United States ex rel. Betty Cordaway v. Young Kang

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 16, 2026
• Docket: 3:25-cv-11122
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 UNITED STATES ex rel. BETTY Case No. 25-cv-11122-LJC CORDAWAY, 8 Plaintiff, ORDER SUMMARILY DENYING 9 MOTION TO STRIKE AFFIRMATIVE v. DEFENSES 10 YOUNG KANG, Re: Dkt. No. 19 11 Defendant.

13 Relator Betty Cordaway moves to strike several affirmative defenses asserted by 14 Defendant Young Kang on the grounds that the “boilerplate” defenses at issue either are not true 15 affirmative defenses (as opposed to mere denials of liability) or are not alleged with sufficient 16 particularity under the Iqbal pleading standard. ECF No. 19. For the reasons discussed below, the 17 Court finds that Motion suitable for resolution without further briefing or oral argument, 18 VACATES the hearing noticed for July 14, 2026, and DENIES the Motion without prejudice.1 19 Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a 20 district court “may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” “The 21 function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by 22 dispensing with those issues prior to trial . . . .” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) ([citation 23 omitted]). “Motions to strike are generally regarded with disfavor because of the limited importance of pleading in federal practice, and 24 because they are often used as a delaying tactic.” Mag Instrument, Inc. v. JS Prods., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1106 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 25 “Ultimately, whether to grant a motion to strike lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Nguyen v. CTS Elecs. Mfg. Sols. Inc., 26 27 No. 13-CV-03679-LHK, 2014 WL 46553, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 1 2014) (citing Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 973). 2 Pollock v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 21-cv-09975-JCS, 2022 WL 912893, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 3 2022); see also Well v. County of Alameda, No. 25-cv-01894-LJC, 2025 WL 1223553, at *1 (N.D. 4 Cal. Apr. 28, 2025). 5 “Motions to strike rarely meet the burden required.” Means v. Dietrich, No. 5:15cv49- 6 MW/GRJ, 2015 WL 13376681, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2015) (cleaned up); see also Lapena v. 7 Las Vegas Metro. Dep’t, No. 2:21-cv-02170-JCM-NJK, 2022 WL 479496, at *1 & n.3 (D. Nev. 8 Feb. 16, 2022) (addressing the high burden for such motions). 9 Courts in this district have “previously declined to strike affirmative defenses where doing 10 so ‘would not in any way limit the “expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating” 11 the case’ and granting the motion to strike ‘would be “an empty formalism.”’” Ely Holdings Ltd. 12 v. O’Keeffe’s, Inc., No. 18-cv-06721-JCS, 2019 WL 4071028, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2019) 13 (quoting Perez v. Banana Republic, LLC, No. 14-cv-01132-JCS, ECF Doc. No. 46 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14 10, 2014) (in turn quoting Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 973; Hernandez v. Balakian, No. CV-F-06- 15 1383 OWW/DLB, 2007 WL 1649911, at *9 (E.D. Cal. June 1, 2007))). 16 To the extent Relator asserts that Defendant’s first, sixth, seventh, ninth through sixteenth, 17 nineteenth, and twentieth affirmative defenses are not actually affirmative defenses but instead 18 mere denials of liability or attacks on legal sufficiency of Relator’s Complaint, ECF No. 19 at 14– 19 18,2 Relator has not shown “that striking these defenses would . . . in any way limit the 20 ‘expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating’ the case.” Perez, ECF No. 46 21 (quoting Whittlestone, 618 F.3d at 973). Instead, it appears that litigating the propriety of those 22 purported affirmative defenses would increase such expenditures for no practical purpose, and in 23 the absence of “prejudice to [Relator] . . . striking th[ese] affirmative defense[s would be] an 24 empty formalism.” See Hernandez, 2007 WL 1649911, at *9. 25 To the extent Relator challenges Defendant’s remaining affirmative defenses as 26 insufficiently alleged, it is possible that striking such defenses could reduce the scope of litigation, 27 ] but Relator’s motion does not explain how or why that is so. “[T]he moving party in a motion to 2 || strike carries the burden and must establish that the matter to be stricken is clearly unrelated to the 3 issues in the case, and that the matter would prejudice the moving party if left in the pleading.” 4 || Johnson v. Exec. Protective Agency K-9 & Investigative Servs., Inc., No. O7CV0570 J (AJB), 2008 5 || WL 11337353, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2008) (emphasis added). Here, Relator does not discuss 6 || any of the specific affirmative defenses that she moves to strike for failure to provide sufficient 7 || factual allegations, much less address what prejudice would result from any specific defense 8 || remaining unstricken from Defendant’s Answer. See ECF No. 19 at 13. 9 Relator’s Motion to Strike is therefore DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, without need 10 || for further briefing or a hearing. Counsel for the parties ace ORDERED to meet and confer’ either 11 in person or by videoconference no later than two weeks from the date of this Order regarding: 12 || (1) whether Defendant actually intends to pursue each of the affirmative defenses asserted in the 13 || Answer; and (2) any prejudice to Relator that might result from such defenses appearing therein. 14 || Ifthe parties are unable to reach an agreement to amend the Answer or to allow it to stand, Relator 3 15 || may file a renewed motion to strike articulating the prejudice that she faces from any disputed 16 || affirmative defense. See Cole v. Serra Pac. Mortg. Co., No. 18-cv-01692-JCS, ECF No. 28 (N.D. 17 || Cal. Nov. 1, 2018). 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 Dated: June 16, 2026 20

‘A J. CISNEROS 22 ited States Magistrate Judge 23 24 25 26 27 3 The Court notes Relator’s representation that Defendant failed to respond to an invitation to meet 28 and confer before Relator filed this Motion. ECF No. 19 at 6. The Court trusts that both parties will comply with this Order to meet and confer.