United States of America v. Laveneur Jackson

2021 DNH 063

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: March 30, 2021
• Docket: 18-cr-132-JD
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

United States of America

v. Criminal No. 18-cr-132-JD Opinion No. 2021 DNH 063 Laveneur Jackson

O R D E R

Defendant Laveneur Jackson moves for reconsideration of the

court's order denying his motion to suppress. The government

objects.

Standard of Review

"A district court may grant a motion for reconsideration

'if the moving party presents newly discovered evidence, if

there has been an intervening change in the law, or if the

movant can demonstrate that the original decision was based on a

manifest error of law or was clearly unjust.'" United States v.

Cintron, 724 F.3d 32, 36 n.5 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting United

States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009)); cf. LR

7.2(d). "The granting of a motion for reconsideration is 'an

extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.'" Palmer

v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting 11

C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)). "Unless the court has misapprehended

some material fact or point of law, such a motion is normally

not a promising vehicle for revisiting a party's case and

rearguing theories previously advanced and rejected." Id.

Discussion

Jackson argues that the court's decision denying his motion

to suppress was based on manifest errors of fact or law.

Specifically, he contends that the court erred in rejecting his

arguments that law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion

to stop and question him on January 2, 2017, and that he was

subjected to a custodial interrogation without being provided

sufficient warnings about his rights. The government objects to

reconsideration on the ground that Jackson merely rehashes

arguments that the court already considered and rejected.

A. Terry Stop

In his motion to suppress, Jackson argued that law

enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him pursuant to

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The court found that "[b]ased

on the information they gathered before stopping Jackson, Agent

Cook and Officer Barter had reasonable suspicion that an illegal

straw purchase of firearms was occurring at Riley’s Sport Shop

on January 2, 2017, and that Jackson was involved." Doc. 152 at

2 12. The court accordingly concluded that the stop and

questioning of Jackson did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Id.

In support of reconsideration, Jackson reiterates arguments

that the court considered and rejected in denying his motion to

suppress. For example, the court considered and rejected

Jackson's argument that reasonable suspicion was lacking because

not every tip about suspicious activity turns out to be criminal

activity as well as his argument that the conversation between

Keenan and Soule-Jensen was ambiguous as to implicating Jackson.

Reconsideration is not warranted on any of those grounds. See

Palmer, 465 F.3d at 30.

Jackson also contends that the court overlooked or

misconstrued certain facts in finding that the government

officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and question him on

January 2, 2017. In its order denying Jackson's motion to

suppress, the court found that "[t]he employee [who called the

ATF] was also known to both Agent Cook and Officer Barter from

previous reports of suspicious firearm-purchasing activity and

had previously provided reliable information." Doc. 152 at 14.

Jackson contends that only Officer Barter, and not Agent Cook,

knew the Riley's Sport Shop employee who reported concerns about

a suspected straw purchase on January 2, 2017.

3 Regardless of whether Agent Cook knew the reporting

employee beforehand, there is no dispute that Officer Barter

did, which, as the court found, enhanced the reliability of the

employee's report. United States v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58, 62-63

(1st Cir. 2007) (stating that the focus of the court's inquiry

is on the collective knowledge possessed by the officers

involved in the investigation). Furthermore, there is no

dispute that Agent Cook met with the reporting employee before

stopping Jackson, which further enhanced the report's

reliability. Doc. 152 at 14 ("The employee, however, did not

call anonymously, and Agent Cook spoke to the employee in

person, which enhances the reliability of the information. . . .

Furthermore, while the information from the reporting employee

was secondhand, Agent Cook further investigated and corroborated

the report before stopping Jackson."); see Florida v. J.L., 529

U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (stating that a “tip from a known informant

whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible

if her allegations turn out to be fabricated” is more

trustworthy than an anonymous tip).

Additionally, during the hearing on the motion to suppress,

Agent Cook testified that he knew Chris Crosby, who had called

the ATF, as well as Lee Adams, who had initially reported what

he believed to be suspicious activity to Crosby. Doc. 166 at 74

("I had talked to [Chris Crosby] a few times [before January 2,

4 2017]. . . . Whenever it came time to get surveillance video,

it was always Chris Crosby who knew how to get the video. . . .

I think I probably talked to [Lee Adams] a few times, nothing

that sticks out."). Accordingly, the court did not misapprehend

the testimony.

Next, Jackson argues that the court failed to acknowledge

that an illegal straw purchase did not, in fact, take place on

January 2, 2017. He contends that any suspicion that officers

could have had about an illegal purchase therefore dissipated

before the government officers stopped and questioned him. The

evidence at the suppression hearing established that law

enforcement had reasonable suspicion to suspect that a straw

purchase was occurring on January 2, 2017. That the officers

interrupted a suspected straw purchase before it could be

completed did not dissipate their reasonable suspicion that

Jackson was involved in criminal activity. See, e.g., United

States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226 (1985) (observing that

Terry stops can be valid when criminal activity is "imminent" or

"ongoing" and holding that Terry stops can also be valid to

investigate "completed" criminal activity); United States v.

Ferreira, 821 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that Terry

stops serve government interests in "crime prevention" and

"crime resolution"). For the foregoing reasons, Jackson has not

5 demonstrated any ground for reconsideration of the court's order

denying his motion to suppress based on an invalid Terry stop.

B. Custodial Interrogation

Additionally, in his motion to suppress, Jackson argued

that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation on January 2,

2017, and that evidence obtained as a result of that

interrogation should be suppressed because the officers failed

to provide Jackson appropriate warnings under Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). After weighing the relevant

facts, the court concluded that Jackson was not in custody

during the questioning. In his motion for reconsideration,

Jackson argues that the court erred in weighing and assessing

the facts. Because the court has already considered and

rejected the same arguments in denying Jackson's motion to

suppress, reconsideration is unwarranted. See Palmer, 465 F.3d

at 30.

Jackson also contends that the court misconstrued the

hearing testimony by finding that Officer Dupuis's cruiser was

not parked in a way that blocked the Audi from leaving the

Riley's Sport Shop parking lot. Specifically, the court found

"credible Agent Cook's and Officer Barter's testimony that the

cruiser was not parked in a way that blocked the blue Audi from

leaving" and that "Officer Dupuis testified that he did not

6 remember where he parked the cruiser, but indicated that he did

not believe that he blocked the Audi." Doc. 152 at 6 n.5.

Jackson contends that Officer Barter testified that he did not

remember whether the Audi was blocked and that Officer Dupuis

did not have a recollection about where he parked the cruiser.

The court, however, found that whether the Audi was blocked

was immaterial to its conclusion that Jackson was not subjected

to custodial interrogation because "even under Jackson’s version

of events, it was the Audi that was blocked by the cruiser;

Jackson himself was never physically restrained. Furthermore,

Keenan and Soule-Jensen drove Jackson to Riley’s Sport Shop and

the Audi was not his car." Doc. 152 at 18; United States v.

Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 436 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming district

court's decision finding that the defendant was not in custody

and noting the significance that "no meaningful physical

restraint was applied to the defendant"). Jackson provides no

argument that suggests this finding should be reconsidered or

was based on a manifest error of fact or law.

In any event, the court's finding that the Audi was not

blocked by the cruiser is not manifestly incorrect. Agent Cook

testified that the cruiser was not blocking the Audi. Doc. 166

at 70, 100-01 ("Q. Did the marked Hooksett vehicle block the

Audi in any way? A. No, it didn't."). Officer Barter did not

remember that the cruiser was parked in a way that blocked the

7 Audi. On direct examination, Officer Barter testified that,

although he was not sure exactly where the cruiser was parked,

he remembered that the cruiser was parked a couple of parking

spots away from where he, Jackson, and Soule-Jensen were

standing, which was near the front (Soule-Jensen) and back

(Jackson) of the Audi. See id. at 26-27 ("I remember the

cruiser being a couple parking spots away, but I don't remember

exactly where it was. I believe it was more towards the road

area, but I can't remember exactly."). When asked if the

cruiser was blocking the Audi from leaving the parking lot,

Officer Barter responded, "Not that I remember." Id. at 27. On

cross-examination, however, Officer Barter indicated that he did

not know whether or not the cruiser blocked the Audi. Id. at

48-49 ("Q. All right. And he parked the cruiser so that it

blocked the Audi from leaving, right? A. I don't remember where

he parked the cruiser. I don't remember that, but I don't

remember for sure where that cruiser was positioned. Q. Okay.

So you're not disputing that. You just don't remember if it was

blocking the Audi from leaving or not? A. Correct. I do not

remember that."). Officer Dupuis testified that, while he did

not recall specifically where he parked the cruiser, he did not

believe it would have blocked a vehicle in the parking lot. Id.

at 114 ("Q. Do you recall if you parked your cruiser in a way

that would have blocked the route of a vehicle in the parking

8 lot? A. It's not written in my report so I can't – I don't

believe I did."). Considering all of the testimony, Jackson has

not demonstrated that the court manifestly erred by finding that

the Audi was not blocked in by the cruiser.

For the foregoing reasons, Jackson has not demonstrated any

manifest error of law or fact in the court's order denying his

motion to suppress.

Conclusion

Jackson’s motion for reconsideration (doc. no. 159) of the

court's order denying in part his motion to suppress is denied.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. United States District Judge

March 30, 2021

cc: Simon R. Brown, Esq. Anna Z. Krasinski, Esq. Seth R. Aframe, Esq.