United States ex rel. Mango v. Weis

181 F. 860, 1910 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205
CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedSeptember 24, 1910
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 181 F. 860 (United States ex rel. Mango v. Weis) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States ex rel. Mango v. Weis, 181 F. 860, 1910 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205 (D. Md. 1910).

Opinion

ROSE, District Judge.

Coloraba Mango, alias Lina Marino, hereafter called the petitioner, is a native of the province of Salerno, kingdom of Italy. On July 30, 1910, the Acting Secretary of Commerce and Labor issued a warrant to the Commissioner of Immigration at Baltimore, directing that she be arrested on the charge that, being an alien, she had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution subsequent to her entry into the United States. The warrant directed the Commissioner to give her a hearing, to enable her to show cause why she should not be deported. Under this warrant she was taken into custody. On August 3, 1910, she was given a hearing. She was represented by counsel. At their request the hearing was adjourned until August 8th, when it was renewed and concluded. On August 12, 1910, the Acting Secretary of Commerce and Labor issued his warrant directing the return of the petitioner to the country whence she came. The warrant sets forth that the petitioner landed in New York on October 23, 1906, and is in this country in violation of the act of Congress approved Eebruary 20, 4907, as amended by the act approved March 26, 1910, in that she is an alien prostitute and has been found an inmate of a house of prostitution subsequent tp her entry into the United States. The petitioner thereupon sued out this writ of habeas corpus.

There is no .controversy as to the facts, and, if there were, as she has had a fair hearing, this court would have no jurisdiction to pass upon any disputes concerning them. They are recited because, being undisputed, they illustrate the evils which doubtless inspired the legislation of Congress upon the construction of which the decision of the present case turns.

In October, 1906, she was about 18 years of age. She says that an Italian, who was established in business as a druggist in New York City, made a short visit to Italy and to the village of which the petitioner is a native. The petitioner, with the consent of her mother, went to New York with him and served as a servant in his family. She landed imNew York on October 23, 1906. She remained with her employer for something over two months, when she was seduced by another Italian whom she met in New York. She lived with him 15 days, when she left him; he having tried to put her in a house of prostitution. She went to Boston, she says, to get work; but on the day she arrived in Boston she met for the first time a certain Cipitello, who induced her to become a prostitute. She says she was an inmate of a house of prostitution in Boston for about six months. During this time she supported Cipitello by her earnings as a prostitute. She then became ill, and spent some time in a hospital as a public charge. While in the hospital, the man who had been living on the wages of [862]*862her shame was convicted of larceny and sent to jail. When he was released, she again joined him and became an inmate of a house of prostitution in Bridgeport. In his company she visited several other cities, in every case practicing prostitution and giving the money she made to Cipitello.' When she found' that he was sustaining like relations with three other girls, she left him. She went to Philadelphia, and became an inmate of a house of prostitution, and afterwards she came to Baltimore: Since coming to Baltimore she has been an inmate of three different houses of prostitution. She says that she was a pure girl when she came to this country, that she does not like the life she is living, and that if she could get honest work she would take it.

Her counsel contend that she cannot be legally deported, because the proceedings looking to her deportation were not instituted within three years after the date of her landing in this country. They claim that section 3 of the act of February 20, 1907, as amended by the act of March 26, 1910, under which the warrant is issued, expressly declares that an alien deported under its provisions shall be deported in the manner provided by sections 20 and 21 of the original act of 1907, and that the authority given by sections 20 and 21 to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to order the deportation of an alien is expressly limited to aliens who have not been more than three years in this country. Section 20 provides for the deportation of an alien who has entered the United States in violation of law, and of such an alien as becomes a public charge from causes existing prior to his landing. It says that such alien shall, upon the warrant of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, be taken into custody and deported to the country whence he came at any time within three years after the date of his entry within the United States. It further provides for the payment of the expenses of such deportation and for releasing the alien on bond pending the hearing of the case against him. Section 21 provides that whenever the Secretary of Commerce and Labor shall be satisfied that an alien has been found in the United States in violation of the act, or that an alien is subject to deportation under the provisions of that act, or of any law of the United States, he shall cause such alien, within the period of three years after landing or entry therein, to be taken into custody and returned to the country whence he came, as provided by section 20. Section 21 further imposes the duty of returning such alien upon certain persons, and authorizes the Secretary of Commerce' and Labor, when the mental or physical condition of the alien requires personal care and attendance, to furnish such care and attendance.

For the petitioner it is argued that, as sections 20 and 21 do not give any power to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to issue a warrant to deport any alien who has been more than three years in the country, the warrant in this case is invalid on its face. The government answers that section 3 as amended merely requires that the deportation shall be made in the manner provided by sections 20 and 21. All that is meant, the government says, is that the same form of procedure shall be followed—that is, that there shall be a warrant issued by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor; that the alien shall be taken into [863]*863custody, and permitted to give bail pending the decision as to whether he shall or shall not be deported; that he shall be deported in the way mentioned in those sections; that the expenses of such deportation shall be paid as provided therein; that personal attendance shall be given to him when necessary, and so on. In the government’s view, the question of whether the warrant of deportation must or must not be issued within any particular time after the entry of the alien in this country depends solely upon the wording of section 3 of the act of February 20, 1907, as amended by the act of March 26, 1910.

It will profit nothing to make a nice inquiry into what construction would ordinarily be put upon the word “manner,” as used in connections similar to that in which it is found in the amendatory act of 1910. The real question is what it means in that act. Congress had two purposes in view in amending the original law of 1907. It was necessary to repeal those provisions of section 3 of the act of 1907 which had been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138, 29 Sup. Ct. 470, 53 L. Ed. 737, and Congress wished more fully and effectively to use, for the prevention of prostitution by aliens, the powers which the federal government has to protect, to exclude, and to deport them.

In section 3 of the original Act of 1907 it is provided:

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Bluebook (online)
181 F. 860, 1910 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-ex-rel-mango-v-weis-mdd-1910.