In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
August Term 2022 No. 22-1741-cv
ATERES BAIS YAAKOV ACADEMY OF ROCKLAND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWN OF CLARKSTOWN, GEORGE HOEHMANN, CUPON INC., CITIZENS UNITED TO PROTECT OUR NEIGHBORHOODS OF GREATER NANUET INC., Defendants-Appellees.
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
ARGUED: JUNE 14, 2023 DECIDED: DECEMBER 8, 2023 Before: PARKER, PARK, and NATHAN, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Ateres Bais Yaakov Academy of Rockland sued Appellees in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Román, J.) asserting claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c, et seq., under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and under state law for tortious interference with contract. The Academy essentially alleged that Appellees blocked construction of a school in Clarkstown, New York intended to educate Orthodox Jewish girls. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, Appellant contends that the district court erred in holding that its religious discrimination and civil rights claims were not ripe and erroneously concluded that it failed to satisfy the traceability requirement for Article III standing as to its tortious interference claim. We agree. We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JOSHUA HALPERN, (Yehudah L. Buchweitz, Kevin M. Simmons, David Yolkut, on the briefs), Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, Washington, DC, Dallas, TX & New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
ELIZA M. SCHEIBEL, (John M. Flannery, on the brief), Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP, White Plains, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.
2 PARKER, Circuit Judge:
In 2018 and 2019, Plaintiff-Appellant Ateres Bais Yaakov
Academy of Rockland (“ABY”) contracted to purchase property in
Clarkstown, New York owned by Grace Baptist Church to establish
an Orthodox Jewish school. ABY alleges that, in response, the Town
of Clarkstown, and Town Supervisor George Hoehmann (the “Town
Defendants”), along with local citizens who had formed a chapter of
an organization known as Citizens United to Protect Our
Neighborhood Inc. (“CUPON”), came together to keep the Orthodox
school out of the community. ABY alleges that, to achieve this result,
the Town Defendants and CUPON manipulated an ostensibly neutral
building permit application and zoning appeals process. Eventually,
ABY alleges, the Town’s efforts were successful, and Grace Church
refused to sell the property to ABY.
ABY then sued in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, asserting claims under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000c, et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, and state law for tortious
interference with contract.
Appellees moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to
dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for
failure to state claims. The district court (Román, J.) granted the
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court
reasoned that ABY failed to sufficiently establish that its civil rights
and religious discrimination claims based on the denial of a building
permit application were ripe because Clarkstown’s Zoning Board of
Appeals (the “Zoning Board” or “ZBA”) never issued a final decision
on the application. Second, the district court held that ABY failed to
plead adequately that the Town Defendants’ conduct caused ABY’s
lost-contract injury, as required for Article III standing. Having
dismissed on Rule 12(b)(1) grounds, the district court did not reach
Appellees’ arguments under Rule 12(b)(6).
ABY argues on appeal that its claims were ripe because nothing
more than de facto finality is required for us to review them, and that
4 such finality attached when the Zoning Board informed ABY that it
would not entertain its appeal. ABY also argues that the district court
erred in holding that ABY failed to satisfy the traceability requirement
of Article III standing as to its tortious interference claim because it
adequately pleaded that the Town Defendants’ conduct caused its
contractual injuries. We agree with ABY and, therefore, we
REVERSE the judgement of the district court and REMAND for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND 1
ABY is a religious educational institution that provides secular
and Orthodox Jewish religious instruction to girls in grades pre-K
through 12. In October 2018, ABY entered into a contract with Grace
Church to purchase the property at issue to open an Orthodox Jewish
school. The property included a sanctuary, a nursery, and an
educational wing of approximately fifty classrooms that had been in
1Because the Amended Complaint was dismissed at the pleading stage, on this appeal, we accept its factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Cayuga Nation v. Tanner, 824 F.3d 321, 327 (2d Cir. 2016).
5 use as a school for several decades. App’x at 23. The contract
contemplated a purchase price of $4.3 million and a closing date of
December 31, 2018 that could be extended by agreement.
After executing the contract, ABY sought the necessary
financing. ABY first applied for tax-exempt bonds from the Rockland
Economic Assistance Corporation (“REAC”), which is administered
by the Rockland County Industrial Development Agency (“IDA”).
Since the REAC had previously authorized the issuance of tax-exempt
bonds to ABY for construction at a different location, ABY asked the
REAC to repurpose its prior approval towards the Grace Church
project.
The REAC informally voted to approve the transfer of
approval, pending a public hearing scheduled to take place in mid-
January 2019. Separately, ABY also sought funding in the private
6 market, and, in December 2018, secured a $5 million loan
commitment from Investors Bank.
ABY alleges that its apparently imminent purchase of the
property quickly generated opposition from segments of the local
community. At a November 27, 2018 Town Board Meeting, according
to ABY, Defendant Hoehmann announced that the Town would
“strongly enforce” applicable zoning and building-code regulations
on the property. App’x at 32. In response to conversations about
potential building-code violations, Hoehmann stated that “all of our
building codes will be followed. We will issue search warrants if
necessary.” App’x at 122. At the meeting, ABY further asserts that
Hoehmann characterized Rabbi Aaron Fink, founder and Dean of
ABY, as having stated that ABY planned “to buy, close, move in and
operate” a school at the property. App’x at 285. Hoehmann stated in
response that “[t]his will not occur in the Town of Clarkstown
without all approvals.” Id. Hoehmann also told the audience that
7 “there is definitely an interest in this property for Town usage.” Id. at
32.
After Rabbi Fink disclosed ABY’s REAC funding and shared
that there would be an upcoming hearing on the issue, Hoehmann
allegedly told the audience to research the IDA to obtain more
information and the particulars of the upcoming meeting. Hoehmann
allegedly concluded the public portion of the Board Meeting by
reminding community members to “reach out to the IDA and the
County Legislature.” App’x at 123. In late 2018, members of the
community formed a local chapter of an organization known as
CUPON. CUPON operates in parts of New York and New Jersey and,
ABY alleges, is dedicated to opposing the growth of the Hasidic
community in those areas. Here, ABY alleges that CUPON’s objective
was to block the transaction and keep the school out of the
community.
On December 18, the IDA canceled the public hearing at which
the REAC was scheduled to formally approve the bond funding it had
8 previously approved informally. The IDA’s executive director
explained that holding a hearing before ABY had received
preliminary permits or approvals from the Town would be “putting
the cart before the horse.” App’x at 33-34. Accordingly, on December
26, ABY submitted a building-permit application to the Town’s
Building Department to make certain improvements to the property.
Town officials and CUPON leadership came together at
another meeting on January 10, 2019. In his remarks at this meeting,
Hoehmann allegedly assured the audience that ABY would need a
variance to use the property as a school, even though the Building
Inspector had yet to rule on its building permit application. The
Building Inspector formally denied ABY’s permit application the
following day. The Inspector’s denial letter explained that “the last
required NY State Fire Safety inspection for a school of general
instruction on this property was conducted on December 11, 1990.”
App’x at 221. The letter went on to say that because the property did
not satisfy local code requirements of a minimum frontage on
9 adjacent roads, a zoning variance would be required.
In response to the Building Inspector’s denial, ABY appealed to
the ZBA and argued that the Building Inspector misapplied the
relevant zoning laws. On March 19, the Building Inspector informed
ABY that the ZBA “requires a survey of the property to be submitted
as part of the application before it can be processed” even though,
according to ABY, nothing in the Town Code or ZBA rules required
such a survey, and the requirement served no practical purpose.
App’x at 223. Nevertheless, ABY obliged. Once the survey had been
completed, on May 7, ABY requested a hearing date for its appeal to
the ZBA. However, the ZBA failed to respond to this request, and the
project came to a standstill. Subsequently, Investors Bank revoked its
commitment to provide financing.
Under the contract, ABY was obliged to close on the property
on May 16, 2019. But by then, ABY had lost its financing and failed
to secure the required permits. And the ZBA still had yet to schedule
a hearing on ABY’s appeal. When ABY failed to close, Grace Church
10 notified ABY that it was terminating the contract to sell the property
and “revoking any consent to land use applications relating to the
property.” App’x at 242. Shortly thereafter, ABY formally objected
to Grace Church’s cancellation of the contract and urged the ZBA to
schedule a hearing on its appeal. On July 9, the Town’s counsel wrote
to ABY regarding the status of the appeal:
Please be advised that the Zoning Board of Appeals will not entertain any appeal by Ateres Bais Yaakov Academy of Rockland ("Ateres") with respect to the Grace Baptist Church property located at 20 Demarest Avenue, Nanuet, NY. Grace Baptist Church has specifically advised the Town that the contract for the sale of the property to Ateres has been terminated and Ateres' right to make any application to the Town concerning their property has been revoked.
Under separate cover, the Town will be refunding the fee submitted by Ateres for the appeal.
App’x at 267.
On October 3, the Town announced that it was purchasing the
11 property for itself. 2
ABY then sued the Town of Clarkstown, Supervisor
Hoehmann, and CUPON in district court asserting five claims: (1) a
RLUIPA claim against the Town; (2) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the Town Defendants alleging violations of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments; (3) a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985 against all Defendants; (4) a claim under the New York
Constitution against the Town Defendants for alleged violations of
freedom of worship and assembly; and (5) a claim for tortious
2 In August 2019, ABY filed a state law Article 78 Petition against the Town, the Zoning Board, and the Building Department in the Supreme Court of New York, County of Rockland alleging religious discrimination and violations of the Town’s zoning and permitting laws and seeking to compel the ZBA to either hear its appeal or invalidate the Building Department’s denial of its permit. On December 23, the court dismissed the petition for lack of standing. The court reasoned that “although ABY was initially an ‘immediate party’ to the administrative proceedings [Grace’s] revocation of its consent terminated ABY’s interest in the Property,” and concluded that “the ZBA’s subsequent actions did not cause ABY to lose its access to financing the acquisition of the Property.” App’x at 336.
12 interference with a contract against all Defendants.
The Defendants moved under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to
dismiss the complaint, and the court granted the motion (without
prejudice) on jurisdictional grounds. See Ateres Bais Yaakov Academy
of Rockland v. Town of Clarkstown, No. 20-cv-1399, 2022 WL 2702447, at
*16 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2022). First, the court held that ABY’s religious
discrimination and civil rights claims were not ripe under Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985), and Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Commission, 402 F.3d 342
(2d Cir. 2005), because the Zoning Board of Appeals, the municipal
entity responsible for the administration of the zoning laws, never
issued a final decision on the merits of ABY’s application. The court
reasoned that Grace’s termination of the contract and revocation of its
permission for ABY to pursue land-use applications effectively
13 constituted a “voluntary dismissal” of the variance application.
Ateres, 2022 WL 2702447, at *15.
Next, the court held that ABY’s tortious interference injury was
not traceable to the Town Defendants because: (1) ABY could have
prevented its injury by simply putting additional contingencies in its
contract with Grace Church; (2) the Town could not be blamed for the
independent decisions of the Church and potential financiers to
discontinue their dealings with ABY; and (3) only CUPON—not the
Town Defendants—was to blame for ABY’s loss of public bond
financing. Id. at *18-19. The court granted ABY leave to replead its
tortious interference claim against CUPON in state court. This appeal
followed. We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction de novo. Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh, 714
F.3d 682, 687 (2d Cir. 2013).
DISCUSSION
ABY argues that the district court erred because its religious
discrimination and civil rights claims are ripe and because, for Article
14 III standing purposes, the lost-contract injury underpinning its
tortious interference claim is traceable to the Town Defendants. We
agree.
I. Ripeness
Ripeness is basic to Article III justiciability. The doctrine “is
drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from
prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” Nat’l Park
Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003). Our Court
has been clear that the “ripeness requirement prevents a federal court
from entangling itself in abstract disagreements over matters that are
premature for review because the injury is merely speculative and
may never occur.” Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning
Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 2002), abrogated on other grounds by
Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019).
Generally, suits in the land-use context are not ripe until a
landowner receives a final, definitive decision on a land-use
application. Vill. Green at Sayville, LLC v. Town of Islip, 43 F.4th 287,
15 290 (2d Cir. 2022); see Sunrise Detox V, LLC v. City of White Plains, 769
F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2014). As long as “avenues still remain for the
government to clarify or change its decision,” it is not final and
therefore not ripe for judicial review. Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco, California, 141 S. Ct. 2226, 2231 (2021). But once the
government is committed to a position, the landscape changes.
“Potential ambiguities evaporate and the dispute is ripe for judicial
resolution.” Id. at 2230.
In dismissing ABY’s religious discrimination and civil rights
claims as unripe, the district court concluded that ABY had not
suffered an “‘actual, concrete injury’ because the ZBA never issued a
final decision on ABY’s appeal and variance application” prior to
Grace terminating its contract with ABY. Ateres, 2022 WL 2702447, at
*14 (quoting Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 193). On this basis, the court
concluded that the “ZBA’s non-final decision here does not give rise
to an injury that is sufficiently concrete and particularized to satisfy
Article III” because Grace Church’s termination “ceased ABY’s
16 contract vendee status, through which ABY was entitled to submit
applications for building permits and variances.” Id. at *14-15
(quotations omitted).
No one doubts that the power of local governments to zone and
control land use is broad and its proper exercise is “an essential aspect
of achieving a satisfactory quality of life.” Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981). In this vein, a number of courts have
noted that “despite the temptation it is not the province of a federal
court to act as a super-zoning board.” Schenck v. City of Hudson, 114
F.3d 590, 594 (6th Cir. 1997); see Burns v. City of Des Peres, 534 F.2d 103,
108 (8th Cir. 1976); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d
956, 960 (1st Cir. 1972).
At the same time, however, federal courts have an obligation to
adjudicate cases that invoke our jurisdiction, and we do not close our
doors to litigants properly seeking federal review simply because
their grievances touch on local zoning matters.
17 In striking this balance, we consider “whether we would
benefit from deferring initial review until the claims we are called on
to consider have arisen in a more concrete and final form.” Murphy,
402 F.3d at 347. So long as a plaintiff has submitted a meaningful
application to municipal agencies to address its land-use controversy,
and the municipal entity responsible for the relevant zoning laws has
had an opportunity to commit to a position “that by all accounts, it
intends to be final,” the parties’ dispute is sufficiently final for
ripeness purposes. Vill. Green at Sayville, 43 F.4th at 297-98 (quoting
Sunrise Detox, 769 F.3d at 124); Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186. It is
important to bear in mind that “the finality requirement is relatively
modest,” and “nothing more than de facto finality is necessary.”
Pakdel, 141 S. Ct. at 2230.
Considering these factors, we conclude that, in declining
review of ABY’s application, the ZBA—representing the Town—
reached a decision that was sufficiently final for ripeness purposes.
18 Here, ABY plausibly alleges that it submitted a meaningful
application for a variance to the ZBA after its Building Permit
Application was denied on January 11, 2019. App’x at 34, 38, 47. ABY
also plausibly alleges that the ZBA issued a final decision by choosing
not to adjudicate ABY’s appeal of this denial. Following that denial,
the ZBA declined to respond to at least five letters urging it to
schedule a hearing. App’x at 49, 53, 55; see Appellees’ Br. at 16.
Further, ABY formally objected to Grace Church’s withdrawal from
the sales contract, contending to the ZBA “that the Town’s
interference was the direct cause of ABY losing its financing
resources.” App’x at 53. Finally, on July 9, 2019, Town counsel wrote
to ABY that the ZBA “will not entertain any appeal by [ABY] with
respect to the [property].” Id. at 55.
This letter made the ZBA’s position pellucid: it had reached a
decision to dismiss ABY’s appeal without revisiting the Building
Inspector’s decision, and it intended the decision to be final. At this
point, there was nothing more ABY could have done. Once Grace
19 Church terminated the contract and the Town stepped in and
purchased the property, ABY had no further avenues of review. At
that point, it was no longer possible that its claims could take on “a
more concrete and final form.” Murphy, 402 F.3d at 347. Because
these events amount at a minimum to de facto finality, which is all that
is required, we conclude that the district court improperly dismissed
ABY’s religious discrimination and civil rights claims.
II. Lost-Contract Injury Traceability
Next, ABY contends that there is Article III jurisdiction to
adjudicate its tortious interference claim against the Town
Defendants and CUPON because the Amended Complaint plausibly
alleged a causal connection between their conduct and the loss of the
Grace Church contract.
The district court disagreed. It concluded that because the loss
of the contract was not traceable to the Town Defendants, ABY lacked
standing to bring its tortious interference claim against them. But it
did grant leave for ABY to replead its tortious interference claim
20 against CUPON in state court. The court reasoned that under the
contract, ABY had agreed to pay Grace Church the full purchase price
in a single payment on the closing date, “regardless of whether ABY
needed financing to do so, or whether ABY would be unable to
operate the property for its intended purpose pending approval by
the Town.” Ateres, 2022 WL 2702447, at *18. Accordingly, the court
concluded that ABY’s injuries were of its own making and that it
failed to allege “how the Town Defendants’ conduct had a
determinative or coercive effect on these third parties.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). But this reasoning sounds in proximate
cause, which is the wrong standard, and, consequently, overstates the
showing that is required.
ABY alleges that through their oversight and participation in
the zoning process, the Town and Hoehmann worked together with
CUPON to prevent ABY from performing under its contract with
Grace Church by obstructing ABY’s attempts to secure financing,
denying its permit application, and refusing to consider its Zoning
21 Board appeal. ABY asserts that the Town Defendants signaled their
opposition to its acquisition of the property, encouraged residents to
voice their complaints, worked with CUPON to block the purchase,
and denied ABY’s initial permit application in an attempt to delay it.
These steps, ABY alleges, prevented it from fulfilling its contractual
obligations with Grace Church, who subsequently terminated the
contract. ABY goes on to allege that the tort injuries it suffered—
financial and dignitary—are directly traceable to the Town
Defendants’ conduct.
To satisfy Article III’s standing requirements,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (quoting Simon
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)). Standing requires
more than “mere speculation about the decisions of third parties” and
must rely instead “on the predictable effect of Government action on
22 the decisions of third parties.” Dep't of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct.
2551, 2566 (2019).
We have been clear that the causal-connection element of
Article III standing, which is the requirement that the plaintiff’s injury
be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not
the result of the independent action of some third party not before the
court, does not create an onerous standard. Carter v. HealthPort Techs.,
LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 55-56 (2d Cir. 2016) (“A defendant’s conduct that
injures a plaintiff but does so only indirectly, after intervening
conduct by another person, may suffice for Article III standing.”). It
requires no more than de facto causality, a standard that is, of course,
lower than for proximate causation. Dep't of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2566;
see also Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 92 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[F]or
purposes of satisfying Article III’s causation requirement, we are
concerned with something less than the concept of proximate cause.”
(citation omitted)). ABY passes this test. It plausibly alleges that the
Town Defendants took steps to frustrate its planned acquisition of the
23 Grace Church property—steps that predictably prevented ABY from
securing the regulatory approvals necessary to acquire the property,
cut off ABY’s access to public and private financing, and led to Grace
Church’s termination of the contract.
We conclude that these contentions plausibly allege that the
Town Defendants’ actions had a “predictable effect” on the decisions
of relevant third parties—namely, Grace Church, the REAC, and the
private financier, Investors Bank. Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2566. We
therefore conclude that the Amended Complaint plausibly alleged a
causal connection between the Town Defendants’ actions and injuries
that resulted from ABY’s lost contract. The district court therefore
had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate ABY’s tortious
interference claims against all Defendants on the merits.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the
district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.