United States of America v. Jonathan A Barajas Nava

District Court, C.D. California·Decided September 29, 2025·No. 5:25-cv-02584·Unknown

Opinion

WO

United States of America, No. MC-25-00005-TUC-JR

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

Jonathan A Barajas Nava,

Defendant. Pending before the Court is the Government’s Application for Writ of Garnishment directed to Navy Federal Credit Union, seeking to garnish funds belonging to Defendant Jonathan A. Barajas Nava, a judgment debtor. (Doc. 1.) Defendant, currently incarcerated at FCI-Phoenix, filed an objection and requested a hearing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3202(d). (Doc. 13.) The Government responded to Defendant’s request. (Doc. 24.) For the reasons below, the undersigned will deny Defendant’s request for a hearing and grant the Government’s request to transfer this case to the Central District of California for any further litigation or collection proceedings. I. Background On April 14, 2025, the United States District Court for the Central District of California entered a Judgment against Defendant for Damage to Religious Property, ordering Defendant to serve 51 months in the Bureau of Prisons and to pay $7,008.66 in restitution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A and a special assessment of $100. (See 5:24-cr- 00134-JFW, Doc. 63.) The Judgement states that the criminal penalties are to be paid in full immediately or due immediately. (Id.) The sentencing court imposed a payment schedule requiring that payments be made under the Bureau of Prisons financial Responsibility Program at a rate if not less than $25 per quarter. (Id.) The current balances due on the Judgment is $7,108.66 as nothing has been collected. (Doc. 24 at 2.) On May 29, 2025, the Government filed an Application for Writ of Garnishment (the “Writ”) to Garnishee Navy Federal Credit Union in the Central District of California. (Doc. 1.) On June 9, that court entered an order to issue the Writ and for the Clerk to issue the notice of garnishment to Defendant. (Doc. 7.) On the same day, the Clerk issued both the Writ and the Notice to Debtor. (Docs. 8, 9.) On June 16, 2025, the Government served the Writ on the Garnishee. (Doc. 10.) On July 10, 2025, the Government sent a copy of the Writ, Clerk’s Notice, and appropriate orders to Defendant by mail. (Doc. 11.) On July 11, 2025, the Garnishee answered the Writ stating that it has property belonging to Defendant: a solely owned checking/deposit account with a $7,108.66 approximate value. (Doc. 12.) On July 21, 2025, Defendant filed a request for hearing and that the court transfer the case to the district court where he resides.1 (Doc. 13.) Defendant’s request is comprised of a form pleading with prepopulated options, which Defendant checked the box indicating “I request a hearing and that this Court transfer the hearing to the federal district where I reside.” (Id. at 2.) The Government filed a Notice of Non-Opposition to Defendant’s Request for Transfer of Garnishment Proceedings, (Doc. 15), and the court transferred the case from the Central District of California to the District of Arizona, (Doc. 16). On August 11, 2025, the District of Arizona acknowledged receipt of the case (Doc. 17) and assigned the case to the undersigned (Doc. 18). II. Legal Rule Under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a), the Government may collect on a restitution judgment using the procedures available for the collection of criminal fines outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a), see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3613(f), 1 At the time the request was filed, Defendant was housed at FCI-Tucson but has since been transferred to FCI-Phoenix. (Doc. 24 at 3.) Regardless, Defendant resides in the District of Arizona. 3664(m), and “may enforce a judgment imposing a fine in accordance with the practices and procedures for the enforcement of a civil judgment under Federal law or State law [.]” United States v. Berger, 574 F.3d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir.2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a)). “The Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act of 1990 (‘FDCPA’) is such a statute.” United States v. Gianelli, 543 F.3d 1178, (9th Cir.2008). The FDCPA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3308, “provides the exclusive civil procedures for the United States to ... recover a judgment on a debt.” 28 U.S.C. § 3001. Id.; United States v. Mays, 430 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2005). “Debt” includes “an amount that is owing to the United States on account of ... restitution .... “28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B); Mays, 430 F.3d at 965 (concluding that the FDCPA's civil enforcement remedies may be used to enforce orders of restitution entered under the MVRA). The FDCPA further provides that it “shall preempt State law to the extent such law is inconsistent.” 28 U.S.C. § 3003(d). Under the FDCPA, the United States is required to provide the judgment debtor with notice of the commencement of a post-judgment garnishment proceeding as provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 3202(b). The judgment debtor then has twenty days following receipt of the notice to request a hearing in which the debtor may move to quash enforcement of the writ of garnishment. 28 U.S.C. § 3202(d). Section 3202(d) provides the limited issues which the court may consider at such hearing: The issues at such hearing shall be limited— (1) to the probable validity of any claim of exemption by the judgment debtor; (2) to compliance with any statutory requirement for the issuance of the postjudgment remedy granted; and (3) if the judgment is by default and only to the extent that the Constitution or another law of the United States provides a right to a hearing on the issue, to— (A) the probable validity of the claim for which the debt is merged in the judgment; and (B) the existence of good cause for setting aside such judgment. Id. “Although the Act states that the court ‘shall hold a hearing’ at the debtor's request, courts have denied a hearing where the debtor did not object based on one of the issues specified in 28 U.S.C. § 3202(d), where the objection is plainly without merit, or where the objection was simply a matter of statutory interpretation.” United States v. Miller, 588 F.Supp.2d 789, 797 (W.D. Mich. 2008) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Baugus, 310 Fed.Appx. 120 (9th Cir.2009) (“[W]e conclude that any error was harmless in light of the district court's subsequent correct ruling that Baugus was not entitled ... to a hearing, see 28 U.S.C. § 3202(d).”); United States v. Pedro, 2011 WL 2262226, at *2 (D.Ariz. May 16, 2011) (denying a hearing) (c

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