United States of America, Intervenor v. Seaboard MacHinery Corporation

256 F.2d 166
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJune 30, 1958
Docket16845
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 256 F.2d 166 (United States of America, Intervenor v. Seaboard MacHinery Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States of America, Intervenor v. Seaboard MacHinery Corporation, 256 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1958).

Opinion

JOHN R. BROWN, Circuit Judge.

Despite its 528 pages of printed record, exhibits numbering in the hundreds of pages, the complaints, cross claims, counterclaims, extensive pre-trial discovery proceedings, motions for summary judgment, truncated presentation of evidence, and the large dollar amounts at stake, this is a very simple case.

The Government was the Lessor of portions of Wainwright Shipyard at Panama City, Florida to Seaboard Machinery Corporation, the Lessee. The lease required Lessee to procure and maintain insurance against fire in the form and in the amounts specified by the Government. The Lessee did so. The property thus insured was totally destroyed by fire. The Insurer paid the full insured values into the Registry of the Court. In the controversy remaining between Government and Lessee, the Government, the sole assured, sought what the Insurer had agreed to, and did, pay. The District Court, however, after first denying the Government’s motion for summary judgment and a trial thereafter on the merits, denied this claim. The Court held that all the Government got was the money equivalent of the “market value” of this war-built installation. Out of some $800,000 of specified insured values, the Government, the admitted owner, got about $200,000. The remaining $590,000 went to the Lessee.

To justify this unusual result, the Lessee takes an elastic approach. The first is that even though this outcome may be wrong, the Government must fail here because the present appeal is contrary to the theory and position asserted by the United States Attorney in the trial below. Reduced to more tan *168 gible terms, it is that here and there in the colloquy between the Court and counsel which covered two years’ time and consumes as much, if not more than, the testimony itself, the United States Attorney agreed that the issue for trial was the “fair market value” of the properties. A fair reading of the record is convincing that these isolated statements never misled the Court as to the Government’s position and when made, were made in response to the contemporary situation created by the preliminary ruling, later made formal by the denial of the Government’s motion for summary judgment, that all that the Government was “entitled to recover * * * [was] * * * the full marketable value of the property owned by it and destroyed in the fire, and [Lessee] is entitled to its day in Court to have such value established by the Court.” By its formal complaints, by the motion for summary judgment and the supporting papers, by mem-oranda and running objections, the Government took and relentlessly held fast to its simple contention that what Lessee had agreed to do, and had done, entitled it to the full specified agreed insured values. That it had to adapt 1 2 itself to the exigencies of the Court’s adverse rulings does not convict it of changing horses in mid-stream.

The Lessee must therefore face the intrinsic merits, and these, we believe, reveal that the decision below is clearly erroneous and may not stand.

In a capsulated form, Lessee’s contentions are: Since the lease limited accountability to the condition of the premises reflected by the Joint Inventory and Condition Survey 2 Report of December 22,1951, and required merely that on termination that the property be restored less ordinary wear and tear or, in lieu thereof, Lessee should “ * * * pay the Government money in an amount sufficient to compensate for the damage sustained by the Government.” 3 Lessee’s liability thereunder would be the fair market value of the premises. Additionally, since liability for breach of an agreement to procure specified insurance may be merely the market value of the uninsured property destroyed, 4 the cate *169 gorical agreement of Lessee to procure insurance 5 in the amount stated gave it the excess of insurance proceeds over the current market values unless the Government used the proceeds to restore the premises.

We think this confuses too many things and assumes that this fire insurance was required not primarily for the protection of the Government’s interest, but for the equal benefit 6 of both Government and Lessee. The Government, as owner of these premises, previously designated by the Department of Defense as a part of the National Industrial Reserve, 7 the Government had, as would, any prudent private owner of property,, several legitimate business interests which were fulfilled by these lease provisions. First, it desired to exact careful maintenance and upkeep of the premises during the lease term. The consequence for failure to maintain or restore the property would be the obligation to make good the Government’s loss, in that case the market value of the premises. But in addition to the contractual security of the financial obligation of the Lessee, the Government wished to make cer *170 tain that if the premises were destroyed or substantially injured by recognized likely perils, it would have the security 8 of insurance in the amounts and forms specified by it.

The Shipyard belonged to the Government. It was deemed a part of the essential reserve system for national defense. It was, therefore, eminently proper and good business judgment for the Government to exact the right, and then exercise it, to prescribe insurance in an amount which was the equivalent of cost of reproduction less depreciation. 9 And there can be, of course, no doubt that this was precisely what the Government demanded and obtained. 10

As the Lessee undertakes its claim to nearly three-fourths of the proceeds of the agreed amount of insurance, the route is a devious one. It seems to be that to have required this insurance was unfair since this put an extraordinary and excessive insurance premium burden on the Lessee for insurance in amounts far exceeding the real value. And, in addition, the Lessee had itself spent several hundred thousand dollars in rehabilitating the properties and in making improvements to put the war-weary plant in shape for use. The first is irrelevant since the contract, note 5, supra, and the requirement letter, note 10, supra, obligated the Lessee in the plainest terms. The second was contrary to the equally plain terms of Article 8 by which Lessee took the property “as-is where-is” with the Lessee being obligated “ * * * at its own cost and expense [to] undertake and perform any and all action which may be necessary in the conditioning and reactivation of the leased premises for its use.”

Lessee seeks to overcome the palpable weaknesses in these contentions by insisting that the option to purchase, 11 *the mechanism 12

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Bluebook (online)
256 F.2d 166, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-of-america-intervenor-v-seaboard-machinery-corporation-ca5-1958.