United States of America, ex rel. Cameron Jehl v. GGNSC Southaven LLC

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Mississippi
DecidedJune 25, 2021
Docket3:19-cv-00091
StatusUnknown

This text of United States of America, ex rel. Cameron Jehl v. GGNSC Southaven LLC (United States of America, ex rel. Cameron Jehl v. GGNSC Southaven LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Mississippi primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States of America, ex rel. Cameron Jehl v. GGNSC Southaven LLC, (N.D. Miss. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI OXFORD DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel. CAMERON JEHL PLAINTIFFS

V. NO. 3:19-CV-91-MPM-JMV

GGNSC SOUTHAVEN LLC D/B/A GOLDEN LIVINGCENTER-SOUTHAVEN; GGNSC ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES LLC D/B/A GOLDEN VENTURES; GGNSC CLINICAL SERVICES LLC D/B/A GOLDEN CLINICAL SERVICES DEFENDANTS

ORDER

This matter is before the court on Relator’s Motion to Compel and to Determine the Sufficiency of Answers and Objections [239]. As discussed in detail below, the motion is granted in limited part and denied as to the remainder. Background The central issue in the instant case is whether the Defendants are responsible for making, with the requisite scienter, a false claim(s) to the government that Nurse Trofort was practicing nursing at the Southhaven Mississippi facility from April 23, 2013, to December 31, 2013, with a multistate privilege from a compact state permitting her to do so. See Amended Compl. [59]. In particular, Relator contends, first, that Nurse Trofort’s multistate privileges from the compact state of Virginia were actually invalid because Nurse Trofort’s “principal state of residence” was outside of Virginia, and secondly, that Defendants knew the privileges were invalid while she was employed at the Southaven facility. Despite this seemingly narrow issue, this action has involved at least eight conferences to address discovery issues and an additional ten motions relating to discovery, including at least two “emergency” motions to compel. The most recent motion to compel, the instant motion, was not filed until May 5, 2021, five days after discovery in the case concluded and well beyond the requisite time period for filing such motions required in L. U. Civ. R. 7(b)(2)(C). Moreover, the instant motion did not ripen for decision until June 22, 2021,1 which was after the deadline for

filing of Daubert and dispositive motions had expired, and such motions had been filed and are pending before the district judge. The trial is set for September 13, 2021. No trial continuance has been sought. The instant motion is not only untimely, but it also follows a practice of unnecessarily broad and irrelevant discovery demands2 as is discussed in more detail below. Untimeliness As mentioned above, the Relator’s motion to compel was made five days after the close of discovery. Pursuant to L.U. Civ. R. 7(b)(2)(C), “[a] party must file a discovery motion sufficiently in advance of the discovery deadline to allow response to the motion, ruling by the court and time to effectuate the court’s order before the discovery deadline.”(emphasis added)

“The obvious purpose of Rule 7(b)(2)(C) is to resolve disputes over the scope of discovery while time remains to conclude it.” Gipson v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 2018 WL 736265, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 6, 2018). All non-movants are afforded fourteen days to respond to any motion, and the movant has an additional seven days to file a reply or to let the Court know that he does not intend to reply.

1 This motion [239] and the related filings were filed with redactions pending the Relator’s motion to seal [241]. The reply was not filed in unredacted form until June 22, 2021.

2 See infra p. 4 for discussion of prior discovery requests. District Courts in this State have routinely denied discovery motions in violation of Local Rule 7(b)(2)(C). See, e.g., Pers. v. Ford Motor Co., 2011 WL 13157355, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 11, 2011) (denying as untimely discovery motions filed three days prior to the close of the discovery deadline); Gueniot-Kornegay v. Blitz U.S.A., Inc., 2013 WL 160259, at *1 (S.D. Miss.

Jan. 15, 2013) (denying as untimely a motion to compel filed two days prior to discovery deadline); Full House Resorts, Inc. v. Boggs & Poole Contracting Grp., Inc., 2015 WL 4478495, at *3 (S.D. Miss. July 22, 2015) (denying motions to compel filed six-and-eight days prior to discovery deadline); Funches v. Mississippi Dev. Auth., 2018 WL 9878315, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 27, 2018) (denying as untimely a motion to compel filed four days prior to the discovery deadline). Further, District Courts in this State have routinely upheld a magistrate judge’s denial of a motion to compel as untimely due to non-compliance with Local Rule 7(b)(2)(C). See, e.g., Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, 2008 WL 5234416 (N.D. Miss. Dec. 12, 2008) (upholding the magistrate judge’s denial of a motion to compel as untimely when the motion was filed one day prior to the expiration of the discovery deadline and would not have been ripe for ruling more

than 28 days after the discovery deadline); McReynolds v. Matthews, 2017 WL 7037745 (S.D. Miss. Sept 20, 2017) (upholding the magistrate judge’s denial of a motion to compel as untimely filed 21 days prior to the discovery deadline); Tubwell v. Specialized Loan Serv. LLC, 2019 WL 1421156, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 29, 2019) (affirming the magistrate judge and finding that the denial of plaintiff’s motion to compel filed 18 days after the discovery deadline was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law); Burroughs v. City of Laurel, Miss., 2021 WL 1723092, at *4, n. 3 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 30, 2021) (affirming the magistrate judge’s denial of a motion to compel filed one day prior to the discovery deadline). In support of his motion, the Relator cites two cases in our sister courts that have granted untimely discovery motions for good cause.3 However, these cases merely demonstrate instances where courts have made exceptions due to specific factual scenarios, which are inapplicable here.4 Moreover, it is worth noting that the Fifth Circuit has affirmed the district court’s ability

to deny motions to compel as untimely even where the motion may otherwise be meritorious. See, e.g., Grey v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 265 Fed. Appx. 342, 348 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“Even if we accept [plaintiff's] contention that additional discovery would have enabled him to prove his [discrimination claims], we are not required to find that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to compel discovery, because it was filed on the day of the discovery deadline after an extensive discovery period”). In short, given the lack of persuasive factual and legal arguments by the Relator, the motion to compel is on the whole untimely under L. R. 7(b)(2)(C). Nevertheless, certain further responses will be compelled in accordance with the discussion below. Overly Broad, Burdensome, and Irrelevant Discovery

In addition to its untimeliness, the discovery is generally overly broad, burdensome and, as drafted, seeks information not relevant or proportional to the needs of the case – a practice

3 See Hostetler v. Dillard, No. 3:31cv351-DCB-MTP, 2014 WL 12708703 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 14, 2014); Guthrie v. Quitman County Hosp., LLC, No. 3:13–CV–244–M–A, 2014 WL 8276240 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 27, 2014).

4 In Hostetler, the court found good cause to grant an untimely discovery motion because the case had: (1) recently been reassigned, which required an extension of the trial date; (2) there were other discovery disputes pending; and (3) the plaintiffs presented evidence that they were unaware that the defendants were withholding information. Here, such circumstances have not been persuasively demonstrated. In fact, the parties here were given ample time and guidance from the court to resolve the discovery disputes before the discovery deadline. In Guthrie, the court found good cause because the deadlines in the case management order did not allow for sufficient time to respond to the parties’ expert designations. Here, there were no such scheduling conflicts in the case management order. In fact, the Relator sought, and was granted, multiple extensions of the discovery related deadlines.

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Related

Grey v. Dallas Independent School District
265 F. App'x 342 (Fifth Circuit, 2008)

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United States of America, ex rel. Cameron Jehl v. GGNSC Southaven LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-of-america-ex-rel-cameron-jehl-v-ggnsc-southaven-llc-msnd-2021.