UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ______________________________ ) INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED ) GOVERNMENT SECURITY OFFICERS ) OF AMERICA, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. ) 02-1484 (GK) JOHN CLARK, in his official ) capacity as Director of the ) United States Marshals ) Service, et al., ) ) Defendant. ) ______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs in this case are five individual Court Security
Officers (“CSOs”) who were medically disqualified and terminated.1
They allege that the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”)
violated their constitutional rights in causing their terminations.
Defendant is John Clark, in his official capacity as Director of
1 This case originally involved two sets of plaintiffs. The first set, the plaintiffs in Int’l Union, United Gov’t Sec. Officers of Am. v. Clark, No. 02-1484, (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2002) [Dkt. No. 2] were International Union, United Government Security Officers of America (“the Union”) and 65 CSOs who filed the original complaint. The second set, the plaintiffs in Byron Neal v. Benigno G. Reyna, No. 05-0007 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2005) [Neal Dkt. No. 3] (“Neal plaintiffs”), were six CSOs who filed a separate complaint. Neal was later consolidated with Int’l Union. For reasons explained below, only five plaintiffs now remain: James Dolnack, Herman Edwards, Gary Erickson, Wayne Mize, and Byron Neal. These are the “Plaintiffs” referred to hereafter. the USMS.2 This matter is now before the Court on the remaining
parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment [Dkt. Nos. 349 & 358].
Upon consideration of the Motions, Oppositions, Replies, and
the entire record herein, and for the reasons set forth below,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Due Process
Claims is granted and Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background3
This case has a long and complex factual background, which is
set out in full in the Court’s 2010 decision in Int’l Union, United
Gov’t Sec. Officers of Am. v. Clark (“Int’l Union”), 706 F. Supp.
2d 59 (D.D.C. 2010). The following is a brief summary of the facts
directly relevant to the due process claim of the five remaining
Plaintiffs now before the Court.
To “provide for the security of” federal courthouses, 28
U.S.C. § 556(A), the USMS contracts with private security
companies. Int’l Union, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 61. The private
2 This case originally involved three defendants. In addition to John Clark, in his official capacity as Director of the USMS, Defendants were Akal Security, Inc. (“Akal”) and MVM, Inc. (“MVM”) [Dkt. Nos. 59 & 60]. All claims against Defendants Akal and MVM have either been dismissed, denied on summary judgment, or settled. 3 Unless otherwise noted, the facts set forth herein are drawn from the parties’ Statements of Undisputed Material Facts [Dkt. Nos. 358 & 361].
-2- security companies then enter into collective bargaining agreements
(“CBAs”) with the Union which the CSOs are members of. The CBAs
include language governing the conditions for suspension and
termination, among other subjects. Notably, the CBAs contain
provisions prohibiting, except in specified circumstances, the
suspension or dismissal of an employee without just cause (“just-
cause provision”).4 See id.
The CBAs also require CSOs to have a physical examination
during the initial clearance for employment, conducted by the
private security company’s doctors who are approved by the United
States Public Health Service’s (“USPHS”) Office of Federal Law
Enforcement Medical Program. USPHS doctors review the medical
records and either certify the CSO as medically qualified for duty
or request more information. If more information is requested, a
CSO is given 30 days to respond to the prescribed list of
4 A suspension or termination for just cause has been defined as “one which is not for any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason and which is one based on facts (1) supported by substantial evidence and (2) reasonably believed by the employer to be true.” Podish v. UNC Lear Siegler, 161 F.3d 13 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Spano v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Civil Action No. 2:09-cv-04055 (DMC)(JAD), 2011 WL 6934837, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 2011) (“A discharge for just cause is defined as one that is based on facts that are (1) supported by substantial evidence and (2) are reasonably believed by the employer to be true and also (3) is not for any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason.” (internal quotation omitted)); Autohaus, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., No. CIV. A. 92-10403-MA, 1993 WL 1503945, at *8 (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 1993) (“The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has noted that a [d]ischarge for “just cause” is to be contrasted with a discharge on unreasonable grounds or arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith.” (internal quotation omitted)).
-3- additional medical examinations or medical information on the USPHS
doctors’ review form. If USPHS doctors determine that a CSO is not
medically qualified for duty after the CSO has had an opportunity
to respond, the USMS sends a medical disqualification letter to the
private security company requesting that the CSO be removed from
the private security company’s contract with the USMS and that an
application for a replacement be submitted within 14 days.
In 1997, the Judicial Conference of the United States
(“Judicial Conference”) expressed concern that CSOs were not
physically capable of responding to security threats. Int’l Union,
706 F. Supp. 2d at 62. In 1998, the Judicial Conference began to
inquire into the medical standards used to evaluate CSOs. In 1999,
the Judicial Conference ordered the USPHS to conduct a job function
analysis of CSOs. In 2000, the USPHS presented new medical
standards to the Judicial Conference which it adopted. In 2002,
the USMS modified its contracts with the private security companies
and required full compliance by all CSOs with the new medical
standards and related procedures.
Under the new procedures, the private security companies must
submit annual medical certificates for CSOs. As with the initial
medical determination, if USPHS doctors determine during the annual
medical review that a CSO is not medically qualified for duty, and
after the CSO has had an opportunity to respond, the USMS sends a
medical disqualification letter to the private security company
-4- requesting that the CSO be removed from the private security
company’s contract with the USMS and that an application for a
replacement be submitted within 14 days.
The five remaining Plaintiffs now before the Court were all
medically disqualified and terminated under these annual medical
review procedures.
B. Procedural Background
On September 9, 2002, the Int’l Union plaintiffs filed their
Amended Complaint alleging that their medical disqualifications and
terminations violated the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause, as
well as certain statutes. Int’l Union, United Gov't Sec. Officers
of Am. v. Clark, No. 02-1484, (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2002) [Dkt. No. 2].
On December 2, 2002, Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss the
Int’l Union plaintiffs’ due process claim [Dkt. No. 7]. On August,
28, 2003, the Court denied Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Int’l
Union plaintiffs’ due process claim, finding that the Int’l
Union plaintiffs had stated a valid due process claim based on the
just-cause clauses in the CBAs [Dkt. Nos. 24 & 25].
On January 4, 2005, Plaintiffs James Dolnack, Herman Edwards,
Gary Erickson, Calvert Harvey, Wayne Mize, and Byron Neal filed
their Amended Complaint alleging that their medical
disqualifications and terminations violated the Fifth Amendment’s
due process clause, as well as certain statutes. Byron Neal v.
-5- Benigno G. Reyna (“Neal”), No. 05-0007 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2005) [Neal
Dkt. No. 3].
On October 12, 2006, Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ due process claim in the Amended Complaint [Neal Dkt.
No. 21]. On April 10, 2010, the Court denied Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs’ due process claim. Int’l Union, United Gov't
Sec. Officers of Am. v. Clark, 704 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60-63 (D.D.C.
2010).
On February 6, 2007, Plaintiffs’ case was consolidated with
the Int’l Union case [Neal Dkt. No. 23; Dkt. No. 205].
On January 10, 2008, Defendant filed his Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Int’l Union plaintiffs’ due process claim [Dkt. No.
263]. On February 19, 2008, the Int’l Union plaintiffs filed their
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. Nos. 268 & 270]. Briefing
was completed on March 28, 2008 [Dkt. Nos. 272-274]. On April 15,
2010, the Court granted Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
the Int’l Union plaintiffs’ due process claim [Dkt. No. 291]. The
Court held that, while the Int’l Union plaintiffs had a property
interest in their continued employment, they received due process
before being medically disqualified and terminated. Int’l Union,
706 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
On September 29, 2011, Defendant filed the Motion for Summary
Judgment now before the Court on Plaintiffs’ due process claim
[Dkt. No. 349]. Plaintiffs filed their Cross-Motion for Summary
-6- Judgment on October 24, 2011 [Dkt. No. 357]. Defendant filed his
Reply on November 8, 2011 [Dkt. No. 361].
In a Joint Status Report submitted on June 4, 2012, Plaintiffs
and Defendant stated that they had executed agreements settling all
other claims. The sole claim remaining is the due process claim
brought by Plaintiffs James Dolnack, Herman Edwards, Gary Erickson,
Wayne Mize, and Byron Neal against Defendant.5
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate “when the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
An issue is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d 329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)). A fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of
the action under the governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that “at the summary judgment
stage, the judge’s function is not . . . to weigh the evidence and
5 On December 21, 2011, Plaintiff Calvert Harvey voluntarily dismissed all claims against Defendant [Dkt. No. 365].
-7- determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there
is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs do not have a property
interest in their continued employment that entitles them to due
process with regard to medical disqualification and termination.
Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of His Mot. for Summ. J. on the Due Process
Claims (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 4 [Dkt. No. 349]. Defendant argues that,
regardless of the terms in the CBAs, the CBAs do not and cannot
impose due process obligations on the USMS. Id.
In the alternative, Defendant maintains that even if
Plaintiffs have a property interest in their continued employment,
they were provided with the process that was due. Def.’s Mot. at
4. Defendant relies heavily on the fact that the Court granted
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the Int’l Union
plaintiffs’ due process claim. Id. at 1. The Court held that the
process that the Int’l Union plaintiffs received when they were
medically disqualified and terminated was constitutionally
sufficient. Id. Defendant argues that the Int’l Union plaintiffs
and Plaintiffs now before the Court received the same process, and
therefore, the Court’s earlier ruling must be followed. Id.
A. Plaintiffs’ Initial Concessions
Plaintiffs concede that “it is undisputed that the facts,
circumstances, and issues presented by these Plaintiffs’ due
-8- process claims are identical to those presented by the [Int’l Union
plaintiffs] and Plaintiffs understand that the Court will most
likely rule on these Motions in the same manner as it did for the
previous dispositive motions.” Pls.’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for
Summ. J. and Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 1-2 [Dkt. No. 357].6
B. Law of the Case Doctrine Does Not Compel the Conclusion that Plaintiffs Have a Property Interest in Their Continued Employment
Plaintiffs maintain that the Court’s 2003 decision denying
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Int’l Union plaintiffs’ claims
resolves the issue of whether Plaintiffs have a property interest
in their continued employment. Pls.’ Mem. in Supp. of Their Opp’n
to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pls.’
Cross-Mot.”) at 10-13. Plaintiffs argue that the Court should
“deny Defendant’s Motion [for Summary Judgment] and reaffirm it
[sic] decision that the individual CSOs represented by Plaintiff
UGSOA have a property interest in their employment.” Id. at 13.
However, the Court has previously considered and rejected this
argument. Int’l Union, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 64-65. The Supreme
Court has held that denial of a motion to dismiss is an
6 Plaintiffs request that the Court “review and perhaps reconsider its prior ruling” on the issue of whether Plaintiffs received due process. Pls.’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. at 2 [Dkt. No. 357]. No Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Reconsideration under the applicable Rules of Civil Procedure or attempted to make the showing that such a motion requires. Therefore, the Court will not grant the request to “perhaps reconsider.”
-9- interlocutory order. See Office of Senator Mark Dayton v. Hanson,
550 U.S. 511, 515 (2007); EAW Group, Inc. v. Republic of Gambia,
No. 02-2425, 2007 WL 1297180, at *2 (D.D.C. May 1, 2007). Our
Court of Appeals has stated that “[i]nterlocutory orders are not
subject to law of the case doctrine and may always be reconsidered
prior to final judgment.” Langevine v. Dist. of Columbia, 106 F.3d
1018, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Safir v. Dole, 718 F.2d 475,
481 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that the law of the case doctrine
is discretionary).
Furthermore, Plaintiffs themselves note that Defendant
introduced 26 CBAs, the contracts under which Plaintiffs were
employed by the private security companies, after the Court’s 2003
decision. Pls.’ Cross-Mot. at 11. The Court’s 2003 decision
discussed only the just-cause clauses in the CBAs. It did not
discuss the sections of the CBAs introduced as evidence after the
Court’s 2003 decision. As previously explained, “Defendant
presented additional facts that could have a substantial impact on
the question of whether a property interest exists.” Int’l Union,
706 F. Supp. 2d at 65.
In sum, application of the law of the case doctrine is
discretionary, and cannot be invoked to limit the Court’s ability
to reconsider interlocutory orders when new evidence is introduced
after a motion to dismiss has been decided. Thus, the Court’s 2003
decision does not foreclose Defendant from raising his due process
-10- defense again on a motion for summary judgment. See 10A Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2713 (3d ed. 1998) (“[t]he ruling on a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief is addressed solely
to the sufficiency of the complaint and does not prevent summary
judgment from subsequently being granted based on material outside
the complaint”).
C. Plaintiffs Have a Property Interest in Their Continued Employment
The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he right to hold specific
private employment and to follow a chosen profession free from
unreasonable governmental interference comes within the ‘liberty’
and ‘property’ concepts of the Fifth Amendment.” Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959).
Under the Fifth Amendment, the federal Government must not
deprive individuals of property “without due process of law.” U.S.
Const. Amend V. In determining whether Plaintiffs’ due process has
been violated, the Court must of course first establish whether
Plaintiffs have been deprived of a property interest. Bd. of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
The Supreme Court has held that property interests are not
created by the Constitution. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. “[R]ather
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
-11- state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and
that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.” Id.
Plaintiffs maintain that they have a property interest in
their continued employment because the CBAs limit the private
security company’s right to terminate them except for just cause.
Pls.’ Cross-Mot. at 14-15. Plaintiffs also argue that the fact
that the CBAs contain exceptions to the just-cause clauses in the
CBAs does not diminish their property interest in their continued
employment. Id. at 15.
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs do not have a property
interest in their continued employment because, with a few
exceptions, the CBAs were drawn so Plaintiffs were virtually
at-will employees. Def.’s Reply in Supp. of His Mot. for Summ. J.
on the Due Process Claims and Opp’n to Pls.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ.
J. (“Def.’s Reply”) at 2. Defendant also argues that Plaintiffs do
not have a property interest in their medical clearances. Id. at
2-3.
Our Court of Appeals has held that “[t]o determine whether
[one] ha[s] a property interest in continued employment, we ask if
he [or she] ha[s] a legitimate expectation, based on rules (statute
or regulations) or understandings (contracts, expressed or
implied), that he would continue in his job.” Hall v. Ford, 856
F.2d 255, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In examining the issue of whether
the CBAs create a property interest, the Court must be guided by
-12- the language of the contracts. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, Local
2924 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 470 F.3d 375, 381 (D.C. Cir.
2006); see also N.L.R.B. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 8 F.3d 832, 836
(D.C. Cir. 1993); Vanover v. Hantman, 77 F. Supp. 2d 91, 102
(D.D.C. 1999) (“Of course, the language involved must be sufficient
to create an ‘objectively reasonable’ expectation that an employee
will be terminated only for certain causes.”).
Once again, the Court has previously considered and rejected
this argument. Int’l Union, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 65-68. The Court
previously held that the Int'l Union plaintiffs had an “objectively
reasonable” expectation that they would maintain their employment
even though there were substantial limits on their expectation
“that [they] would continue in [their] job.” Id. at 66-67 (quoting
Hall, 856 F.2d at 265). Despite these limitations, the Court
concluded that these limits on their job protection (i.e., failure
to satisfy medical standards) does not and cannot mean that
Plaintiffs are deprived of all property interest in their
employment. Id. at 66. Such a conclusion would eviscerate the
significance of including the just-cause clauses in the CBAs, and
for all practical purposes, would render the clauses a nullity.
Smith v. Kerrville Bus Co., Inc., 709 F.2d 914, 919 (5th Cir. 1983)
(“To hold as a matter of law that management could, at its sole
discretion, terminate an employee without cause would in effect
-13- allow it the unqualified power to avoid contractually mandated
rights and benefits.”).
Fundamental principles of labor law support the Court’s
conclusion. The Ninth Circuit has held that it is “difficult to
imagine a meeting of the minds between an employer and a union
authorizing an employer to discharge an employee without good
cause. Employer security goes to the very essence of a collective
bargaining agreement.” Dickeson v. DAW Forest Products Co., 827
F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1987).
Furthermore, the tradition of just-cause clauses in CBAs is so
long-standing that courts have approved finding implied just-cause
clauses in CBAs even where no explicit provision exists. See SFIC
Properties, Inc. v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
Dist. Lodge 94, Local Lodge 311, 103 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 1996);
Smith, 709 F.2d at 919 (“Mindful that we are bound to exercise a
reasoned flexibility in construing the terms of a labor contract
. . . we are loath to conclude, as a matter of law and undisputed
fact, that no just-cause limitation inheres in the . . . collective
bargaining agreement.”); Young v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 309 F. Supp.
475, 478 (E.D. Ark. 1969), aff'd 424 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1970).
D. Plaintiffs Received Due Process Before Being Medically Disqualified
Having found that Plaintiffs have a property interest in their
continued employment, the Court now addresses the issue of whether
-14- Plaintiffs received due process when they were medically
disqualified and terminated.
“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural
protections as the particular situation demands.” Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). “The essential requirements of
due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to respond.”
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
Courts consider three factors in determining whether due
process has been afforded: “[f]irst, the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and [third], the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Plaintiffs maintain that the procedures that Defendant
followed did not provide them with sufficient notice of their
medical disqualifications or with sufficient opportunity to
respond. Pls.’ Cross-Mot. at 38-40. Plaintiffs argue that the
USPHS’s doctor’s response form did not provide notice that
Plaintiffs were charged with being medically unfit or the bases on
which Plaintiffs might be medically unfit. Id. at 38-39.
Plaintiffs also argue that they were not allowed to create their
-15- own responses or to have direct contact with the USPHS doctors.
Id. at 39. They could only submit a prescribed list of medical
information from their personal doctors or the private security
company’s doctors. Id.
Defendant relies heavily on the fact that the Court granted
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Int’l Union
plaintiffs’ due process claim, and that Plaintiffs now before the
Court received the same process as the Int’l Union plaintiffs.
Def.’s Mot. at 1.
The Court previously held that the additional steps proposed
by Plaintiffs are simply not required under the Fifth Amendment’s
due process clause. Int’l Union, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 70. Adequate
process can be provided based on written medical records. Mathews,
424 U.S. at 344; Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (finding that an
individual should have the “opportunity to present reasons . . .
either in person or in writing”). There is no evidence that having
the Int’l Union plaintiffs’ objections lodged via written medical
reports or communicating through their doctors denied them “a
meaningful opportunity to present their case.” Mathews, 424 U.S.
at 349.
Plaintiffs also maintain that their private interest in
employment is substantial and that the risk of erroneous
deprivation is serious. Pls.’ Cross-Mot. at 40-47. They agree
with Defendant that the Government’s interest in providing adequate
-16- security for federal courthouses is legitimate. Id. at 47.
However, Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has not demonstrated that
the Government’s interest should outweigh the private interest or
the risk of erroneous deprivation. Id. at 47-48.
this argument. Int’l Union, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 68-71. The Court
previously held that, in balancing the private and public
interests, the parties both have significant interests at stake.
Id. at 69. Plaintiffs face the loss of their continued employment
while the Government must protect federal courthouses. Id. at 69-
70. In balancing the risk of erroneous deprivation with the
improved medical screening that additional procedures might
provide, the balance tilts in favor of Defendant. Id. at 70.
The Supreme Court has held that the review of written medical
records provided by doctors who have personally examined the
patient is a reliable method of review. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at
344. In this case, Plaintiffs are given a chance to avoid medical
disqualification by using the USPHS’s doctor’s response form.
Either Plaintiffs’ personal doctors or the private security
company’s doctors have a chance to personally examine Plaintiffs
and to respond to the prescribed list of medical information
requested by the USPHS doctors. Nor is there language limiting or
prohibiting what additional medical information may be included.
Int’l Union, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 63; see also Judicial Security
-17- Division, Medical Review Form, Felipe Jorge-Rodriguez (Oct. 9,
2001; Aug. 14, 2002) (Ex. 18 to Pls.’ Cross-Mot.).
The Court’s 2010 decision relied on a Third Circuit case that
reached the same conclusion on similar facts. Int’l Union, 706 F.
Supp. 2d at 70. In Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 178-79 (3d
Cir. 2007), the court held that while the CSOs’ opportunity to
respond might not constitute a “traditional hearing, the process
afforded the [CSOs] is sufficient given the balance of their
interest in maintaining employment and the [G]overnment’s interest
in security.” Again, the reasoning in that decision is just as
compelling now as it was in 2010.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that the lack of post-deprivation
process “render[s] their minimal pre-deprivation process
constitutionally-infirm.” Pls.’ Cross-Mot. at 48. However, the
Supreme Court has held that “due process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481. There is also no firm rule that
termination procedures must be furnished at a specific time in
order to be deemed constitutionally sufficient. See Adkins v.
Rumsfeld, No. 1:04CV494, 2005 WL 2593450, at *5 (E.D. Va. Oct. 13,
2005), aff’d 464 F.3d 456 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied 551 U.S.
1130 (2007). Indeed, our Court of Appeals has approved the
provision of only post-termination process where pre-deprivation
process would have been overly burdensome. Washington Teachers’
-18- Union Local #6, Am. Fed. of Teachers, AFL-CIO v. Bd. of Educ. of
the Dist. of Columbia, 109 F.3d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding
that where post-termination relief was available, “due process did
not require pre-termination proceedings before [a] 1996
[reduction-in-force]”). As discussed above, this Court has already
determined that the pre-termination process that Plaintiffs
received is constitutionally sufficient.
In sum, while the terms of the CBAs did create a property
interest in Plaintiffs’ continued employment, Plaintiffs received
their appropriate and sufficient due process before being medically
disqualified. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment due process
claim must be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on Plaintiffs’ Due Process Claim is granted and
Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. An order
shall issue with this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ July 19, 2012 Gladys Kessler U.S. District Judge
Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF
-19-