United Insurance Co. of New-York v. Robinson

2 Cai. Cas. 280
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 15, 1805
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 2 Cai. Cas. 280 (United Insurance Co. of New-York v. Robinson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United Insurance Co. of New-York v. Robinson, 2 Cai. Cas. 280 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1805).

Opinion

Per curiam delivered by

Kent C. J.

This is a clear cafe for the plaintiffs. Their claim is founded on found principles, in the law of infurance. The defendants abandon, and the plaintiffs accept and pay. They were then fubftituted for the defendants, and fucceeded to the benefit of the acts of the agent abroad, in relation to the property in queftion. The mailer and merchants at Malaga, adted, nominally, as agents for the defendants, but, in reality, they were agents for the party having the ultimate claim to the property. What they did was, undoubtedly, founded on previous instructions from the defendants, and on the connexion that the defendants had with the property, as former proprietors, and exifting claimants. When the defendants abandoned the ihip and cargo, and received their indemnity from the plaintiffs, they renounced all concern in the interference of their agents, and transferred, to the infurer, the. refult of that interference. This is fettled doitrine in refpeft to abandonment. The prefent cafe is analogous to that of capture and fubfequent ranfom, where, upon an accepted abandonment, the whole benefit of the compofition, and the effects reclaimed, go to the infurer.

There is no ground for confidering the purchafe, by the. houfe of Grevigne, Sc Co. as made for the defendants, in '¡the character of ftrangers to the property. It was made for the. defendants as having an intereft in it, and with intent to mitigate the lofs. The law of abandonment, applies to fuch a cafe with the greateft juftice and good policy, in making the previous inftru&ions, and all acts of the agent, enure to the in-furer. To give to the infured a full indemnity on his policy, and aifo the advantages of thefe efforts of the agents to repair the lofs, would be doubly injurious to the infurer. It would deprive him of the benefits of his fubftitution, tend to ilacken the exertions of agents to recover the property, and invite them to refort to fraudulent fpeculations upon the lofs. It cannot be admitted, that the condemnation at Malaga, put an end to the intereft of the infured, fo as to rentier a purchafe, by him, thereafter, equivalent to a purchafe by a ftranger. In the cafe of MPMafiers v. Shoolbred, 1 Efp. Rep. 237, the veffel was condemned by the French coniul, fold by him as a prize, and the captain purchafed her at fuch fale, on account of the owners. But it was confidered as fo much property [284]*284recovered by the allured, and it was likened, by Lord Kenyan,. to the cafe of ranfoms. The condemnation, and change thereby 0f the legal title, was not coniidered as any impediment to the dodtrine, that the affured by a recovery, in that mode, had fuftained only an average lofs. That cafe differs from this in one particular, only ; that here was an abandonment and payment of a total lofs. It was admitted, in the cafe I have cited, that if the infured, upon the capture, had abandoned, he might have recovered a total lofs. But then, upon .the very principles of abandonment, (and which that cafe did not mean to queftion) the property ib recovered, to ufe Lord Kenyon’s expreffion, muft have enured to the benefit of the in-furer. It is a principle perfedtly well fettled, that abandonment has a retrofpedlive effedt, fo as to make the infurer to be regarded as the proprietor ab initio. The infurer is put in the place of the infured, and the latter is coniidered, as if he had not exijled, according to the language of fome of the books. Putting out of view, as the cafe in Efpinajfe certainly does, any material operation from the fadl of condemnation, I cannot fee any difficulty in the queftion. Suppofe there had not been a condemnation, but the infured had, by their agent, purchafed, or recovered the property, immediately upon the capture, and before this technical change of title by condemnation, I apprehend there would, in that cafe, be no queftion, but that the affured, when he abandons, parts alfo with the benefit of his repurchafe. The confequences would, otherwife, .be moft unjuft towards the infurer, and the. infured would turn his contradi, from one of indemnity into one of gain. If the condemnation in this cafe, creates no difficulty, no other exifts. .The infurer was not bound, unlefs he pleafed, to accept of the purchafe at Malaga -, nor was the infured. The agent pur-chafed at- his peril. There can be no rifle, therefore, that this dodtrine will involve infurers in hazardous mercantile concerns. They have nothing to do with them, but at their eledtion. - After an accepted abandonment, they can, if they • pleafe, accept of the repurchafe by the agent, and affirm his acts-, or they may leave them to fall upon the agent. The French ordinance of marine, has made provifion for this very cafe of a repurchafe after capture, and it ordains that the infu-rers may take the compofition for their own benefit, or they inay, at their eledtion, refufe to have any thing to do with the repurchafe, and content themfelves with paying a total lofs. So alfo, on the other hand, the affured may refufe to ratify [285]*285the repurchafe, and for this reafon, fays Valin, it behoves the agent to aft with great circumfpection and prudence. Grd. Art. 66 & 67. 2 Val. 159, 160. See alfo 1 Emer. 464. & §21. I agree that the infurer is always bound to decide promptly, whether or no, he claims the benefits of the re-purchafe, but as that point is not drawn in queftion in the prefent cafe, I intend that no objeftion exifts on that ground. The repurchafes, authorized by the French law, are as applicable to cafes where the veffel has been condemned, as where ihe has not. For by the law of nations, asun-derftood when thefe ordinances were eftabliíhed, a capture and carrying into port, or infra prafidia, fo as to take away from the captured the hope of recovery, as effeftually changed the property, as a fentencc of condemnation will do at this day.

In the cafe of Gofs v. Withers, 2 Burr. 694, the doctrine of capture underwent a very learned inveftiga'tion, and Lord Mansfield, in giving the opinion of the court, obferved that if after condemnation the owner recovers, or takes his captured ihip, the infurer can be in no other condition, than if ihe had been recovered or retaken before condemnation. The reafon is plain from the nature of the contract. The iniurer runs the riik of the infured, and undertakes to indemnify. He muft, therefore, bear the lofs aftually fuftain-ed, and can be liable to no more. So that, if after condemnation, the owner recovers the ihip in her complete condition, but has paid falvage, or been at any expenfe in getting her back, the insurer muft bear the lofs fo aftually fuf-tained. He obferves in another place, that no capture by an enemy, though condemned, can be fo total a lofs, as to leave no poffibility of recovery, page 696.

I agree that after a condemnation the property is changed, fo that a complete title can be transferred from the captor to a third perfon. But this rule does not apply between infurer and injured, fo as to authorize the infured to be that pur-chafer, at the very time of the lofs, and with the exprefs view of indemnifying himfelf againft a part of it. If he does, and ftill claims a total lofs from the infurer, he muft tender to him the benefit of that purchafe. This rule is founded on the cleared: juftice and is efiential to prevent fraud. As long as the property remains in the hands of the captor, although a condemnation has taken place, there is ftill the pofi-Ability of a recovery.

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Bluebook (online)
2 Cai. Cas. 280, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-insurance-co-of-new-york-v-robinson-nysupct-1805.