United States of America v. Deep River Landing, LLC, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: January 13, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-05307
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CASE NO. C25-5307-KKE 8

the Government(s), ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 9 v.

10 DEEP RIVER LANDING, LLC, et al.,

11 Defendant(s).

12 This action stems from an oil spill that was first reported on November 4, 2021 in the Deep 13 River, a tributary to the Lower Columbia River Estuary. After utilizing funds from the Oil Spill 14 Liability Trust Fund (“OSLTF”) to respond to and clean up the oil spill, the Government brought 15 this action under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2720 (“OPA”), against Deep 16 River Landing, LLC (“Deep River Landing”) and Luke Gardner. Dkt. No. 1. The OPA subjects 17 “each responsible party for a vessel … from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial 18 threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines” to liability 19 “for the removal costs and damages” resulting from such incident. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). A 20 “responsible party” includes “any person owning” or “operating” the vessel. Id. § 2701(32)(A). 21 Defendant Gardner moved to dismiss the Government’s claims against him with prejudice for 22 failure to state a claim. As detailed below, the Court finds the Government sufficiently pleads that 23 Gardner is a vessel owner or operator under the OPA, and thus denies Gardner’s motion. 24 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 A. The Oil Spill 3 On November 4, 2021, an individual reported to the Washington State Department of

4 Ecology (“Department of Ecology”) that a barge appeared to be leaking an oily substance into the 5 Deep River. Dkt. No. 15 ¶ 23. According to the report filed with the Department of Ecology, the 6 barge was located on property owned by Deep River Landing, a local commercial fish buyer, and 7 investigators dispatched to the scene “found a black substance on blackberry bushes along the 8 Deep River but no sheen.” Id. ¶¶ 22, 23. Pollution responders from the United States Coast Guard, 9 Sector Columbia River Incident Management Division (“IMD”) were also dispatched, and 10 “observed a sheen in the water,” and that, at low tide, “the barge rested in the mud with oil 11 discharging out of a hole in the bottom of the barge.” Id. ¶ 24. 12 IMD subsequently appointed a Federal On Site Coordinator (“FOSC”), which used funds

13 from the OSLTF to remove the oil and mitigate the threat of future oil discharges from the barge. 14 Id. ¶¶ 24–25. When contractors arrived to remove the oil, they discovered two 15-foot-by-14-foot- 15 long compartments that each contained eight to twelve inches of “an emulsified mixture of diesel 16 and lube oil.” Id. ¶ 26. By late December 2021, the barge and oil were removed from the water. 17 Id. ¶ 27. After additional surveying and cleanup efforts, roughly 3,231 gallons of oil were 18 recovered from the barge, and an estimated 36 gallons of oil had seeped from the barge into the 19 Deep River. Id. The Government estimates it incurred $1,221,178 in response and recovery costs 20 directly related to the barge pollution incident. Id. ¶ 28. 21 B. Gardner’s Relationship to the Barge 22 According to the Government, between June 2017 and October 2018, Gardner moved the

23 barge onto property owned by Deep River Landing, and continued to use the barge as a vessel 24 afterward. Id. ¶ 22. The Government asserts that Gardner owned both the barge and the property 1 to which it was moored, and that he “managed,” “controlled,” and “operated” the barge. Id. ¶¶ 2 14–18. The Government further alleges that both Defendants used the barge to transport people 3 and/or goods. Id. ¶ 20. Finally, the Government alleges that Gardner is an officer and/or owner

4 of Deep River Landing, and that Deep River Landing and Gardner “were agents of each other 5 and/or alter egos and are therefore responsible and liable, jointly, and severally, for all of each of 6 the others’ obligations, acts, omissions, and strict liability[.]” Id. ¶ 21. 7 II. ANALYSIS 8 A. Legal Standard 9 In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court examines the complaint to 10 determine whether, assuming the facts alleged are true, the plaintiff has stated “a claim to relief 11 that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. 12 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible if “the plaintiff pleads factual content

13 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 14 alleged.” Id. 15 To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint generally must 16 satisfy only the minimal notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. Rule 17 8(a)(2), in turn, requires only that the complaint include a “short and plain statement of the claim 18 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Specific facts are 19 unnecessary: the statement need only give the defendant “fair notice of the claim and the grounds 20 upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 21 555). 22 B. The Oil Pollution Act

23 The OPA creates a strict liability regime for parties responsible for oil spills, subject to 24 certain exceptions. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a); Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1052 1 (9th Cir. 2003). To establish liability, the Government must prove: (1) that the defendant is a 2 “responsible party”; (2) that oil was discharged or that the incident posed a substantial threat of 3 discharge; and (3) that the actual or threatened discharge occurred in navigable waters or adjoining

4 shorelines. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). 5 As to vessels,1 the OPA defines a “responsible party” as “any person owning, operating, 6 or demise chartering the vessel.” Id. § 2701(32)(A). An “owner or operator” is, “in the case of a 7 vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, the vessel.” Id. § 2701(26)(A)(i). 8 A “person” under the OPA can be “an individual” or “corporation.” Id. § 2701(27). The OPA 9 defines a “vessel” as “every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, or 10 capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water, other than a public vessel.” Id. § 11 2701(37). 12 In construing who is an “operator” under the OPA, courts routinely look to the operator 13 liability framework set forth in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 14 Liability Act (“CERCLA”), an environmental statute that is structurally similar to OPA and 15 establishes strict liability for polluters. See United States v. Nature’s Way Marine, L.L.C., 904 16 F.3d 416, 420 (5th Cir. 2018) (observing that OPA and CERCLA define “operator” “with the exact 17 same language”); see also United States v. Ships Int’l Inc., 779 F. Supp. 3d 1235, 1237 (W.D. 18 Wash. 2025) (noting the common legislative purpose and structure of OPA and CERCLA). In 19 particular, courts apply the Supreme Court’s reasoning in United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 20 (1998), which considered operator liability in the CERCLA context, to the OPA operator liability 21

22 1 Although Gardner does not explicitly dispute the barge’s status as a “vessel” under the OPA as part of his motion to dismiss, he asserts that what the Government calls the “Deep River Barge” is a “Float” and “does not concede 23 whether the Float is in fact a barge … or whether such an object is subject to OPA as a ‘vessel.’” Dkt. No. 18 at 1 n.1, Dkt. No. 24 at 2 n.1. Because the Court construes the alleged facts to be true, and because Defendant does not contest, at this point, whether the barge is a “vessel” under the OPA, the Court will not address whether the barge is 24 a vessel in this Order. 1 context. See, e.g., Nature’s Way Marine, L.L.C., 904 F.3d at 420; see also Ships Int’l, 779 F. Supp. 2 3d at 1237. Recognizing the circularity of CERCLA’s definition of “owner or operator,” the 3 Supreme Court expanded on the “natural meaning” definition of “operator” as follows:

4 [A]n operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous 5 waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental regulations. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 66–67 (1998). “In a mechanical sense, to ‘operate’ 6 ordinarily means ‘[t]o control the function of; run: operate a sewing machine.’” Id. at 66. “[T]he 7 common purposes and shared history of CERCLA and OPA further suggest that OPA’s 8 responsible party language should be read broadly,” and operator liability “may extend to those 9 who exercise joint or practical control over vessel operations.” Ships Int’l, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1237 10 (citation modified) (collecting cases). 11 C. Responsible Party Under the OPA 12 1. Potential direct liability as an owner or operator 13 Gardner asserts that the Government’s allegations are insufficient to show that he is either 14 an owner or operator under the OPA. The crux of Gardner’s argument is that the Government’s 15 amended complaint consists of mere “conclusory labels,” as to each. Dkt. No. 18 at 6–8, Dkt. No. 16 24 at 7–8. 17 a. The Government sufficiently alleges that Gardner is an owner under the 18 OPA. 19 Gardner argues that the Government “failed to allege any facts … to make ownership 20 plausible,” and suggests that the Government could have identified “title documents” or made 21 other “assertions of ownership by Mr. Gardner, personally.” Dkt. No. 18 at 8, Dkt. No. 24 at 4. 22 Without citing any authority, Gardner argues that absent such factual allegations, the 23 24 1 Government’s assertion that Gardner owns the barge is a “bare legal conclusion.” Dkt. No. 18 at 2 8. 3 The Court finds that the Government has pled sufficient facts to make Gardner’s status as

4 a vessel owner plausible. To begin, the Government affirmatively asserts that Gardner owned the 5 barge at “all material times.” Dkt. No. 15 ¶ 14. The Government also alleges that Gardner 6 personally moved the barge onto property owned by Deep River Landing—a limited liability 7 corporation that “Gardner is and continues to be an officer and/or owner of”— between 2017 and 8 2018, and continued to use the barge afterward as a vessel, including “to transport people and/or 9 goods on water.” Dkt. No. 15 ¶¶ 19–22. That Gardner personally moved the barge onto property 10 owned by his corporation, Deep River Landing LLC, and used the barge to transport people or 11 items on the water from 2018 onward, supports an inference of Gardner’s ownership of the barge 12 during the 2021 oil pollution incident.

13 b. The Government sufficiently alleges that Gardner is an operator under the OPA. 14 The Government relies on two allegations to support that Gardner is an operator under the 15 OPA: (1) that Gardner owned and operated the barge; and (2) that Gardner operated the barge to 16 move it onto Deep River Landing’s property, and continued to use and exercise control of it 17 afterward. Id. ¶¶ 14–17, 22. 18 Gardner argues that such contentions are insufficient, and that the Government must allege 19 specific facts “to demonstrate how Mr. Gardner was ‘personally involved with or personally 20 responsible for the operations specifically related to pollution in order to establish liability.’” Dkt. 21 No. 18 at 7 (citing City of W. Sacramento, California v. R & L Bus. Mgmt., No. 2:18-CV-900 WBS 22 EFB, 2018 WL 6019340, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2018)). Gardner’s reliance on City of West 23 Sacramento is misplaced. There, the court explained pleading requirements to establish operator 24 1 liability as to a company’s president who was altogether removed from the facility where 2 hazardous substances were disposed. But here, the Government has alleged that Gardner has 3 physically exerted control over the barge, which was the source of the oil spill, including by using

4 it to transport goods and people, at multiple points in time. 5 Gardner also cites2 Gregory Village Partners, L.P. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. for the 6 proposition that an allegation of owner/operator status is a “legal conclusion … not entitled to a 7 presumption of truth.” Dkt. No. 18 at 7 (citing Gregory Vill. Partners, L.P. v. Chevron U.S.A., 8 Inc., 805 F. Supp. 2d 888, 897 (N.D. Cal. 2011)). First, the Court disagrees with Gardner’s 9 characterization of the Government’s complaint as failing to plead any supportive facts as to owner 10 or operator status. Moreover, Gregory Village is distinguishable from this case. In Gregory 11 Village, the court found ownership allegations to be insufficient where it was unclear that the 12 defendant owned the relevant parcel of land at the time the pollution incident took place. Gregory

13 Village, 805 F. Supp. 2d at 897 (“The complaint does not clearly allege that a release of [pollutants] 14 occurred on the Northern Parcel between 1986 and 2003, the only period when Chevron owned 15 that parcel”). In other words, the Gregory Village court found the plaintiff’s failure to allege 16 ownership at the relevant time to be insufficient—not the allegation of ownership itself. Unlike 17 Gregory Village, here, the Government asserted that Gardner owned the barge at all times relevant 18 to the pollution incident, and that he continued to use the barge as a vessel after moving it onto his 19 company’s property in, at the latest, 2018. Because the oil pollution incident occurred in 2021— 20 a time during which the Government asserts Gardner continued to own the barge (which was the 21 source of the oil spill), use the barge for transportation purposes, and store it on his company’s 22

2 Though Gardner cites this case in support of his argument on operator liability, the Court notes that the portion of 24 the Gregory Village deals with owner liability. 1 property—it is plausible that Gardner had sufficient control over the barge to be an owner and/or 2 operator at the time of the incident. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66. 3 In sum, the Government has sufficiently alleged that Gardner is an operator under the OPA.

4 2. Potential alter ego liability 5 Defendant Gardner asserts that the Government’s claims against Gardner must be 6 dismissed because its “theories of agency/alter ego liability are invalid” and improperly seek to 7 pierce the corporate veil as to Deep River Landing. Dkt. No. 18 at 4, Dkt. No. 24 at 8. Gardner 8 specifically argues that the Government has not pleaded sufficient facts to support piercing the 9 corporate veil here. Dkt. No. 18 at 4–5. The Government counters that Gardner’s argument is an 10 improper basis for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because its alter ego 11 allegations do “not give rise to a standalone cause of action.” Dkt. No. 23 at 5 (citing 54 Dyer LP 12 v. Ambruso, 2:21-CV-09306-SVW-SK, 2022 WL 1840344, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2022)). The

13 Court agrees with the Government. 14 Asserting that one defendant is the “alter ego” of another does not form an independent 15 cause of action, but “is only a means of imposing liability for an underlying cause of action[.]” 16 Hadnagy v. Moss, 2:23-CV-01932-BAT, 2024 WL 1328568, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2024) 17 (citing Local 159, 342, 343 & 444 v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 185 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 1999) 18 (“A request to pierce the corporate veil is only a means of imposing liability for an underlying 19 cause of action and is not a cause of action in and of itself.”)). While “alter ego allegations are 20 sufficient to raise a factual issue as to whether the doctrine should apply, a finding of fact of alter 21 ego, standing alone, creates no cause of action.” 54 Dyer LP, 2022 WL 1840344, at *2 (citation 22 modified) (citing 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia of Corporations, § 41.10, n.13–15 (2021)). Indeed, the

23 Government’s amended complaint asserts its alter ego theory only as part of its general allegations: 24 1 it does not assert an independent cause of action of “alter ego” against either Deep River Landing 2 or Gardner. See Dkt. No. 15 ¶ 21. 3 Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss the Government’s claims against Gardner on this

4 basis. 5 III. CONCLUSION 6 For these reasons, the Court denies Gardner’s motion to dismiss. 7 Dated this 13th day of January, 2026. 8 A 9 Kymberly K. Evanson 10 United States District Judge

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