelling reasons exist under certain circumstances:

If a defendant received an unusually long sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, [. . .] but only where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full consideration of the defendant’s individualized circumstances.

U.S.S.G. 1B1.13(b)(6).

Paladin bases his current motion on the Supreme Court’s recent

decision in Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024). Erlinger held that

prior convictions cannot be used to enhance a defendant’s sentence pursuant

to the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), unless a jury has

found beyond a reasonable doubt that, as the statute requires, the

convictions were committed on occasions different from one another. 602 U.S.

at 835. Paladin contends that Erlinger also applies to sentencing

enhancements based on § 841(b)(1)(A). He then claims that this change in

the law qualifies as an extraordinary and compelling reason for an additional

sentence reduction because it results in a gross sentencing disparity when

his sentence is compared to the sentence that a comparable defendant would

receive for the same conduct today.

This argument is hopelessly flawed even if I assume that Erlinger

applies to sentencing enhancements imposed pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(A).

3 First, Erlinger is a procedural rule dealing with the process required to

warrant a sentencing enhancement. Paladin cannot use a compassionate

release motion to collaterally challenge the lawfulness of his sentence. See

United States v. Trenkler, 47 F.4th 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2022) (noting the

distinction between federal habeas relief and compassionate release). Thus,

the appropriate comparator when determining whether Erlinger would

result in a gross sentencing disparity is a comparable defendant who today

has the same qualifying convictions as Paladin. Because that comparable

defendant would be subject to the same mandatory minimum sentence that

Paladin received, his gross disparity argument is a nonstarter.

More fundamentally, Paladin has failed to recognize that when I

reduced his sentence from life to twenty-five years, I determined that I would

have given him the same sentence even if he had not been subject to a

mandatory minimum sentence. See Doc. 143 (imposing a twenty-five year

sentence after “pay[ing] attention to and respect to what the guidelines

would suggest is the appropriate sentence here”). Accordingly, because my

sentencing judgment was not affected by the mandatory minimum sentence

alone, Erlinger could not cause a defendant with the same “individualized

circumstances” as Paladin to receive a lower sentence today than the

sentence Paladin is now serving.

4 For the reasons set forth in this order, Paladin’s motion for

compassionate release, Doc. 139, is denied.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Paul J. Barbadoro Paul J. Barbadoro United States District Judge

November 21, 2024

cc: Patricio Paladin, pro se U.S. Probation U.S. Marshal