JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.
Despite its 528 pages of printed record, exhibits numbering in the hundreds of pages, the complaints, cross claims, counterclaims, extensive pre-trial discovery proceedings, motions for summary judgment, truncated presentation of evidence, and the large dollar amounts at stake, this is a very simple case.
The Government was the Lessor of portions of Wainwright Shipyard at Panama City, Florida to Seaboard Machinery Corporation, the Lessee. The lease required Lessee to procure and maintain insurance against fire in the form and in the amounts specified by the Government. The Lessee did so. The property thus insured was totally destroyed by fire. The Insurer paid the full insured values into the Registry of the Court. In the controversy remaining between Government and Lessee, the Government, the sole assured, sought what the Insurer had agreed to, and did, pay. The District Court, however, after first denying the Government’s motion for summary judgment and a trial thereafter on the merits, denied this claim. The Court held that all the Government got was the money equivalent of the “market value” of this war-built installation. Out of some $800,000 of specified insured values, the Government, the admitted owner, got about $200,000. The remaining $590,000 went to the Lessee.
To justify this unusual result, the Lessee takes an elastic approach. The first is that even though this outcome may be wrong, the Government must fail here because the present appeal is contrary to the theory and position asserted by the United States Attorney in the trial below. Reduced to more tan
gible terms, it is that here and there in the colloquy between the Court and counsel which covered two years’ time and consumes as much, if not more than, the testimony itself, the United States Attorney agreed that the issue for trial was the “fair market value” of the properties. A fair reading of the record is convincing that these isolated statements never misled the Court as to the Government’s position and when made, were made in response to the contemporary situation created by the preliminary ruling, later made formal by the denial of the Government’s motion for summary judgment, that all that the Government was “entitled to recover * * * [was] * * * the full marketable value of the property owned by it and destroyed in the fire, and [Lessee] is entitled to its day in Court to have such value established by the Court.”
By
its formal complaints, by the motion for summary judgment and the supporting papers, by mem-oranda and running objections, the Government took and relentlessly held fast to its simple contention that what Lessee had agreed to do, and had done, entitled it to the full specified agreed insured values. That it had to adapt
itself to the exigencies of the Court’s adverse rulings does not convict it of changing horses in mid-stream.
The Lessee must therefore face the intrinsic merits, and these, we believe, reveal that the decision below is clearly erroneous and may not stand.
In a capsulated form, Lessee’s contentions are: Since the lease limited accountability to the condition of the premises reflected by the Joint Inventory and Condition Survey
Report of December 22,1951, and required merely that on termination that the property be restored less ordinary wear and tear or, in lieu thereof, Lessee should “ * * * pay the Government money in an amount sufficient to compensate for the damage sustained
by the
Government.”
Lessee’s liability thereunder would be the fair market value of the premises. Additionally, since liability for breach of an agreement to procure specified insurance may be merely the market value of the uninsured property destroyed,
the cate
gorical agreement of Lessee to procure insurance
in the amount stated gave it the excess of insurance proceeds over the current market values unless the Government used the proceeds to restore the premises.
We think this confuses too many things and assumes that this fire insurance was required not primarily for the protection of the Government’s interest, but for the equal benefit
of both Government and Lessee. The Government, as owner of these premises, previously designated by the Department of Defense as a part of the National Industrial Reserve,
the Government had, as would, any prudent private owner of property,, several legitimate business interests which were fulfilled by these lease provisions. First, it desired to exact careful maintenance and upkeep of the premises during the lease term. The consequence for failure to maintain or restore the property would be the obligation to make good the Government’s loss, in that case the market value of the premises. But in addition to the contractual security of the financial obligation of the Lessee, the Government wished to make cer
tain that if the premises were destroyed or substantially injured by recognized likely perils, it would have the security
of insurance in the amounts and forms specified by it.
The Shipyard belonged to the Government. It was deemed a part of the essential reserve system for national defense. It was, therefore, eminently proper and good business judgment for the Government to exact the right, and then exercise it, to prescribe insurance in an amount which was the equivalent of cost of reproduction less depreciation.
And there can be, of course, no doubt that this was precisely what the Government demanded and obtained.
As the Lessee undertakes its claim to nearly three-fourths of the proceeds of the agreed amount of insurance, the route is a devious one. It seems to be that to have required this insurance was unfair since this put an extraordinary and excessive insurance premium burden on the Lessee for insurance in amounts far exceeding the real value. And, in addition, the Lessee had itself spent several hundred thousand dollars in rehabilitating the properties and in making improvements to put the war-weary plant in shape for use. The first is irrelevant since the contract, note 5, supra, and the requirement letter, note 10, supra, obligated the Lessee in the plainest terms. The second was contrary to the equally plain terms of Article 8 by which Lessee took the property “as-is where-is” with the Lessee being obligated “ * * * at its own cost and expense [to] undertake and perform any and all action which may be necessary in the conditioning and reactivation of the leased premises for its use.”
Lessee seeks to overcome the palpable weaknesses in these contentions by insisting that the option to purchase,
*the mechanism
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JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.
Despite its 528 pages of printed record, exhibits numbering in the hundreds of pages, the complaints, cross claims, counterclaims, extensive pre-trial discovery proceedings, motions for summary judgment, truncated presentation of evidence, and the large dollar amounts at stake, this is a very simple case.
The Government was the Lessor of portions of Wainwright Shipyard at Panama City, Florida to Seaboard Machinery Corporation, the Lessee. The lease required Lessee to procure and maintain insurance against fire in the form and in the amounts specified by the Government. The Lessee did so. The property thus insured was totally destroyed by fire. The Insurer paid the full insured values into the Registry of the Court. In the controversy remaining between Government and Lessee, the Government, the sole assured, sought what the Insurer had agreed to, and did, pay. The District Court, however, after first denying the Government’s motion for summary judgment and a trial thereafter on the merits, denied this claim. The Court held that all the Government got was the money equivalent of the “market value” of this war-built installation. Out of some $800,000 of specified insured values, the Government, the admitted owner, got about $200,000. The remaining $590,000 went to the Lessee.
To justify this unusual result, the Lessee takes an elastic approach. The first is that even though this outcome may be wrong, the Government must fail here because the present appeal is contrary to the theory and position asserted by the United States Attorney in the trial below. Reduced to more tan
gible terms, it is that here and there in the colloquy between the Court and counsel which covered two years’ time and consumes as much, if not more than, the testimony itself, the United States Attorney agreed that the issue for trial was the “fair market value” of the properties. A fair reading of the record is convincing that these isolated statements never misled the Court as to the Government’s position and when made, were made in response to the contemporary situation created by the preliminary ruling, later made formal by the denial of the Government’s motion for summary judgment, that all that the Government was “entitled to recover * * * [was] * * * the full marketable value of the property owned by it and destroyed in the fire, and [Lessee] is entitled to its day in Court to have such value established by the Court.”
By
its formal complaints, by the motion for summary judgment and the supporting papers, by mem-oranda and running objections, the Government took and relentlessly held fast to its simple contention that what Lessee had agreed to do, and had done, entitled it to the full specified agreed insured values. That it had to adapt
itself to the exigencies of the Court’s adverse rulings does not convict it of changing horses in mid-stream.
The Lessee must therefore face the intrinsic merits, and these, we believe, reveal that the decision below is clearly erroneous and may not stand.
In a capsulated form, Lessee’s contentions are: Since the lease limited accountability to the condition of the premises reflected by the Joint Inventory and Condition Survey
Report of December 22,1951, and required merely that on termination that the property be restored less ordinary wear and tear or, in lieu thereof, Lessee should “ * * * pay the Government money in an amount sufficient to compensate for the damage sustained
by the
Government.”
Lessee’s liability thereunder would be the fair market value of the premises. Additionally, since liability for breach of an agreement to procure specified insurance may be merely the market value of the uninsured property destroyed,
the cate
gorical agreement of Lessee to procure insurance
in the amount stated gave it the excess of insurance proceeds over the current market values unless the Government used the proceeds to restore the premises.
We think this confuses too many things and assumes that this fire insurance was required not primarily for the protection of the Government’s interest, but for the equal benefit
of both Government and Lessee. The Government, as owner of these premises, previously designated by the Department of Defense as a part of the National Industrial Reserve,
the Government had, as would, any prudent private owner of property,, several legitimate business interests which were fulfilled by these lease provisions. First, it desired to exact careful maintenance and upkeep of the premises during the lease term. The consequence for failure to maintain or restore the property would be the obligation to make good the Government’s loss, in that case the market value of the premises. But in addition to the contractual security of the financial obligation of the Lessee, the Government wished to make cer
tain that if the premises were destroyed or substantially injured by recognized likely perils, it would have the security
of insurance in the amounts and forms specified by it.
The Shipyard belonged to the Government. It was deemed a part of the essential reserve system for national defense. It was, therefore, eminently proper and good business judgment for the Government to exact the right, and then exercise it, to prescribe insurance in an amount which was the equivalent of cost of reproduction less depreciation.
And there can be, of course, no doubt that this was precisely what the Government demanded and obtained.
As the Lessee undertakes its claim to nearly three-fourths of the proceeds of the agreed amount of insurance, the route is a devious one. It seems to be that to have required this insurance was unfair since this put an extraordinary and excessive insurance premium burden on the Lessee for insurance in amounts far exceeding the real value. And, in addition, the Lessee had itself spent several hundred thousand dollars in rehabilitating the properties and in making improvements to put the war-weary plant in shape for use. The first is irrelevant since the contract, note 5, supra, and the requirement letter, note 10, supra, obligated the Lessee in the plainest terms. The second was contrary to the equally plain terms of Article 8 by which Lessee took the property “as-is where-is” with the Lessee being obligated “ * * * at its own cost and expense [to] undertake and perform any and all action which may be necessary in the conditioning and reactivation of the leased premises for its use.”
Lessee seeks to overcome the palpable weaknesses in these contentions by insisting that the option to purchase,
*the mechanism
of which they set in motion
but never finally consummated, gives a special relevance to the appraisal survey of September 30, 1952. This appraisal survey was made in the fall of 1952 to determine the fair sales price for the whole Shipyard and its equipment either subject to or free from the NSC. With respect to the properties with specified insured values aggregating $598,675, note 10, supra, this appraisal, for each of those buildings subsequently destroyed, showed a fair sales price aggregating $146,400. For the personalty and equipment with a specified insured value of $200,000, of which a total of $164,620 was subsequently destroyed, the appraisal showed a fair sales price of $100,361 for all of it, and $54,526.01 for that part destroyed in the fire. It was on this appraisal that the Court limited the Government’s interest in the proceeds to $146,400 and $54,526.01, respectively, see note 13, infra.
The option, as it was called, was of no significance on the insurance. The right of the Secretary of Defense, in the exercise of his duty to reject all offers or proposals on the basis of national security requirements, destroyed its enforceability. The appraisal survey was nothing more than spectacular evidence of the sharp difference between insured values and market or sales value if the Lessee was right on its legal theory.
Indeed, it is this sharp difference and the unwarranted specifying of Lessee as a named assured which demonstrates the wisdom, reasonableness, and the legal validity of the insurance clause of this lease. If the Lessee, either on some theory that it had spent sums to improve or add to the property, or had acquired some elusive unenforceable rights under an option entitling it to negotiate for a purchase, is allowed to claim an interest in the very insurance demanded by the Lessor, the Lessor has not obtained the protection it sought. As insurance limits remain constant once specified, instead of recovering cost of reproduction less depreciation, the Government would have only the right to litigate the difficult question of market value of a facility having none in fact and as to which the reconstruction of a “market value” would exhaust the full storehouse of appraisal techniques. Not only will the Government as Lessor have lost the protection sought, it will have lost it by the curious fact that having exacted performance of the Lessee and the Lessee having performed, the Lessor gets no more than it would had the contract been silent.
The Lessee acknowledges, as it must, that had the Government used the money to restore the premises, see note 5, supra, the" Lessee would be entitled to none of the proceeds. Lessee reasons that it would have realized the benefit of this. But this is illusive for the lease had a 90-day unrestricted cancellation clause and with the option to purchase necessarily so carefully hedged, the Lessee could not have counted on any such benefit. If, as is conceded, the property owner had the right to the control and use of the funds for its unlimited, exclusive, future use in restored properties, it had the right as well to specify that it alone should get the proceeds and determine as it saw fit how money received as reimbursement for its lost property would be spent.
The contract was to procure insurance in a stated amount. The Lessee did this. The insurers were anxious to, and did, pay. What the Lessee promised it would obtain for the Government, the Government is entitled to have. The Lessee can
claim nothing for having done what it promised to do.
The judgments are reversed and rendered
for the Government.
Reversed and rendered.
CAMERON, Circuit Judge, concurs in the result.
On Petition for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
By a vigorous petition for rehearing lessee asserts that adoption by us of the Government’s contentions in complete reversal of its position taken below in this protracted case is a denial of due process. It argues that the “waiver” or “abandonment” by the Government of other issues and submission to the trial of the one fixed by the District Court amounted to a solemn stipulation, the
effect of which, in the light of our reversal and rendition, is to have deprived lessee of the opportunity of presenting evidence on (a) the nature and exercise of the option to purchase, (b) naming itself as a joint assured in the fire insurance policies, (c) the replacement insurance value of the real property, and (d) the extent of damage to and the replacement insurance value of personalty.
We need not further determine whether this was a change of position, a waiver or stipulation. For in neither case can evidence respecting (a) alter the lease contract and the requirements of the National Industrial Reserve Act, see note 7, concerning the option to purchase and the undisputed fact that as there required, consent by the Secretary of Defense was never given, see note 12. For (b) the same is true of the plain, positive requirements of Article Twelve of the Lease requiring the United States be the sole
named assured, see note 5.
Nor is anything left for proof with respect to (c) replacement value of realty. Pursuant to Article Twelve of the Lease, the Government by formal letter specified the exact dollar amount of insurance to be obtained for each building, and this precise amount was insured in the policies and subsequently paid by the Insurers, see note 10. It matters not whether actual replacement costs less depreciation was more or less.
As to (d) value of personalty, while there was no schedule as in the case of realty fixing in advance the precise amount of insurance aggregating $200,000 with respect to each item, the District Court in its opinion, by language which we paraphrased in note 13, held that the Government’s “ * * * claim of $164,620 for personal property * * represents the full amount of insurance coverage placed upon the personal property of [Government] destroyed by the fire.” There was sworn testimony by a competent appraisal expert who, on behalf of the insurance companies, had actually checked and approved for payment the Government’s detailed Proof of Loss for this precise sum, that the insurable value for each item destroyed or damaged, as well as the total, was a con
servative figure on the basis of replacement cost less depreciation. No attack was made on this evidence save to have the witness acknowledge that he was stating the insurable value on this formula and not the present market or fair sales price value.
Petition denied.