United States Gypsum Co. v. Karnaca

216 F. 857, 133 C.C.A. 61, 1914 U.S. App. LEXIS 1386
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJuly 29, 1914
DocketNo. 4096
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 216 F. 857 (United States Gypsum Co. v. Karnaca) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States Gypsum Co. v. Karnaca, 216 F. 857, 133 C.C.A. 61, 1914 U.S. App. LEXIS 1386 (8th Cir. 1914).

Opinion

GARLAND, Circuit Judge.

This action was brought by Karnaca to recover damages from the Gypsum Company for a personal injury he received while in its employ,"and which as he alleges was caused by the negligence of the company, lie recovered a verdict. The company brings the case here, assigning as error the ruling of the trial court [858]*858refusing to direct a verdict in its favor. The company has specified the particulars in which the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict as follows: (1) There was no evidence for the jury that the company was negligent. (2) There was no evidence for the jury that the machinery on which Karnaca was-injured was of a such a dangerous character as to require a guard. (3) There was no evidence for the jury that it was practicable to guard the conveyor without interfering with the operation thereof. (4) The evidence showed Karnaca to have been guilty of contributory negligence. Karnaca specified in his complaint as acts of negligence: (1) Failure to use ordinary care to furnish him with a reasonably safe place to work. (2) Failure to use ordinary care to furnish him with proper tools and appliances to remove the clogged gypsum without being compelled to place his hands in close proximity to the unguarded revolving conveyer screw. Under specification lfj Karnaca mentioned the failure to properly guard the conveyer screw as provided by section 4999a2, Supplement, Iowa -Code. (3) In permitting an obstruction to remain over and across the door of bin No. S, thereby causing Karnaca to place his hands near the conveyer screw. (4) Failure to warn Karnaca of the dangers of his employment.

[ 1 ] Section 4999a2, reads as follows:

“It shall be the duty of the owner, agent, superintendent or other person having charge of any manufacturing or other establishment where machinery is used, to furnish and supply or cause to be furnished and supplied therein, belt shifters or other safe mechanical contrivances for the purpose of throwing belts on and off pulleys, and, wherever possible, machinery therein shall be provided with loose pulleys; all -saws, planers, cogs, gearing, belting, shafting, set screws and machinery of every description therein shall be properly guarded.” -

In construing-this statute the Supreme Court of Iowa, in McCarney v. Bettendorf, 156 Iowa, 418, 136 N. W. 920, said:

“Enough has been said to indicate the reasons for our conclusion that the clause ‘machinery of every description’ should not be restricted to the kinds or class particularly mentioned, but given the broad construction, evidently intended by the Legislature, as meaning all machines of a character dangerous to employSs operating them or working in their vicinity. Machines, or parts likely, if unguarded, to injure those operating or coming in contact with them, are particularly mentioned, and directed to be ‘properly guarded,’ and by ‘machinery of every description’ the Legislature undoubtedly intended machinery not specifically enumerated, but which might reasonably be anticipated to cause injury unless provided with appropriate guards. See Kimmerle v. Dubuque Altar Mfg. Co. [154 Iowa, 42], 134 N. W. 434: As everyone knows, a large percentage of machinery requires no shield against danger to workmen operating or near- it, and this, as plainly appears from the statute when construed as a whole, was not contemplated by the Legislature. When a machine, or machinery, however, is proven to be of a character such that injury therefrom to employés operating or near it is reasonably to be apprehended, then the statute exacting proper guards is as mandatory as though it had been particularly mentioned therein.”

The court in the above case cited with approval the case of U. S. Cement Co. v. Cooper, 172 Ind. 599, 88 N. E. 69. The Indiana statute reads:

“All vats, pans, saws, planers, cogs, gearing, belting, shafting, set screws and machinery of every description therein shall be properly guarded.”

[859]*859The Supreme Court of Indiana in construing this statute said:

“Considering the general purpose of the legislation, as distinctly shown by the various provisions of the act, it becomes plain that the design of the lawmakers was the selection of certain manufacturing instrumentalities, generally known to be dangerous, and susceptible of being guarded without impairing their usefuliu-ss, and the imposition upon masters of the general duty of properly guarding all such instrumentalities, on the penalty that failure to do so should he accounted negligence per se. While the great body or mass of machinery usually assembled in important manufacturing establishments — too multiform and diversified for classification or just control by fixed rules of law — should bo understood as being within the scope and meaning of the general words, ‘and machinery of every description therein’ shall be guarded, this distinction, however, in the rules applicable to objects within the purview of the general words, is manifest. The failure to guard all machinery is not negligence per se. When a machine, or some part of a machine, is not of a dangerous character, or is so located as not to imperil wbrkmen when in the place, or places, to which their duties call them, or where gua rding or fencing is impracticable without materially impairing the use, the same need not be guarded.”

The trial court in the case at bar told the jury that the statute of Iowa required the revolving screw which injured Karnaca to be guarded. Whether it appeared that the machinery was so clearly dangerous as to allow the court to say that it was within the statute (Kimmerle v. Dubuque Altar Mfg. Co., 154 Iowa, 42, 134 N. W. 434), we may not consider, as there was no exception or complaint made when the court so charged.

Chapter 219, Acts 33d General Assembly of Iowa, provides:

“That in all cases where the property, works, machinery, or appliances of an employer are defective or out of repair, and where it is the duty of the employer from the character of the place, work, machinery or appliances to furnish reasonably safe machinery, appliances or place to work, the employ») shall not be deemed to have assumed the risk by continuing in the prosecution of the work, growing out of any defect as aforesaid, of which the employ»'; may have had knowledge when the employer had knowledge of such defect, except when in the usual and ordinary course of his employment it is the duty of such empioyé to make vhe repairs, or remedy the defects. Nor shall the empioyé under such conditions be deemed to have waived the negligence, U any, unless the danger bo imminent and to sucli extent that a reasonably prudent person would not have continued in the prosecution of the work; but this statute shall not be construed so as to include such risks as are incident to the employment.”

The law and the issues being as stated, it simply remains to consider whether there was evidence to sustain a verdict for Karnaca in the particulars specified. We are justified in saying that there was no evidence to sustain a recovery on the ground that tire company had not used ordinary care in providing. Karnaca with reasonably safe tools and appliances with which to perform his work. Counsel for Karnaca practically concede this in their brief. The question was submitted to the jury, however, by the court, but no complaint is made of this anywhere. If there was evidence to go to the jury on any alleged act of negligence, it was not error to overrule the motion for a directed verdict.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
216 F. 857, 133 C.C.A. 61, 1914 U.S. App. LEXIS 1386, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-gypsum-co-v-karnaca-ca8-1914.