United States of America v. Jesus Vasquez Cantu

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: December 5, 2025
• Docket: 3:25-cv-00919
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No.: 17CR2376-JLS 25CV0919-JLS 10 Plaintiff,

11 ORDER DISMISSING v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION UNDER 28 12 U.S.C. § 2255 TO VACATE, SET

13 ASIDE, OR CORRECT SENTENCE JESUS VASQUEZ CANTU, AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 14 Defendant. APPEALABILITY 15

16 Pending before the Court is Defendant Cantu’s Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to 17 Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (ECF No. 51). 18 Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to Defendant’s motion (ECF No. 61) and 19 Defendant has submitted a reply (ECF No. 63). Having considered these submissions and 20 the applicable authorities, the Court will dismiss Defendant’s motion for lack of 21 jurisdiction. 22 Background 23 On August 18, 2017, Defendant Cantu pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to 24 the offense of conspiracy to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. ECF No. 3. 25 In his plea agreement, Defendant admitted to demanding and receiving things of value 26 from Leonard Glen Francis, owner of Glen Defense Marine Asia (“GDMA”), in return for 27 being influenced in the performance of his official acts and in return for being induced to 28 1 do and omit to do acts in violation of his official duties. ECF No. 8 at 9. Defendant 2 admitted that the value of the items he received from GDMA was more than $15,000 and 3 including items such as meals, entertainment, travel and hotel expenses, and the services 4 of prostitutes. Id. at 11. The factual basis set forth in the plea agreement detailed 5 Defendant’s participation in the offense in 34 paragraphs spanning 9 pages. Id. at 3-11. In 6 his plea agreement, Defendant represented that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, 7 that he discussed its terms with counsel and “fully understands its meaning and effect,” and 8 that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation. Id. at 13-14, 21. Under the terms 9 of the plea agreement, Defendant agreed to waive all rights to appeal and collateral attack, 10 “except a post-conviction collateral attacked based on a claim of ineffective assistance of 11 counsel.” Id. at 18. 12 Defendant was represented by retained counsel at the change of plea proceeding 13 before the Magistrate Judge. ECF No. 3. The Magistrate Judge found that Defendant was 14 competent to enter a plea, that his guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily, and 15 that there was a factual basis for the plea. ECF No. 9. Defendant was sentenced by this 16 Court on February 23, 2023, to a term of imprisonment of 30 months, 3 years of supervised 17 release, a fine of $75,000, and restitution in the amount of $100,000. ECF No. 45. 18 On February 28, 2022, trial commenced for five defendants also charged with 19 receiving bribes from Leonard Glenn Francis and GDMA. 17CR0623-JLS, ECF No. 755. 20 During the trial, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct arose and additional allegations 21 came to light post-trial, following the convictions of four of the defendants. Id., ECF Nos. 22 1156, 1200. On September 6, 2023, these misconduct allegations led to a post-trial 23 disposition in which the convicted defendants were permitted to plead guilty to 24 misdemeanor offenses and their felony convictions were dismissed by the Government. 25 Id., ECF Nos. 1237-1240. In the ensuing months, the Court permitted three cooperating 26 codefendants who pled guilty prior to trial and a fourth cooperating defendant in a related 27 case to withdraw their guilty pleas and enter misdemeanor pleas, based on the prosecutorial 28 misconduct issues alleged during and after the trial. Id., ECF Nos. 1314, 1317, 1321; 1 13CR4287-JLS, ECF No. 377. In addition, the Court granted the Government’s motion to 2 dismiss the case of an unsentenced cooperating codefendant who pled guilty prior to the 3 trial. 17CR0623-JLS, ECF No. 1318. 4 The Government justified these dispositions because the non-trial defendants 5 accepted responsibility for their crimes and cooperated, yet they inequitably faced “much 6 harsher outcomes that their immediate co-conspirators who did not accept responsibility, 7 did not cooperate, and opted for trial.” 17CR0623-JLS, ECF No. 1311 at 2. The 8 Government noted that “nothing suggests the defendants pending sentencing or other 9 defendants in Francis-related cases who pleaded guilty did not commit the charged crimes,” 10 but acknowledged that “certain issues” affected the prosecution of the case. Id. at 3. These 11 issues included this Court’s finding of prosecutorial misconduct for failing to disclose 12 Brady material regarding a prostitute provided by Francis to trial defendant Lausman; the 13 nondisclosure of the testifying case agent’s factual mistakes in a bribery case in another 14 district; information received after the trial regarding the acquisition of certain evidence 15 known as the “Covington hard drives;” the handling and treatment of Leonard Francis; 16 authentication issues of certain evidence at trial; and evidentiary issues regarding testimony 17 of the case agent at trial. Id. at 3-4. 18 Analysis 19 Defendant contends that his conviction must be vacated due to the prosecutorial 20 misconduct disclosed during and after the related trial proceedings and the fact that the 21 similarly situated trial defendants and cooperating defendants received reduced charges or 22 dismissals. Defendant contends that his plea bargaining process was tainted because he 23 and his counsel entered plea discussions “unaware of the government’s reliance on flawed 24 and compromised evidence.” ECF No. 51-1 at 20. Defendant notes that during and after 25 the trial proceedings, it came to light that a subset of evidence known as the “Covington 26 hard drives” lacked a proper chain of custody. Defendant contends that his proffer session 27 and protracted plea negotiations were tainted by this improperly handled and maintained 28 evidence in violation of the principles established in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 1 479 (1984). Defendant further contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel 2 because of the government’s suppression of exculpatory evidence revealed in statements 3 made by Leonard Francis during a podcast released in 2021. In addition, Defendant 4 contends that the Government’s failure to disclose Francis’ podcast statements constituted 5 due process violations under Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) and Giglio v. United 6 States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Finally, Defendant argues that the selective prosecution and 7 sentence disparities in the related cases violate the Equal Protection Clause. 8 The Government responds that Defendant waived his right to collateral attack, that 9 his § 2255 motion is time-barred, that several of Defendant’s claims are not cognizable in 10 a § 2255 motion, and that his claims are procedurally defaulted. The Court agrees that 11 Defendant’s motion is both waived and time-barred. Further, the Court agrees that 12 Defendant’s claims are not cognizable due to his voluntary guilty plea and are procedurally 13 defaulted because he has not demonstrated prejudice. 14 1. Waiver 15 A knowing and voluntary waiver of a statutory right is enforceable. United States 16 v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990). The right to collaterally attack a 17 sentence under § 2255 is statutory in nature, and a defendant may therefore waive the right 18 to file a § 2255 petition. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994); United 19 States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993). 20 In this case, the record reflects that Defendant’s plea agreement was knowingly and 21 voluntarily entered and Defendant makes no persuasive showing otherwise. The language 22 of the plea agreement sets forth Defendant’s acknowledgment that his guilty plea was 23 knowing and voluntary, that he understood and discussed its terms with counsel, and that 24 he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation. ECF No. 8 at 13-14, 21. 25 At the change of plea hearing, Defendant was represented by counsel and the 26 Magistrate Judge took Defendant’s guilty plea in full compliance with Rule 11 of the Rules 27 of Criminal Procedure and recommended this Court accept the guilty plea upon a finding 28 that Defendant was competent to enter the plea, did so voluntarily, and there was a factual 1 basis for the plea. ECF No. 9. No objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings and 2 recommendation were filed, and this Court accepted Defendant’s guilty plea. ECF No. 17. 3 Thus, all of the evidence contemporaneous with Defendant’s guilty plea suggests that the 4 plea agreement was voluntarily entered. 5 Defendant maintains, however, that his plea was rendered involuntary because 6 prosecutorial misconduct materially affected his understanding. ECF No. 63 at 9. 7 Defendant points to no specific instance of prosecutorial misconduct that was part of his 8 plea negotiations, nor does he identify any specific information that would call into 9 question any of the facts and conduct admitted in the plea agreement or which materially 10 affected Defendant’s decision to plead guilty. For example, Defendant does not contend 11 that he detrimentally relied on any document(s) from the Covington hard drives in deciding 12 to plead guilty (or that they were false). Furthermore, the alleged withheld impeachment 13 evidence consists of statements made by Leonard Francis during a podcast which was not 14 in existence at the time of Defendant’s plea negotiations.1 Instead, Defendant speculates 15 that whatever conduct impacted the trial verdicts and guilty pleas of the cooperating trial 16 defendants also impacted his guilty plea. But in assessing the voluntariness of a plea, the 17 court must accord great weight to statements made by the defendant contemporaneously 18 with his plea. Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986), citing Blackledge v. 19 Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). “The subsequent presentation of conclusory allegations 20 unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal...” Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74. 21 Thus, against the existing record in this case, Defendant’s speculative assertions are 22 insufficient to demonstrate that his guilty plea was involuntary. 23 The Court notes that the plea agreement waiver of collateral attack did contain an 24 exception for post-conviction challenges based on a claim of ineffective assistance of 25 counsel. Defendant, however, fails to make a colorable claim that his motion falls within 26

27 1 Defendant pled guilty in August of 2017, the podcast was not aired until October and November of 28 1 this exception. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Defendant has the 2 burden of showing that counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient 3 performance prejudiced Defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 4 Deficiency of performance is established through a showing that “counsel’s representation 5 fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To 6 establish prejudice in the plea agreement context, the defendant must show that there is a 7 reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 8 would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 9 Here, Defendant contends that the Government’s suppression of material 10 impeachment evidence about Leonard Francis and its “defective evidence collection 11 process” resulted in a tainted plea-bargaining process and ineffective assistance of counsel. 12 ECF No. 51-1 at 20-22. However, the focus of Defendant’s ineffective assistance of 13 counsel claim is the Government’s alleged suppression of exculpatory evidence, not the 14 reasonableness of defense counsel’s performance. Defendant makes absolutely no 15 showing that his attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 16 or that there is any reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, Defendant would 17 not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Instead, Defendant’s 18 ineffective assistance of counsel claim is merely a repetition of his Brady/Giglio claim in 19 disguise.2 Thus, the Court finds that the collateral attack waiver provision in the plea 20 agreement to be applicable, despite the exception for claims of ineffective assistance of 21 counsel. Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered 22 the plea agreement and therefore waived his right to bring his Section 2255 motion. 23 / / / 24

25 26 2 Notably, Defendant also fails to make any showing that the facts he admitted in his guilty plea were at all compromised by any non-disclosed evidence. He also fails to demonstrate that he was 27 prejudiced by the prosecution’s failure to disclose material evidence, as would be required to establish a violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 28 1 2. Limitation Period 2 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) establishes a 1-year limitation period running from the latest of: 3 (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by 4 governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 5 States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; 6 (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the 7 Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 8 (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented 9 could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

10 In this case, Defendant’s conviction became final on March 15, 2023.3 His Section 11 2255 motion was filed on February 12, 2025, nearly two years later. Thus, Defendant has 12 clearly exceeded the limitations period set forth in Section 2255(f)(1). Defendant contends 13 that his motion is timely under Section 2255 subsection (f)(2) because the government’s 14 concealment of its misconduct constituted an impediment to making the motion, and under 15 subsection (f)(4) because the specifics of the government’s misconduct as it relates to 16 Defendant’s plea negotiations and proffer sessions “remain exclusively within the 17 government’s possession.” In addition, Defendant argues that equitable tolling should 18 apply. 19 The Court is not persuaded that either of these Section 2255 limitation provisions 20 are applicable in this case. First, the Court is not persuaded that an acknowledgment of 21 prosecutorial misconduct is the type of governmental action encompassed within the 22 “impediment to making a motion” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(2). The Court 23 agrees with the Government’s position that the absence of an admission of error does not 24

25 26 3 The judgment in this case was entered on March 1, 2023 (ECF No. 46), and Defendant filed no notice of appeal. Thus, his conviction became final 14 days later. See United States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d 27 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that statute of limitations for § 2255 motion began to run upon the expiration of the time during which the defendant could have sought review by direct appeal). 28 1 prevent a motion alleging the error. In fact, the trial defendants, without impediment by 2 the government, brought motions raising the same allegations Defendant now contends he 3 was “impeded” from raising until 2024. In January 2022, those defendants filed a motion 4 alleging prosecutorial misconduct related to the Francis podcasts and his medical furlough. 5 17CR0623-JLS, ECF No. 662. In July 2023, a similar motion was filed with respect to the 6 Covington hard drives. Id., ECF No. 1200. Second, the Government’s concession of 7 improprieties during the trial of the related defendants occurred on September 6, 2023, 8 when a joint recommendation for misdemeanor dispositions for the convicted defendants 9 was presented the Court. Id., ECF No. 1243. Thus, even if one were to count the 10 concession of error as the removal of a governmental impediment, Defendant’s motion 11 filed on February 12, 2025 still falls outside of the 1-year limitation period established 12 under Section 2255(f)(2). 13 Defendant also fails to demonstrate that the facts supporting his claims could not 14 have been discovered prior to February of 2024, as would be required under Section 2255 15 subsection (f)(4). The Francis podcast was publicly released, before Defendant was even 16 sentenced, in October and November of 2021. 17CR0623-JLS, ECF No. 635-3 at 2. As 17 noted in the paragraph above, the other facts supporting Defendant’s claims were known, 18 or could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, by at least September 19 6, 2023, more than one year prior to the filing of Defendant’s Section 2255 motion in 20 February 2025. 21 Defendant’s argument that Subsection (f)(4) is applicable because the specifics of 22 the government’s misconduct relating to his plea negotiations and proffer sessions remain 23 exclusively in the government’s possession is faulty on two fronts. First, it presumes 24 misconduct even though the government has never conceded any error with respect to the 25 related defendants who pled guilty and were sentenced prior to the trial-related 26 dispositions. The government has steadfastly maintained that there is nothing to suggest 27 that other defendants in Francis-related cases who pleaded guilty did not commit the 28 charged crimes. See, e.g., 17CR0623-JLS, ECF No. 1311 at 3. Second, Defendant was 1 part of the plea negotiations and proffer sessions, the evidence and information he relied 2 upon in making his decision to plead guilty was not exclusively in the Government’s 3 possession. If any of the trial-related concessions of error or allegations of misconduct 4 impacted Defendant’s plea negotiations and proffer sessions, Defendant would be in a 5 position to know this and due diligence would require him to raise his claims within one 6 year of their publication in 2021 or 2023. 7 Finally, for this reason, the Court is not persuaded that Defendant has demonstrated 8 due diligence or extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling. See, e.g., 9 Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (to receive equitable tolling, “[t]he 10 petitioner must establish two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, 11 and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.”)(quotation omitted)). The 12 Court is not persuaded that Defendant’s attempt to resolve this matter by correspondence 13 with the prosecutor after the expiration of the limitations period constitutes due diligence, 14 nor an extraordinary circumstance standing in the way of a timely filing. Accordingly, the 15 Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction in this matter because Defendant’s motion was 16 filed outside of the 1-year limitation period established by Section 2255(f). 17 3. Guilty Plea Limitation 18 “It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an accused 19 person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked.” 20 Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984). “ ‘[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully 21 aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to 22 him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or 23 promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or 24 unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having 25 no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes).” Id. at 509, quoting Brady 26 v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). 27 As previously discussed with respect to his plea agreement waiver of collateral 28 attack, Defendant has not meaningfully called into question the voluntary and intelligent 1 character of his guilty plea. Defendant pled guilty with the assistance of counsel and in 2 full compliance with the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3 Under these circumstances, Defendant is not entitled to collateral relief. 4 4. Procedural Default 5 “The general rule in federal habeas cases is that a defendant who fails to raise a claim 6 on direct appeal is barred from raising the claim on collateral review.” Sanchez-Llamas v. 7 Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350–51 (2006) (citing Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 8 (2003); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998)). “‘Where a defendant has 9 procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be 10 raised in habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate either “cause” and actual 11 “prejudice” or that he is “actually innocent.”’” United States v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 12 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622; citing United States v. Johnson, 13 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993)) (footnote omitted). 14 In this case, Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence. Even if the Court 15 were to presume cause resulting from the timing of the disclosures in the trial and related 16 cases, Defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice or that he is actually innocent. As the 17 Court previously noted when it denied Defendant’s request for additional discovery (ECF 18 No. 60), Defendant fails to make any specific showing that his guilty plea was impacted 19 by any of the misconduct or issues uncovered during the trial which took place more than 20 four years after he pled guilty. Although Defendant makes generalized assertions regarding 21 his plea agreement process, the government’s suppression of evidence and reliance on 22 fraudulent evidence, Defendant makes no specific showing how any of these factors 23 invalidated his guilty plea. Much of the alleged misconduct resulting in the more lenient 24 post-trial dispositions stemmed from trial issues unique to those defendants involved in the 25 trial. In the case of the cooperating witness defendants, their dispositions stemmed from 26 the Government’s position that they, as cooperators, should not receive harsher sentences 27 than those who opted for trial and did not accept responsibility. This determination was 28 based in equity, there was no showing or finding that these defendants did not commit the 1 || crimes they admitted. While it is true that these defendants received more lenient sentences 2 || than Defendant Cantu, who also testified on behalf of the prosecution at the trial, Defendant 3 ||simply has not established that his own conviction was illegal or unconstitutional.‘ 4 || Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to demonstrate actual prejudice 5 ||resulting from his failure to present his claims on direct appeal and that his claims are 6 || procedurally defaulted. 7 Conclusion 8 The Court finds that the Section 2255 motion and the record conclusively 9 ||demonstrate that Defendant is entitled to no relief because the motion was waived as a 10 |/result of Defendant’s plea agreement and not timely filed under 28 U.S.C. §2255(f). The 11 Court further finds that Defendant’s claims are not cognizable in light of his guilty plea 12 || and are procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 13 ||to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by Person in Federal Custody is Hereby 14 ||Dismissed. Additionally, the Court Denies Defendant a certificate of appealability, as 15 ||Defendant has not made a substantial showing that he has been denied a constitutional 16 || right. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 Dated: December 5, 2025 tt 19 jen Janis L. Sammartino 20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 2 26 ||4 The Court acknowledges the inequity in this result. However, procedurally, the dispositions of the related defendants were possible only because they had not been sentenced and either were permitted to 27 || withdraw their guilty pleas or were the beneficiary of a government motion to dismiss. Now, because 28 on Cantu’s conviction is final, the Court is constrained by the legal requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 11