UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
United States of America
v. Criminal No. 18-cr-132-JD Opinion No. 2021 DNH 027 Laveneur Jackson
O R D E R
Defendant Laveneur Jackson moves to suppress all evidence
and statements obtained by the government resulting from a
January 2, 2017, encounter at Riley’s Sport Shop in Hooksett,
New Hampshire. Doc. 98. Jackson also filed a “Supplement to
Motion to Suppress” (doc. no. 115), in which he argues that the
government failed to timely obtain a warrant for two cell phones
seized during the encounter.1 The government objects to
Jackson’s motion to suppress but states that it will not use any
evidence obtained from Jackson’s cell phones. The court held an
evidentiary hearing by videoconference on the motion to suppress
on January 19, 2021.
1 Jackson filed the motion to suppress and supplement to the motion to suppress pro se. Subsequently, on Jackson’s request to end his pro se status, the court appointed Attorney Simon Brown to represent Jackson. Attorney Brown represented Jackson during the January 19 evidentiary hearing. Background
Jackson is charged with two counts of possession of a
firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g).2 He has pleaded not guilty.
The court finds the following facts based on the testimony
and evidence presented during the January 19, 2021,
videoconference evidentiary hearing.3 During the hearing, ATF
Task Force Officer Matthew Barter, ATF Special Agent John Cook,
and Hooksett Police Department Officer Kristofer Dupuis
testified. The court also accepted into evidence two audio
recordings of voicemails left by Jackson. The court has
considered Jackson’s affidavit (doc. no. 98-1), which he
submitted pro se with his motion to suppress, but the affidavit
2 At the time Jackson filed the motion to suppress, he was also charged with two counts of aiding and abetting the making of a material false statement in connection with the purchase of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(2). The government moved to dismiss those two charges on December 3, 2020. The court dismissed both counts with prejudice.
3 The court is authorized to conduct evidentiary hearings by videoconference pursuant to the CARES Act and the District of New Hampshire’s standing administrative orders relating to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. See Order Extending CARES Act Authorization, ADM-1, Order 20-35 (Dec. 8, 2020); see also United States v. Rosenschein, 474 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1206-10 (D.N.M. 2020) (rejecting defendant’s several procedural and constitutional arguments against holding a pretrial suppression hearing by videoconference); United States v. Gonzalez- McFarlane, 2020 WL 6262968, at *2 (D.V.I. Oct. 24, 2020) (finding that CARES Act authorizes conducting evidentiary hearings for motions to suppress by videoconference).
2 is given minimal weight because Jackson did not testify during
the suppression hearing and therefore was not subject to cross-
examination on the contents of the affidavit. See United States
v. Reyes, 2018 WL 1704781, at *1 n.1 (D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2018).
A. Tip from Riley’s Sport Shop Employee
Officer Barter testified that, on January 2, 2017, an
employee at Riley’s Sport Shop, a federally licensed firearms
dealer in Hooksett, New Hampshire, called the ATF and spoke to
him. The employee reported to Officer Barter his concern that a
woman – whom the employee identified as Angelina Keenan – was
engaging in a straw purchase. Officer Barter was familiar with
the Riley’s employee because the employee had participated in
informal ATF training on straw purchases and had previously
provided reliable tips to Officer Barter.
During the phone call, the employee relayed to Officer
Barter the grounds for his concern. A few days earlier, on
December 27, 2016, Keenan had purchased two firearms from
Riley’s. On December 27, Keenan had arrived with a then-
unidentified man who appeared to be pointing out firearms to
Keenan and closely monitoring the purchase.
On January 2, Keenan was at Riley’s again looking to
purchase firearms of the same make, model, and caliber that she
had bought on December 27. According to the reporting employee,
3 the same man was also with Keenan, and, as with the December 27
purchase, Keenan was consulting with him. The employee also
told Officer Barter that Keenan and two men had arrived in a
blue Audi and that Keenan had gone to and from the store and car
several times. The employee provided Officer Barter with the
car’s license plate number.4
Based on that information, Officer Barter drove to Riley’s
Sport Shop. Officer Barter contacted Agent Cook, who also
responded to the store. When he arrived, Agent Cook entered the
store to speak with the reporting employee and potentially make
contact with Keenan, while Officer Barter watched a blue Audi
that matched the description and license plate number provided
by the Riley’s employee. Shortly after Agent Cook went inside
the store, Keenan and a white male, later identified as Benjamin
Soule-Jensen, left the car and walked into the store. Another
man, later identified as Jackson, remained in the rear passenger
side seat of the blue Audi.
Agent Cook testified that, inside the store, he spoke with
the employee who had called Officer Barter to report his
suspicions about a straw purchase. The reporting employee told
Agent Cook that a second employee had relayed the information
about Keenan’s behavior. The reporting employee told Agent Cook
4 Agent Cook testified that another Riley’s employee went to the parking lot to obtain the car’s license plate number.
4 that Keenan and an unidentified black male had been in the store
recently, that the man had handled firearms, and that he had
directed Keenan through the process of purchasing the firearms.
The man, however, did not purchase anything himself. The
reporting employee also told Agent Cook that Keenan appeared
sick and that she kept going to the bathroom as well as back and
forth to the car.
Agent Cook saw Keenan and Soule-Jensen enter the store.
Hoping to stop Keenan and to question her about the suspected
straw purchases, Agent Cook, who was wearing plain clothes,
followed Keenan and Soule-Jensen. Agent Cook testified that he
saw Keenan and Soule-Jensen leave and stop on a wheelchair ramp
in front of the store, apparently to smoke cigarettes. Agent
Cook walked by them and overheard Keenan ask, “Is he going to
pay a hundred dollars per each?” to which Soule-Jensen
responded, “one hundred dollars per.” Agent Cook then went to
Officer Barter’s unmarked car, which was parked near the blue
Audi.
B. Stop & Questioning
Agent Cook and Officer Barter decided to stop Keenan,
Soule-Jensen, and Jackson based on their suspicion that they
were involved with the illegal straw purchase of firearms.
Officer Barter put on a police jacket, and both he and Officer
5 Barter displayed police badges. Officer Barter had a holstered
firearm on his belt alongside handcuffs. Officer Barter and
Agent Cook also called for a marked police cruiser as backup.
Agent Cook stopped Keenan and Soule-Jensen before they
arrived at the car, while Officer Barter approached Jackson, who
was sitting in the rear passenger seat. Officer Barter asked
Jackson to exit the car. Agent Cook and Officer Barter frisked
Jackson, Keenan, and Soule-Jensen for weapons. At around the
same time, Officer Dupuis arrived in a marked patrol cruiser,
which he parked in a way that did not block the blue Audi from
leaving.5
Away from Jackson and Soule-Jensen, Agent Cook interviewed
Keenan. Keenan initially told Agent Cook that she was
purchasing firearms for herself, but Agent Cook testified that
he believed she was lying based on her demeanor. After Agent
Cook “forcefully” told her that lying to a federal officer is a
felony offense, Keenan told Agent Cook that she was purchasing a
firearm for Jackson and that she had purchased three firearms
for him previously. Keenan told Agent Cook that Jackson was
going to pay her $100 for attempting to purchase the guns.
5 The court finds credible Agent Cook’s and Officer Barter’s testimony that the cruiser was not parked in a way that blocked the blue Audi from leaving. Officer Dupuis testified that he did not remember where he parked the cruiser, but indicated that he did not believe that he blocked the Audi.
6 Keenan added that, as partial payment for completing the
purchase, Jackson was to give her one of the firearms.
Keenan also told Agent Cook that she had overheard Jackson
talking to other people on his cell phone about the firearms.
Keenan admitted to habitual drug use and added that Jackson had
sold drugs to her on occasion.
Officer Barter testified that he briefly spoke with Jackson
at about the same time Agent Cook interviewed Keenan. Jackson
told Officer Barter that he had a prior felony conviction for
drug sales. Jackson denied that Keenan was buying guns for him.
Officer Barter collected identifying information from Jackson,
such as his name, date of birth, and address, but ended the
interview because he was not obtaining any information useful to
the investigation. Officer Barter’s interview of Jackson, which
Barter testified was “conversational” in tone, lasted
approximately five minutes.
After completing his interview with Keenan, Agent Cook
approached Jackson, who was then standing by himself near the
wheelchair ramp leading to the entrance to Riley’s. Agent Cook
asked Jackson if he was a convicted felon and told Jackson that
he was in trouble because video from the store showed him
handling firearms. Agent Cook told Jackson that he could help
law enforcement by retrieving the firearms that Keenan had
purchased.
7 Jackson told Agent Cook that the guns were in Massachusetts
and said that he might be able to retrieve some of the firearms,
but it might take some time. Agent Cook, however, told Jackson
that he would need to work in conjunction with law enforcement
to recover the firearms. Jackson was unwilling to work with law
enforcement, and he then asked to talk with a lawyer. At this
point, Agent Cook ended his questioning of Jackson, which Agent
Cook described in his testimony as “casual” and which had lasted
about two minutes before Jackson asked for an attorney.
Based on the information gathered, Agent Cook and Officer
Barter decided to seize a cell phone that Jackson had placed on
the roof of the Audi and another cell phone in the car that they
could see and that Jackson had said was his. They provided
Jackson with a receipt for the cell phones and, because Keenan
had agreed to return with Agent Cook and Officer Barter to the
Hooksett Police Department for a further interview, Agent Cook
and Officer Barter told Jackson to leave the area so that he did
not learn she was working with them.
Before leaving the area, however, Jackson asked Keenan to
return $1,000 that he said she was holding for him. Agent Cook,
who did not know what Jackson was talking about, asked Keenan
whether she was holding the money Jackson had requested, and
Keenan produced $1,000 in cash. Keenan remarked that Jackson
gave her the money to buy the firearms and that $100 of it was
8 her payment for completing the firearms purchase. Agent Cook
and Officer Barter took the money. Jackson then left the area
on foot. Approximately forty-five minutes elapsed between the
time Officer Barter and Agent Cook arrived at Riley’s and the
time Jackson left.
The next day, January 3, Jackson called the ATF several
times. He spoke with Officer Barter and requested the return of
the money and cell phones. He made another call and spoke with
Agent Cook and made the same request. Jackson also left two
voicemails which were entered into evidence. In addition,
Jackson went to the ATF office and requested that Agent Cook
return the cell phones and money. Jackson told Agent Cook that
he had a lawyer, to which Agent Cook responded that Jackson’s
lawyer should be the one contacting the ATF. The ATF did not
return the money or Jackson’s cell phones.
Discussion
Jackson argues that the court must suppress all evidence
and statements obtained by the government resulting from the
January 2, 2017, stop at Riley’s. He asserts that the Agent
Cook and Officer Barter lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and
question him about the suspected straw purchases. Jackson
additionally contends that any statements he made during the
stop on January 2 should be suppressed because he was not warned
9 of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and because his statements were coerced. In his
supplement to his motion to suppress, Jackson adds that the
court should suppress any evidence obtained from the cell phones
seized by the government, and, at the evidentiary hearing,
Jackson argued that the court should suppress the $1,000 in
seized cash and any evidence obtained therefrom. The government
objects to suppression except as to the cell phones. Jackson
filed a reply, and the government filed a surreply.6
A. Reasonable Suspicion for January 2, 2017, Stop
Jackson contends that Agent Cook and Officer Barter did not
have reasonable suspicion to stop and question him on January 2,
2017. The government objects, arguing that the officers had
reasonable suspicion to stop Jackson and question him about the
suspected straw purchase of firearms based on the tip provided
6 In his reply to the government’s objection, Jackson argues that the government’s objection was untimely. He contends that his motion to suppress was served on April 10, 2020, making the government’s objection due fourteen days later on April 24. See Crim. LR 14.1. The government’s objection was not filed until April 27. In its surreply, the government argues that its objection was timely under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 45 and 49. Under Rules 45(c) and 49(a)(4)(C), an additional three days for a response are provided when a motion is served by mail, as Jackson’s motion to suppress was here. Therefore, the government’s objection was timely because it was filed on April 27, which was within seventeen days of service of Jackson’s motion to suppress by mail.
10 by the Riley’s Sport Shop employee and the subsequent
information obtained by Agent Cook.
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), government agents
“may stop and briefly detain an individual for investigative
purposes” without violating the Fourth Amendment7 “if [they] have
a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” United
States v. Dapolito, 713 F.3d 141, 147 (1st Cir. 2013). The
government agents must have reasonable suspicion for the initial
stop, and any “subsequent actions are measured by the ‘emerging
tableau’ of circumstances as the stop unfolds.” United States
v. Orth, 873 F.3d 349, 354 (1st Cir. 2017). Therefore, the
focus of the stop may shift based on information obtained during
the course of the original investigatory stop. Id.; see also
United States v. Tanguay, 918 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2019)
(discussing reasonable responses by officer to emerging
circumstances during Terry stop).
To have reasonable suspicion, the officer must have
specific, articulable facts supporting the decision to stop a
suspect. United States v. Am, 564 F.3d 25, 29-30 (1st Cir.
2009). In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the
7 “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
11 court must make “a practical, commonsense judgment” considering
the idiosyncrasies of the case. United States v. Hornbecker,
316 F.3d 40, 47 (1st Cir. 2003). Furthermore, “the focus is
upon the collective knowledge possessed by, and the aggregate
information available to, all the officers involved in the
investigation.” United States v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58, 62-63
(1st Cir. 2007).
Based on the information they gathered before stopping
Jackson, Agent Cook and Officer Barter had reasonable suspicion
that an illegal straw purchase of firearms was occurring at
Riley’s Sport Shop on January 2, 2017, and that Jackson was
involved. The Riley’s employee described to Officer Barter and
Agent Cook multiple circumstances that, considered together,
were consistent with a straw purchase. Agent Cook testified
that Keenan was attempting to buy two commonly-trafficked,
inexpensive handguns and that she had very recently purchased
two more of the same firearms from the store. Keenan appeared
to have been guided through the transactions on both dates by
another person, and she was going back and forth to the blue
Audi during the sale. Prior to stopping Jackson, Agent Cook
also overheard Keenan and Soule-Jensen discussing how much
12 Keenan would be paid for making the straw purchases.8 Taken
together, these circumstances were sufficient to provide Officer
Barter and Agent Cook with reasonable suspicion to stop and
question Jackson about the suspected straw purchases.
Jackson argues that a man’s direction of a woman through
the purchase of a firearm is not unusual or at least not
indicative of criminal activity. See United States v.
Siqueiros, No. CR 12-1839-TUC-RCC, 2013 WL 3282548, at *4 (D.
Ariz. June 27, 2013) (“[S]tanding alone, there is nothing
suspicious about a man helping a woman with the purchase of a
firearm.”). Here, however, Jackson’s assistance of Keenan does
not stand alone. While consultation on a purchase is not
necessarily indicative of criminal activity, such consultation
combined with repetitive purchases of multiples of the same
inexpensive and commonly-trafficked firearm suggests straw
purchases and the plausibility of an innocent explanation for
those actions does not undercut grounds for reasonable
suspicion. See United States v. Wright, 582 F.3d 199, 213 (1st
Cir. 2009) (stating that officers may make a stop based on
reasonable suspicion “even if the conduct justifying the stop
8 Jackson contends that the conversation that Agent Cook overheard did not occur. The court, however, finds Agent Cook’s report of the conversation credible. No evidence has been elicited casting doubt on Agent Cook’s credibility or on his testimony about the conversation.
13 was ambiguous and susceptible of an innocent explanation”
because “the very purpose of [such] stops is to clarify
ambiguous situations”).
Jackson contends that the tip from the Riley’s employee was
not sufficiently reliable to support Agent Cook’s and Officer
Barter’s suspicion. The employee, however, did not call
anonymously, and Agent Cook spoke to the employee in person,
which enhances the reliability of the information. See Florida
v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (stating that a “tip from a
known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be
held responsible if her allegations turn out to be fabricated”
is more trustworthy than an anonymous tip). The employee was
also known to both Agent Cook and Officer Barter from previous
reports of suspicious firearm-purchasing activity and had
previously provided reliable information. Furthermore, while
the information from the reporting employee was secondhand,
Agent Cook further investigated and corroborated the report
before stopping Jackson. As noted, Agent Cook overheard a
conversation between Keenan and Soule-Jensen that suggested that
they were involved in a straw purchase and that a third person
was involved. While it is true that Jackson was not
specifically identified in the conversation, Jackson had arrived
with the two individuals who were known to be involved, so
further investigation of Jackson’s potential involvement through
14 a Terry stop was a reasonable and logical expansion of the
investigation given the emerging facts.
Considering all the circumstances, it was reasonable for
the officers to address Jackson’s involvement in the suspected
straw purchase by stopping and questioning him. Once the stop
occurred, the emerging facts justified continuing the stop, as
both Keenan and Jackson made incriminating statements about
their involvement. For these reasons, Jackson’s motion to
suppress is denied as to his contention that the Terry stop was
not supported by reasonable suspicion.
B. Custodial Interrogation
Jackson also argues that his statements made on January 2,
as well as any evidence discovered because of his statements on
January 2, should be suppressed because he was interrogated
while in custody but was not provided the warnings as provided
in Miranda. In support of his contention that he was in
custody, Jackson asserts that he was blocked by a police
cruiser, that he was subjected to a pat frisk, that his
identification was confiscated, and that he was told to remain
where he was by uniformed officers. Jackson also stresses that
during the interrogation he was told that he was in legal
trouble and confronted with false evidence of his guilt. The
15 government argues that the totality of the circumstances show
that Jackson was not in custody.
The exclusion of incriminating statements obtained during a
“custodial interrogation” is required unless the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was waived after a suitable
warning of the right to remain silent and the consequences of
failing to assert that right. United States v. Campbell, 741
F.3d 251, 265 (1st Cir. 2013). Whether a person is in custody
during an interrogation is determined through an objective, two-
step test. United States v. Melo, 954 F.3d 334, 339-40 (1st
Cir. 2020).
At the first step, the court asks whether, given the
objective circumstances of the interrogation, “a reasonable
person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate
the interrogation and leave.” Id. (alterations and quotation
marks omitted). In assessing the first step, the court looks to
the following, non-exhaustive list of factors: (1) whether the
questioning occurred “in familiar or at least neutral
surroundings”; (2) “the number of law enforcement officers
present at the scene”; (3) “the degree of physical restraint
placed” on the individual; and (4) “the duration and character
of the interrogation.” Campbell, 741 F.3d at 266. At the
second step, the court asks “whether the relevant environment
presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of
16 station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Melo, 954 F.3d
at 340.
The questioning occurred in a neutral location, a parking
lot where Jackson had arrived on his own volition. Although
Jackson was not familiar with the area, an open parking lot is
distinguishable from a jailhouse interrogation that
traditionally requires Miranda warnings. See Campbell, 741 F.3d
at 267 (“The defendants were questioned in a neutral location, a
hotel parking lot.”); United States v. Jones, 187 F.3d 210, 218
(1st Cir. 1999) (“Although the location apparently was not
familiar to [the defendant] and the area was not well-lit, a
public highway is a neutral setting that police officers are not
in a position to dominate as they are, for example, an
interrogation room at a jailhouse.”).
The number of law enforcement officers at the scene was not
excessive. Although there were three officers at the scene, the
officers split up, did not crowd Jackson, and Jackson was
questioned by only one officer at a time. See Campbell, 741
F.3d at 267 (“The police officers split up and questioned the
defendants separately, such that each defendant was questioned
by at most two officers. There is no indication that this
police-to-suspects ratio was overwhelming to the defendants.”).
Neither Jackson nor his companions were placed in physical
restraints, and the officers did not draw their weapons.
17 Jackson argues that Audi was blocked by a police cruiser, which
left him unable to leave. The testimony from Agent Cook,
Officer Barter, and Officer Dupuis, however, was consistent in
that the cruiser was parked away from and was not blocking the
Audi. In any event, even under Jackson’s version of events, it
was the Audi that was blocked by the cruiser; Jackson himself
was never physically restrained. Furthermore, Keenan and Soule-
Jensen drove Jackson to Riley’s Sport Shop and the Audi was not
his car.9 Jackson was later able to leave the scene on foot
after he terminated the questioning by requesting a lawyer.
Neither the duration nor the character of the questioning
suggests that Jackson was in custody. Although Jackson was
stopped, questioned, and confronted with evidence tending to
show his involvement in suspected criminal activity, a Terry
stop on its own does not create a custodial atmosphere even
though it can be inherently coercive to some degree. See
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (“Even a clear
statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is
a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody
issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the
police decide to make an arrest.”); United States v. Trueber,
238 F.3d 79, 92 (1st Cir. 2001) (stating that a Terry stop
9 Testimony at the hearing indicated that the car was owned by a relative of Benjamin Soule-Jensen.
18 usually does “not implicate the requirements of Miranda because
Terry stops, though inherently somewhat coercive, do not usually
involve the type of police dominated or compelling atmosphere
which necessitates Miranda warnings”). Likewise, although the
officers frisked Jackson, the stop called for a weapons frisk
because the suspected crime involved firearms. The officers’
check of Jackson’s identification is consistent with the nature
of a Terry stop and does not transform the encounter into a
custodial interrogation. Cf. Tanguay, 918 F.3d at 5 (noting
that officers are generally permitted to ask a person for their
identification even without any basis for suspecting that the
person has committed a crime).
The stop lasted, in total, only about forty-five minutes,
which was not an inordinate length of time under the
circumstances. See United States v. Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 437
(1st Cir. 2011) (characterizing ninety-minute interview as
“relatively short”). The interviews themselves were even
shorter, as Officer Barter testified that he only questioned
Jackson for about five minutes and Agent Cook testified that he
only questioned Jackson for two minutes. Jackson also exercised
control over the length of the questioning, as it was terminated
after he requested a lawyer. These factors weigh strongly
against a finding of custodial interrogation.
19 Jackson was not in custody during the January 2, 2017,
Terry stop and questioning at Riley’s Sport Shop. None of the
factors enumerated in Campbell weigh in Jackson’s favor.
Considering the objective circumstances, a reasonable person
would have felt that he was at liberty to terminate the
questioning and leave. Therefore, Jackson’s motion to suppress
any incriminating statements he made or evidence the government
obtained as a result of incriminating statements he made without
Miranda warnings is denied.
C. Coerced Statements
In addition, Jackson argues that his statements to law
enforcement officers on January 2 were coerced or involuntary
and should be suppressed for that reason. He concedes that his
statements to law enforcement officers on January 3 – when he
called the ATF requesting return of his cell phones – were not
coerced, but he argues that they should be suppressed as
stemming from the coerced statements on January 2. The
government argues that Jackson’s statements were not coerced.
The government may not use an involuntary or coerced
statement against a defendant at trial. United States v.
Hufstetler, 782 F.3d 19, 21 (1st Cir. 2015). Similar to
determining whether Miranda warnings are necessary, in assessing
the voluntary nature of a statement the court examines the
20 totality of the circumstances. See United States v. Hughes, 640
F.3d 428, 438 (1st Cir. 2011). The “lynchpin” of the analysis
“is whether the government’s conduct overtook the will of the
defendant.” Hufstetler, 782 F.3d at 22. The factors for the
court to consider include the length and nature of the
questioning, whether investigators threatened the defendant, or
whether investigators deprived the defendant of his essential
needs. Id.; Hughes, 640 F.3d at 438.
The same circumstances and facts that show that Jackson was
not in custody on January 2 establish that his statements were
not involuntary or coerced. Jackson was questioned by officers
in an open parking lot pursuant to a lawful Terry stop justified
by reasonable suspicion. Although the officers frisked Jackson,
ran his identification,10 and stopped him for approximately
forty-five minutes and questioned him briefly, Jackson was never
physically restrained. Jackson was not deprived of his
essential needs. During the brief questioning, Jackson was told
he faced the possibility of jail time, but very soon thereafter,
when discussions occurred about working with law enforcement,
Jackson asked for a lawyer, the questioning immediately ended,
and Jackson left. For those reasons, Jackson’s statements on
January 2 were not coerced. See Hughes, 640 F.3d at 438.
10In his affidavit, Jackson states that his identification was returned to him before he left. Doc. 98-1 ¶ 21.
21 Therefore, Jackson’s statements on January 3 did not result from
any unlawful coercion on January 2.
D. Search Warrant for Cell Phones
In his supplement to his motion to suppress, Jackson
asserts that the government took too long to obtain a warrant to
search the cell phones that Officer Barter and Agent Cook seized
during the January 2, 2017, stop. The government did not object
to Jackson’s supplement and instead stated that it will not
introduce evidence obtained from the cell phones at trial. Doc.
124. Accordingly, Jackson’s motion to suppress is granted as to
the cell phones. Any evidence obtained from the cell phones
will not be admitted at trial.
E. Seizure of Money
At the evidentiary hearing, Jackson briefly argued that, on
January 2, 2017, Officer Barter and Agent Cook seized $1,000
from him unlawfully. Government agents may seize an item
without a warrant “if the officer is lawfully present in a
position from which the item is clearly visible, there is
probable cause to seize the item, and the officer has a lawful
right of access to the item itself.” United States v.
Hernandez-Mieses, 931 F.3d 134, 140 (1st Cir. 2019). Officer
Barter and Agent Cook’s seizure of the money was supported by
22 probable cause, it was clearly visible to the officers once
Keenan voluntarily produced it, and the officers had a lawful
right to access the money. Specifically, the officers had
probable cause to seize the money because of Jackson’s and
Keenan’s earlier statements about their involvement in illegal
straw purchases of firearms, as well as Keenan’s statement that
Jackson had given her the money to buy the firearms and that
$100 of it was to be used as her payment. For those reasons,
Jackson’s motion to suppress is denied as to the $1,000 in cash.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Jackson’s motion to suppress
(doc. nos. 98, 115) is denied except as to any evidence obtained
from the cell phones seized on January 2, 2017. The motion to
suppress is granted solely as to the cell phones seized on
January 2, 2017.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________ Joseph A. DiClerico, Jr. United States District Judge
January 29, 2021 cc: Simon R. Brown, Esq. Anna Z. Krasinski, Esq. Seth R. Aframe, Esq. U.S. Marshal U.S. Probation