United States of America ex rel. NPT Associates v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 29, 2022
Docket1:07-cv-05696
StatusUnknown

This text of United States of America ex rel. NPT Associates v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (United States of America ex rel. NPT Associates v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States of America ex rel. NPT Associates v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, (S.D.N.Y. 2022).

Opinion

USDC SDNY DOCUMENT UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ELECTRON □□□□□ SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Ds CX DATE FILED: 8/29/22 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE STATES OF DELAWARE, HAWAII, ILLINOIS, INDIANA, LOUISIANA, MONTANA, NEW HAMPSHIRE, NEW JERSEY, NEW MEXICO, NORTH CAROLINA, OKLAHOMA, RHODE ISLAND, TENNESSEE, WISCONSIN, and THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ex rel. NPT 1:07-cv-05696 (ALC) ASSOCIATES, OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff-Relator, v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA HOLDINGS ET AL., Defendant. ----------- xX

ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge: Plaintiff-Relator NPT Associates (“NPT” or “Relator’”) brings this gui tam action against Defendant Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (“LabCorp”), on behalf of the United States of America, as well as the States of Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia (the “States”), alleging in its Fourth Amended Complaint (““FAC” or “Complaint”) that LabCorp violated the Federal Civil False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq. (“FCA”) and its state equivalent laws (“State FCA laws”) by (1) giving “kickbacks” to private insurance companies in the form of discounted lab testing rates and (2) charging Medicare and Medicaid programs prices “substantially in excess” of the prices it charges said private insurers. LabCorp now moves for dismissal of all claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

9(b) and 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant LabCorp’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 167) is GRANTED. BACKGROUND I. Factual Background

The following facts, alleged in the FAC, are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion. The allegations are based on the direct and personal knowledge of a former LabCorp sales executive, Thomas Golubic, who is now a partner at NPT. FAC ¶ 47. Golubic served as Regional Director of Sales for LabCorp in Manhattan, the Bronx, and Staten Island from 2006 to 2008. Id. According to the FAC, “NPT’s partners are professionals in the independent clinical laboratory business.” Id. ¶ 10. LabCorp is the second largest independent clinical laboratory company in the United States. Id. ¶ 13. LabCorp and its independent clinical laboratories provide analysis of human body specimens for patients referred to them by doctors. Id. ¶ 15. Referrals include both privately insured patients and those covered by Medicare and Medicaid (collectively, the “Government

Programs”). Id. Because Government Programs provide generous reimbursement, pay more quickly and efficiently, and dispute fewer claims than private insurance programs (“Private Programs”), they are particularly sought after in the laboratory testing industry. Id. ¶ 16. NPT alleges that LabCorp carried out a fraudulent scheme with Private Programs to increase its Government Program business. Id. ¶ 17. The scheme is as follows. First, LabCorp and the Private Program would enter into an agreement under which LabCorp would serve as the exclusive or preferred provider for patients insured by the private program, in exchange for LabCorp agreeing to discount the price of tests for those patients. Id. ¶ 61. The discounted prices were below the amount the Government Programs paid for the same tests. Id. The Private Program would also influence its in-network doctors to send their Government Program-covered patients to LabCorp. Id. ¶ 63. Second, LabCorp and the Private Program would execute their agreement; the agreement would reflect the exclusivity in exchange for heavily-discounted pricing but would not contain the

“illegal referral agreement” under which the Private Program agrees to influence its in-network doctors to help LabCorp obtain “pull-through” business. Id. ¶¶ 3, 64. The FAC explains that “‘pull- through’ is a commonly used phrase for lucrative patient referrals consisting primarily of Government Program patient referrals.” Id. ¶ 64. Third, representatives of LabCorp and the Private Program would inform in-network doctors of the agreement and explain that these doctors were required to send all Private Program patients to LabCorp. Id. ¶ 68. Fourth, LabCorp tracked and shared information with the Private Programs about in-network doctors sending insufficient Government Programs patients to LabCorp for it to profit from the referral agreement. Id. ¶ 73. Using that information, at the fifth step, the Private Program would contact those in-network doctors and “pressure” them to use

LabCorp for all testing. Id. ¶ 71. As the sixth and final step, LabCorp billed the Government Programs for patients referred by these doctors at rates substantially in excess of the rates billed to Private Programs. Id. ¶ 73. NPT alleges that beginning in 2007, LabCorp carried out this scheme with UnitedHealth Group Incorporated (“UHC”). LabCorp agreed to provide testing services to UHC at below-cost prices that were 70 to 80 percent less than it charged Government Programs. Id. ¶ 61. LabCorp also agreed to pay UHC up to $200 million over three years for “transition costs related to developing an expanded network.” Id. ¶ 62. LabCorp and UHC publicly announced this arrangement (“Exclusive Provider Agreement”), but did not disclose the “illegal referral agreement” under which UHC would ensure “that LabCorp received referrals from UHC’s in- network doctors of patients insured by Government Programs—sufficient referrals to allow LabCorp to recoup its losses on the UHC relationship and then to profit from it by virtue of the Government Programs’ payments.” Id. ¶ 63. LabCorp executives repeatedly emphasized to their

employees that the only purpose of the agreement was to obtain this pull-through business. Id. ¶ 64. For instance, in 2007, LabCorp’s Chief Operating Officer Donald Hardison explained that LabCorp entered into the agreement to obtain pull-through business from UHC’s in-network doctors and that “if LabCorp did not obtain sufficient ‘pull-through’ business from [UHC], LabCorp would lose its shirt and would not even be able to turn on the lights.” Id. NPT alleges that he also “advised the group that anyone who did not understand this should find another job.” Id. Further, between January and April 2007, LabCorp and UHC representatives held regular meetings with the purpose of ensuring that “both parties were benefiting from the Exclusive Provider Agreement.” Id. ¶ 65. These meetings took place at UHC’s offices at 1 Penn Plaza in

Manhattan. Id. ¶ 69. Attendees included UHC Senior Managers Beth Ann Clark and Melissa, and William Crawford, Jeffrey Newman, and Chris Kabel of LabCorp. Id. Golubic also attended these meetings. Id. At the meetings, participants would identify in-network doctors who were not sending sufficient numbers of UHC patient referrals to LabCorp. Id. ¶ 71. The two parties would then “pressure” these doctors “through in-person visits, telephone calls, and written communications to send all [UHC] patients to LabCorp.” Id. By April 2007, most of UHC’s in-network doctors were sending “substantially all of their UHC patients to LabCorp.” Id. ¶ 72. Once the two parties determined that in-network doctors were sending substantial numbers of UHC patients to LabCorp for testing, subsequent meetings from April to August 2007 were aimed at ensuring that these “doctors were sending enough Government Programs patients to LabCorp.” Id. ¶ 73. In these meetings, “LabCorp personnel presented ‘pull-through’ reports”

showing eleven doctors at five practice groups in New York who were sending insufficient numbers of Government Programs patients for LabCorp to recoup and profit from the agreement. Id. ¶¶ 73, 74. NPT has provided names, addresses, and identification numbers for these doctors. Id. ¶ 74.

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United States of America ex rel. NPT Associates v. Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-of-america-ex-rel-npt-associates-v-laboratory-corporation-nysd-2022.