United States ex rel. Soeder v. Crossen

264 F. 459, 1920 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1202
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 23, 1920
DocketNo. 6792
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 264 F. 459 (United States ex rel. Soeder v. Crossen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States ex rel. Soeder v. Crossen, 264 F. 459, 1920 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1920).

Opinion

THOMPSON, District Judge.

From the petition and return it appears that the petitioner is the wife of George Soeder; that they occupy as their dwelling the premises No. 200 Walnut street, Philadelphia, which premises are used in part by the husband, George Soeder, as a public house or saloon. Two federal prohibition agents, acting under the direction of the respondent, went to the saloon, and, according to their statements, were served with whisky by the relator’s husband. Upon the third floor in the part of the house used as a private dwelling, the agents seized a large quantity of intoxicating liquors, which remains in the custody of the respondent.

’The relator avers that, prior to July 1, 1919, she became the owner and possessor in her own right of a quantity of gin, whisky, wild cherry, and Dash bitters, included among the liquors seized by the prohibition agents, which she avers she kept in her private dwelling at 200 Walnut street for her own use and for use of bona fide guests when entertained by her therein. She avers that the liquors were not kept for the purpose of sale or dispensation in the saloon conducted by her husband, nor for any other purpose than that set forth above; that the respondent retains the liquor and refuses to redeliver it to her. The relator avers that she is thus deprived of her property without due process of law, and is deprived of remedy by replevin by virtue of the provisions of section 25 of title 2 of the National Prohibition Act (Act Oct. 28, 1919, c. 85), which provides that property seized on a search warrant shall not be taken from the officer seizing the same on any writ of replevin or other like process. She applies for a mandamus commanding the respondent to cause a summons to be issued in due form under the provisions of section 39 of the National Prohibition Act, so that she may be enabled to defend her rights to the liquor claimed by her.

Section 39 provides:

“In all cases wherein the property of any citizen is proceeded against or wherein a judgment affecting it might be rendered, and the citizen is not the one mho vn person violated the provisions of the law, summons must be issued in due form and served personally, if said person is to be found within the jurisdiction of the court.”

It is claimed- on behalf of the respondent that the relator does not come within the provisions of section 39, because the petition does not show that the relator is “not the one who in person violated the provisions of the law.” The pertinent sections of title 2, in relation to possession of intoxicating liquor, are sections 3, 25, and 33.

Section 3 provides that no person shall, on or after the date when the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution goes into effect, possess, any intoxicating liquor, except as authorized in the act, and all [461]*461the provisions of the act shall be liberally construed, to the end that the use of intoxicating liquor as a beverage may be prevented.

Section 25 provides that it shall be unlawful to have or possess any liquor or property designed for the manufacture of liquor intended for use in violating the title, and ffio property rights shall exist in any 'such liquor or property. It provides for the issue of a search warrant, and such liquor, the containers thereof, and such property so seized shall be subject to such disposition as the court may make thereof. If it is found that such liquor or property was so,unlawfully held or possessed, or had been so unlawfully used, the liquor, and all property designed for the unlawful manufacture of liquor, shall be destroyed, unless the court shall otherwise order. No search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such, unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless it is in part used for some business purpose such as a store, shop, saloon, restaurant, hotel, or boarding house. The term “private dwelling” shall be construed to include the room or rooms used and occupied, not transiently, but solely as a residence in, an apartment house, hotel, or boarding house. The property seized on any such warrant shall not be taken from the officer seizing the same on any writ of replevin or other like process.

Section 33 makes the possession of liquors by any one not legally permitted under title 2 to possess liquor prima facie .evidence that it is kept for the purpose of sale, barter, exchange, gift, or other disposition in violation of the act, and requires every person legally permitted to have liquor to report to the commissioner the kind and amount of intoxicating liquor in his possession. It further provides:

“But it shall not be unlawful to possess liquors in one’s private dwelling while the same is occupied and used by him as his dwelling only and such liquor need not he reported: Provided such liquors are for use only for the personal consumption of the owner thereof and his family residing in such dwelling and of his bona fide guests when entertained by him therein; and the burden of proof shall he upon the possessor in any action concerning the same to prove that such liquor was lawfully acquired, possessed, and used.”

Upon a search warrant duly issued upon sufficient information supported by affidavit in accordance with title 11 of the Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, 40 S’tat. 228 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 10212i, 1049ói4a-l0496J4V), the premises in question, although a private dwelling, occupied as such, might be lawfully searched, either upon the ground that it appeared from the affidavit that it was being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor or because it was in part used by the relator’s husband in conducting a saloon.

Assuming that a search warrant was so issued upon proper affidavit, the seizure of the liquor in its containers was lawful, and the inquiry then is: What further proceeding is required under the provisions of the act to require a summons to be issued to bring in a citizen who “is not the one who in person violated the provisions of the law,” in order to enable such citizen to defend his claim in a case wherein the property of such citizen is proceeded against, or wherein a judgment affecting it might be rendered?

[462]*462[1] A careful analysis of the act makes it apparent that.in no case is a prohibition officer or agent justified in seizing intoxicating liquor or other property without a search warrant, except as provided in section 26, which makes it his duty to seize all intoxicating liquors found being transported contrary to law in any wagon, buggy, automobile, water or air craft, or other vehicle. Upon seizure in either case, however, the act contemplates a remedy by orderly process of law for the disposition of the intoxicating liquor seized. . '

[2, 3], Intoxicating liquor seized under a warrant may either be liquor as to which no property rights exist under section 25, or it may be liquor that has been lawfully possessed. There must be a determination of questions of fact, and the application of the law to the facts, if there is a claim of lawful possession. When an officer seizes intoxicating liquors, it is not intended that he shall constitute the tribunal to determine those questions of fact nor of law.

The right to due process of law is ‘not abrogated by the Eighteenth Amendment.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
264 F. 459, 1920 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1202, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-ex-rel-soeder-v-crossen-paed-1920.