AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge:
Bruce Barksdale, seeking to set aside his seventeen-year-old conviction for aggravated rape, appeals from the district court denial of his petition for a writ of habeas [1117] corpus. As the basis for his petition, Barks-dale, who is black, alleges that blacks were systematically excluded from the Orleans Parish grand jury which indicted him and from the petit jury venire which included the jurors who convicted him.1 A panel of this court, with one judge dissenting, agreed with Barksdale’s contentions and reversed the district court. United States ex rel. Barksdale v. Blackburn, 610 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1980). The court then voted to rehear this case en banc, United States ex rel. Barksdale v. Blackburn, 616 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1980), thus vacating the panel opinion. See Fifth Circuit Local Rule 17. We find that there was no systematic exclusion of blacks from the juries and jury venires in question, and therefore now affirm the judgment of the district court.
I. The Factual Background2
The facts of this case seem to have “been lost in the ‘nice, sharp quillets of the law.’ ”3 On the morning of October 3, 1962, Bruce Barksdale followed a young woman to her apartment building in New Orleans’ French Quarter. He knocked on her door and inquired whether a couch in the hallway was for sale. As the woman opened the door to respond, Barksdale slammed against the door, shoved the woman back into her apartment, and threatened her with a raised hammer. The woman tried to run past Barksdale, but he grabbed her before she could reach the stairway and forcibly brought her back into the apartment. Barksdale then robbed his victim, pushed her into the bedroom, and shoved her face down onto the bed. He placed his knee in the middle of her back, and told her, “I’m not going to hurt you if you do as I tell you.” Barksdale pulled off the woman’s skirt, ordered her to remove her blouse, and tore off her underwear. Then, with the hammer still in his hand, Barksdale raped his victim. He told her, “[y]ou know I am going to have to kill you now.” The woman begged hysterically for her life, and Barksdale relented after requiring her to swear to tell no one of the incident. As he left the apartment, Barksdale grabbed his victim by the throat and gave her a final warning: “If you ever tell anybody about this I will kill you. I have before and I will again, and I better not see you on the streets.”
A short time later, the victim was found in an extremely agitated and distressed condition by her landlord. She was able to give the police a description of her assailant, from which a composite drawing was made. Two workers at a motel across the street from the victim’s apartment also gave the police descriptions of a man with a hammer seen in the vicinity that morning. On the basis of these leads, the police were able to apprehend Barksdale the next morning.
The victim positively identified Barksdale on October 4, the day after the attack, in a lineup at New Orleans police headquarters. The two workmen also identified Barksdale. Clothing seized from Barksdale at the time of his arrest matched the victim’s description of her assailant’s clothes. A hammer similar to the one described by the victim was also found. Scientific tests of Barks-dale’s clothing revealed seminal fluid on the genital region of his garments. Furthermore, cat hair removed from Barksdale’s clothing matched hair taken from the victim’s bed, clothing and pet cat.
[1118] On October 5, Barksdale asked to see the arresting officers in order to make a statement. He subsequently dictated a confession that was typed out verbatim by a police lieutenant. The facts in Barksdale’s statement substantially corroborate those related by the rape victim.4
Barksdale was indicted for aggravated rape by an Orleans Parish Grand Jury. Two of the twelve members of that jury were black. Prior to trial, counsel for Barksdale challenged the composition of the general jury venire, the grand jury venire, the petit jury venire and the grand jury itself, alleging systematic exclusion of blacks. The state trial court held a hearing to consider these contentions and developed an extensive record which included the testimony of the Chairman of the Orleans Parish Jury Commission and seven judges of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court.5 In addition, counsel for Barksdale and the state entered into written stipulations regarding black representation on the venires and the juries for various years. Based on this record, the court denied Barksdale’s challenges.
At trial, Barksdale presented no evidence or testimony in his favor and offered no defense.6 Indeed, except for some limited cross-examination of police officers regarding the voluntariness of the confession, counsel for Barksdale did not cross-examine the victim or other witnesses produced by the state. The accused’s confession, the scientific tests, eyewitness identifications and other evidence all were admitted without objection. The jury found Barksdale guilty as charged and imposed the death penalty. The sentence was later reduced to life imprisonment.
II. Barksdale’s Appeals
Over the past seventeen years, Barksdale has resorted to every available appellate channel, alleging a variety of defects including jury discrimination. The Louisiana Supreme Court heard his first appeal, and, in a lengthy opinion, unanimously found no intentional or systematic exclusion of blacks from the jury system, noting that since Eubanks v. State of Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 78 S.Ct. 970, 2 L.Ed.2d 991 (1958), a case which reversed a murder conviction because of grand jury discrimination, “the judges of the parish have adopted a practice of jury selection in keeping with the spirit of the law announced in the Eubanks case.” State v. Barksdale, 247 La. 198, 170 So.2d 374, 380 (1964). Barksdale then presented his jury discrimination claims to the United States Supreme Court, which denied certiorari, 382 U.S. 921, 86 S.Ct. 297, 15 L.Ed.2d 236 (1965). Approximately two years later, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied Barksdale’s habeas petition. State ex rel. Barksdale v. Dees, 252 La. 434, 211 So.2d 318 (1968).7
In 1971, Barksdale filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The petition was originally heard by [1119] a federal magistrate, and, based on the magistrate’s recommendations, the district court set aside Barksdale’s conviction. The state’s appeal was dismissed. Barksdale v. Henderson, No. 73-1536, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880, 95 S.Ct. 145, 42 L.Ed.2d 120 (1974). The state then moved to vacate the district court judgment on the ground that the hearing before the magistrate was an improper delegation of authority under Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461, 94 S.Ct. 2842, 41 L.Ed.2d 879 (1974). The motion was granted and affirmed on appeal, Barksdale v. Henderson, 519 F.2d 382 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1045, 95 S.Ct. 2662, 45 L.Ed.2d 697 (1975). The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing, and, after three such hearings,8 the district court finally denied the petition. It found that at “the time of petitioner’s trial the jury commission and the judges were not engaged in invidious racial discrimination and purposeful exclusion of blacks as a class from jury service on the grand and petit juries.”
Barksdale appealed the district court ruling, and a panel of this court, with one judge dissenting, reversed, holding that Barksdale presented an unrebutted prima facie case of racial discrimination. The panel compared the black percentage of the general population of Orleans Parish in 1962 and 1963 with the percentage of blacks appearing on the general jury venire for those years and reasoned that the disparities found proved “the existence of both grand and petit jury discrimination” because “both [the] grand and petit juries were selected from the names which appeared on the general venire.” 610 F.2d at 266. In addition, the panel noted that the sequence of blacks serving on grand juries from 1954 through 1963 in itself “evidences discrimination through limited inclusion.” 610 F.2d at 268. The panel held that the state’s justifications for the disparities were either unsupported or illegal. The state’s contention that different literacy levels for white and black jurors explained the lower level of black participation was held to be “unsupported by the record.” 610 F.2d at 272. The state’s contention that the remainder of the disparity was explained “in terms of the arguably benign system of excusing ‘hardship’ cases” was held to be unacceptable in light of Labat v. Bennett, supra, 365 F.2d 698. Thus, with the state “left without a legitimate non-discriminatory explanation to rebut Barksdale’s prima facie case,” 610 F.2d at 272, the panel set aside the conviction.
III. Is Guilt Irrelevant?9
On this appeal, Barksdale raises only one issue, alleging that the jury system in Orleans Parish systematically excluded blacks from grand jury and petit jury service. Several analytical steps must be taken before this broad issue can be determined, however. Initially it must be determined whether Barksdale proved a prima facie case of jury discrimination. At issue in that determination will be not only how much of a disparity exists between the eligible black population and actual black representation on juries, but also how much of a disparity is needed to prove the ease and what statistical measures of population and jury representation are appropriate. Once a prima facie case has been proved, it must be determined whether the state effectively rebutted that case. Here it will be necessary to examine whether the Orleans Parish system of excusing certain workers on request was a constitutionally permissible means of rebuttal in light of Labat v. Bennett, supra, and related cases.
A preliminary matter is suggested by the fact that Barksdale has never made, and could never make, any colorable claim that he is innocent of the crime for which he was [1120] convicted. As Justice Powell stated in his concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 257-58, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2063, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the “central reason” for habeas corpus is “the affording of means, through an extraordinary writ, of redressing an unjust incarceration.” One can legitimately question whether freeing a petitioner who is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a heinous crime furthers that central concern.
We are mindful, however, that recently in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 99 S.Ct. 2993, 61 L.Ed.2d 739 (1979), Justice Black-mun wrote in Part II of his opinion for the Court that a claim of racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury foreman presented an issue cognizable on habeas corpus regardless of the guilt or innocence of the petitioner, and regardless of whether the state had previously granted a full and fair hearing on the petitioner’s claim. This was an apparent response to speculation raised by Justice Powell in his dissent in Castaneda where he stated that “claims of grand jury discrimination are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus after Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037 [49 L.Ed.2d 1067] (1976).” Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1287 n.1, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977). However, Part II of Justice Blackmun’s opinion was joined by only two justices who joined in the judgment of the Court and by two dissenters (Justices White and Stevens), leading Justice Powell to question its precedential value “for not all of the four Members who join it support even the Court’s judgment.” Rose v. Mitchell, supra, 443 U.S. at 582, n.3, 99 S.Ct. at 3014 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring). Since “the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2923 n.15, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), Justice Powell’s point is well taken. Even if one considers Part II to be a part of the Court’s holding, it may not be dispositive of this case. Justice Blackmun’s opinion primarily addresses the contention of Justice Jackson, dissenting in Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 298, 70 S.Ct. 629, 637, 94 L.Ed. 839 (1950), that discrimination in grand jury selection, absent petit jury discrimination, should never result in reversal of a conviction. Rose v. Mitchell, supra, 443 U.S. at 552, 99 S.Ct. at 2998. It might very well still be an open question whether, in light of the facts and circumstances of a particular case, such grand jury discrimination might be harmless error. If ever there was a case in which harmless error should apply it is this one, in which the grand jury did include two blacks, in which the grand and petit jury selection occurred at a time when great progress was being made in eradicating jury discrimination in Louisiana, in which the evidence was so overwhelming that no grand jury, no matter how selected and constituted, could fail to indict, and in which no serious claim of innocence has ever been raised.
Whatever the precedential value of Part II of Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Rose, it may not be the final word on the subject. As Justice Powell noted in his concurrence:
Whenever a federal court is called upon by a state prisoner to issue a writ of habeas corpus, it is asked to do two things that should be undertaken only with restraint and respect for the way our system of justice is structured. First, as one court of general jurisdiction it is requested to entertain a collateral attack upon the final judgment of another court of general jurisdiction. Second, contrary to principles of federalism, a lower federal court is asked to review not only a state trial court’s judgment, but almost invariably the judgment of the highest court of the State as well. These considerations prompt one to inquire, more critically than this Court ever has, whether it is appropriate to allow the use of habeas corpus by state prisoners who do not seek to protect their personal interest in the justness of their convictions.
Rose v. Mitchell, supra, 443 U.S. at 579-80, 99 S.Ct. at 3012 (footnote omitted). The use of habeas corpus to free guilty prisoners [1121] who had a fair and accurate trial is indeed troublesome. In the present case, however, we need not rest on the inappropriateness of habeas corpus since we find that Barks-dale’s claims do not prevail on the merits.10
IY. The Legal Issues
Intentional racial discrimination is the foundation of Barksdale’s claim. “Recent cj.ges have established the fact that an official act is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.” Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 430 U.S. at 493, 97 S.Ct. at 1279, citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). The evidence presented in this case is statistical; Barks-dale has offered no proof to show that even one qualified black was excluded from jury service. Barksdale is not entitled to relief upon a mere showing of a statistical disparity between black population and black participation in the Orleans Parish jury system, but can prevail only if such a disparity “results from purposeful discrimination.” Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 430 U.S. at 493, 97 S.Ct. at 1279.
Castaneda set out a definitive means of proving discriminatory intent:
Thus, in order to show that an equal protection violation has occurred in the context of grand jury selection, the defendant must show that the procedure employed resulted in substantial under-representation of his case or of the identifiable group to which he belongs. The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied.... Next, the degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as grand [1122] jurors over a significant period of time.... Finally, as noted above, a selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral supports that presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing.. .. Once the defendant has shown substantial under-representation of his group, he has made out a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose, and the burden then shifts to the State to rebut that case.
Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 430 U.S. at 494-95, 97 S.Ct. at 1280. There are thus four parts of the jury discrimination test. The plaintiff must first identify a distinct class, then show a significant underrepresentation of that class, and then, finally, support that showing by demonstrating that the selection procedure is susceptible to abuse. The fourth part of the test permits the state to rebut the inference of discriminatory purpose. The test does not eliminate the need to show discriminatory intent, but merely acknowledges that “[i]f a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it is due solely to chance or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one must conclude that racial or other class-related factors entered into the selection process.” Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 430 U.S. at 494 n.13, 97 S.Ct. at 1280 n.13. This procedure does not reveal how large a disparity is required to establish a prima facie case or what statistics should be used in defining that disparity.
The Supreme Court has “never announced mathematical standards for the demonstration of ‘systematic’ exclusion of blacks .... ” Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630, 92 S.Ct. 1221, 1225, 31 L.Ed.2d 536 (1972). Nevertheless, some guidance as to the disparities necessary to raise a prima facie case can be gleaned from Supreme Court precedent. In Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965), the evidence established that “while Negro males over 21 constitute 26% of all males in the county in this age group, only 10 to 15% of the grand and petit jury panels drawn from the jury box since 1953 have been Negroes [sic], there having been only one case in which the percentage was as high as 23%.” 380 U.S. at 205, 85 S.Ct. at 827-28. The Court concluded that this was insufficient “to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment.” 380 U.S. at 206, 85 S.Ct. at 828. While the actual disparities found in Swain range from 11 to 16%, the Court held that purposeful discrimination based on race alone could not be “satisfactorily proved by showing that an identifiable group in a community is underrepresented by as much as 10%.” 380 U.S. at 208-09, 85 S.Ct. at 829. See Gewin, An Analysis of Jury Selection Decisions, appended to Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 828-30 (5th Cir. 1975). This circuit, in Thompson v. Sheppard, 490 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 984, 95 S.Ct. 1415, 43 L.Ed.2d 666 (1974), held that the Jury Commission would not be required to recompose jury lists when there was an 11% disparity between the percentage of blacks in the total population and the percentage of blacks on the jury list.
Whether or not greater disparities constitute prima facie evidence of discrimination depends upon the facts of each case. In Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 405 U.S. at 630, 92 S.Ct. at 1225, the Court found that the petitioner had established a prima facie case of discrimination because the juror “selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral” and there was a 14% disparity between the presumptively eligible black population and the actual list of prospective jurors. The Court made clear that it did not rely “on statistical improbability alone, for the selection procedures themselves were not racially neutral.” 405 U.S. at 630, 92 S.Ct. at 1225. The 14% disparity was sufficient to create a prima facie case only with other evidence of discrimination. A disparity of 14% was found sufficient to establish a prima facie case in Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 74 S.Ct. 667, 98 L.Ed. 866 (1954), in light of- the fact that no person with a Mexican or Latin American surname had ever served on a jury commission, grand jury or petit jury in the county. In other cases the Supreme Court has found prima facie cases to be established when [1123] there were disparities of 23%, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970); 33%, Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320, 90 S.Ct. 518, 24 L.Ed.2d 549 (1970); 25.7%, Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 88 S.Ct. 4, 19 L.Ed.2d 25 (1967); and 33.5%, Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 87 S.Ct. 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967).
While the above cases give some idea of the magnitude of disparity needed to establish a prima facie case, their greatest significance lies in their demonstration that there is no magic figure which proves jury discrimination. Any given disparity means little in isolation; a determination of intentional racial discrimination requires an examination of all of the facts and circumstances of a given case. The Supreme Court cases also do not reveal which statistics should be used to measure the disparities. In particular, at issue is whether general population statistics or more meaningful eligible population statistics should be used where, as here, those statistics are in the record. The inquiry is an important one — a given disparity may increase or decrease substantially depending on which set of statistics is employed.11
Although Castaneda v. Partida, supra, used general population statistics to measure racial disparities, that case should not be read to require using those figures. When Castaneda reached the Supreme Court, it had been tried and appealed to this circuit on the basis of general statistics. It was not until oral argument before the Supreme Court that the State of Texas contended that more narrow eligible population statistics would explain the disparity found by the Court. Castaneda v. Partida, supra, 430 U.S. at 488 n.8, 97 S.Ct. at 1276 n.8. The Court proceeded on the basis of general population statistics because there were “so many implicit assumptions” in the use of the untested eligible population statistics which an appellate court could not make “without a record below in which those assumptions were tested.” Id. In other cases, where the appropriate statistics had been developed in the record, the Court relied on statistics describing the population of blacks presumptively eligible for jury service.12 See, e. g., Alexander v. Louisiana, supra; Swain v. Alabama, supra; Jones v. Georgia, supra; Whitus v. Georgia, supra.
V. The Statistics
The district court and this court have been presented with a multitude of statistics which attempts to describe the Orleans Parish jury system as it existed almost two decades ago. Most of the statistics were proposed by Barksdale’s expert, Dr. Levine, or stipulated to by counsel during either the district court hearing or the state court proceedings. The state, for its part, generally accepted the statistics proposed by Barksdale, although on appeal the state argued in its original brief an even more favorable view of the statistics than that taken by the district court.13 While we do not decline to join the statistical fray, this case proves the danger of uncritical deference to statistics. In the absence of any clear guidelines, persuasive figures can be found to support as well as to undermine the finding of a prima facie case of discrim[1124] ination. Depending on the figures compared, the disparity between the actual black participation in the juries and venires and presumptively eligible population may be as small as 4.34%14 or as great as 25.2%.15 But neither of these figures has any meaning unless the facts of this case are examined as a whole. The task of this court is first to determine whether the conglomeration of statistics presented conclusively shows intentional racial discrimination, and then to determine whether the state has effectively rebutted that showing.
Our analysis differs radically from that of the panel majority. First, we find that statistics describing the presumptively eligible black juror population, rather than the general black population, provide the proper starting point for an inquiry into racial disparities in the Parish. Statistics describing the percentage of black males of jury age were provided by Barksdale and the state. Further information regarding the presumptively eligible black population is readily obtainable from the 1960 census figures which Barksdale himself offered in evidence before the federal district court. Second, our analysis places considerably greater emphasis on certain statistics stipulated to by both Barksdale and the state before the state trial court and the district court.
A. The Eligible Population
Barksdale contends that he was indicted by a grand jury and convicted by a petit jury from which blacks were systematically excluded. To assess the merits of this claim, it is necessary to first determine the percentage of the population eligible for grand jury service attributable to blacks, and then to determine the percentage of black jurors and veniremen. According to the statute in effect in 1962, compulsory jury service was limited to males at least 21 years old.16 Jurors had to be literate in English, a resident of the Parish for one year prior to service, and neither under indictment for a crime nor convicted of a felony. In addition, certain persons were occupationally exempt from service.17
[1125] Neither the census nor any other source presented to the court contains statistics detailed enough to calculate the exact racial breakdown of the population meeting these statutory criteria. In order to approximate the black percentage of the eligible population, Barksdale’s expert, using a complicated mathematical formula called the Three-Point LeGrangian Interpolation,18 estimated the black male population of Orleans Parish as of 1962 and 1963. He then adjusted that figure to eliminate the estimated proportion of the group which was illiterate or occupationally exempt.
In addition to our reluctance to condemn the state’s jury system on the basis of mere estimates, there are several reasons why we do not accept the approximations of Barksdale’s expert. First of all, the use of 1962 figures ignores the fact that potential jurors had to reside in the Parish for at least one full year before they become eligible for jury service. In addition, the jury wheel is not totally emptied and replaced at any one time, but instead new names are added as the old ones are used. Thus the population .of eligibles on the wheel would normally include some names which had been on it for several months. Furthermore, the city directory, from which the names of jurors were selected, certainly did not add all new residents instantaneously.19 For these reasons, the appropriate date to measure the composition of the jury-eligible population must be well over a year prior to 1962, and we therefore use the more precise figures of the 1960 census rather than 1962 approximations.20
Second, Barksdale’s expert seems to have been overzealous in his adjustment of the eligible population on account of occupational exemptions. His adjustments eliminated all persons categorized as “Salesmen and Sales Clerks” in all but the retail trade. This is certainly a much broader category than the statutory exemption for “commercial travelers.” In the absence of any exact figure for that exemption, we cannot adjust for the “commercial traveler” exemption, and will limit our occupational adjustments to the other categories listed in the statute, specified in the census, and included in the adjustments made by Barks-dale’s expert.21 Finally, while Barksdale’s expert does calculate the proportions of the population with fifth-, sixth- and seventh-grade education as a substitute for the literacy and knowledge requirements for jury service, he emphasizes the fifth-grade figure in making his comparisons. We see no reason to declare erroneous the Louisiana Supreme Court determination that a seventh-grade education approximates the qualifications needed for jury service, State v. Barksdale, supra, 170 So.2d at 382-83, especially in light of the fact that in addition to simple literacy, a juror was required to “understand the duties and obligations of citizenship under a republican form of government.”22 We therefore use a sev[1126] enth-grade education figure to approximate the literacy and knowledge requirements for jury service, although we also calculate an estimate of the eligible population with a sixth-grade education. We find the following estimates of the presumptively eligible black population to be the most appropriate:23
Seventh Sixth
Percentage of Blacks in Eligible 28.16%
These statistics will be compared below to the percentage of blacks on the grand jury, the grand jury venire and the petit jury venire.
B. The Racial Composition of the Grand Jury and the Grand Jury Venire
There has been great dispute between the parties over the racial breakdown of the persons who were included in the jury venire. We therefore compare a variety of jury and venire participation figures to the eligible population statistics. At trial, the parties appear to have stipulated that 19.43% of the persons on the jury wheel as of January 1, 1962, were black.24 This figure presumed that all persons of undetermined race were black, a presumption with some support in the record.25 The parties at one point sampled thirteen of a group of undetermineds, and found that seven were black, leading to an alternative presumption that 50% of the undetermineds were black.26 Using that presumption, 16.64% of the persons on the jury wheel as of January 1, 1962, were black. Finally, two out of the twelve persons on the grand jury which indicted Barksdale, as well as the three previous grand juries, were black, yielding a black percentage of 16.67%. These figures for grand jury and venire participation compare to the previously derived figures for eligible population as follows:
SEVENTH-GRADE EDUCATION
Stipulation, Stipulation, Actual Undetermined Undetermined Grand Jury Black