United States Department of the Treasury v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co.

475 B.R. 347, 2012 WL 2822547
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 3, 2012
DocketNos. 12 Civ. 561(CM), 12 Civ. 695(CM)
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 475 B.R. 347 (United States Department of the Treasury v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States Department of the Treasury v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co., 475 B.R. 347, 2012 WL 2822547 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

Opinion

[350]*350DECISION AND ORDER

McMAHON, District Judge.

Appellants United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) and Export Development (“EDC”) ask this Court to overturn an order of the United States Bankruptcy Court (Gerber, B.J.), dated November 28, 2011, which granted summary judgment in an adversary proceeding in favor of Appellee Official Committee Of Unsecured Creditors Of Motors Liquidation Company (the “Committee”).1 This decision can be found at In re Motors Liquidation Co., 460 B.R. 603 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2011).

Because this case is not yet ripe for adjudication, I vacate the Bankruptcy Court’s decision and direct that the complaint be dismissed without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

I. The GM Bankruptcy

By now, the story of how General Motors faltered and was bailed out is well-known; for background, the reader may refer to Judge Gerber’s thorough decision in In re General Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2009), stay pending appeal denied, 2009 WL 2033079 (S.D.N.Y.2009), appeal dismissed and aff'd, 428 B.R. 43 (S.D.N.Y.2010), and 430 B.R. 65 (S.D.N.Y.2010), appeal dismissed, No. 10-4882-bk (2d Cir. July 28, 2011). Familiarity with the basics of this bankruptcy is presumed.

In 2008 and 2009, Old GM, then known as General Motors, began to suffer “a steep erosion in revenues, significant operating losses, and a dramatic loss of liquidity, putting its future in grave jeopardy.” Id. at 476. Upon request, the United States Government began providing financial assistance to Old GM in late 2008, to help it survive while it attempted to turn around its fortunes. Things did not work out. Treasury suggested that, if Old GM was “unable to complete an effective out-of-court restructuring, it should consider a new, more aggressive, viability plan,” i.e., it should file a bankruptcy petition to avoid further erosion of value. Id. at 478. The thought was that, within a bankruptcy proceeding, Old GM would be able to sell substantially all of its assets to a Treasury-sponsored purchaser in an expedited sale under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”). “Under this game plan, the Purchaser would acquire the purchased assets; create a New GM; and operate New GM free of any entanglement with the bankruptcy cases.” Id. at 480.

Under the terms of the expedited section 363 sale, New GM would be owned by four entities: Treasury, EDC, a New Employees’ Beneficiary Association Trust, and Old GM. Id. at 483-84. Old GM was to own 10% of New GM’s common stock on an undiluted basis if the chapter 11 plan of reorganization was implemented. It would also be due an additional 2% if the allowed prepetition general unsecured claims were to exceed $35 billion. Id. at 484. Old GM’s interest in the New GM is referred to in this litigation as the “New GM Equity Interests.”

[351]*351As a part of this arrangement, Treasury and EDC (referred to collectively as “the Governments”) agreed to provide debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) financing to Old GM. Id. DIP financing would both ensure that Old GM could continue to operate through the completion of the section 363 sale, and fund the liquidation and wind-down of the remaining assets and liabilities of Old GM. The Governments eventually provided over $30 billion to achieve the former, and $1,175 billion to accomplish the latter.

On June 1, 2009, GM and certain of its subsidiaries filed chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions (the “Debtors”). The Debtors in this case include “GM, Saturn, LLC, Saturn Distribution Corporation, and Chevrolet-Saturn of Harlem, Inc.” (R 190.2) In the five weeks following the petition, Judge Gerber signed three orders approving the DIP financing, discussed below.

On July 5, 2009, Judge Gerber approved the section 363 sale of Old GM’s assets to the New GM.

II. The Avoidance Action

In the adversary proceeding on appeal, the Committee seeks a declaration that the Governments have no right to any proceeds that may be awarded in an avoidance action that the Committee brought on behalf of the Old GM bankruptcy estate (the “Avoidance Action”).

The Avoidance Action involves a $1.5 billion pre-bankruptcy petition secured loan made to GM. When GM filed its bankruptcy petition, “The Prepetition Term Lenders [who made the $1.5 billion loan] were paid [by the bankruptcy estate] because their bank agent asserted they were oversecured by, among other things, a security interest in the Debtors’ assets.” (Committee’s Opp’n at 3.) In the Avoidance Action, the Committee asserts that this loan may have lost its secured status prior to the filing of Old GM’s bankruptcy petition:

Months before the bankruptcy, Old GM’s counsel caused the filing of a form UCC-3 that terminated the security interest with respect to most of those assets. The UCC-3 was filed with the consent of bank agent’s counsel, as communicated in emails and signed escrow instructions. If these facts constitute “authorization” by the bank agent, the Prepetition Term Lenders forfeited most of their collateral, and the $1.5 billion postpetition payment is potentially voidable.

(Id.)

The Committee filed the Avoidance Action, pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Final DIP Order (discussed below), in order to void the payment and recover for the bankruptcy estate the approximately $1.5 billion paid to the Prepet-ition Term Lenders. (See Official Comm, of Unsecured Creditors of Motors Liquidation Co. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Motors Liquidation Co.), Adv. Pro. No. 09-504, 2009 WL 2446727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2009) (ECF No. 1).)

Cross-motions for summary judgment in the Avoidance Action are presently sub judice.

The issue in this case is who will enjoy the proceeds from the Avoidance Action— if there are any.

III. The DIP Financing of the Old GM Chapter 11 Bankruptcy

Judge Gerber signed three post-petition financing orders between the Governments and Old GM (as the debtor-in-possession):

[352]*352(1) An “Interim” DIP Financing Order, entered on June 2, 2009 (the “Interim DIP Order”);
(2) A “Final” DIP Financing Order, entered on June 25, 2009 (the “Final DIP Order”); and
(3) A modified final DIP financing order, revised to address, financing needs during the post-363 sale “wind-down” of Old GM’s chapter 11 case, entered on July 5, 2009 (the “Wind-Down Order”);

In re Motors Liquidation Co., 460 B.R. at 608.

A. The Interim DIP Order

On June 1, 2009, “Old GM moved for approval of its DIP financing — for an ultimate $33.3 billion, with $15 billion of the $33.3 billion to be borrowed on an emergency, interim, basis.” Id. at 609. On June 2, 2009, Judge Gerber signed the Interim DIP Order, approving borrowing of up to $15 billion.

For readers who are unfamiliar with post-bankruptcy petition financing arrangements:

Creditors are often loathe to knowingly extend credit to entities in reorganization.

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