United States of America v. Edwin Pascual Sanabria de la Torre

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: June 23, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-00400
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 JS-6 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. 2:26-cv-00400-MEMF-MBK 13 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING CERTIFICATE OF EXTRADITABILITY 14 v. 15 EDWIN PASCUAL SANABRIA 16 DE LA TORRE, 17 Relator. 18 19 The United States seeks a certificate of Edwin Pascual Sanabria de la 20 Torre’s extraditabilty to the Republic of Peru pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184. In 21 2017, a Peruvian court found Sanabria guilty of the murder of his sister, Olga 22 Eugenia Sanabria de la Torre, and sentenced him to twenty years in prison. 23 Sanabria was present for the trial hearings in his case, but fled Peru shortly 24 before the court issued its judgment of guilt. His conviction and prison 25 sentence were upheld on appeal. On August 16, 2023, Peru submitted a 26 diplomatic note requesting Sanabria’s extradition from the United States. 27 Sanabria was arrested by the United States Marshals in Lake Forest, 28 California, on December 3, 2025. The United States filed a motion for a 1 certificate of extraditability on January 29, 2026. After the completion of 2 briefing, the Court held an extradition hearing on June 5, 2026. For the 3 reasons that follow, the Court grants the United States’ motion and issues a 4 certificate of Sanabria’s extraditability to the Secretary of State. 5 6 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 7 A. Factual Background 8 The instant extradition request arises from Sanabria’s conviction for the 9 murder of his sister, Olga Eugenia Sanabria de la Torre (“Olga Sanabria”), in 10 2012. On April 5, 2017, following a trial, the Court of Appeals of Northern 11 Lima, Second Criminal Division Specialized in Proceedings with Non- 12 Incarcerated Defendants (the “Northern Lima Court of Appeals”), issued a 13 judgment finding Sanabria guilty of Aggravated Murder for Financial Gain. 14 The Supreme Court of Justice of the Republic of Peru (“Supreme Court of 15 Justice”) affirmed Sanabria’s conviction on August 21, 2018. The following 16 factual summary is drawn from the written decisions of the Northern Lima 17 Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Justice, as well as investigative 18 files from the case, which Peru provided in support of its extradition request. 19 Dkt. 22-1 at 2. 20 The Sanabria family owned and operated the San Marcelo Educational 21 Institution, which has multiples campuses in Lima, Peru. In or around 2009, 22 Sanabria’s and Olga Sanabria’s mother passed away and left most of her 23 business property to Olga Sanabria, including the educational facilities of San 24 Marcelo’s San Martín de Porres campus, as well as shared ownership of a 25 campus in Callao with Sanabria. Dkt. 22-3 at 321, 258-59, 349. 26 At the time of her mother’s passing, Olga Sanabria was married and 27 living with her family in Valencia, Spain, where she had resided for the past 28 1 approximately twenty years. She subsequently returned to Lima to run the 2 schools. Id. at 40, 317, 325, 349. Evidence presented at trial indicated that 3 Sanabria and his sister’s relationship had deteriorated during her time abroad 4 and worsened when she returned to Peru. Id. at 317, 321, 351, 384. According 5 to colleagues and Olga Sanabria’s husband, Olga Sanabria had constant 6 conflicts with Sanabria and his wife, Nany Reaño Vásquez, who also worked 7 at the school. Id. at 366, 350-51, 523-26. Olga Sanabria ultimately required 8 Ms. Vásquez to resign her position. Id. 9 On March 1, 2012, Olga Sanabria attended a training at the San Martín 10 de Porres campus. Id. at 47, 193, 196, 318. Sanabria was not present at the 11 school. According to evidence presented at trial, Sanabria and his wife called 12 the principal of the school, who was present at the training, multiple times to 13 inquire about the timing and location of the training. They also specifically 14 asked what clothing Olga Sanabria was wearing and what time she would be 15 leaving the event. Id. at 59, 345, 388. Separately, on the day of the training, 16 Sanabria placed a call to request that the school’s security guard assist with a 17 project at a different school campus. The guard complied, leaving the door to 18 the school unattended. Id. at 357, 366, 511. 19 At approximately 1:15 p.m., a man entered the school campus and shot 20 Olga Sanabria three times in her thorax and abdomen. She later died from 21 her wounds. Id. at 106, 287, 357, 382, 507. 22 According to the subsequent investigation by law enforcement 23 authorities, Sanabria had planned the murder of his sister with his wife and 24 their long-time housekeeper, Rose Mitma. Mitma worked with other 25 individuals, including Yolanda Sara Borja Zavaleta and Jorge Luis Poves 26 Paucar, to hire a hitman and supplied him with a cellular telephone. Id. at 27 616-17. In exchange for Mitma’s assistance, Sanabria extended the payment 28 1 terms of a loan that Mitma’s family owed him, valued at approximately 2 $13,800. Id. at 368, 394, 542-43. 3 At trial, the prosecution introduced telephone records as evidence of the 4 conspiracy between Sanabria, Reaño Vásquez, Mitma, Borja Zavaleta, and 5 Poves Paucar. The records showed that, between February 3, 2012, and March 6 1, 2012, numerous telephone calls took place between the telephones believed 7 to be used by Mitma, Sanabria, and Reaño Vásquez. Id. at 146-148, 371-72, 8 616-17. Among other calls, the records showed that the telephone believed to 9 be used by Mitma called the telephone believed to be used by Sanabria 10 minutes before Olga Sanabria’s murder. Id. at 332, 369. The prosecution 11 identified a telephone believed to be used by the hitman, based on cell site 12 records placing the telephone in the area in which the crime took place. The 13 telephone records showed that the telephone believed to be used by Mitma 14 had exchanged calls and text messages with the telephone believed to used by 15 the hitman immediately prior to, and directly after, Olga Sanabria’s shooting. 16 Id. at 11, 162-64, 200, 289, 371-72, 391-92, 540-42, 616-17. 17 Following Olga Sanabria’s death, Sanabria became the exclusive 18 operator of the San Marcelo Educational Institution. According to evidence 19 introduced at trial, Sanabria substantially increased his own salary and also 20 re-hired his wife, Reaño Vásquez, who was given a significantly higher wage 21 than she had previously earned before she resigned her position. Id. at 264, 22 531-32. Sanabria also transferred part of his ownership stake in the school to 23 his father-in-law and hired other members of Reaño Vásquez’s family. Id. 24 B. Sanabria’s Trial and Appeal 25 On October 23, 2012, the Sixth Provincial Prosecutor’s Office 26 Specialized in Criminal Proceedings in and for Northern Lima issued a formal 27 complaint charging Sanabria, Reaño Vásquez, Mitma, Borja Zavaleta, and 28 1 Poves Paucar, with Murder and Aggravated Murder for Financial Gain, in 2 violation of Sections 106 and 108 of the Criminal Code. Id. at 88-103. 3 On December 10, 2012, the Northern Lima Court of Appeals issued an 4 order committing the case for trial. Id. at 104-19. The court permitted the 5 defendants to remain out of custody during the trial proceedings subject to 6 certain conditions, including a prohibition on leaving the country. Id. at 115- 7 16. Hearings took place in the criminal trial on June 27, 2016, and November 8 25, 2016, at which the court heard witness testimony and other evidence. Id. 9 at 218-85. Sanabria was present for these trial court proceedings. Id. On 10 March 30, 2017, Peruvian migratory records reflect that Sanabria departed 11 Peru for Mexico. Id. at 438. There is no record that he has returned to Peru 12 since that time. Id. 13 On April 5, 2017, the Northern Lima Court of Appeals issued a written 14 decision and judgment in the criminal case. Id. at 286-405. The decision 15 summarizes in detail the charges brought against the defendants and the 16 evidence presented at trial. Based on its conclusions of fact and law, the 17 Northern Lima Court of Appeals found Sanabria and Mitma guilty of 18 Aggravated Murder for Financial Gain. Id. at 364-89. The court characterized 19 Sanabria as the “mastermind” of the crime and Mitma as his “primary 20 accomplice,” and rejected that Sanabria should be found liable as an “aider 21 and abettor.” Id. at 396-97. The court, however, found insufficient evidence to 22 convict Reaño Vásquez, Borja Zavaleta, and Poves Paucar, and acquitted them 23 of the murder. Id. at 378-79, 402. The court sentenced Sanabria and Mitma to 24 20 years in prison without possibility of parole and imposed civil restitution of 25 100,000 soles, significantly more than the 15,000 soles sought by the 26 prosecution. Id. at 398-404. On the day after it issued its judgment, April 6, 27 2017, the Northern Lima Court of Appeals issued a letter requesting 28 1 Sanabria’s arrest and extradition. Id. at 406-20. 2 Although Sanabria remained abroad, he subsequently appealed his 3 sentence and conviction to the Supreme Court of Justice. On August 21, 2018, 4 the Supreme Court of Justice issued a written decision addressing Sanabria’s 5 appeal, as well as the appeals of other parties in the criminal case. Id. at 505- 6 50. The Supreme Court of Justice found that Sanabria’s conviction and 7 sentence were “duly justified . . . the evidence is sufficient, and it categorically 8 proves his criminal responsibility.” Id. at 520-38. However, the court 9 “clarified,” that under Peruvian criminal law, Sanabria should have been 10 found liable as an “aider and abettor,” rather than “mastermind.” Id. at 547- 11 48. It made clear, though, that this correction did not affect the validity of the 12 conviction or sentence. Id. at 547 (“the factual situation is the same, the 13 charges against him also”). The Supreme Court of Justice further found that it 14 was impermissible to impose a civil restitution order greater than the amount 15 requested by the prosecution. Id. at 547-48. Accordingly, the court concluded 16 that there were no grounds to annul Sanabria’s conviction, but ordered that 17 the civil restitution award be reduced to 15,000 soles. Id. at 548-49. In its 18 decision, the Supreme Court of Justice also affirmed Mitma’s conviction, 19 reversed the acquittals of Reaño Vásquez and Borja Zavaleta, and ordered 20 new trials for Reaño Vásquez and Borja Zavaleta. Id. 21 On April 23, 2019, the Court of Appeals for Northern Lima issued a 22 final judgment consistent with the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision. Id. at 23 551-54. With respect to Sanabria, the court acknowledged that the “correct 24 characterization of the facts was aider and abettor,” but that “there are no 25 grounds for annulment to the extent that [Sanabria] is sentenced as a primary 26 accomplice.” Id. at 552. 27 C. Extradition Request and Proceedings in the United States 28 1 On August 16, 2023, Peru submitted a diplomatic note formally 2 requesting Sanabria’s extradition. Dkt. 22-1 at 2, 18. 3 On November 24, 2025, the United States filed a Complaint for Arrest 4 Warrant and Extradition for Sanabria. Dkt. 1. After Magistrate Judge Rozella 5 A. Oliver issued an arrest warrant, (Dkt. 3), the United States Marshals 6 arrested Sanabria in Lake Forest, California, on December 3, 2025. Dkt. 6, 8. 7 Sanabria made his initial appearance before the undersigned Magistrate 8 Judge on December 4, 2025. Dkt. 9. The Court found no special circumstances 9 warranting Sanabria’s release pending extradition proceedings and ordered 10 his continued detention. Dkt. 12. 11 On January 14, 2026, the United States filed its Request for 12 Extradition, with accompanying exhibits. Dkt. 16; see also Dkt. 22 (redacted 13 Request for Extradition). The United States filed its Extradition 14 Memorandum on February 6, 2026. Dkt. 23. Pursuant to the parties’ 15 stipulation, (Dkt. 24), Sanabria filed his Opposition to the Government’s 16 Extradition Memorandum on April 20, 2026, and the United States filed its 17 Reply on May 19, 2026. Dkt. 26, 27. The Court held a hearing on June 8, 2026, 18 after which it took this matter under submission. Dkt. 28. 19 20 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 21 “‘Extradition from the United States is a diplomatic process’ that is 22 initiated when a foreign nation requests extradition of an individual from the 23 State Department.” Manta v. Chertoff, 518 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008) 24 (quoting Prasoprat v. Benov, 421 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005)). “If the State 25 Department concludes that the request is within the scope of a treaty between 26 the requesting nation and the United States,” the United States may file a 27 request in federal district court seeking a certificate of the individual’s 28 1 extraditability. Id. The court is authorized by statute to determine whether to 2 certify to the Secretary of State that the evidence submitted by the country 3 requesting extradition is “sufficient to sustain the charge.” 18 U.S.C. § 3184. If 4 the court so certifies, the Secretary of State then decides whether the relator 5 should be surrendered to the requesting country. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3184, 3186; 6 Santos v. Thomas, 830 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 7 To issue a certification to the Secretary of State, the court must find: (1) 8 it has jurisdiction to conduct extradition proceedings; (2) it has jurisdiction 9 over the relator; (3) an extradition treaty is in force and effect; (4) the relator 10 is being sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits 11 extradition; and (5) there is sufficient evidence to establish probable cause 12 that the relator committed the offense for which extradition is requested. See 13 Santos, 830 F.3d at 991. 14 The judiciary’s role in the extradition process is a limited one. See 15 United States v. Knotek, 925 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019). If the 16 certification requirements are met, “the extradition court must certify the 17 extradition to the Secretary of State, who ultimately determines whether to 18 extradite the accused to the requesting state.” Martinez Santoyo v. Boyden, 19 130 F.4th 784, 788 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal alterations omitted); Manta, 518 20 F.3d at 1140. The court “has no discretionary decision to make.” Prasoprat, 21 421 F.3d at 1012 (quoting Lopez-Smith v. Hood, 121 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 22 1997)). 23 24 III. DISCUSSION 25 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 26 18 U.S.C. § 3184 provides that “any justice or judge of the United 27 States, or any magistrate judge authorized so to do by a court of the United 28 1 States” may conduct extradition proceedings and, if the evidence so 2 establishes, issue a certificate of extraditability to the Secretary of State. 3 Central District of California General Order 05-07, in turn, authorizes 4 Magistrate Judges in the District to conduct “[e]xtradition proceedings 5 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3181 et seq.” C.D. Cal. General Order 05-07 at 3. 6 Accordingly, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this extradition 7 proceeding. 8 B. Personal Jurisdiction 9 This Court has jurisdiction over a fugitive found within its jurisdictional 10 boundaries. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (stating a court “may, upon complaint made 11 under oath, charging any person found within [its] jurisdiction, . . . issue [its] 12 warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged”). Sanabria was found 13 within the Central District when he was arrested in Lake Forest, California, 14 on December 3, 2025. Dkt. 6, 8. The Court therefore has jurisdiction over 15 Sanabria. 16 C. Valid Extradition Treaty 17 The Court finds there is a valid extradition treaty in full force and effect 18 between the United States and Peru. The United States filed a copy of the 19 relevant treaty, the Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America 20 and the Republic of Peru, executed in Lima, Peru on July 26, 2001. See Dkt. 21 22-1 at 4-16. Sanabria does not contest that the document represents the 22 current treaty in effect between the United States and Peru. 23 D. Sanabria is Sought for an Offense that is Covered by the Treaty 24 The Court now turns to whether the offense for which Peru has sought 25 Sanabria’s extradition is covered by the treaty. “The question of whether an 26 offense is extraditable involves determining: (1) whether it is listed as an 27 extraditable crime in the relevant treaty; (2) whether the alleged conduct is 28 1 criminalized in both countries; and, (3) whether the offenses in both countries 2 are substantially analogous.” Knotek, 925 F.3d at 1128-29 (footnote omitted). 3 “In assessing dual criminality, we look first for a similar criminal provision of 4 federal law or, if none, the law of the place where the individual was found or, 5 if none, the law of the preponderance of the states.” Id. at 1129 n.10. “[T]he 6 elements of the analogous offenses need not be identical.” Clarey v. Gregg, 138 7 F.3d 764, 766 (9th Cir. 1998). Rather, it is sufficient that the statutes are 8 “substantially analogous” and “directed to the same basic evil.” Id. (cleaned 9 up). 10 Here, the Treaty provides for the extradition of fugitives who were 11 charged or convicted of “an extraditable offense if it is punishable under the 12 laws in both Contracting States by deprivation of liberty for a maximum 13 period of more than one year or by a more severe penalty.” Dkt. 22-1 at 6. The 14 Northern Lima Court of Appeals convicted Sanabria of Aggravated Murder for 15 Financial Gain, in violation of Section 108 of the Peruvian Criminal Code, and 16 sentenced him to twenty years in prison. Dkt. 22-3 at 8-9, 402-03. As 17 discussed above, in its initial decision and judgment, the Northern Lima 18 Court of Appeals found Sanabria liable as a “mastermind,” rejecting that he 19 should be held liable as an “aider and abettor.” Id. at 396-97. The Supreme 20 Court of Justice subsequently upheld Sanabria’s conviction and prison 21 sentence, but found that Sanabria should have been found liable as an “aider 22 and abettor.” Id. at 547-48. Consistent with the Supreme Court of Justice’s 23 instructions, on remand, the Northern Lima Court of Appeals corrected its 24 judgment to reflect Sanabria’s liability as an “aider and abettor.” Id. at 552. 25 The parties dispute which United States criminal law is comparable to 26 Sanabria’s Aggravated Murder conviction under Peruvian criminal law. In its 27 Motion for a Certificate of Extraditability, the United States argued that the 28 1 comparable offense is homicide under 18 U.S.C. § 1111. Dkt. 23 at 29. In his 2 opposition, Sanabria argues that—in light of the Supreme Court of Justice’s 3 ruling—“the more appropriate corollary offense is [1]8 U.S.C. § 2, aiding and 4 abetting homicide.” Dkt. 26 at 6. In its reply, the United States argues that it 5 is immaterial whether the comparison is to liability as a principal or as an 6 “aider and abettor” because—under either theory of liability—Sanabria’s 7 conduct would be unlawful if it occurred in the United States. Dkt. 27 at 7-8. 8 The Court agrees with the United States that Sanabria was convicted of 9 an extraditable offense under the Treaty. The Supreme Court of Justice found 10 that the correct characterization of Sanabria’s liability, as an “aider and 11 abettor,” did not affect the validity of his conviction for Aggravated Murder. 12 Dkt. 22-3 at 547. It also upheld his twenty-year prison sentence. Id. 13 Regardless of whether Sanabria would have been charged as a principal or 14 aider and abettor in the United States, he would have faced a potential prison 15 sentence in excess of one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111(b) (providing that the 16 punishment for murder may include “any term of years,” “for life,” or in 17 certain circumstances, “death”). See also 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (providing that an 18 offense committed by aider and abettor is “punishable as a principal”). As 19 such, Sanabria was convicted of an offense that it “is punishable under the 20 laws in both Contracting States by deprivation of liberty for a maximum 21 period of more than one year or by a more severe penalty.” Dkt No. 22-1 at 6.1 22 Sanabria argues that his offense is not extraditable because, under its 23 domestic law, Peru was required to re-authorize its extradition request after 24 the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision. Dkt. 26 at 7. Sanabria points to 25 Section 520 of the Peruvian Civil Code, which provides:

26 If the characterization of the crime that gave rise to extradition was 27 1 Because there is a federal analog, the Court need not consider California state 28 criminal law. See Knotek, 925 F.3d at 1129 n.11. 1 State, it must also be authorized by the Government of Peru, under the same procedures as the previous paragraph, with the specification that 2 it should only be processed if the new characterization also constitutes an extraditable offense. 3 Dkt. 22-3 at 776. Sanabria argues that the Supreme Court of Justice’s 4 decision “modified” the “characterization” of Sanabria’s crime in the manner 5 contemplated by Section 520. See Dkt. 26 at 7. Because the Northern Lima 6 Court of Appeals first issued a request for Sanabria’s extradition on April 6, 7 2016, before the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision, (Dkt. 22-3 at 406-20), 8 Sanabria claims that Peru was therefore obligated to initiate a new request 9 that reflected the Supreme Court’s corrected basis for his criminal liability. 10 Dkt. 26 at 7-8. 11 Even assuming that a violation of Peruvian Civil Code § 520 would 12 violate the Treaty and provide a basis to deny a certificate of extraditability, 13 the Court rejects that Peruvian law required Peru to re-authorize its 14 extradition request for two reasons. First, it is doubtful that Peruvian Civil 15 Code § 520 was triggered by the Supreme Court of Justice’s opinion. As 16 discussed above, the Supreme Court of Justice affirmed Sanabria’s conviction 17 for Aggravated Murder and his prison sentence. While it corrected the basis 18 for Sanabria’s liability, it made clear that the “the factual situation” and 19 “charges against him” are “the same.” Dkt. 22-3 at 547. The Supreme Court of 20 Justice’s decision therefore did not meaningfully change the “characterization” 21 of Sanabria’s conviction and sentence under Peruvian law. 22 Second, and more importantly, Peru completed all the relevant steps in 23 its extradition process after the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision. While the 24 Northern Lima Court of Appeals issued its initial extradition request in 2016, 25 it issued a new request on November 4, 2021, more than three years after the 26 Supreme Court of Justice’s decision. Id. at 645-50. Approximately two years 27 later, on August 16, 2023, Peru submitted a diplomatic note to the United 28 1 States formally requesting Sanabria’s extradition. Dkt. 22-1 at 2, 18. Amy 2 Lindsay, an Attorney Advisor in the Office of the Legal Adviser for the 3 Department of State, avers that Peru’s April 16, 2023, diplomatic note, 4 constituted a “formal[]” extradition request “[i]n accordance with the 5 provisions of the Treaty.” Dkt. 22-1 at 2. Thus, each step in Peru’s extradition 6 process was undertaken after the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision. 7 The Court therefore rejects that Peru’s extradition request was 8 procedurally improper and concludes that Peru seeks Sanabria’s extradition 9 for an offense covered by the Treaty. 10 E. Probable Cause 11 The Court next proceeds to determine whether there is probable cause 12 to believe that Sanabria committed the extraditable offense. 13 An extradition hearing to determine probable cause is “akin to a grand 14 jury investigation or a preliminary hearing under Federal Rule of Criminal 15 Procedure 5.1.” Santos, 830 F.3d at 991. Under that standard, the court must 16 “consider whether competent legal evidence ‘demonstrate[s] probable cause to 17 believe that the accused committed the crime charged’ by the foreign nation.” 18 Manta, 518 F.3d at 1140 (quoting Zanazanian v. United States, 729 F.2d 624, 19 626 (9th Cir. 1984)) 20 “It is fundamental that the person whose extradition is sought is not 21 entitled to a full trial at the magistrate [judge]’s probable cause hearing.” 22 Santos, 830 F.3d at 991 (quoting Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 508 (7th Cir. 23 1981)). Rather, “[t]he function of the committing magistrate [judge] is to 24 determine whether there is competent evidence to justify holding the accused 25 to await trial, and not to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to 26 justify a conviction.” Id. at 991-92 (quoting Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316 27 (1922)). “[C]ourts have emphasized that ‘[t]he person charged is not to be tried 28 1 in this country for crimes he is alleged to have committed in the requesting 2 country’ because ‘[t]hat is the task of the ... courts of the other country.’” Id. at 3 992 (quoting Eain, 641 F.2d at 508). “Given the limited nature of extradition 4 proceedings, neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of 5 Criminal Procedure apply.” Id. Evidence may be admitted if it is 6 authenticated and would “be received for similar purposes by the tribunals of 7 the foreign country from which the accused party shall have escaped.” 18 8 U.S.C. § 3190. 9 Here, the parties dispute the relevance of Sanabria’s conviction in the 10 probable cause analysis. The United States claims that Sanabria’s conviction 11 following trial “is dispositive of the issue of probable cause.” Dkt. 23 at 30. As 12 the United States observes, courts have generally held that “a foreign 13 conviction obtained after a trial at which the accused is present is sufficient to 14 support a finding of probable cause for the purposes of extradition.” Sidali v. 15 I.N.S., 107 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Extradition of Hughes, No. 12- 16 cv-1831-JGB-MLG, 2013 WL 1124294, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (holding 17 that “[w]here, as here, the fugitive has already been convicted, the conviction 18 is dispositive of the issue of probable cause” and collecting cases). “The 19 principle that foreign convictions generally constitute probable cause under § 20 3184 is rooted in comity.” Haxhiaj v. Hackman, 528 F.3d 282, 290 (4th Cir. 21 2008). “To hold that such convictions do not constitute probable cause in the 22 United States would require United States judicial officers to review trial 23 records and, consequently, substitute their judgment for that of foreign judges 24 and juries.” Spatola v. United States, 925 F.2d 615, 618 (2d Cir. 1991). 25 However, as Sanabria argues, (Dkt. 26 at 8)—and the United States 26 does not dispute, (Dkt. 23 at 32)—courts have taken a different approach 27 when the relator was not present for their trial and the conviction was 28 1 obtained in absentia. Some courts “treat in absentia convictions as nothing 2 more than charges of criminal wrongdoing, requiring the government to 3 present proof from which the magistrate judge can make an independent 4 assessment of whether probable cause exists.” Haxhiaj, 528 F.3d at 291 5 (collecting cases); see also In re Extradition of Ferriolo, 126 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 6 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (“When a person is convicted in absentia, the judgment 7 is treated as a charge, not a conviction.”). Other courts, following the lead of 8 Fourth Circuit’s decision in Haxhiaj, hold that a probable cause determination 9 can be based on an in absentia conviction where the judgment provides a 10 summary of the facts and relevant evidence. Haxhiaj, 528 F.3d at 289-92. 11 It is not clear that Sanabria’s conviction properly falls in the in absentia 12 line of cases. “Underlying the disparate treatment of a conviction rendered in 13 absentia is the notion that ‘a trial in absentia is not likely to be a fair trial,’ 14 affording the accused ‘no opportunity to confront the prosecution witnesses or 15 to present a defense’ and providing no real ‘assistance in ascertaining the 16 probable guilt of the accused.’ Id. at 291 (quoting Note, Foreign Trials in 17 Absentia: Due Process Objections to Unconditional Extradition, 13 Stan. 18 L.Rev. 370, 377 (1961)). Sanabria was present for all the trial hearings in his 19 case, at which he was represented by counsel. See Dkt. 22-3 at 218-85. While 20 Sanabria left Peru several days before the Northern Lima Court of Appeals 21 issued its decision finding him guilty of Aggravated Murder, (id. at 438), it 22 appears he was present for all the proceedings in which the court considered 23 evidence and argument. He therefore had the opportunity to meaningfully 24 participate in his defense at trial. It is true that Sanabria also was not 25 physically present in Peru during the appellate proceedings in his case, but 26 there is no indication that his appeal was prejudiced by his absence. See 27 United States v. Perilla Umbarila, 562 F. Supp. 3d 729, 742 (C.D. Cal. 2022) 28 1 (“The Superior Tribunal’s judgment of conviction was based on the record 2 developed at trial, and therefore, the fact that Perilla Umbarila did not 3 participate in the appellate proceedings does not alter the analysis.”) (footnote 4 omitted); Hughes, 2013 WL 1124294, at *2 (finding conviction dispositive of 5 probable cause, where the relator’s acquittal at trial court level was reversed 6 by Mexican appellate court and the relator had fled “[s]ometime during the 7 pendency of these proceedings”). In fact, in his appeal, Sanabria successfully 8 convinced the Supreme Court of Justice that he was incorrectly found to be 9 the “mastermind” of his sister’s murder and to substantially reduce the civil 10 restitution award he owes. See Dkt. 22-3 at 547-49. 11 But even assuming that Sanabria’s conviction is not dispositive of the 12 probable cause inquiry, the Court finds that the United States has established 13 probable cause to believe he committed the offense at issue. In reaching this 14 conclusion, the Court is guided by the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Haxhiaj. 15 There, the Fourth Circuit rejected that the extradition statute “requires the 16 requesting nation to submit underlying trial evidence in support of an in 17 absentia conviction.” Haxhiaj, 528 F.3d at 290. Rather, “in light of the limited 18 nature of the extradition hearing” and comity interests at stake, the Fourth 19 Circuit found it permissible to base a probable cause determination on a 20 foreign court’s decision that sets forth the underlying evidence supporting an 21 in absentia conviction. Id. at 291-92. “Haxhiaj has been widely followed” 22 throughout the country, including in this District. See Perilla Umbarila, 562 23 F. Supp. 3d at 742 (collecting cases); In re Extradition of Camelo-Grillo, No. 24 16-cv-9026, 2017 WL 2945715, at *8 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2017) (“The Court 25 adopts the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Haxhiaj and other courts, 26 in which an in absentia conviction, supported by the court’s summary of the 27 evidence presented, may provide probable cause.”). Although the Ninth 28 1 Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, Haxhiaj’s reasoning is consistent 2 with Ninth Circuit authority emphasizing the “limited nature of extradition 3 proceedings” and admissibility of hearsay evidence. Santos, 830 F.3d at 992. 4 In support of its extradition request, Peru submitted the Northern Lima 5 Court of Appeal’s decision finding Sanabria guilty of Aggravated Murder and 6 the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision upholding his conviction, as well as 7 documents from Peruvian law enforcement’s investigation of Sanabria. Dkt. 8 22-3 at 286-405, 505-50. Both court decisions contain detailed summaries of 9 the evidence submitted at Sanabria’s trial. While, as discussed below, 10 Sanabria disputes the significance of some of this evidence, he does not claim 11 that the decisions misrepresent the evidence submitted at trial or are 12 otherwise inaccurate. As such, consistent with Haxhiaj and the cases that 13 have adopted its reasoning, the Court considers whether there is probable 14 cause to believe Sanabria committed Aggravated Murder based on the 15 Peruvian courts’ summary of the evidence presented at Sanabria’s trial. 16 Based on those decisions, there is ample evidence to support that 17 Sanabria participated in the conspiracy to murder his sister. First, the 18 evidence presented at trial indicates Sanabria had a motive to kill. Sanabria 19 and his sister had a strained relationship, which further deteriorated after 20 she inherited a substantial portion of their mother’s estate and returned to 21 Peru to run the San Marcelo school. Witnesses reported that Olga Sanabria 22 frequently fought with Sanabria and Reaño Vásquez, and that she ultimately 23 required Reaño Vásquez resign her position. Following Olga Sanabria’s death, 24 Sanabria gained control of the school, re-hired his wife, and substantially 25 increased their income from the school. The evidence thus indicates that 26 Sanabria had personal, financial, and business incentives to kill his sister. 27 Second, the evidence presented at trial indicated that Sanabria was part 28 1 of a conspiracy to murder his sister. The prosecution introduced evidence that 2 Sanabria’s longtime housekeeper, Mitma, facilitated the hiring of a hitman 3 and provided the hitman with a cellular phone. Cell phone records indicate 4 that the cell phone believed to be used by Mitma contacted the cell phone 5 believed to be used by the hitman shortly before Olga Sanabria’s murder. 6 Telephone records also indicate that Mitma and Sanabria had been in regular 7 contact in the weeks preceding the murder, including through a call placed by 8 the telephone believed to be used by Mitma to the telephone believed to be 9 used by Sanabria in the minutes before the murder. The prosecution also 10 introduced evidence that, several weeks before the murder, Sanabria 11 compensated Mitma by extending the payment terms of a substantial loan, 12 valued at approximately $13,800, owed by Mitma’s family. 13 Third, the evidence presented at trial indicated that Sanabria 14 personally took steps to facilitate his sister’s murder on the day of the 15 shooting. Sanabria and Reaño Vásquez placed several calls to the principal of 16 the school, who was present with Olga Sanabria, to inquire about details of 17 the event and Olga Sanabria’s clothing. Sanabria also called a security guard 18 to request that he assist with a project at a different school campus, leaving 19 the front door to the San Martín de Porres campus unattended. 20 Sanabria argues that there are “benign explanations” for much of the 21 evidence that prosecutors presented against him at trial. Dkt. 26 at 10. First, 22 Sanabria claims that there is nothing incriminating about the phone calls 23 between Mitma, Sanabria, and Reaño Vásquez because Mitma was a “lifelong 24 friend of the family” and employee. Dkt. 26 at 11. Second, Sanabria rejects 25 any impropriety in the alteration of the payment terms for the loan to Mitma’s 26 family, observing that the loan was between Sanabria and Mitma’s mother, “it 27 was made public before a notary,” and it is “reasonable that a well-to-do 28 1 family would be happy to provide needed financial assistance to their lifelong 2 housekeeper.” Id. at 12. Third, Sanabria argues that the evidence suggests 3 that Olga Sanabria, not Sanabria himself, had requested the security guard 4 leave the school to assist with the project at the other school on the day of her 5 murder. Id. at 13.2 Fourth, Sanabria argues that the reason he did not 6 immediately hand over control of the San Marcelo school, or transfer money, 7 to Olga Sanabria’s heirs is because they were minors living in Spain at the 8 time. Id. at 13-14. 9 The Court grants that Sanabria has provided potentially “benign” 10 explanations for some of the evidence presented against him. But the Court 11 need not rule out such benign explanations before finding probable cause. Cf. 12 D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018) (“[P]robable cause does not require 13 officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation for suspicious facts”). 14 Rather, “probable cause is established if ‘there was any evidence warranting 15 the finding that there was a reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty.’” 16 Perilla Umbarila, 562 F. Supp. 3d at 741 (quoting Mirchandani v. United 17 States, 836 F.2d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1988)). The evidence—as summarized by 18 the Northern Lima Court of Appeals and Supreme Court of Justice—easily 19 establish reasonable grounds to believe that Sanabria had a motive and took 20 21 2 In support of this argument, Sanabria cites a portion of the Supreme Court of Justice’s decision that states the security guard “received the order from the victim 22 to paint the bathrooms.” Dkt. 22-3 at 536. However, it appears that this was an error. The remaining parts of Supreme Court of Justice’s decision, as well as that of 23 the Northern Lima Court of Appeals, reflect that the evidence presented at trial 24 indicated that Sanabria called the security guard and requested his assistance at a different school. Dkt. 22-3 at 357 (“Defendant also showed particular interest in 25 summoning the security guard of the school, who worked as a doorman and was in charge of maintenance work at the school in San Martín de Porres, so that he could 26 go to the other school located in Callao to help paint it.”); id. at 366 (“Defendant . . . 27 required the services of the security guard . . . leaving the entrance door unattended”); id. at 511 (referencing Sanabria’s “request for the service of the 28 security guard”). 1 | steps to facilitate his sister’s murder. As such, the Court finds probable cause 2 | to believe that Sanabria committed the offense for which his extradition is 3 | sought. 4 5 IV. CERTIFICATION 6 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that: there is a valid treaty in 7 | force between the United States and the Republic of Peru; the offense for 8 | which extradition is sought is covered by the Treaty; and the extradition 9 | request contains sufficient probable cause that Edwin Pascual Sanabria de la 10 | Torre committed the extraditable offense. 11 Having found all the requirements for certification of extradition have 12 | been satisfied, the Court hereby CERTIFIES the extradition of Edwin Pascual 13 | Sanabria de la Torre to the Republic of Peru on the offense for which 14 | extradition was sought. 15 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Edwin Pascual Sanabria de la Torre 16 | shall remain committed to the United States Marshal pending final decision 17 | on extradition and surrender by the Secretary of State pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 18 | 3186. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall forward 20 | forthwith deliver to the Assistant U.S. Attorney a certified copy of this Order 21 | and Certification and forward without delay certified copies of the same to the 22 | Secretary of State (to the attention of the Office of the Legal Adviser) and the 23 | Director, Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division, U.S. Department 24 | of Justice, Washington D.C., for appropriate disposition. GEES OTR

26 | Dated: June 23, 2026 - ee □ son Sere ea —— 28 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 20