United States Farm Land Co. v. Darter

183 P. 696, 42 Cal. App. 292
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJuly 19, 1919
DocketCiv. No. 2015.
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 183 P. 696 (United States Farm Land Co. v. Darter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States Farm Land Co. v. Darter, 183 P. 696, 42 Cal. App. 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919).

Opinion

BURNETT, J.

The action was by a real estate broker against a land owner to recover five thousand dollars commissions for procuring a purchaser for land under a written contract of agency. The answer admitted the execution of said contract, but “denied that in said contract in writing defendant promised and agreed to pay to plaintiff for said services of plaintiff in the event that the plaintiff procured and introduced to defendant a purchaser of said property all money realized in excess of the sum of thirty-five thousand dollars (thirty thousand dollars ?) as defendant might sell said property to a purchaser procured by plaintiff and introduced by plaintiff to defendant, but, on the contrary, defendant alleges that by the terms of said contract in writing, defendant agreed to pay plaintiff one-half of the said sum realized from such sale in excess of the sum of thirty thousand dollars that defendant might sell said property to purchaser procured by plaintiff and introduced by the plaintiff to defendant. ’ ’ Defendant furthermore alleged in the answer “that on the twenty-second day of June, 1915, he terminated and canceled the aforesaid agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant on the fourth day of December, 1914,” and denied that plaintiff obtained a purchaser for the premises who “was able or willing to purchase from said defendant said property or any property for the sum of thirty-five thousand dollars.”

Defendant admitted that plaintiff introduced a Mr. Neergard to defendant, but denied “that said Neergard or any other person purchased said property, or any part thereof, for the sum of thirty-five thousand dollars or for any other sum of money or at all.” Defendant, however, alleged that “subsequent to the termination and cancellation of the agreement, dated December 4, 1914, entered into between plaintiff and defendant, to wit, July 2, 1915, defendant entered into a contract of sale with the said Mr. Neergard and W. F. Noble, by the terms of which he agreed to sell to said Neergard and Noble the property described in plaintiff’s com *295 plaint for the sum of thirty-five thousand dollars, which purchase price was to be paid in installments extending over a period of years; that subsequent to the termination and cancellation of the aforesaid agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendant, defendant agreed that in the event that the said Neergard and Noble paid the installments provided in said contract of sale to be paid, he would pay plaintiff the amount agreed to be paid by the terms of the agreement dated December 4, 1914, and terminated by defendant. That the said Neergard and Noble failed to pay any of the installments provided tó be paid in said contract of sale entered into between defendant and said Neergard and Noble except the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars. ’ ’ We may add that there is no objection to the form of the complaint and we have set out all the material parts of the answer. By the foregoing it appears that the only issues were whether the commission was to be the entire excess of the selling price over the sum of thirty thousand dollars or one-half thereof, whether said contract for the payment of a commission was terminated, and whether within the contemplation of said contract plaintiff obtained a purchaser for the premises. The court found in favor of defendant as to the amount of commission and for the plaintiff on the other issues. The discussion of the case by appellant has taken a wide range, and his counsel has displayed much learning and industry, but we think the determination of the merits is a comparatively simple matter.

The transaction between the parties is disclosed by correspondence, the managing agent of plaintiff residing in Los Angeles and defendant in Stockton. The material portions of the correspondence we shall set forth.

The first letter was written by defendant on December 4, 1914, to A. D. Kildahl, the representative of plaintiff. It opened with the statement: “Referring to our conversation when you were in Stockton with reference to the dairy ranch, will say that there is 170 acres five miles east of the Courthouse of Stockton. ’ ’ It proceeded with a vivid description of the land and its improvements and concluded as follows : “Make you a price of $30,000 net on this place. There is no unimproved land between this land and Stockton that can be bought below $200 per acre. I will protect you on the difference between $30,000 and what you ask for it. I *296 will also allow you one-half of any commission should I make a sale to any one on this property or any other property.”

To this Mr. Kildahl made answer on December 7th, stating: “I have to-day received your favor of the 4th, with description of your dairy farm, just east of Stockton. I shall certainly bear this in mind and make every effort to dispose of it for you, probably on the basis of about $200 per acre, which would mean $4,000 commission.” We may add that, admittedly, respondent advertised the property extensively, enlisted the services of other agents and made quite an effort to secure a purchaser for it. The result was that one Mr. Neergard became interested in the property and on May 1, 1915, plaintiff wrote to defendant: “This will introduce to you Mr. Neergard, of Noble and Neergard, Compton, California. Mr. Neergard, who is an experienced dairyman, is looking for another location for his business, and our friend, Mr. E. L. Parke, has told them about your dairy ranch of 170 acres located close to Stockton. We would be glad if you will show Mr. Neergard the property, if not disposed of, when he reaches there. He will start North in a few days.” Two days later plaintiff wrote another letter referring to the fact that it had written the letter of introduction of May 1st, and saying: “Mr. Neergard will probably reach Stockton in the course of the next ten days or so and if he does, we will be very glad if you could show him your place, if not then sold. We understand that his firm is amply able to fulfill any obligation they undertake, and we hope that success will crown your efforts.”

Mr. Darter replied to the letter on May 6th, saying: “In reply to your favor of the 3d will say that I am glad to note that Mr. Neergard is interested in the dairy. I have not sold this place yet and hope I will be able to do some business with him when he arrives.” In answer, respondent wrote: “ We have yours of the 6th with regard to the dairy ranch, please note that the price quoted to Mr. Neergard by the broker was $35,000, including the stock and implements, We sent you a list some time ago, copies of which were sent to a number of agents and dealers here, and no doubt you have this list yet and would probably refer to it before talking price to Mr. Neergard, but I thought best to write you *297 and thus make sure that you understood the price that was quoted. We trust that you will be able to interest Mr. Neergard as he seems to prefer an improved place. ’ ’

On May 27th defendant wrote to Mr. Kildahl as follows: “The parties you sent up to look at the dairy ranch came up and went out to look at the place and would be very glad to buy, but they are unable to raise more than four or five thousand dollars. He promised me that he would bring his father-in-law and that they might get together and consider' it. Hoping you will be able to do something with it,” etc. On June 21st, respondent wrote: “We understand that Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
183 P. 696, 42 Cal. App. 292, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-farm-land-co-v-darter-calctapp-1919.