United Fuel & Supply Co. v. Interlake S. S. Co.

272 F. 633, 1921 U.S. App. LEXIS 1661
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedMay 4, 1921
DocketNo. 3469
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 272 F. 633 (United Fuel & Supply Co. v. Interlake S. S. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United Fuel & Supply Co. v. Interlake S. S. Co., 272 F. 633, 1921 U.S. App. LEXIS 1661 (6th Cir. 1921).

Opinion

.KNAPPEN, Circuit Judge.

Appeal from a decree in admiralty dismissing libel for damage by collision. Shortly before midnight of July 29, 1917 (central standard time), the tug Annie L. Smith, having in tow the scow Chinook, collided with the steamer Perseus in the St. Clair Flats. Both tug and scow were sunk. Their owner filed this libel. The District Court) on final hearing found the Perseus free from fault and dismissed the libel. The Perseus was a steel freighter, 480 feet keel, was down-bound, loaded with iron ore, drawing about 20 feet, and was making about 9 miles an hour. The tug was upbound, was 65 feet in length, and making 4% miles an hour. The scow was 130 feet long and was without cargo, being towed by a 25-foot line.

The Perseus came down the west, or down-bound, channel of the St. Clair Flats Canal, and somewhere between the lower end of the canal proper and the lower entrance of the canal, which is about 1% miles lower down, was sighted by the tug Smith (which was then at least three-fourths of a mile below the Perseus); the tug thereupon giving a one-blast, or port to port, passing signal. Soon afterward, when the Perseus was still several hundred (apparently 500 to 1,000) feet above the tug, the latter blew an alarm, followed by a two-blast, or starboard to starboard, passing signal, hard-starboarded her helm, and made a sharp sheer to port and directly across the bows of the down-coming steamer, which struck the scow nearly at right angles on the starboard side, about 50 feet back from its forward end, later colliding with the tug. The collision occurred, according to the weight of the testimony, about half a mile below the lower entrance of the canal. To this extent the facts are either conceded or not seriously disputed.

The real question relates to the cause and asserted justification for this action of the tug, whose navigator asserts that soon after he had blown the one-blast passing signal (at which time the Perseus was admittedly coming down the channel on the regular course, and showing both red and green lights), the Perseus, which, the tug asserts, had made no' reply to the latter’s passing signal, hauled off to its port (easterly) across the channel, entirely shutting out its red light, and having, when the tug blew her alarm and gave the two-blast passing signal, reached a point where the Perseus was on the tug’s starboard, thus putting the tug in extremis. The Perseus, on the contrary, asserts that she promptly accepted the tug’s one-blast passing signal (by blowing the regular one blast), and kept down the regular course on the westerly side of the channel and headed slightly to starboard; that [635]*635when the tug blew the alarm and the two-blast passing signal the latter was well off the Perseus’ port bow; and that on hearing the tug’s signal the Perseus immediately replied with an alarm and one blast, ported her wheel and reversed, doing everything possible to avoid collision, which occurred in the westerly half of the channel. The merits of the case depend upon the credibility of these respective and conflicting claims.

The testimony was all taken in open court. It appeared that the navigation of the tug at and prior to the collision was entirely in the hands of the mate; the master having turned in and no other person being on deck, except the lookout, who could not be located and was not produced as a witness. As the trial court said:

“For all practical purposes there was no lookout kept, and the tug was handled and navigated by the mate without other assistance. He was in charge of all the duties of master, wheelsman, navigator, and watch.”

On the part of libelant, the mate was the only witness having knowledge of the navigation of either the tug or the steamer. The scow, also, was navigated entirely by the tug; her rudder being lashed down, and none of her crew being on deck, except a watchman. On the other hand, the master, wheelsman, and second mate of the Perseus, all of whom were on duty, appeared and testified, the lookout only being absent; counsel’s statement being accepted as evidence that reasonable, diligence had been exercised to ascertain his present whereabouts and to procure his attendance. All of the witnesses for the Perseus impressed the trial judge as “intelligent ánd frank as witnesses and highly competent as seamen.” The testimony of the tug’s mate was, in the court’s opinion, “so far discredited that wherever a conflict exists his testimony must be disregarded. His appearance and bearing on the witness stand do not impress one favorably.” The facts were found to sustain the claims of the Perseus as to her own navigation and freedom from fault.

The claim of the tug’s mate that the Perseus had directed her course to port across the channel was expressly rejected, and the finding made that the Perseus “was in her proper course at the time the alarm was given and west of the center of the channel.” This finding was based not alone upon the testimony of the master and other officers of the Perseus, but was corroborated by the testimony of the master of the Griffin, which was following the Perseus, and, as asserted, not more than half a mile behind her, watching her course, in connection with getting the range for steering his own vessel, and who testified that the course of the Perseus and her position at the time of the alarm was that claimed by the crew of the Perseus. Corroboration was also found in the testimony of the master of the Robinson, who met and passed the Perseus at about the time the tug gave the Perseus the port to port passing signal, afterward heard the alarm signals, and on looking back says he saw the Perseus, and that she was well to the westward of the center of the channel.

The judge expressed the opinion that the tug’s maneuver which brought the boats into collision could be accounted for only “on the assumption that the mate of the Smith, burdened with the duties of mas[636]*636ter, watch, and wheelsman,/was not observing either the position of his own vessel or of the Perseus, and on a sudden and hasty observation wholly misread the signals and misconstrued the situation,” and that the asserted-failure of the tug’s mate to hear the acceptance by the Perseus of the tug’s one-blast passing signal “is explainable only on the assumption that he is either not telling the truth, or was then paying no attention to what was happening.” The conclusion was reached that—

“In view of the maneuver made by the Smith a collision was then unavoidable, and no blame is to attach to the Perseus because of anything she did or failed to do after the Smith sounded her alarm.”

The tug was found at fault, sufficient to account for the collision, in failing to hear the one-blast response of the Perseus; not hearing it, in continuing to navigate thereafter on the assumption that a port to port passing agreement had been made; also in giving a cross-signal when the boats were but a few hundred feet apart, and executing it without waiting for response from the Perseus.

[1, 2] The conclusion of law that the Perseus was without fault is plainly justified, if the court’s conclusions on tire facts are to be accepted; and the rule is thoroughly settled that such conclusions of facts by a judge who personally saw and heard the witnesses, and thus had an 9Pportunity of weighing their intelligence and candor, must be accepted, unless the evidence decidedly preponderates against them. City of Cleveland v. Chisholm (C. C. A. 6) 90 Fed. 431, 434, 33 C. C. A. 157; Monongahela Co. v. Schinnerer (C. C. A. 6) 196 Fed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
272 F. 633, 1921 U.S. App. LEXIS 1661, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-fuel-supply-co-v-interlake-s-s-co-ca6-1921.