United Foundation Corp. v. United States

158 Ct. Cl. 41, 1962 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 178, 1962 WL 9331
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 18, 1962
DocketNo. 317-58
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 158 Ct. Cl. 41 (United Foundation Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United Foundation Corp. v. United States, 158 Ct. Cl. 41, 1962 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 178, 1962 WL 9331 (cc 1962).

Opinion

Laeamobe, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action, brought under a special jurisdictional statute, based on a contract for the installation of flood control conduits and sewers in Cumberland, Maryland. Plaintiff’s claim embraces seven different items, all basically involving extra work which it allegedly was required to perform, plus a claim for an additional period of time for contract completion.

The questions presented by each item of the claim are: (1) whether the record establishes that the adverse decisions of the head of the department on plaintiff’s claims were deprived of finality; (2) whether, regardless of the finality of the board’s decisions, the present record establishes that plaintiff was required to do work not called for by the com tract and specifications; (3) whether the record establishes that plaintiff’s delay in completion was excusable, so that liquidated damages assessed against it should be remitted.

Defendant contends that the decision of the Corps of Engineers Claims and Appeals Board, which was adverse to plaintiff on all of its claims, is final and conclusive. The argument of the Government is that under the so-called Wunderlich statute, 68 Stat. 81, plaintiff must allege and prove at least one of the statutory elements therein contained ; i.e., that the decision shall be final unless fraudulent, capricious, arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence. Volentine and Littleton v. United States, 136 Ct. Cl. 638; Fehlhaber Corporation v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 571 cert. denied 355 U.S. 877. With this argument we agree.

While the petition leaves something to be desired by way of specificity, the petition does allege, following a statement of plaintiff’s claims, that the decisions on each and every claim were- capricious, arbitrary, or so grossly erro[43]*43neous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or were not supported by substantial evidence. Since no attack was made on the petition, we regard the facts well pleaded.

Defendant then contends that in this case the plaintiff has failed to establish such factors; i.e., that the commissioner made no findings which expressly or by implication establish that the decision of the head of the department was fraudulent, capricious, arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence, and that plaintiff has not excepted to the report of the commissioner or requested the court to make such a finding.

Whether an ultimate finding in this regard is necessary, or indeed whether such a finding is propitious, has been the subject of much debate. The view is taken by some that such an ultimate finding is a conclusion of law which should be drawn from the general findings. Others take the position that such a finding is a mixed question of law and fact. Still others believe that the findings should in so many words show that the action was arbitrary, etc., before recovery can be had.

While there is much merit in each position, it is our judgment that the court must look to the findings and from them determine whether the decision of the head of the department was fraudulent, capricious, or arbitrary, or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, each item of the claim will be discussed separately in the order presented by the petition.

Item A is a controversy over whether some of the sheeting and shoring, which was classified by the contracting officer as type “B”, should be paid for at the unit price applicable to such sheeting and shoring; i.e., $0.30 per square foot. Plaintiff claims the payment should have been made under the price applicable to type “A”; i.e., $2 per square foot.

The two types are described in the specifications in the following terms:

(1) Type “A” shall be used at the locations indicated on the drawings where, in order to provide adequate protection, it is necessary to drive a continuous dia[44]*44phragm of timber or steel sheeting to the required depth in advance of excavation and to support such sheeting in place with waling, bracing, and shoring as the excavation progresses.
(2) Type aB” sheeting and shoring shall be used where and as determined by the Contracting Officer in lieu of Type “A” in all areas where no danger of sliding or caving in of the earth is anticipated during excavation operations. Type “B” sheeting and shoring shall be placed as the excavation progresses.

As can be observed, type “A” was to be used at locations indicated on the drawings, while type “B” was to be used where and as determined by the contracting officer. Type “A” was to be driven to the required depth in advance of excavation and supports placed as excavation progressed. Type “B” was to be placed as the excavation progressed. Type “A” was to be a continuous diaphragm of timber or steel sheeting, but the specification defining type “B” contains only the general requirement that all such sheeting and shoring shall be used in lieu of type “A” where, as determined by the contracting officer, there is no danger of sliding or caving of the earth during excavation operations.

Thus the contracting officer, not the contractor, was to determine which type was to be installed and, in addition, type “A” was to be driven in advance. As a matter of fact, the contracting officer at all times took the position that type “A” must be driven in advance and in such places as was indicated on the drawings.

There is no question from the facts in this case that the contractor determined that in certain locations there was danger of sliding and this determination was made after partial excavation by a backhoe. Having partially excavated, the contractor then drove sheeting and claims payment as type “A”. That this was not the province of the contractor is clear from the specifications.

In all locations where plaintiff, after partial excavation, drove sheeting and installed a continuous diaphragm, it was paid for as type “A”. It is those locations where, after excavation by the backhoe to a depth of 4 to 6 feet and sometimes deeper, plaintiff installed continuous sheeting, even though it never drove one foot, that the shoring was classified [45]*45and paid for as type “B”, for which plaintiff is claiming payment as type “A”.

As stated earlier, the defendant had the contractual right to specify the types of sheeting to be utilized and plaintiff had the duty to comply. So when the plaintiff did not drive the sheeting, for which a compensation is claimed, it is not entitled to payment for this type of sheeting. When the head of the department, following the dictates of the contract, found the above facts existed and ruled that payment would not be made on the basis of type “A”, such decision cannot be said to be arbitrary, capricious, or so grossly erroneous as to necessarily imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, plaintiff is not entitled to recover on this item of its claim.

Item B is for compensation in excess of the contract price of $3 per yard for some of its excavation. In the second part of this claim, plaintiff seeks compensation for excavation beyond the neat lines ordered.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
158 Ct. Cl. 41, 1962 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 178, 1962 WL 9331, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-foundation-corp-v-united-states-cc-1962.