United States Ex Rel. Brandon v. Downer

139 F.2d 761, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 4123
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJanuary 7, 1944
Docket210
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 139 F.2d 761 (United States Ex Rel. Brandon v. Downer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States Ex Rel. Brandon v. Downer, 139 F.2d 761, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 4123 (2d Cir. 1944).

Opinion

FRANK, Circuit Judge.

1. Were it not for the incident of the eye examination we would be obliged to reverse, for in that event appellant would unquestionably have been a conscientious objector within the statute as we recently construed it in United States v. Kauten, 2 Cir., 133 F.2d 703, 708. The Appeal Board, according to the testimony of its chairman, gave as one ground for its decision an interpretation opposed to ours. But the Board gave as another ground its conclusion that the eye-examination incident showed the insincerity of appellant’s convictions. Judge HAND and I would have decided otherwise, had we been members of the Board; we would have agreed with the hearing officer that a single instance of a deviation from a principle does not demonstrate a lack of serious devotion to that principle, for even a saint may have a momentary lapse from his faith. But we are not the Board, and on such a subject reasonable men can differ. As, therefore, we cannot say that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, we cannot say that its decision lacked all legality.

2. Appellant argues in effect that the Appeal Board and the Directors were obliged to adopt the views of the Hearing Officer; that contention lacks merit since the statute and the Regulations specifically provide that the Hearing Officer’s recommendations are to be purely advisory and may be disregarded.

3. Appellant complains that he was not represented at the hearing by a lawyer and that the hearing was not public; assuming arguendo that lie could have demanded that he be represented by a lawyer and that the hearing be public, he made no such demands. He also objects that he was not given access to the report of the F. B. I. Section 5(g) of the statute calls for a reference to the Department of Justice “for inquiry and hearing” and provides that “after appropriate inquiry” a hearing shall be held. It was therefore proper for the Department of Justice, through the F. B. I., to make an inquiry and proper that the hearing officer should consider the results of such inquiry; moreover, the Hearing Officer’s report disclosed that there was nothing unfavorable in the F. B. I.’s report other than the incident as to the eye-examination which was fully disclosed to appellant. The F. B. I. report was not included in the record before the Appeal Board or the Director, and appellant made no effort to subpoena the F. B. T.’s report at the trial in the court below. Appellant makes some suggestion with respect to the minutes of the Flearing Officer but he offered no proof that there were such minutes nor did he endeavor *766 to subpoena them if there were any. There is no merit to the suggestion that the Appeal Board did not see and examine appellant; neither the statute nor the Regulations make any such requirement; appellant was seen and heard by the Hearing Officer.

4. Appellant argues that the appeal taken by the State Director to the President was not properly considered because the decision was made by General Hershey, the Director of Selective Service, who was a military officer. In this connection appellant points to a provision of § 10(a) (2) of the statute that the President “shall establish within the Selective Service System civilian local boards and such other civilian agencies, including appeal boards and agencies of appeal, as may be necessary. * * * Appeal boards and agencies of appeal within the Selective Service System shall be composed of civilians * * * ”; and appellant also points to the portion of § 10(a) (3) which refers to “any officer * * * of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard * * * who may be assigned or detailed to any office or position to carry out the provisions of this Act (except to offices or positions on local boards, appeal boards, or agencies of appeal established or created pursuant to section 10(a) (2) * * *).” He argues that the action of the President in delegating the power to pass on Presidential appeals to General Hershey violated those provisions of the Act. We need not pass upon that question. For Congress, on December 3, 1943, amended the pertinent portions of § 10(a) (2) to read “civilian local boards, civilian appeal boards, and such other agencies, including agencies of appeal, as may be necessary. * * * Appeal boards within the Selective Service System shall be composed of civilians. * * * ” It also then amended the pertinent portion of § 10(a) (3) by deleting from the above-quoted parentheses the words “agencies of appeal.” Assuming arguendo that the appeal was not properly considered under the statute as it read prior to this recent amendment, a reversal in the instant case on that ground would merely mean that General Hershey would now reconsider the matter with doubtless the same result. The question is therefore academic.

5. Appellant also argues that General Hershey improperly left the decision to a committee of military officers. But the record shows that General Hershey regarded the report of those officers as merely advisory, for, in his affidavit, he states that the entire file together with their recommendations was considered by him and that he made the decision refusing to overrule the decision of the Appeal Board. 4

Affirmed.

Appendix

Pertinent Provisions of the Statute and Regulations

Statute

Section 5(g).

“Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Any such person claiming such exemption from combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections whose claim is sustained by the local board shall, if he is inducted into the land or naval forces under this Act, be assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service, in lieu of such induction, be assigned to work of national importance under civilian direction. Any such person claiming such exemption from combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections shall, if such claim is not sustained by the local board, be entitled to an appeal to the appropriate appeal board provided for in section 10(a) (2) * * *. Upon the filing of such appeal with the appeal board, the appeal board shall forthwith refer the matter to the Department of Justice for *767 inquiry and hearing by the Department or the proper agency thereof. After appropriate inquiry by such agency, a hearing shall be held by the Department of Justice with respect to the character and good faith of the objections of the person concerned, and such person shall be notified of the time and place of such hearing. The Department shall, after such hearing, if the objections are found to be sustained, recommend to the Appeal Board (1) that if the objector is inducted into the land or naval forces under this Act, he shall be assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or (2) that if the objector is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service, he shall in lieu of such induction be assigned to work of national importance under civilian direction.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Goldstein v. Middendorf
400 F. Supp. 53 (D. Massachusetts, 1975)
Weaver v. United States
210 F.2d 815 (Eighth Circuit, 1954)
United States v. Geyer
108 F. Supp. 70 (D. Connecticut, 1952)
United States v. Estep
150 F.2d 768 (Third Circuit, 1945)
United States Ex Rel. Levy v. Cain
149 F.2d 338 (Second Circuit, 1945)
United States ex rel. Aberasturi v. Cain
147 F.2d 449 (Second Circuit, 1945)
United States Ex Rel. Trainin v. Cain
144 F.2d 944 (Second Circuit, 1944)
United States ex rel. Beye v. Downer
143 F.2d 125 (Second Circuit, 1944)
United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt
141 F.2d 845 (Second Circuit, 1944)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
139 F.2d 761, 1944 U.S. App. LEXIS 4123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-ex-rel-brandon-v-downer-ca2-1944.